AN

ENQUIRY

INTO THE

IDEAS

OF

SPACE, TIME, IMMENSITY, and ETERNITY, &c.

ERRATA in the INQUIRY.

Pag. 70. read as well as. p. 96. line ult. add p. 35. p. 109. l. 19. r. Chap. p. 129. l. 13. *dele* such.

ERRATA in the DISSERTATION.

Page 2. line 18. Part 1. Parts. p. 19. l. 1. *dele* in. *ibid.* Not. l. 11. 2. r. 870. *ibid.* l. ult. 3. r. 23. p. 22. l. 13. 1614. r. 1604. p. 21. l. 3. r. cannot. p. 26. l. 27. miscalling, r. calling. p. 42. Not. l. 8. intrinsece, r. intrinsece. *ibid.* l. 6. cognoscetur, r. cognoscatur. p. 35. Not. l. 7. intrinsece, r. intrinsece. *ibid.* l. 10. accedit, r. accidit. p. 37. Not. l. 3. adjuste, r. adjuste. p. 38. Not. l. 17. ei, r. ea. p. 56. l. 15. fresh, r. such. p. 77. l. 25. pia, r. pie. p. 93. l. 23. Ipsum, r. Ipsius. p. 98. l. 8. *before* not, r. implying.

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE IDEAS OF SPACE, TIME, IMMENSITY, and ETERNITY;

As also the

SELF-EXISTENCE, NECESSARY EXISTENCE, and UNITY of the DIVINE NATURE:

In ANSWER to a Book lately Publish'd by

Mr. *JACKSON*,

ENTITLED,

The Existence and Unity of God proved from his Nature and Attributes.

By *EDMUND LAW*, M. A.
FELLOW of *Christ-College* in CAMBRIDGE.

To which is added,

A DISSERTATION upon the Argument *a Priori* for proving the EXISTENCE of a FIRST CAUSE. By a Learned Hand.

CAMBRIDGE:

Printed by W. FENNER and R. BERESFORD, for W. THURLBOURN; and Sold by Meſſ. KNAPTON, INNYS and MANBY, C. RIVINGTON, S. BIRT, *London*; and S. HARDING, in *St. Martin's-Lane, Weſtminſter*. MDCCXXXIV.

AN ENQUIRY

Into our IDEAS of SPACE, TIME, IMMENSITY and ETERNITY, &c.

THE Ideas of *Space* and *Time*, and their *Infinity*, or the Ideas of *Immenſity* and *Eternity*, being made the Foundation of that which Dr. *Clarke* was pleas'd to call an Argument *a priori*, in his Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of God; and what he was always obliged to have recourſe to, as explanatory of his Notion of *abſolute Neceſſity*, in the ſeveral Uſes he was to make of it; *viz.* whether as antecedently *forcing itſelf upon us*, *i. e.* antecedently to our Suppoſition of the Exiſtence of any thing; or as an antecedent *Cauſe*, Ground or Reaſon of the Exiſtence, or as a *Mode* of the Exiſtence, or laſtly as a Cauſe

ſine qua non of the Exiſtence, of every thing: Theſe being, I ſay, the laſt Reſort on all Occaſions, and abſolutely neceſſary in the Doctor's Scheme; Mr. *Jackſon* likewiſe allowing them and the Arguments deduced from them to be of the greateſt Importance in the preſent Controverſy; * I think it the moſt natural Method to begin with ſettling and explaining theſe ſeveral Ideas, with examining what they are and how acquired; which ſeems to be the only ſure way to diſcover what they will infer, and of what Force all Arguments can be which are deduced from them.

AFTER this I ſhall conſider what Mr. *Jackſon* has any where objected either concerning the Nature and Qualities of theſe Ideas, or our manner of acquiring them; as well as the direct Arguments which he has offer'd in Support of his own way of conceiving them.

IN the next Place I will propoſe ſome more Arguments againſt his Notions of *Space*, *Time*, *Immenſity* and *Eternity*.

AND laſtly, I intend to examine the ſeveral Conſequences which he has drawn from them, with regard to the *Neceſſary Exiſtence*, *Infinity*, and *Unity* of God. 5 JY61

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* *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 43.

CHAP.

CHAP. I.

Of SPACE.

IN the first Place, with regard to the Idea of Space, 'tis confess'd that Men have some kind of Notions of it, otherwise there would never have been so many tedious Disputes about it: But then again these Notions have been so various and inconsistent, so roving and indeterminate, that from the very first Dawn of Philosophy to the present Time scarce two Authors of Note have entertain'd precisely the same Opinion concerning it. Some have been induced to think it a Substance, others a Property, others some middle thing between Substance and Property. It has been term'd a Mode of Existence, a Relation, a mere Possibility, Ponibility, *&c.* Some again have supposed it to be eternal, independent, infinite; others created, dependent, finite. Some have made it the very Substance of the Deity, others one of his Attributes; others an Attribute both of the divine Substance and Attributes; and others have gone so far as to conceive of it as of some Organ of the Deity, or as it were his *Sensorium*. Some make it the same with solid Matter; some suppose it to arise from the Absence of Matter, or to be mere Vacuity. Lastly, some imagine it to comprehend the Essences, and to be necessary to the Existence of all things whatsoever, and others contend that it is absolutely nothing. Ch. I.

Ch. I. Now the first Observation, which an indifferent Person would make concerning that remarkable variety of Sentiments upon the Subject before us, seems to be this, *viz.* That it can hardly be any fix'd, determinate Object in Nature, which suggests so many inconsistent Notions of itself; but rather one of the *Entia Rationis*, or an Ideal Image arbitrarily set up in the Mind, and that accordingly there may be as different Notions of it in the World, as there are different ways of forming or acquiring it. This, I say, seems to be the most obvious Thought on the first view of the Subject; but whether this be right or no, may need some farther Enquiry.

The Author of the Notes to A.Bp. *King* proposed a way of settling this Debate by examining the Nature and Properties of our abstract Ideas, in order to see whether Space, Duration, Immensity and Eternity were to be reckoned in that Class. Upon Enquiry it appear'd, that these had the same Properties with some other abstract Ideas, confessedly such; and might originally have been form'd in the same manner, tho' Custom has made them so familiar to us, that we may easily mistake them for natural. Of this I think no notice has been taken, except two or three superficial Glances, intimating that there is something more in *them* than in *some other* abstract Ideas, without directly affirming or denying that they are such; nor has the Account of abstract Ideas there given been either confuted, or attempted to be reconciled to the other Hypothesis.

As to *Space*, in particular, the Author of the Notes began with proposing three several Notions of it, all of them maintain'd by considerable Writers; *viz.* That it was either the mere Absence of Body; or its Extension in the Abstract; or an imaginary Substratum join'd to the general Idea of Ex-

Extenſion: on any of which Suppoſitions he ſhew'd it to be nothing real *ad extra*, nothing more than an Idea or Conception of the Mind (which was indeed pretty evident from that very diverſity of Opinions concerning it, as obſerv'd above) and conſequently that it could infer nothing more than a Power in us of framing ſuch Ideas: However, that on ſome of the foregoing Suppoſitions it could not be endowed with any poſitive *Property*, on all of them it was incapable of that poſitive *Infinity* which had been aſcribed to it by Dr. *Clarke* and his Followers. This was then judg'd ſufficient to overthrow all the Arguments built on the real Exiſtence of Space. To this ſeveral Objections have been made, and ſome new Arguments invented to ſupport the contrary Opinion, all which are judiciouſly collected and well urged by Mr. *Jackſon* in the Book before us, and ſhall be conſider'd in their Order. Ch. I.

He begins this Subject with the following Propoſition, which he takes to be an evident Truth,[a] *Whatſoever is poſſible in Idea, is poſſible in itſelf.*

I am ſorry to find that we are obliged to differ from this celebrated Writer, not only in the Subjects of Space and Time, but in the firſt Principles and Foundation of Knowledge, nay in our very Notion of *Knowledge* itſelf. He ſeems, by his following Arguments, to place it in a connection between Ideas and certain Ideata, or real Exiſtences; we, with Mr. *Locke*, muſt place it in perceiving a connection between our Ideas themſelves, and can carry it but a little way into real Exiſtence.[b] We are forced to ſuppoſe that many things may be in

[a] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 43.

[b] See *Locke* on Human Underſtanding, Book IV. Ch. vii. §. 7, &c.

their

Ch. I. their own Natures impoſſible, which, for want of knowing the whole of their reſpective Natures, we may conceive to be poſſible, and *vice verſa*: Which, as we apprehend, muſt unavoidably be the Caſe, except our Conceptions were an adequate meaſure of Things, and could reach all the Poſſibilities and Impoſſibilities in Nature.

'Tis granted, that where we have a clear intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two or more Ideas, there we have all the Evidence our Natures are capable of, and may be certain that theſe Ideas do really agree or diſagree; thus we come at all our general Knowledge; this is our only Criterion of Truth and Certainty: But then this Knowledge, Truth, and Certainty, reaches no farther than theſe Ideas themſelves, and their Relation to each other. It does indeed aſſure us, that if there are ſuch things as our Ideas repreſent, they muſt be likewiſe ſo related, and the ſame Conſequences will follow in Fact, that do in Theory: But it does not in like manner inform us that there really are or may be external things correſpondent to ſuch our Ideas; this can only be known from *Fact* and Experience, from their either being now, or having once been, immediately preſented to us. To prove therefore either the actual or poſſible Exiſtence of Things from the Conceptions which we have of them in our Minds, is, in my Opinion, ſetting up a falſe Standard of Truth; and this Author's Conſequence will not hold good, *viz.* that "That cannot be ne-"ceſſary *in ſe*, by virtue of any unknown Proper-"ties, which I can conceive poſſible not to be:"[c] If by conceiving he means only *imagining*; in which Senſe he muſt uſe that Word when he comes to apply it to the Exiſtence of Space and Time.

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[c] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 44.

NEITHER

Ch. I.

NEITHER do the Inſtances, which he brings to eſtabliſh this, come up to the point; *viz.* That we cannot conceive twice two not to be equal to four; or the Properties of a Square to be thoſe of a Triangle or Globe.[a] For here is a Connection between Idea and Idea. Twice two will be equal to four, or elſe it will be more or leſs than twice two, *i. e.* not twice two; which is a clear Contradiction. But is there the like Connection between ideal and real Exiſtence? Is Exiſtence *ad extra* as clearly implied in the Idea of Space, as four is implied in the Idea of twice two? Can I be as ſure of the Exiſtence of a Triangle, as I am of ſome of its Properties, *viz.* that its three Angles are equal to two right ones? Or do I as plainly perceive that there is a perfect Square or Globe in Nature, as that a Square is not a Globe?

HE adds, "The Fallacy we put upon ourſelves, I "imagine to be in this, that being totally ignorant "of many things, and uſing ourſelves to talk of "Words without diſtinctly knowing or conſidering "the Ideas which belong to them, or even fixing any "to them, we think that we can conceive things "*to be*, or *not to be*, as we pleaſe, and ſo that we "can conceive any Truth to be falſe, or any Falſe-"hood to be true, till it is actually proved to us "to be the one or the other; as if a Truth or "Falſhood was different when known, from what "it is when unknown."[b] I anſwer, it is very different with regard *to us*. In the former caſe our Conceptions are neceſſarily determined to one ſide; in the latter they are undetermined, and may be of either. And tho' we cannot in general conceive things to be or not to be, *as we pleaſe*, (of which

[a] Ibid. p. 454.

[b] Ibid.

more

Ch. I. more hereafter) yet we may imagine things, things whereof we have distinct Ideas, and which we do consider, to be very different from what they really are, till we have got *adequate* Ideas of them, and can clearly discover all their Relations. We may, as he has it in the next Page, conceive that which is an absolute Contradiction to be true, so long as we are not apprized of all the Circumstances, or do not perceive the Repugnancy of the several Ideas which we have of it, *i. e.* until we see that it is a Contradiction. Instances of this are frequent in all Arts and Sciences.

He subjoins,[f] "We cannot indeed always determine concerning necessary Truths and Falshoods, "because of our Ignorance of so many of them; but "to say that we can conceive things to be otherwise "than they *necessarily* are, is to determine that they "*may* be otherwise, which is a Contradiction." I reply, We cannot indeed conceive them to be only *possible*, when we do clearly perceive them to be *necessary*; we cannot believe them to be what they are not, when we actually know what they are: But while we want this clear Perception or Knowledge, we may, as was said before, suppose them to be very different from what they are in their own Natures; we may believe that to be necessary, which is barely possible, or contingent; and that to be possible, which is absolutely impossible; and therefore, 'till we have a clear Perception of the thing, we ought to *determine* nothing about it. A Man that neither understood Letters, nor had any Idea of Painting, would judge it impossible to make Sounds visible, or to represent a spherical Body on a plain Surface.[g] An Algebraist perceives that multiply-

[f] Ibid. p. 45.

[g] See *Philos. Transact.* N° 402. p. 442.

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ing Negatives into Negatives will produce an Affirmative; one that is ignorant of that Science will be apt to conceive the direct contrary. Many that know what a Cube is, will be inclined to think it a Contradiction for one Cube to perforate or be let through another of equal Dimensions; which yet is demonstrably true, and has been done in fact. Our Conceptions therefore ought not immediately to stand for the Measure of all Possibles, *&c.* And I should rather imagine the great Fallacy to be in this, that we too often mistake our Conceptions for the things themselves, and too hastily put an *Imagination* for *intuitive* Knowledge: And on this Fallacy, I think, is built, among others, the Author's following Corollary,[h] "That if we *clearly* "*perceive* and understand that there is *one* necessa- "rily existent Being, and can also conceive that "no more than one such *may* exist, it follows "thence that there *is but one* necessarily existent "Being; because it is before already proved, that "we cannot conceive any thing not to be, whose "Existence is necessary." To make which conclusive, he should have put *clearly perceive and understand* in both parts of the first Proposition; and at last, instead of *whose Existence is necessary*, he should have said, whose Existence is *perceived to be* necessary. This would have been very true, tho' not to his purpose. But as it is, the whole turns on the promiscuous Use of the Words *conceive* and *perceive*; it confounds Imagination with Knowledge, as abovesaid; and takes for granted that whatever we conceive, in the former Sense of that Word, is therefore real *ad extra*. Whether this be an *evident Truth*, or any Truth at all, we submit to the Judgment of the Reader. Ch. I.

[h] *Existence and Unity*, p. 46.

Ch. I.

I MUST beg leave here to take notice once more of the Quibble in these Words *possible, necessary, contingent*, &c.[l] which seems to run thro' all this Author's Reasoning. Possibility then is twofold, *relative* and *absolute*; a supposeable Possibility, or a Possibility *in us* to conceive any thing to be, the Existence of which implies no Contradiction to our Ideas; and a *real* Possibility in Nature, or a certain *Power* of bringing that thing into Existence: Which two are very different, and the latter does by no means follow from the former. The Reality of a *Power*, or an actual efficient Cause requisite to produce any thing, cannot be proved barely from the Existence of this thing being *possible* in the first Sense, or its implying no Contradiction to our Ideas that this thing should exist: And therefore the Consequence so often drawn from Possibility *in Idea*, or *quoad nos*, to Possibility *in se*, or *in rerum natura*, will never hold. The same may be observed of *Necessity*, *Contingency*, &c.[k]

THIS Author's second Proposition, relating to the Proof of a God from our *Idea* of one,[l] shall be more fully consider'd in another Place. To proceed,

'TIS granted farther, That an immediate Perception from without, implies the real Existence of something external, *i. e.* some Cause, Ground, or Occasion of it: (tho' that Occasion very often bears no kind of Resemblance to it[m]) But then

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[l] *Existence and Unity*, p. 45.

[k] See this at large in *Collibet*'s *Impartial Inquiry*, p. 173, 174, and p. 177, 178, &c. Conf. Note 11. to *King*, p. 54, &c. second Edition.

[l] *Existence and Unity*, p. 46, 47.

[m] See *Locke* on Human Understanding, Book II. cap. viii. §. 2.

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this Evidence reaches no farther than that immediate Perception; it holds no longer than whilst the Mind is paſſive in receiving the Impreſſion: As ſoon as ever it begins to reflect and operate on this Perception, to alter, enlarge, and modify it anew, it then becomes properly the Work and Fiction of the Mind, and, as there view'd, neither has, nor ever had, any proper Archetype or objective Reality. Ch. I.

THUS is the Caſe of all our abſtract Ideas; and thus in the Inſtance before us. The Idea of Space, if taken from a Portion of real Extenſion, it has ſo far an external Ideatum as that Extenſion reaches; we are ſure of an objective Reality ſo far as our Senſes inform us concerning real Extenſion, or rather extended things; and may conceive our Idea of Extenſion to have a *poſſible* Archetype ſo long as ever we can enlarge it in our Mind: But that Archetype will then only be an imaginary one, not founded in the nature of things, tho' we may become inur'd to it by degrees, till we cannot get it out of our Heads again: Cuſtom may render it ſo familiar to us, that we ſhall at length miſtake this Imagination for an Appearance of Nature; and, like that too, it will *force* itſelf upon us whether we will or no. Nay, we may carry it beyond Nature, and form an Imagination which neither has, nor had, nor ever can have, an objective Reality. We may ſet up an Idea, which *Reaſon* (or other Ideas) will ſhew us to be an abſurd one, or inconſiſtent with the nature of things. And this I take to be the Caſe, when we ſtrive to enlarge this ſame Idea of Extenſion to *abſolute Infinity*, and ſuppoſe it already ſo great, that it is not capable of being made any greater, or what we call Space actually infinite: Whereas every thing *actually infinite*, or ſuch Infinity as may be applied to real Exiſtence, is confeſſedly *incapable* of

Ch. I. any Increaſe; and that which conſiſts of *Parts*, as all Extenſion is likewiſe acknowledged to do (nay, which is the very Meaning of the Word Extenſion, as is well obſerved by the ingenious Author of Dr. *Clarke*'s Notion of Space examined [n]) muſt evidently admit of a *perpetual Increaſe*: Which is an expreſs Contradiction.

THE ſame has happen'd in our Ideas of *Duration*, and of the *Diviſibility* of Matter, and likewiſe of *Number*, for the very ſame Reaſon, ſince Number is the Meaſure of all the others; and, properly ſpeaking, 'tis not their Infinity, but that of Number only, which the Mind contemplates when aſcribed to theſe, or any other kinds of *Quantity*, as Mr. *Locke* obſerves [o]. That great Maſter of Reaſoning thought [p] "it would be hard to find any "one ſo abſurd as to ſay he has the poſitive Idea "of an actual infinite Number, the Infinity whereof "lies only in a Power ſtill of adding any Combi-"nation of Units to any former Number, and that "as long and as much as one will; the like alſo "being in the Infinity of Space and Duration, which "Power leaves always to the Mind room for end-"leſs Additions: Yet (adds he) there be thoſe "who imagine they have *poſitive* Ideas of *infinite* "Duration and and Space. It would, I think, be "enough to deſtroy any ſuch poſitive Idea of In-"finite, to ask him that has it, whether he could "add to it or no."

THUS far Mr. *Locke*; who, were he now alive, would find himſelf miſtaken in his firſt Conjecture. He might eaſily meet with thoſe who maintain the poſitive Infinity of *Number*, among their other In-

[n] Pag. 126.

[o] Book II. chap. xvi. §. 8. and chap. xvii. §. 10.

[p] Chap. xvii. §. 13.

finites;

finites; and indeed they have equal Reaſon for it, as was obſerved above. Ch. I.

Mr. *Jackſon* declares peremptorily, that "it is "a great Error——to think there is *no Number*, "or *no Space* or *Duration* ſo great but a greater "may be conceived. Theſe are," continues he, "in their nature actually and poſitively *infinite*, "incapable even in Idea of *Increaſeableneſs*; which "ſhews——that the Infinity of them is an *abſolute*, "*poſitive* and perfect Infinity, or that to which no-"thing can be added." [q]

A Number infinite! A Space and Duration incapable of Increaſe, *even in Idea!* What can be ſaid to one who really conceives the Poſſibility of all this? For my own part, I muſt deſpair of ever conceiving it, or of convincing thoſe that think they do; and can only deſire all ſuch ſeriouſly to peruſe the latter part of Mr. *Locke*'s Chapter of Infinity [r]; and with regard to *an infinite Number* in particular, I muſt, with that excellent Author, think *it enough to deſtroy any ſuch poſitive Idea, to ask him that has it* a ſhort Queſtion of the ſame kind, *viz.* Whether this infinite Number be *Even* or *Odd*?

If Mr. *Jackſon* means here that Number in general, or what the Schools call *Numerus numerans*, is incapable of Increaſe (which his Words will by no means bear) this indeed is ſo far true, that if we ſuppoſe it poſitively infinite, we cannot conceive it to be any larger; but then 'tis manifeſtly beg-

[q] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 87.

[r] "To have actually in the Mind the Idea of a Space infinite, "is to ſuppoſe the Mind already paſs'd over, and actually to "have a view of all thoſe repeated Ideas of Space, which an "endleſs Repetition can never totally repreſent to it; which "carries in it a plain contradiction. *Locke on Human Underſtanding*, Book II. Chap. xvii. §. 7.

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ging the Queſtion, and taking it for granted that there can be any ſuch Infinite in a Thing the very Nature and Eſſence whereof demonſtrates the contrary [f].

But to return to the Idea of Space. The Author of the Notes to A. Bp. *King* [t] mention'd this among ſome other abſtract Ideas, and endeavour'd to ſhew how he might poſſibly acquire it, *viz.* by taking the property of Extenſion ſeparate from all particular extended things, and thereby rendering it *general*, and then by the Addition of an unknown *Subſtratum*, making it become *independent*, and applying it as a common *Meaſure* for all particular things, as well as a *Receptacle* to contain them. An eminent Writer, to whom whom we are obliged for this account, and whom Mr. *Jackſon* is not unacquainted with, explains it in the following manner.

'A Man having got the Idea of a Room, di-
'ſtinguiſh'd into ſeveral Parts, Ranges and Claſſes,
'and filled with variety of Things, lodges the Idea
'in his Memory, and can by the help of Imagi-
'nation revive the Idea when he pleaſes, and con-
'ceive it as diſtinctly, only more faintly, as if the
'Things were before his Eyes. He can conceive
'the ſeveral Things removed out and in, or ima-
'gine them differently placed, or ranged with
'great variety, while the Room itſelf continues
'fix'd and immutable, independent of the Things
'contain'd in it, and unconcerned in their Mo-
'tions. Now take but away the Idea of Solidity,
'and retain the Idea of the Diſtances, Range, and
'Order of the Things in the Room, and then a-

[f] See *Collibet*'s Impartial Enquiry, Book II. chap. ii. Or *Sherlock* on the Trinity, p. 77.

[t] V. 1. p. 6. IId Edit.

'riſes

'riſes the Idea of *Space* containing the Things in 'the ſame Order as the *material* Room before. 'Thus the Idea is transfer'd from *real* to *imagi-* 'nary Place, by a Fiction of the Mind, of great 'uſe for conceiving and retaining the diſtinct Or- 'der of Things: And there's no more Difficulty 'in imagining this, than there is in my imagining 'the Paper whereon I write to be annihilated, and 'yet the Letters drawn on it to keep the ſame 'Order and Diſtances as before. Thus the Idea 'of *real Locality* is transfer'd to an imaginary Sub- 'ject, and the Ideas of *Continuing*, *Fixedneſs*, and '*Independency* go along with it. And becauſe it 'is apply'd to all Exiſtences, in the ſame manner 'as the other is to ſome, therefore it is conceiv'd 'abſolutely independent of any thing: And there's 'no more Myſtery in it, than in my conceiving the 'Claſſes and Shelves of my Study to be independ- 'ent of the Books they contain; to be antecedent 'in conception to the placing of the Books, and 'to continue if the Books be removed. All the 'Difference is, that the Claſſes and Shelves in 'Space are purely *imaginary*, which ſerve as well 'as *real*, for fixing the Order of Things in the 'Mind, and the Books contained are the Books 'of Nature, if I may ſo ſpeak, all Subſtances what- 'ever. Uſe and Cuſtom fixes this Idea in our 'Minds till it grows in a manner natural to us, 'and it ſerves to all the intents and purpoſes of 'Speech, as well as if there were ſomething more 'than *mere Fiction in it.*

Ch. I.

'THUS Space, which, as a *common Meaſure*, 'is conceiv'd capable of being enlarged to Infinity, 'is, as a *common Receptacle*, conceiv'd to have 'that Infinity *independently*, *neceſſarily* and *unal-* 'terably. And to this it is owing that we not 'only conceive that it *may be* infinite, but that it 'muſt be ſo too, inaſmuch as it is conceiv'd, in

" the

Ch. I. 'the whole and in every Part, antecedently independent on any thing."

THUS far this judicious Writer: To whose Account I ſhall take the liberty to add that of Dr. *Watts*. [v] "Sometimes the Soul dwelling in "animal Nature, and under the power of Imagination, miſtakes a *ſubſtantial Being* for *mere Nothing*, and ſometimes it miſtakes *Nothing* for a "*ſubſtantial Being*: And indeed this is the very "firſt way whereby Men gain the Idea of *Space*.— "We ſee a Room which is full of Light and Air, "which are real *Bodies* or *Subſtances*, and we imagine there is *nothing* in it, and then we call this "nothing *void*, or *empty Space*, and fancy this "empty *Space* to be broad, and long, and deep, "to reach from Wall to Wall, and from the Floor "to the Ceiling: Thence comes our firſt Conception of *Space*, with its Properties of Length, "Breadth and Depth; and thus it is uſher'd into "our Minds at firſt by a groſs Miſtake of Light "and Air, which are *ſomething*, for meer *nothing*. "Then our Imagination changes the Scene, and "turns this *nothing* into *ſomething* again, by leaving out the Idea of *void* or *emptineſs*, giving it a "poſitive Name, and calling it *Space*."

This excellent Author has a good many Obſervations which make the foregoing Account more than probable, to which I refer the Reader; and ſhall only beg leave to obſerve here, that whether any of theſe Accounts ſuit exactly with the Ideas which *all* Men have of Space, and fully deſcribe the manner of their acquiring them, or not; whether Men firſt get their Idea of it from a full Room or one imagin'd to be empty; from perceiving the abſence of ſolid Matter, and *feeling* the difference

[v] Philoſophical Eſſays, p. 24.

between

between Reſiſtance and No-reſiſtance; or from the Extenſion of material Things abſtracted from its proper Subjects, and enlarged in the Mind: Whether they acquire it from Sight or Touch, or join the report of both Senſes together: Whether they add a Subſtratum to it, or no; In which ſoever of theſe ways, I ſay, the generality of Mankind acquire this Idea, (as in truth they have many ways of coming at ſuch Notions as are of their own collecting) or whether or no we could ſhew any way of their acquiring it, it would ſtill be indifferent to the main Diſpute about the reality of its Object. We put the Aſſerters of ſuch a reality on proving ſome Exiſtence correſpondent to the generally received Ideas of *Space*, which they can never do, ſo long as theſe Ideas may poſſibly be acquired in any of the ſeveral Methods aſſigned: And we make no farther Uſe of theſe or the like Accounts, than to ſhew that there's no abſolute Neceſſity for aſcribing this ſo various an Idea to Nature, or admitting all the Conſequences drawn from thence. Ch. I.

HOWEVER we ſhall proceed to conſider the ſeveral Arguments or Inſinuations which Mr. *Jackſon* has any where dropp'd againſt the foregoing Accounts.

AND firſt of our *making* the Idea of Space. * "That which hath given the Author of the Notes, "and other thinking Perſons, a wrong Notion "of this Matter is, that becauſe they get the "Ideas of Time and Space, Eternity and Immenſity, from outward, viſible, and material Beings, "form them by Degrees, and abſtract them from "thence in their Minds, they are apt to think "them to be mere abſtract Ideas *of their own mak-*

* *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 51.

Ch. I. "*ing*, and to refer them only to theſe outward "things. But this is plainly a Miſtake. For the "Ideas of Time and Space are quite different "from the Idea of any viſible or material Be-"ings."

I ANSWER. We do not ſuppoſe theſe Ideas to be *wholly* of our own making, but to have an original Foundation in ſome outward Things, and afterwards to be carry'd on beyond thoſe Things which at firſt occaſion'd them, and referred to every Thing in Nature, to a great many Things to which they neither do, nor can bear any natural Relation.

THE Idea of Space, in particular, may have taken its firſt Riſe from real Length, Breadth and Depth, or from Extenſion, a Property of material Beings; it may be grounded on ſome real Subſtance, Mode or Property, as all abſtract Ideas are; but when it is once ſeparated from the Subſtance or Properties with which it was join'd in Nature, it then becomes a mere *Ens rationis* or *abſtract* Idea, and *ſo far* 'tis of our own making, and we may, if we pleaſe, refer it to Spirits, of which it is not a Property, and call them long, broad, and deep. By this means indeed it will become *quite different*, as he ſays, from the Idea of any viſible, material Being, but then it will be quite fictitious alſo.

WHETHER it be merely *by Accident*, that we form the Idea of Space from the Obſervation of *extended Things*, as he objects [1], will depend upon the ſort of Idea that we have of it; which, in ſome, may perhaps be only that of a mere *Void*, or no Reſiſtance, as obſerv'd above: But this will be more fully conſidered hereafter. I ſhall only take

[1] Pag. 68. and 74.

notice here that his Argument, for our having the ſame Idea of Space, tho' we did not perceive any thing extended, ſeems to be a very odd one. "If "all things, ſays he, appear'd to us in *Points*, "without any viſible *Extenſion*, the Idea of Space "would ſtill be the ſame, and have the ſame Di- "menſions that we now obſerve amongſt extended "Things exiſting in Space[a]." Ch. I. §. 3

Anſw. THE juxta-poſition of theſe Points would be the very Idea of Extenſion, and imaginary Lines drawn from each of theſe Points to other Points, would produce imaginary Dimenſions alſo; ſo that by this Suppoſition we ſhould be juſt where we are. He adds, "Suppoſe all the Matter in the "World annihilated, and an intelligent *finite* Spi- "rit to exiſt, this Spirit could not but be conſcious "to itſelf, or perceive that it was *finite*, and that "ſomething really exiſted without it: And ſup- "poſing it to *move* every way, it would have the "Idea of Space in all Dimenſions"[a]. Here again while this Author is propoſing to *exclude all extended Things*, he muſt ſuppoſe this very Spirit to be extended, elſe what can he mean by the Word *finite?* Finite, in the proper Senſe, is *limited*, and Limits or Limiters have nothing to do where there is no *Extenſion*. But ſuppoſing this intelligent Spirit to be finite or extended in a certain determinate, limited manner; yet where's the Conſequence, *viz.* that therefore ſomething really exiſts *without it?* His Reaſon, I fancy, is becauſe there muſt be ſomething to ſet *Bounds* to it. But Dr. *Clarke* would tell us, that it is *only terminated by its own Dimenſions*[b]. And therefore, tho' by

[a] Pag. 68.
[a] Ibid.
[b] IVth Letter to *Leibnitz*. §. 8. p. 127.

Ch. I. the Supposition (as has been observ'd) it may require Extension *within*, yet it requires none *without*[c].

Lastly, SUPPOSE the Case truly put, and I dare affirm it will make against our Author. If there was nothing in Nature but pure Spirits, or immaterial Beings, they would, as far as we can see, have no Perception at all of Space; at least, it cannot be proved that they would have any, till it be made appear either that they are extended themselves, or have some kind of relation to Extension; which, I think, Mr. *Jackson* has not directly attempted to shew.

THE supposed *Motion* of this intelligent Spirit will be consider'd in another Place.

AS will also this Author's following Assertion[d], that the Idea of Space "is a *simple* one, as much "a simple one as any other Idea can be." In the same place he grants very justly, that "we cannot "conceive it to be without Parts:" But answers, "It is not merely a Composition of Parts, but a "Composition of various and separable Parts or "Ideas, that makes up complex Ideas."

We reply: All Parts as such, or of what kind soever, make our Ideas not strictly *simple*, but *compound* (which is the same as *complex* in Mr.

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c "'Tis humbly conceiv'd the *Ends* of Things are absolute or "independent on their being bounded or encompass'd by any "thing without them; being in reality nothing distinct from "the Things themselves. For what is it to have Ends, but to "have Extremities? If it was not so, then the immediate Rea-"son of a Thing's being finite would be no other than the "Neighbourhood of the surrounding Beings. But who will "assert the Air or the Divine Substance itself (considered as ab-"stracted from the Divine Power) to be the immediate Reason "that the Globe of the Earth is of a finite Extension?" *Collier's Impartial Enquiry*, p. 151. See also, p. 152, 153.

d Pag. 51.

Locke's

Locke's Language, as will appear below) and in the present Case the addition of a *Substratum*, which enters into the generally receiv'd Idea of Space[e], makes it properly *complex*. That the common Idea of Space includes something more than bare Extension, appears from hence, that we generally say *Space is extended*, which would be Nonsense to affirm of Extension itself: If therefore we should allow *pure Extension* to be a *simple* Idea (which will be more fully examin'd hereafter) it does not follow that *Space* must be one too, since they are evidently not the same Ideas. Ch. I. §§

He adds[f] "Nor can they (the Ideas of Time "and Space) be mere *Relations* of Matter, because "their Existence has no Dependence on the Ex- "istence of Matter, and they may be conceiv'd to "exist, if no Matter at all existed." I deny the Consequence. Tho' their present Existence, or the Form in which we now conceive them, has no Dependence on the Existence of Matter (and is for that very Reason merely ideal) yet their original Being was derived from thence, as is fully shewn by Mr. *Locke*[g]. The ground of these two Ideas could be nothing more than certain Relations between external Things; and consequently the Ideas themselves once were *relative* ones, tho' we can easily carry them (not by Reason and Proof, but by the Power of Imagination) far beyond their original Ideata, one into Time before the Worlds, the other into *Extra-mundane* Space. Nay, we can change their very Natures, and from relative Ideas turn them into absolute; from finite and dependent, make them become indefinite and inde-

[e] See *Watts Essay* I. §. 3. p. 7, 8.

[f] *Existence and Unity*, p. 52.

[g] *Hum. Und.* Book II. Ch. xiii. and xiv.

pendent;

Ch. I. pendent; we can apply Extenſion where there is nothing to be extended, and Duration where there is nothing to endure, and call the one Immenſity, the other Eternity. It does not then appear but that theſe might originally have been mere Relations of Matter, or taken their Riſe from thence, tho' the Relation be ſince dropt out of our Minds, and we can now conceive them without the Exiſtence of Matter "Whether Space be only a Re-"lation reſulting from the Exiſtence of other Be-"ings at a Diſtance," Mr. *Locke* will not determine [h]. *Leibnitz*'s Notion of its being *the Relation of one Thing to another, ariſing from their reſpective Order and Situation*, is well explain'd in his fifth Letter to Dr. *Clarke*, §. 47. to which I apprehend the Doctor has given but a very inſufficient Anſwer.

The foregoing Argument is repeated by Mr. *Jackſon* upon ſeveral occaſions, particularly againſt another Notion of Space which has been advanced, *viz.* that it is the *Abſence* or Privation of Matter. "It is farther evident, ſays he, that the Idea of "Space is not the Idea of the privation of Matter,— "becauſe we have as clear and perfect an Idea of "it excited in us where Matter is preſent, as "where it is abſent." [i]

As Space is conceiv'd to be pure *Vacuum*, a Notion which I believe the generality of Mankind are content with, the Idea of it can only be excited in us by the abſence or removal of Solidity, or by the difference which we find between the preſence and abſence of ſolid Matter, and our comparing them together: By conſidering how we are affected when we feel ſomething that reſiſts the

[h] Book II. chap. xiii. §. 27.

[i] Pag. 66.

Motion

Motion of our Bodies, and when we do not; or by obſerving the preſence of ſuch Objects as have made (and we thence conclude will make) ſuch Reſiſtance to us, or not perceiving any ſuch Objects; from whence we judge that we ſhall meet with no ſuch Reſiſtance: By which means we get the Idea of Space both from *Sight* and *Touch*, as Mr. *Locke* obſerves [k]. But if the ſame Objects were always preſented to us, and we alike affected by them, I don't ſee how we cou'd have a clear and perfect Idea of Space, or any Idea of it at all, excited in us. Indeed when we have once got this Idea from the ſame Things not being always preſent, or from the difference obſerv'd between their Preſence and Abſence, we may alter and new modify it, as in the former Caſe. We may transfer it, if we pleaſe, to very different Things from thoſe which firſt occaſion'd it; Things directly oppoſite to, and inconſiſtent with it. We may apply it to immaterial, cogitative Beings, which are of a quite diſparate kind, or even connect it with *ſolid Extenſion*, which is the very reverſe. We may ſay, as this Author does [l], that this Space *penetrates* all Matter; or with the ſame Reaſon affirm, that all Matter penetrates Space. We may divide this Vacuum into *Places*, and give it the Property of *receiving Bodies*, and with like Reaſon aſcribe to Bodies the Property of occupying or receiving it: Whereas in truth theſe neither penetrate nor receive, but rather *nullify* each other, as is obſerv'd by Dr. *Watts* [m]. "It is a very improper thing to "ſay *Space penetrates Body or Matter*, for we "might as well ſay, *Light penetrates Shadow*,

Ch. I.

[k] Book II. chap. iv.

[l] Pag. 53.

[m] *Eſſays*, p. 33.

"whereas

"whereas in truth where Light comes Shadow "ceaſes, and is no more, for Light excludes it. "May it not be as natural and juſt therefore to "ſuppoſe that Space can never penetrate Matter, "but that whereſoever Matter is, there Space is "not? Doth not Space vaniſh or ceaſe utterly "when and where Body comes? I am ſure *empty* "*Space* ceaſes, and I know of no Space but *empty* "*Space.*"

SEE alſo Dr. *Clarke*'s Notion of Space examin'd, p. 28. But more of this when we come to Mr. *Jackſon*'s Argument for the reality of Space from its having *real Properties.*

HIS next Objection is to the Idea of Space as ariſing from the Extenſion of Bodies *abſtracted* by the Mind.

"THIS Author thinks that if there is but "*real Extenſion in Bodies*, and any real *Continuance* "as of our own Exiſtence, and of the Exiſtence of "other Things, theſe are ſufficient to account for "the Idea of Space and Time without any other "external objective Reality of them. He might "as well and as reaſonably argue, that becauſe we "get the Idea of the Exiſtence of God from the "Exiſtence of *outward*, *ſenſible* and *finite* Things, "therefore they are abſtract Ideas of them [n]."

Anſw. WE apprehend the two Caſes to be very different. The Idea of God is form'd by Reaſon and an Exiſtence conformable to it proved in this manner: We behold a regular Syſtem of Things in the Univerſe, which implies *Wiſdom*, and Wiſdom requires ſome Subject to which it may belong, diſtinct from the Things themſelves: Hence we infer a wiſe Being who made and conſtituted

[n] Pag. 66, 67.

theſe

theſe things. Or thus, We obſerve Degrees of Wiſdom and Intelligence in the Creatures, which require ſome Cauſe, and which is therefore communicated by, and conſequently inherent in the Creator; who muſt therefore be in a higher Degree wiſe and intelligent. But can we argue in like manner from our Idea of extended Things to the Exiſtence of Space? We obſerve Extenſion in Body, or particular Bodies extended; this Extenſion we ſeparate in Idea from their other Properties, and enlarge in our own Minds: But ſtill we leave its firſt Ideatum where we found it, *i. e.* in the particular Bodies. Does it therefore follow that there is really *another Ideatum* correſpondent to our Idea of Extenſion thus alter'd and enlarg'd? Or does *this* our Idea of Extenſion *depend on the Exiſtence of other Things* and require an external Cauſe, in the ſame manner as thoſe Properties of Intelligence, *&c.* which we find in the Creatures? Or, laſtly, can it *infer an Ideatum*, as he urges below [o], equal to it, in the ſame Senſe, and with the ſame Evidence, as Effects infer an equal Cauſe? Till theſe Particulars be reconciled, the Parallel will not hold; neither can we, I humbly apprehend, argue quite as reaſonably for the Exiſtence of *Space*, as for that of God. Ch. I.

HE objects [p] againſt the Poſſibility of our having an Idea of Space infinite and independent from the Extenſion of finite Things. "The Idea of the "*Independency* and *neceſſary Infinity* of Space, the "Author of the Notes would account for, by ſup- "poſing the *Extenſion* of Bodies, or various ex- "tended Things to be taken apart from *Solidity*, "and by Abſtraction made a general Idea to com-

[o] Ibid.

[p] Pag. 73.

Ch. I. "prehend all particular Extenſions; and which may
Sect. "be amplify'd every way *in infinitum*, and ſerve
"(by adding an imaginary *Subſtratum* to it) both
"as a common *Meaſure* and a common *Receptacle*
"for all Bodies. But in Anſwer: If the Idea of
"Space was nothing but the Idea of *Diſtances* and
"*Order* of ſenſible extended Things *abſtracted* from
"Solidity, then it would follow, that the Idea of
"Space wou'd infer it to be naturally no *larger* or
"more *neceſſary* than the Things themſelves; and
"the Mind by taking away in Idea the Exiſtence
"of the extended Things, cou'd conceive Space
"actually not to exiſt."

IN this Anſwer here are three different Notions of Space jumbled together, *viz.* that of mere *Diſtance*, that of the *Order* or *Relation* of Things co-exiſting, and that of *Extenſion in the Abſtract*. The two former are perhaps no more neceſſary than the Things themſelves; *i. e.* Take away the Things and their reſpective Order and Diſtance, as well as the Meaſure whereby we computed that Order and Diſtance, may ceaſe and be extinct. The Idea of Space in theſe two Senſes may be neither abſolutely neceſſary, infinite, nor independent: But in the third Senſe of that Word, which Mr. *Jackſon* was here only to conſider, the Idea of it is carry'd far beyond the Exiſtence of Things, and continued even when all Things elſe are ſuppoſed not to exiſt. It is as large as we are pleas'd to make it, and may be increaſed in the Mind ſo long as we can add one part of Extenſion to another, or have the Power of counting, which we find we always have, and therefore we can never be obliged to ſtop, nay rather we muſt always go on; which I think ſufficiently accounts for the *Neceſſity* this Author mentions. The negative Infinity therefore, or rather Indefiniteneſs, of this Idea follows of courſe, not from the Nature of the Things from whence

whence it was at firſt deriv'd, for then indeed it could not go beyond them; but from the nature of the human Mind, which when it is once ſet on work, wants no Pattern to work by, neither requires any external Archetypes agreeable to its Operations, but goes on uniformly without regard to the different Forms and Manners in which outward Things exiſt. Ch. I.

THAT the Mind has ſuch a Power of ſeparating the Modes and Properties of Things from their proper Subjects and conſidering them at large, is evident from a thouſand Inſtances [q]. But all theſe Modes and Properties, when ſo abſtracted, immediately become *independent*; they are conſider'd by way of Subſtances, (which is the reaſon that in every Language they are expreſs'd by *Subſtantives*) and do not ſtand in need of their former Concretes: They have another and more comprehenſive Subject aſcribed to them; and, as this Author ſays of Space and Duration [r], *they tranſcend the Cauſe which produced them.* They are apply'd as common Meaſures to all Particulars of their kind, and are conceiv'd to ſubſiſt of themſelves when theſe Particulars are removed. Thus Whiteneſs, Hardneſs, Number, Quantity, *&c.* are conceiv'd as diſtinct from the particular Things that are white, hard, *&c.* and comprehend them all. The Caſe is the ſame in moſt other abſtract Ideas.

MR. *Jackſon* adds [s], "As to ſolving the Inde-
"pendency of Space by applying it to the Exiſt-
"ence of all extended Things, apply Solidity, Fi-
"gure and Motion to all Exiſtences of extended

[q] See *Locke* on *Hum. Und.* Book II. chap. ii. §. 9. or Book iii. chap. iii.

[r] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 67.

[s] Pag. 75.

Ch. I. "and ſenſible Things, and try whether that makes "us neceſſarily conceive them (even by ever ſo "long thinking upon it) to be independent of any "Thing."

Anſw. THE Independency of Space does not ariſe from our *applying it to* the Exiſtence of all extended Things, but rather the contrary; 'tis made by our *ſeparating* the Idea of Extenſion *from* all particular Things, and carrying it on in our Minds indefinitely; by our deſtroying the Relation which it had to them and rendering it abſolute; which Idea then becomes independent, and may afterwards be again apply'd to particular Things, thoſe from whence it was at firſt taken, or others, or all: Or it may be conſider'd without regard to any, as obſerv'd above. It becomes alſo indefinite, or what is commonly call'd *infinite*, and for the ſame Reaſon that you add to it at all, you may go on perpetually adding, and can find nothing to induce you ever to ſtop. But of this alſo before, and I'm ſorry we are obliged ſo often to repeat theſe things.

THE ſame has happen'd in the Idea of *Solidity*, which (tho' our Author will not allow it that Privilege, yet) often has, and is ſtill by many conceiv'd to be neceſſary, independent, infinite, and every way commenſurate to the common Idea of Space. An *Ariſtotelian* would contend for the Neceſſity of his *firſt Matter*, and tell us he could not poſſibly conceive it away, even by ever ſo long thinking on it. A *Carteſian* or *Spinoziſt* will bring the very ſame Arguments for the neceſſary Exiſtence of ſolid Matter, that Mr. *Jackſon* does for empty Space: And perhaps moſt of us might have had the ſame Notions of its *Infinity* at this day, had not Fact inform'd us of the contrary, and ſome late Experiments convinced us of a *Vacuum*, or that Matter is every way limited. His two other Inſtances

Inſtances of *Figure* and *Motion* are by no means parallel, ſince the very Idea of theſe implies Finiteneſs, and therefore they cannot, by his own Principles, be either neceſſary or independent. Ch. I.

He proceeds, "Therefore nothing can be weaker "than that Solution, unleſs it be the Pretence of "*Uſe* and *Cuſtom*. But Uſe and Cuſtom cannot "make one Idea more neceſſary than another, when "both are equally natural and familiar."

I answer, 1. There are no Ideas ſo familiar to us as thoſe of Extenſion and Duration, which are ſuggeſted by, and taken up to meaſure every thing we meet with. *Where* and *when*, as Mr *Locke* obſerves[t], are Queſtions belonging to all finite Exiſtences, which cannot be ſaid of any other of our Ideas.

2. By this Author's allowing ſo little to the Power of *Cuſtom* in making things appear natural which have no real Foundation in Nature, one would imagine he had never thoroughly conſider'd Mr. *Locke*'s Chapter on *Aſſociations*, at leaſt, not taken it in its due Extent. There we find Inſtances of the Force of Cuſtom and Imagination full as ſurpriſing as the Caſe before us. To mention but one. *Spirit* ſeems to me to have no more Connection with *Darkneſs*, than with *Space*; nor can it, I believe, be ever prov'd from Principles of Reaſon to bear any Relation to either; and yet we find that all theſe three are firmly join'd together in ſome Mens Minds, and 'tis beyond the Power of Argument to ſeparate them.

When the Caſe is particular, and relates only to ſome few Things and Perſons, we readily aſcribe it to a wrong Aſſociation of Ideas, or believe it to be the Effect of a diſorder'd Imagination. I don't

[t] Book II. chap. xv. §. 8.

doubt

doubt but we ſhould find many general ones no leſs ſo, if we took the ſame Liberty in examining them. But ſome of theſe are more eaſily broken than others: Some we are much leſs inclined to examine than others, ſuch as have been a long time embraced by us, have enter'd into all our Schemes, and bear a conſiderable part in our Syſtem of Knowledge: On which account we are ready to cry out, that undermining theſe is ſubverting the Foundations of Knowledge itſelf, that 'tis denying the Veracity of our Faculties, and deſtroying *all Evidence, Truth and Certainty.* By this means it is that we often find Ideas *ruſhing into our Minds whether we will or no* [v], and *forcing* themſelves upon us on many occaſions where they have properly no buſineſs. The Imagination is haunted with ſuch troubleſome Gueſts as cannot be diſmiſs'd of a ſudden, and it would be to as little purpoſe to argue with one in ſuch Circumſtances, as to reaſon with a Man that ſees Spectres or imagines himſelf poſſeſs'd.

UPON the whole, 'tis a very falſe Poſition which this Author lays down [x], "That if the Imagination make a Thing, it can with the ſame "Eaſe unmake or annihilate it." Fact and Experience declare the contrary, and aſſure us that it is with an unruly Imagination, even among Philoſophers, as the Vulgar ſuppoſe it to be with Conjurers; they often raiſe a Spirit which they cannot lay again.

BUT he goes on [y]: "Are not *Solidity* and *Co-*"*lour* as natural and familiar Ideas, as Space is? "and yet as we can enlarge in Idea Solidity and

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[v] Pag. 154.
[x] Ibid.
[y] Pag. 75.

"*Colour*

" *Colour* without Bounds" [the latter we cannot. See *Locke*, Book. II. Chap xvii. §. 6.] " ſo we can " in Idea ſet Bounds to them or annihilate them." [the former a *Carteſian*, &c. cannot. See above.] " And the Reaſon plainly is, becauſe in their Na- " ture they are actually capable of either: But " when we think on *Space*,——we not only con- " ceive it capable of being enlarged to Infinity, " but cannot but conceive it to be *actually Infinite*. " And the Reaſon certainly is, becauſe in its real " exiſtent Nature it is *neceſſarily infinite*."

Ch. I.

THAT the Ideas of Space and Time are eſſentially incapable of an *actual* or *poſitive Infinite*; that nothing which has Quantity, or conſiſts of Parts in any Senſe, can be conceiv'd to reach abſolute Infinity, without an expreſs Contradiction, has been already ſhewn [a], and will be conſider'd farther when we come to the Ideas of *Eternity* and *Immenſity*. As to the *Impoſſibility of ſetting Bounds* to the Ideas of Space and Duration, which this Author frequently inſiſts upon, (and which if it were proved, would only ſhew them to be indefinite and always increaſable, contrary to his Scheme) I beg leave to diſtinguiſh between Ideas of *Imagination* and Ideas of *Intellect*; in the former Senſe we can and do ſet Bounds to Space, tho' not in the latter.

WE can conceive or *imagine* a certain Quantity of Space, or a limited Duration, as eaſily as we can form an Imagination of a Mathematical Sphere or Cylinder of given Dimenſions, or of a Line or a Body diviſible into a given Number of Parts [b]: Or I ſhould rather ſay, whenever we frame in our Imagination an Idea of Space or Time, we *cannot*

[a] See the 3d Note to A.Bp. *King*, p. 15, 16, 17. 2d Ed.

[b] See *Collier*, p. 151.

but

Ch. I. *but* conceive them to be limited; just as when we imagine a Body actually divided, we cannot but *conceive* it divided into a certain number of Parts, tho' at the same time we know 'tis divisible *in Infinitum*. In this Sense therefore our Ideas of Space, or any other Quantity, must have Bounds; and 'tis so far from being true that we cannot but conceive them to be *actually infinite*, that we cannot but *conceive* the direct contrary.

But in another Sense (which this Author might perhaps intend tho' he used the Word *conceive*) they have no Bounds, *viz.* as they are Ideas of pure *Intellect*. When we try them by abstract Reason, we cannot but perceive that Number is increaseable without End; that Space and Duration are in like manner capable of being enlarged without Bounds or Measure; and the Reason is, because abstract Number and abstract Quantity are adequate to every *Thing* that can be number'd or measured; or because nothing can exhaust them. And this very thing demonstrates that they are nothing but Ideas of pure Intellect, and have no regard to the Existence of any external Object, and that therefore to limit them is to destroy one of our Faculties, *viz.* that of numbering, as was shewn from the excellent Writer cited in *Note* 3.[b] and referr'd to above. 'Twould be to deny that we have the Power of repeating the same Idea, or of adding one of our own Ideas to another, while we find we actually have it. The Reason then of their Indefiniteness is with me, not "because in their real existent "Natures they are necessarily infinite," but quite the reverse, *viz.* because they have no *real existent Nature* at all. If this Account be not satisfactory to our Author, I must refer him to the Force of

[b] IId Edit.

Association

Association intimated above. Or laſtly, if he pleaſes, I will own to him, that I know not the Reaſon why we cannot ſet Bounds to ſome of our Ideas, *viz.* thoſe of *Quantity*, every way conſider'd: (which at the ſame Time, and for the ſame Reaſon, we perceive to be in their own Natures incapable of an abſolute, poſitive, or what I call *Metaphyſical*, Infinite) and why we can bound others, *v. g.* thoſe of all *Qualities*: (which yet are the only ones capable of a poſitive infinite *Perfection*, or abſolutely higheſt *Degree*.) But then I muſt deſire to have it remember'd, that the Ideas of both theſe ſorts may for all this be only Ideas ſtill; and that their being or not being capable of either kind of Infinity does by no means ſhew them to have correſponding Archetypes, or any real Archetypes at all. This remains to be proved as much as ever. Ch. I.

I SHALL therefore, in the next Place, proceed to our Authors direct Arguments for the *real Exiſtence* of Space: The firſt of which is this.

" THE Ideas of Space and Time are *ſimple* " Ideas;

" THEREFORE they have their objective *Re-* " *alities*;

" THEREFORE Space and Time are *real*.]

A SIMPLE Idea in the proper Senſe, *i. e.* in that which proves an *objective Reality*, is, according to Mr. *Locke*, [c] " in it ſelf *uncompounded*, and con- " tains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance " or Conception of the Mind, and is not diſtin- " guiſhable into *different* Ideas." He might have added, " or *more* Ideas," in conformity to his ge-

[c] Book II. chap. ii. §. 1.

neral Scheme, tho' I ſuppoſe he meant the ſame here. Of theſe ſimple Ideas he affirms that they have ſome external *Cauſe*, tho' it is often very different from them: [d] That they are not always exactly the Reſemblances of ſomething inherent in the Subject; moſt of thoſe of Senſation being in the Mind no more the Likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the Names that ſtand for them are the Likeneſs of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us. [e] But then, as the Mind is wholly paſſive in the Reception of all theſe, ſo it exerts ſeveral Acts of its own whereby other Ideas are framed. [f] Theſe Acts of the Mind are chiefly three. 1. Combining ſeveral ſimple Ideas into one compound one; thus all *complex* Ideas are made. 2. Bringing two Ideas, whether ſimple or complex, together, and ſetting them by one another, ſo as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which it gets all its Ideas of *Relations*. The 3d is, Separating them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real Exiſtence: This is called Abſtraction; and thus all its *general* Ideas are made [g].

ALL Ideas formed in any of the three Ways abovementioned, Mr. *Locke* calls *complex* Ideas; which he divides again into three ſorts: *Modes*, *Subſtances*, and *Relations*. [h] Modes are either *ſimple* or *mix'd*. The former being only different Combinations of the ſame Idea; as a Dozen, a

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[d] Ch. viii. §. 1, 2.

[e] §. 7.

[f] Ch. xii. §. 1.

[g] Book II. ch. xii. §. 1. Compare ch. xi. §. 9.

[h] §. 3, 4.

Score,

Score, &c.[j] and in the Parts of *Space*, an Inch, an Ell, &c.[j] But both theſe are in Mr. *Locke*'s Senſe *complex Ideas*, and expreſsly ſo denominated, as well in his general Diviſion abovementioned, as in Ch. xi. §. 6, &c. More particularly, Ch. xv. §. 9. and in the Note annexed, he ſtiles the Ideas of *Space or Extenſion and Duration*, COMPLEX MODES. 'Tis true, as this Author obſerves[k], he allows that Space and Duration *may have a Place amongſt* our ſimple Ideas; but I muſt beg leave alſo to obſerve, that this is contrary both to his Definition and Diviſion laid down above, and that the Reaſon here aſſign'd is quite foreign, *viz.* becauſe the Parts whereof they are compounded are of the *ſame kind*;[l] which would indeed intitle them to a Place among *ſimple Modes*, but can by no means make them *ſimple Ideas*, according to Mr. *Locke*'s Scheme. Nay, the Reaſon, which immediately follows, will ſhew us that we can have *no* ſimple Idea of them, or any of their Parts. "'Tis the very Nature of them (ſays Mr. *Locke*) "to conſiſt of Parts;" and in the following Note, "Their Eſſence conſiſts in having Parts of the ſame "kind, and you can never come to a Part entirely "exempted from all Compoſition." I add, and therefore we can never come at a ſimple Idea in them: We can never ſo much as imagine a *Minimum*, or abſolutely leaſt Part, ſince they are eſſentially diviſible *in infinitum*. Every Idea then of Extenſion, which, according to Mr. *Locke*, conſiſts in having *Partes extra Partes*,[m] is ſo far from be-

[j] Ibid.

[k] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 63.

[l] Note to §. 9.

[m] Note ibid.

Ch. I. ing a ſimple Idea, that, properly ſpeaking, it includes Three diſtinct Ideas; Two, *viz.* of the *two Parts*, and a third of their *Relation*, denoted by the Term *extra*. This *third* indeed, or that which Mr. *Locke* calls, The Idea of *having Partes extra Partes*, cannot, as he obſerves [n], be reſolved into other Ideas. But this will do our Author no Service, ſince it is merely *relative*, and as ſuch can imply no Ideatum; all relative Ideas ariſing not from the Nature of the Subject itſelf, but going *beyond* it, and to ſomething *diſtinct* from it, as Mr. *Locke* juſtly obſerves [o]. They are Compariſons made only by Mens Thoughts, and are Ideas only in Mens Minds, [p] and of conſequence neither have, nor can be ſuppoſed to have, any external Archetypes, as will be evident to ſuch as ſhall reflect a little upon the Nature of *relative* Ideas, or conſult Mr. *Locke* upon the Subject; B. II. Ch. xxv.

If, to avoid this Conſequence, Mr. *Jackſon* have recourſe to a *mathematical Point*, and inſiſt upon that being a ſimple Idea; we anſwer, ſuch a Point is ſtrictly no *Quantity*, but only the beginning of Quantity, or rather an intermediate Idea between Quantity and no Quantity, and therefore it can have nothing to do either with Body or Space. There is properly no one ſuch Point in Space (ſuppoſing it to be any thing real) becauſe every Part of it is made up of others, as every Part of Body is made up of Particles; and therefore we cannot argue from Mathematical Points, which are only abſtract Ideas, to thoſe of Space, which are ſuppoſed to be real, phyſical Points, or

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[n] Ibid.

[o] Book II. ch. xxv. §. 1, & 10.

[p] Ch. xxviii. §. 19.

elſe

elſe there is nothing in the Argument drawn from them.

FROM what has been ſaid, I think it appears, that Extenſion is not, and much leſs Space, a *ſimple Idea*, in any proper Senſe, however not in ſuch as muſt infer an objective Reality; and to uſe it in any other (*v. g.* in that of the Author, of Procedure, Extent, &c. [q]) is nothing to the purpoſe: By this means a *Man* or a *Houſe* may become ſimple Ideas, becauſe they cannot be divided into *more* Men or Houſes (as the ſame Author argues) and by the ſame way of Reaſoning *Noah*'s Ark, or the whole Univerſe, may be a ſimple Idea. And indeed all theſe ſeem to have as good a Title to Simplicity as *Space* and *Time*. The Parts of each are alike innumerable; the *Uniformneſs* and *Continuity* of thoſe of the two latter (which this Author urges [r]) will make them not equally *mixt* indeed (if we ſet aſide the Notion of their *Subſtratum*) but no leſs *compounded* or *complex* than the former.

As to what farther regards Mr. *Locke*'s Opinion, we have ſeen that by his Definition, and the general Diviſion of his Book, theſe are not ſimple Ideas; but, being deſirous to reduce them as near as poſſible to that Claſs, he adds, [s] "That the "leaſt Portion of Space or Extenſion, whereof we "have a clear and diſtinct Idea, may perhaps be "the fitteſt to be conſidered by us *as a* ſimple "Idea of that kind, out of which our *complex* "*Modes* of Space and Extenſion are made up." But this will not much mend the Matter, ſince it is impoſſible to come at any abſolutely leaſt Portions

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[q] Ch. v. p. 100.

[r] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 63.

[s] Note to ch. xv. §. 9.

of

of them, as was obſerved above. In the laſt place, Mr. *Locke* ſeems to give up the Point, and ſpeaks of this ſame Space as not exactly agreeing with his Diſtribution of Ideas, but thinks it better to leave it where it is, than to make a new Diviſion in its favour [x].

It does not therefore yet appear that we are *obliged*, either from Mr. *Locke*'s Authority, or any Reaſon offer'd by this Author, to allow the Ideas of Space and Time to be *ſimple* ones.

But, *ſecondly*, granting that they are ſuch, yet it will never follow that they have *objective Realities*, in this Author's Senſe, but only ſomething or other without, or ſome difference in external things, which may occaſion them. It has been obſerv'd [z] from Mr. *Locke*, that bare *Privations* in the Subject are often ſufficient to occaſion poſitive Ideas in our Mind, and Inſtances given in Darkneſs, Silence, &c. Mr. *Jackſon* replies, [y] "Here it is to "be obſerv'd that Mr. *Locke* ſpeaks doubtfully, and "ſays *perhaps* the Cauſes which produce them are "barely Privations. Strictly ſpeaking, a Privation, "which is *Nothing*, can be no Cauſe of, or pro-"duce any Idea."

I Answer: If Mr. *Locke* were doubtful, yet the Reaſon which he aſſigns, and which this Author will not find it eaſy to confute, ſhews ſufficiently that mere Privations may cauſe poſitive Ideas, *viz.* by an Abatement of ſome former Motion in the animal Spirits, or in thoſe Organs of the Body, of what kind ſoever they be, which ſerve to convey

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[z] Ibid.

[y] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 64.

[x] *Note* the 3d to *King*, p. 10. 2d Edit. and *Poſtſcript* p. 17. 8vo.

[y] Pag. 65.

Ideas,

Ideas, and which convey them only by different modes of Motion. Mr. *Locke* adds [a] "I appeal to every one's own Experience whether the Shadow "of a Man, tho' it consists of nothing but the ab- "sence of Light (and the more the Absence of "Light is, the more discernible is the Shadow) "does not, when a Man looks on it, cause as clear "and positive an Idea in his Mind, as a Man him- "self, tho' cover'd over with clear Sunshine? And "the Picture of a Shadow is a positive thing." See also §. 8.

THERE are then *Ideas*, in Mr. *Locke*'s Sense of that Word, real and positive ones, originally occasion'd by what he justly calls Privations in the Subject. The immediate Causes of them may be a Cessation or Abatement of Motion in the Organs of the Body, and this Cessation or Abatement of Motion may arise from mere Defect, from the ab- sence or withdrawing of the moving Power, and consequently these Ideas are in one Sense *produced by nothing*.

MR. *Jackson* adds [b], "The Truth is, it is the "real Subject, which, as by being present, it caus- "ed one sort of Idea, so, by being absent, it caus- "ed another. We could never have had the Idea "of Darkness, if Light had never been, nor of "Blackness, if there had been no Colour. So that "Light by having been present, and then being "absent, is the Cause of the Idea of Darkness and "Blackness. But these are not Ideas in Mr. *Locke*'s "Sense of Ideas, but only Names expressing the "Absence of Ideas."

WHETHER these be positive Ideas or not, or any Ideas at all, must be determin'd by every Man's

[a] Book II. chap. viii. § 5.

[b] Pag. 65.

own

Ch. I. own Perception. Mr. *Locke*'s Opinion of them has been given above. As to this Author's Account, tho' in different Words, and design'd to give a different Turn to the Argument, yet it really leaves it where it was. For what, I pray, is any Thing's being the Cauſe of an Idea *by its Abſence*, or by its *being abſent*, but a mere Privation? Where's the difference between an Idea proceeding from the abſence of a real Subject, and one proceeding from no real Subject? When Mr. *Locke* ſays it will be hard to determine whether the Ideas above-mention'd ariſe from bare Privations, he is not doubtful whether the outward Occaſions of them be Privations or no; he was ſo far vers'd in the Elements of Natural Philoſophy, as to make it impoſſible for him to diſpute whether Black, Darkneſs, *&c.* were real Properties of any external Object? However, we know better now a-days than to doubt of it. But that which Mr. *Locke*, according to his uſual Modeſty, would not determine, was (as he immediately adds) whether "Reſt be any more a "Privation than Motion:" That is, the Reſt or Motion in thoſe Organs of the Body which are the immediate Conveyers of all our Ideas. Whether this Reſt, I ſay, or Ceſſation of Motion, were not as poſitive as the Motion itſelf, was the only Point which Mr. *Locke* thought hard to determine. He cou'd never doubt whether the Preſence or Action of any external Object was requiſite to produce this ſame *Reſt* in the Organs of the Body and that *Idea* in the Mind which is conſequent upon it; and which is not properly cauſed *by* this Reſt, Abſence or Privation, but rather depends on that Union of the Soul and Body, whereby 'tis order'd that all ſuch Abſence of any thing which did once affect the latter, ſhould be perceiv'd or taken notice of by the former; or that the Soul ſhou'd have a Conſciouſneſs, or *poſitive Idea* of it, in

Mr.

Mr. *Locke*'s Senſe, nay, in any Senſe of theſe Words: For, ſtrictly ſpeaking, every Idea *as ſuch*, or as it is a *Perception in the Mind*, muſt neceſſarily be poſitive, a negative Perception being really the ſame as no Perception at all. Ch. I.

WELL then, I think, we may ſafely conclude that there are Ideas without correſpondent Ideata, or, properly ſpeaking, any Ideata; *the Abſence of Light*, according to this Author, and Ceſſation of Sound, being all that is neceſſary from without to occaſion the Perception, Conſciouſneſs, or whatever we call it, in us, of Darkneſs and Silence. And that we really have Ideas affixed to both theſe Words, is full as clear as that we have a Meaning to the Word Space. I'm ſure I find myſelf apt to conceive of both theſe as of ſomething, 'till better informed by Philoſophy (and that not from the *Words*,[b] but the Ideas which I really have of them) in the ſame manner as I do of Space, and therefore have the very ſame Right to term that Word *a Negation of certain Ideas*, which any one has to give that Title to the others.

GRANTING then (which I apprehend cannot with Reaſon be denied) that we have *Ideas* of theſe two ſomewhats ſignified by the Words Darkneſs and Silence, and finding at the ſame time that theſe imaginary ſomewhats are really nothing *ad extra*; we have an Inſtance of what the Defenders of Dr. *Clarke* eſteem ſo very unaccountable, *viz. Two nothings which yet have ſomething to diſtinguiſh them*; a mere ideal Difference, or a Difference in theſe two Ideas, being enough to conſtitute a Diſtinction between them, as is obſerved elſewhere.

[b] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 66.

Ch. I. AGAIN, as the Difference between Light and Darkneſs conſiſts in the Preſence or Abſence of a luminous Body, without ſuppoſing the latter to be ſome *thing* or poſitive Cauſe, which would be a Contradiction: So the Difference between *two Bodies touching or not touching* (another famous Topic amongſt them) may with like Reaſon be placed in their Preſence to, or Abſence from each other, without ſuppoſing any Thing, Quality, &c. *between* them, to conſtitute their *Diſtance*; or any thing more than an Idea to make it capable of being conſider'd apart from the Bodies themſelves.

AT the Concluſion of this Argument Mr. *Jackſon* ſeems to change the State of the Queſtion in theſe Words: "So it is ſtill to be diſproved, that "any *ſimple* Idea would *ever have been* in the Mind, "if there was not ſomething *poſitive* without to "cauſe it." [c] This we grant in one Senſe, *viz.* That perhaps it cannot be proved (nor does the proving part belong to us) that there would have been any Ideas in the Mind, had there not been ſomething or other without, to give the Mind ſome original Perception, and firſt ſet it on work. But when this is once begun, it may be ſhewn that a perpetual Train of Ideas will ſucceed of courſe, will ariſe from and be propagated out of each other, the Abſence or Abatement of one begetting another diſtinct from it, and ſo on *in infinitum*. Thus the firſt Ideas we got, ſuch as of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkneſs, Motion and Reſt, as well as the general Ideas of Pleaſure and Pain accompanying any of them, were mutually related, and rais'd each other; the abſence or ceaſing of Pleaſure being ſome degree of Pain, and *vice verſa*: By which means we may conceive the Soul to have always

[c] Pag. 66.

had

had Ideas from its first beginning to think. But this by the bye. Ch. I.

Allowing therefore that something positive without might be necessary to *begin* any of these or the like Ideas, yet this will do our Author no service, since the same Ideas may be *continued* without the Existence of the same Objects, and new ones, and *simple* ones too, produced by the Abatement or Alteration of the Force impressed, or even by the Absence or Inaction of these Objects, as well as by their actual Presence and Operation. 'Tis no Consequence, that because something was necessary to give the Mind its first simple Ideas, or to put it on thinking at all, that therefore the Presence of this or the like real thing must still be necessary to the Continuance of its Thought, or to its having any other simple Ideas; or that it cannot take occasion to frame to itself simple Ideas, even from its wanting those Objects, or comparing the Difference between its having and not having them, or its having more or less of them. The new Modification of any Idea becomes a new one, according to Mr. *Locke*; and reflecting upon the Operations of the Mind about our simple Ideas will produce other simple ones, according to the same Author.

But I am afraid we have been too tedious on this Point, and shall therefore beg leave to dismiss it with an Observation of the judicious *Crousaz*.[a] "The Logicians have almost to a "Man laid it down as an important Maxim, or a "Paradox, that there is no Error in *simple Per-* "*ceptions*. But this Remark to me seems founded "on an Equivocation, and, when rightly explain'd, "falls to nothing. It is an Error when we con- "ceive things to be otherwise than what they really

[a] *New Art of Thinking*, Vol. I. p. 13. Eng. Edit.

are. If then, by means of an erroneous Idea, "we imagine an Object which that Idea ought regularly to repreſent, whereas in truth no ſuch "Object is really *exiſting*, I cannot ſee why we "muſt not be ſaid to have formed a falſe Idea. "—— Our Error conſiſts not in forming the Idea, "but in applying it, and taking it for what it is "not: in ſuppoſing it to repreſent an Object which "it really does not repreſent."

Mr. *Jackſon*'s ſecond Argument is this:

"THE Ideas of Space and Time *force* their "their actual Exiſtence upon us;

"THEREFORE the Exiſtence of them is *poſitive* "and *neceſſary*."

WHICH he propoſes more fully in the Words of Dr. *Clarke*. "If we have in our Minds the Idea "of a thing, and cannot poſſibly in our Imagina- "tions take away the Idea of that thing as actually "exiſting, any more than we can change or take "take away the Idea of the Equality of twice Two "to Four, the certainty of the Exiſtence of that "thing is the ſame, and ſtands on the ſame Found- "ation as the certainty of the other Relation," 'and this in fact is the Caſe with us in reſpect of 'the Ideas of Time and Space.'[g]

I HAVE in a good meaſure obviated this Argument and the Illuſtration of it already, particularly in Anſwer to p. 45. and ſhall therefore diſpatch it more briefly. *Firſt* then, we deny that the Ideas of Space and Time neceſſarily force themſelves upon us, ſince we can, and muſt conſider all im-

[g] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 69.

material

material Beings without the former [f], and the Deity, as existing alone, or before all Creation, without the latter [g]. Ch. I.

2*dly*, In any Idea of Space force itself on the generality of Mankind, 'tis not this Author's Idea, but that of mere *Emptiness*, as Dr. *Watts* has justly observ'd [h].

3*dly*, It has been shewn that the Consequence is not good from Ideas in our Minds to things without; or that our Conception of a thing, *as actually existing*, will not of itself prove that thing actually to exist. I add, there are other Ideas which equally *force* themselves on some Minds, and are as impossible to be removed as Space and Time, which yet are evidently abstract Ideas and nothing more; such as Fate, Nature, Fortune, Order, Chance: To which we may add Necessity, Truth, Motion, Rest, *&c.*

4*thly*, SUPPOSING our Imagination in this Case to be very strongly connected with the Notion of their actual Existence (which has been already accounted for) yet it has been likewise observ'd that this falls short of the Point; since a Connection of Ideas may be either *natural or acquired*; either a necessary, rational one, which produces real Knowledge; or an accidental, absurd one, commonly known by the Name of *Association*. The Question will be, to which of the two does this belong? Wherever there is the former kind of Connection, it may be made appear, and the contrary Supposition reduced to an express Contra-

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[f] See *Note* the 7th to *King*, p. 345. 2d Edit. and Dr. *Watts* on the Locality and *Whereness* of Spirits, *Essay* 6. *Sect.* 2, 3, 4, 5. and *Essay* 1. p. 17.

[g] *Remark* c. p. 68, *&c.* 2d Edit.

[h] *Essays*, p. 31, 32.

diction;

diction; as was obſerv'd in the Connection between the Ideas of twice Two and Four and that of Equality: And if the Connection between the Idea of Space and that of real Exiſtence were of the ſame kind, ſure it might be made out with the ſame Evidence, and all Oppugners of it as eaſily reduced to an apparent Self-contradiction.

If it were either ſelf-evident or capable of clear Proof, one would think the World ſhould be as much agreed about it, after ſo many elaborate Arguments for and Explications of it, as they are about the Equality of twice Two to Four.

This Mr. *Jackſon* will not affirm; and, till this happen, I muſt beg leave to doubt whether its *Certainty ſtands upon the ſame Foundation* as that of the other.

Indeed Dr. *Clarke* in another Paſſage cited by this Author [i] has endeavour'd to fix ſome Contradictions on thoſe who deny the Reality of Space; but they are ſuch as evidently beg the Queſtion, and ſuppoſe that we allow it to be ſomething real at the ſame time that we declare the contrary. Thus he proves that Bounds cannot be apply'd to it [k]: "To ſet Bounds to Space is to ſuppoſe it "bounded by ſomething which itſelf takes up Space, "and that's a Contradiction."

Anſw. 'Tis no Contradiction maintain'd by us, who ſay that Space, according to our Notion of it, has nothing at all to do with Bounds and Bounders, any more than Abſence, Emptineſs, or any abſtract Ideas have [l]. He adds, "Or elſe that it is "bounded by *Nothing*, and then the Idea of that

[i] Pag. 70.

[k] Ibid.

[l] *Note* the 3d to *King*, p. 12, 13. 2d Edit.

"*Nothing*

"*Nothing* will ſtill be *Space*." Allow'd, ſay we, becauſe that *Space* is *Nothing*. Again; "Nothing "cannot have real Qualities[m]." Agreed: Nor do we allow any of the ſuppoſed Properties of Space to be *real*; of which under the next Argument.

THE *Heap of Contradictions* which Mr. *Jackſon* has compiled[n] depend in like manner on a Suppoſition that we either do, or ought to maintain the Reality of *abſolute Place* and *abſolute Motion*, which we think we have good Reaſon to diſcard, as will appear under his Fifth and Seventh Arguments. As to Mr. *Locke*'s Judgment alledg'd here by this Author, we have ſhewn in the Caſe of Number, that his Notion of the Infinity of Space and Time was only *negative*, and ſo far from forcing us to believe them really infinite, in the proper Senſe of that Word, that it demonſtrates the Impoſſibility of ever conceiving them to be poſitively infinite: their Infinity, as he tells us, lying only in a Power of adding to them as long and as much as one will. Book II. chap. 17. §. 13, *&c.*

THO' it were a ſufficient Anſwer to this Argument drawn from the Idea of Space *forcing* itſelf upon us, to deny the Fact, ſince we are not obliged to prove the Negative; yet we ſhall advance a ſtep farther, and endeavour to ſhew that the Idea is not really natural and neceſſary, but acquired, and owing rather to Habit than any unavoidable Report of Senſe. *Diſtance* between Objects is, according to Mr. *Jackſon*, *real Space* one way conſider'd, and which therefore ought to *ruſh into* our Minds as neceſſarily as the Ideas of external Objects, whenever our Eyes are open. But of this we have naturally no Idea, and require a good

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[m] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 70.

[n] Pag. 71, 72.

deal

Ch. I. deal of time to learn it; as appears from the known Experiment of a Gentleman brought to Sight by Mr. *Cheſelden*, who for ſome time could not help imagining that every thing was immediately contiguous to him [o]. Nor, *2dly*, When we have once got an Idea of Diſtance, can we ever have any fix'd natural way of meaſuring it, or come at any tolerable Certainty in judging of its Parts: No Rules in Optics can determine it, as apears from the beſt Writers on that Subject, who are forced to reſolve all into Habit, Prejudice, and the like [p]. The thing is ſtill more evident in Perſons loſing or diſordering one of their Eyes, who have then very different Ideas of Diſtances from what they had before, as Mr. *Boyle* informs us [q]. The like may be obſerved by any one upon cloſing one of his Eyes for ſome time, or viewing an Object with his Head in a very inclined Poſture.

How far theſe Caſes will affect our Author's Argument I leave to be conſider'd; and paſs on to his Third Proof.

"SPACE and Time have *real Properties*;
"THEREFORE they are *real*."

THIS he ſupports by an *Aſſertion* [r], "Space "is not only conceiv'd, but is *neceſſarily* conceiv'd

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[o] *Philoſophical Tranſactions*, N°. 40. §. 7. p. 448. "When "he firſt ſaw he was ſo far from making any judgment about "Diſtances, that he thought all Objects *touch'd his Eyes* (as he "expreſs'd it) as what he felt did his Skin." The ſame Account may be met with at the end of *Cheſelden's Anatomy*, 2d Edit. or in Dr. *Smith's Opticks*, Book I. chap. v. p. 43.

[p] See Dr. *Smith*, *ibid.* p. 46, 49, 58, &c.

[q] Some uncommon Obſervations about vitiated Sight, p. 256, &c.

[r] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 77.

"to

"to have *Dimenſions*, or to be Quantity indued "with Dimenſions; this Author cannot conceive "otherwiſe; which makes a wide Difference be- "tween Space and abſtract Ideas, which are merely "the Work of the Mind, and exiſt no where elſe." Ch. I.

'Tis true, when we have the Idea of Space in our Minds we cannot but have that of Dimenſions, becauſe we make it the Standard and Meaſure of all Dimenſions, as obſerv'd above; or rather it is nothing but Dimenſions; but whether theſe Dimenſions be any thing more than ideal ones, ſtill wants Proof. Mathematicians are uſed to conceive certain Lines, Surfaces, and Solids (each of which is very *different* from the other, and has different *Properties*) which ſerve their Purpoſe full as well as if they were *real*; but theſe they know are mere abſtract Ideas, and have no proper Exiſtence any where but in their own Heads. Tho' by this Author's way of arguing they might all be proved to exiſt *ad extra*: Nor is Space really any thing elſe but a *Mathematical Solid* [t]. We have mention'd other abſtract Ideas which many Perſons cannot conceive otherwiſe than as *real Entities*, but which Philoſophy enables us to get rid of; tho', if we are not aware, it may in its turn impoſe ſome upon us which the generality of Mankind would never have dreamt on. I grant that *infinite Weight* [v] is as great an Abſurdity as our Author pleaſes, but, as we conſider it *in the Abſtract*, 'tis equally capable of an unlimited Increaſe, and might, I think, as well be maintain'd as infinite Length, Breadth, and Depth; and as he is able to ſuppoſe *a Number ſo great that a greater cannot be conceiv'd* [x], as alſo

[t] See *Note* the 6th to *King*, p. 26, 27. 2d Edit.

[v] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 78.

[x] Pag. 87.

Ch. I. *an abſolute, poſitive, and perfect Infinity of Space and Duration* [y], I don't ſee why he may not go on and ſuppoſe the ſame in *Weight*, *Denſity*, and every abſtract Idea which is conſider'd by way of Quantity, or conſiſts of Parts.

His next Proof of a real Property of Space is by a *Suppoſition* that the *Diſtance* between two Bodies is ſomething real. "I am conſidering why "I cannot ſhake Hands with the Man in the Moon, "and my Reaſon tells me, the Cauſe is becauſe "there is a vaſt real Diſtance or Space between "us, which exceeds the Extenſion of my Arm; "and that I can conceive and be certain that if this "Space was really away, or not between us, that "I could touch the Moon." This is the ſame with the ſixth Argument, or that of the two Walls above-mention'd.

To the firſt Part I reply with the ingenious Author of Dr. *Clarke*'s Notion of Space examin'd [z], That there's a difference between Things touching and not touching, and that pure Space, without ſuppoſing it to be any Thing really exiſting, is ſufficient to conſtitute this Difference, or to give us an Idea of Things being diſtant: An imaginary Line between any two Bodies will hinder our conceiving them to be contiguous as much as a real one. Wherever any two Bodies do not touch, there we may conceive a Poſſibility for a Line of a certain Length to be put between them: Where they do touch, we cannot place a Line between them even in Imagination: but ſtill the Poſſibility of ſuppoſing any ſuch Line is not the *Cauſe* why theſe Bodies do not really touch, nor is their not touching any more a Proof that there's ſome real

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[y] Ibid.

[z] Pag. 37.

Thing

Thing or Property *between* them (call it Space, Distance, or what you please) than that there's a real Line or Surface between them. Nor, lastly, can this same Space or Distance, supposed to be between them, any more prevent their touching than a mere *Possibility* can; or, as Dr. *Clarke* somewhere has it, than *an abstract Notion can kick a Foot-ball.* Ch. I. § 2.

SUPPOSE then the Space away between me and the Man in the Moon, and in its stead conceive mere Absence of Matter, Emptiness or Void; yet how shall we be any thing nearer shaking Hands for all this? And will you say that Absence, Emptiness or Void prevents it? The Ocean divides *Africa* and *America*; suppose this Ocean, and every thing else between the two Continents, annihilated, would this bring the Continents together? Or would their respective Order and Position be a whit altered by this? The Annihilation of every thing between them is surely not the same Idea as their touching one another, nor do these two Ideas necessarily infer each other; and of consequence this Author's second Proposition, implied above and afterwards insisted on, *viz.* That if there be nothing between two things, they must therefore touch; is as groundless as the first; and this, like his other Argument, takes for granted the very thing in question.

I SHALL beg leave to subjoin the Testimony of Dr. *Watts*, in answer to the foregoing Objection. [a] "May it not be answered by a round Denial of "this Proposition, *If there be nothing between them, "then they touch, or are close together?* Why may "not two Bodies be created or placed at twenty "Miles distance, and yet nothing but Emptiness,

[a] *Essays*, pag. 39.

"i. e. no real Being, between them? However "harsh and uncouth it may sound to learned Ears "that these *two Bodies are twenty Miles asunder, "and they do not touch tho' there be nothing be-"tween them*, yet the vulgar World, who very "much determine the common Sense of Words, "will allow this Language to be good: For they "generally suppose Space to be *Emptiness*, that is, "to be *nothing*. And if the Learned are offended "with this Language, 'tis because they have, of "late Years at least, run into this Supposition, that "Space is a *real something*; and 'tis merely their "own espoused Opinion that makes this Expression "offensive to them, which the vulgar part of Man-"kind approve of, if you give them leave to think "a little."

It had been objected, that to suppose real Properties of Space, and that Space itself is only a Property of something else, is supposing Properties to inhere in one another. Mr. *Jackson* replies,[b] "There's no Difficulty in it. Do not we ascribe "*Infinity* to the *Power* and *Knowledge* of God, as "also *Eternity*, *Independency*, &c? And the ascrib-"ing *Penetrability*, *Immobility*, *Simplicity*, *Incor-"ruptibility*, *Incorporeity*, *Infinity*, *Incomprehensibi-"lity*, *necessary Existence*, and *Eternity*, to Space, "is no more." I answer,

Most of these Properties, which this Author is pleased to ascribe to Space, have been already proved not to belong to it, the rest are mere Negations; and if he means no more by his Properties, we will acquit them of the Absurdity of inhering in one another, or of wanting any thing to inhere in. They are not *Properties* in the strict philosophical Sense of that Word, but only Modes of Apprehension, or so many Modifications of certain

[b] Pag. 80.

Ideas, and which may, without any Difficulty, be ascribed to many other Ideas as well as those of Space and Duration. But we must likewise observe, that these are so far from answering our Author's Purpose in this Argument, *i. e.* inferring the *Reality* of every Subject they are ascribed to, that they will equally flow from a real or imaginary Subject, and their own Reality must depend on the Reality of the Subject to which we ascribe them. Thus we may attribute *Infinity*, *Eternity*, *Independency*, &c. to absolute *Malevolence*, as easily as to perfect *Goodness*, and to both in the same Sense as this Author does to *Knowledge*, *Power*, &c. But this will never prove one or other of the foregoing Qualities to be *real*, or to have actual Being, because these several Properties, as they are term'd, of *Infinity*, &c. may be *ideal* only. Ch. I.

Aristotle's Materia prima, and the *Plenum* of *Des Cartes*, had each as many Properties, and full as considerable Effects in their Systems of Philosophy, as Dr. *Clarke's Space*: I may add, and, as far as appears from this Author's Argument, as real positive ones too; since we may have as clear and positive an Idea of such kind of Properties, and draw as many Consequences from them, whether the Subject to which they are ascribed be real or fictitious: And one would think some of those nine above-mentioned, which our Author has affixed to Space (*Incomprehensibility* for instance) could furnish but a poor Argument for its Reality.

Let us take the Case then which way we will, it must bear hard upon our Author. If these be real Properties of Space, and Space itself be only a Property, then we have *Properties inhering in one another*: If they be not real Properties of Space, they'll not be sufficient to establish its *Reality*, and so the whole Argument built on them falls to the Ground.

For

FOR a more ample Confutation of the ſuppoſed Properties of Space, I refer to Dr. *Watts*,[c] and proceed to the Fourth Argument.

"SPACE and Time are *neceſſarily infinite*, which "no Idea can be;

"THEREFORE they are not *Ideas*, but *real* "Attributes."[d]

THIS Argument, when put into Form, contains the five following Propoſitions. 1. Space and Time are *neceſſarily infinite*. 2. But no *Idea* can be neceſſarily infinite. 3. Therefore Space and Time are *not Ideas*. 4. Therefore they are *real*; and, 5. They are *Attributes*.

AS to the firſt Part, we have already ſhewn the Inconcluſiveneſs of all Arguments hitherto brought to prove the *actual* Exiſtence of Space and Time, 'till which be made out 'twill be loſt labour to enquire after their Infinity. If theſe be nothing but *Ideas*, their *Infinity* will be no more than *ideal Infinity*, and conſequently it can never be urged as a diſtinct Proof of their *real* Exiſtence; tho' it is very unaccountably introduced among the other Arguments for that only purpoſe.[e] In this Point therefore our Author does, and muſt neceſſarily, beg the Queſtion. He muſt ſuppoſe the real Exiſtence of Space and Time before he can attempt to prove them infinite: And, If he have already proved that real Exiſtence, his preſent Attempt is uſeleſs; if he have not, 'tis evidently inſufficient;

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[c] *Eſſay* I. §. 8, 9, 10.

[d] Pag. 81.

[e] See p. 56. where Mr. *Jackſon* ſtiles all theſe, Arguments for the *actual Exiſtence* of Time and Space.

ſince

since it must presuppose the very thing it is brought to establish.

But secondly, In what Sense are these necessarily *infinite*? In the same as Number, the Parts of Matter, and all Quantity, *i. e.* a *negative* one. We cannot set any Bounds to them;[f] and this necessary Infinity we learn from their *Ideas*, "which "of themselves naturally lead us to think that they "are actually boundless."[g]

If our Author will stick to this kind of Infinite, we readily allow it: Since 'tis such as is incompatible with real Existence; 'tis, as Mr. *Locke* says,[h] adjusting a growing Measure to a standing Bulk; and cannot be applied to any positive thing without an express Contradiction, as has been often observed above. And yet even this roving, indeterminate, ever-growing Infinite is more than can be made out on our Author's Principles, from which it will only follow that we are able to *find* no Bounds in Space and Time; not that we can ever know that they actually *have* none. For how can their Ideas naturally of themselves lead us to an actual Infinity, if his second Proposition be true, *viz.* That *no Idea* can be *infinite*? Or indeed how can we be led at all to any kind of Infinity? When a Person undertakes to prove the Existence of some infinite thing from his Idea of Infinity, as Dr. *Clarke* has done, one would think it the Business of an Objector to urge that all Ideas are finite, and that from *finite* Ideas no Consequence can be drawn to any thing *infinite*. But some Authors, we find, are so happy as to be able to turn this very Objection to their own Advantage, and infer the

[f] Pag. 70. from Dr. *Clarke*.

[g] Pag. 72, 73. from Mr. *Locke*.

[h] Book II. ch. xvii. §. 7.

direct

Ch. I. direct contrary, *viz.* That the thing muſt be *neceſſarily infinite*, becauſe our Ideas can repreſent it only as *finite*. This, if I miſtake not, muſt be the Reſult of Mr. *Jackſon*'s Argument, and this will at the ſame time be an unſurmountable Objection againſt it. For he will allow, that all the Knowledge we have either of the Nature or Exiſtence of Space and Time, ariſes only from our Ideas of them; and if theſe Ideas are neceſſarily finite, 'twill always be very reaſonably ask'd, Why then ſhould not we conclude that theſe *things* themſelves (if they be any real things) are finite alſo? At leaſt, how does it appear that they are otherwiſe?

He anſwers from Dr. *Clarke*, that our *Reaſon* will demonſtrate them to be infinite.[i] But can any Reaſoning which is entirely grounded on the Ideas we receive of a thing, prove that thing to be directly the reverſe of what thoſe very Ideas repreſent it to be? Can we from a negative Idea conclude the *Ideatum* to be poſitive; or, from a Poſſibility of always adding to our Idea, infer an Object abſolutely incapable of Addition? By this Method our Reaſon may demonſtrate any thing from any thing.

But Mr. *Jackſon* ſeems to have been ſenſible that this ſecond Propoſition of his is either groundleſs, or will make againſt him, and accordingly he gives it up two or three Pages after, and begins to argue for the poſitive Infinity of Space, Time, and Number, from the Infinity of our Ideas of them; or, which I think muſt amount to the ſame, he urges, that "*theſe are incapable of Increaſeableneſs* EVEN IN IDEA:"[k] And again,[l] "A Perſon may think of an *Inch* of Space and no more,

[i] Pag. 82, 83.

[k] Pag. 87.

[l] Pag. 88.

"or

" or of a *Minute* of Time and no more, or of an " *Unite* and no more, and to these he may add " *in infinitum*: But as these are only Parts of the " *Idea* of Space, Time and Number, the *Infinity* " of which makes up the *whole and perfect Idea*, " so they are not capable of any possible or con- " ceivable Addition."

THIS is recurring to the other kind of Infinite, and at the same time owning that our Ideas are *adequate* thereto; for what else can we understand by this *whole perfect Idea* which 'tis impossible to enlarge? If our Author asserts this to get clear of the Objection which he is often press'd with, *viz.* that his Idea of Infinite can neither be *absolute* nor *positive*, he is concerned to reconcile it both with the Tenor of his present Argument, and that other Assertion at the Beginning of it; *viz.* " Our posi- " tive internal Conception of them is necessarily " finite, but yet we find we cannot but add *in in-* " *finitum*, not to the *Ideas* formed in the Imagina- " tion, there is soon an end of them, but to the " *Ideatums* or *Things themselves.*" [m] Where by *Ideatums* and *Things* I fancy he means no more than *Ideas of Intellect*; for I would not suppose him to mean that we can add to *real Space*, of which he will not allow us even to *conceive one Inch more than actually exists*: [n] And by their *Infinity* he must understand only *Indefiniteness*, or his former kind of Infinite; which has been shewn to follow from the Nature of our own Minds, or from our Faculty of repeating, rather than from any external *Thing*. Nay, if we went by any *Ideatum* at all in framing these Ideas, and consider'd Space and Time as things actually existing, and composed of real

[m] Pag. 83.

[n] Pag. 87. and again, Pag. 91.

Ch. I. Parts, we might, for what I ſee, as eaſily ſet bounds to them, and aſſign a determinate Number of theſe Parts, as we can in *Matter*, which, as our Author juſtly obſerves, [o] "requires no greater Extent, or larger Exiſtence, than the Ideatum actually has. But, adds he, in the Point of Time "and Space, this Author thinks their *Ideata* to be "*finite things*, and yet he owns that we neceſſarily conceive them to be *infinite*, or to be incapable "of any aſſignable *Bounds*, which is a Difficulty I "would deſire him to ſolve."

I ANSWER by denying both theſe Propoſitions. We are neither obliged to conceive theſe things to be *infinite*, nor do we maintain that they have *finite Ideata*. We don't think that they have any proper *Ideata at all*, and for that only Reaſon judge them to be boundleſs. [p] They took their Original perhaps from finite things (which things this Author will always miſtake for their *Ideata*) but as they are now view'd by the Mind, and denoted by the Names of Space and Time, they are mere abſtract Notions, which have no particular Relation to the external things that at firſt occaſion'd them, or to any others; and therefore can be bounded only by the Mind itſelf: But the Mind always finds in itſelf the ſame Power of adding one of theſe Ideas to another, and ſo we term them *infinite*; improperly aſcribing that Infinity to *them*, which is merely a Power in *us*, and which we may apply to any other Ideas that conſiſt of diſtinct Parts, and may make them infinite in the ſame Senſe; nay muſt make them equally ſo, if we conſider them equally, as has been often obſerv'd.

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[o] Pag. 83.

[p] See above, p. 30, 31.

THE

THE Caſe in ſhort is this: Though our Ideas are *finite*, yet there is in the Mind an *ideal Infinity*, made by itſelf, by its Power of enlarging, combining, &c. We underſtand what we mean when we ſay *boundleſs* and *endleſs*, tho' Imagination cannot reach farther than what is limited. But the *poſitive* Idea of a great deal, and the *negative* one of *no Bounds* put together, make up our *ideal Infinity*. Thus, partly by *Imagination*, and partly by *Intellect*, we piece up an imperfect Idea, the beſt we can have in ſuch things; and for this very Idea Dr. *Clarke* and our Author have *imagined* three *objective Realities*, *viz.* Space, Time, and Number: Being reſolved to conceive theſe not only as *ſomethings*, without any Reaſon, but as ſomethings very *large*; and, when *Imagination* fails, to *underſtand* them actually *boundleſs*, and laſt of all from the Idea of *Boundleſſneſs* to riſe to a *poſitive Infinite* and believe them to be incapable of *Increaſe*, which is an Idea directly oppoſite to the former: But they will apply both theſe kinds of infinite to the ſame Subjects, and ſo are obliged perpetually to double between them, and take ſometimes the one, ſometimes the other, as they have occaſion for either, to get rid of a preſent Difficulty.

THIS ſeems to be a ſufficient Account of the neceſſary Infinity of Space, Time, and Number, and if it does not ſatisfy Mr. *Jackſon*, I muſt refer him to the ingenious Author cited in the following Page, who has effectually confuted the Notion of an abſolute Infinite in theſe things, tho' he ſeems defective in his Account of the true poſitive one, or of that *Perfection* which, and which only, I apprehend ought to be aſcribed to God, and will be conſider'd hereafter.

Mr. *Jackſon*'s fourth Conſequence is as extraordinary as any of the foregoing, *viz.* Becauſe

Ch. I. Space and Time are not *Ideas*, but of a Nature as different from our Ideas as finite is from infinite, or in other Words are impoſſible *in Idea*, therefore they are, not as another would be apt to infer, *impoſſible in themſelves* or *abſolutely ſo*; but quite contrary, they are *real*: Which at moſt is concluding a thing to be real, purely becauſe 'tis inconceivable; or alledging *Incomprehenſibility* for one of its Properties (as the ſame Author has done under his third Argument) and thence deducing its Reality. The Reverſe of all this, I think, would follow much better from his Medium, and the Argument might ſtand thus. If Space and Time exiſt at all, then they muſt be infinite, but they cannot be infinite, even in Idea; therefore they do not exiſt. Here nothing would be denied but the Minor, which our Author is ready to make good by ſhewing that *no Idea* can be infinite, and therefore that we cannot have an Idea of theſe as ſuch. If he has not made good both Parts of the foregoing Argument, and thereby confuted himſelf effectually, there are two Authors in the Margin ready to do it for him. ¶

But

¶ "Reaſon will aſſure us that ſince any aſſignable Portion of "Quantity hath certain particular Dimenſions, by conſequence, "an abſolutely infinite or immenſe Quantity or Extenſion (if "really exiſtent) muſt actually contain infinite diſtinguiſhable "Dimenſions, or ſuch a Number as, by reaſon of its Vaſtneſs, "abſolutely excludes the very Poſſibility of the leaſt Addition "and Increaſe. But 'tis humbly conceived that ſuch an abſo-"lutely infinite number is a pure Impoſſibility. For after Mil-"lions of Ages ſpent in adding Millions of Millions together, "'tis evident that the Number will be no leſs finite than it "was at the firſt, and ſo there will ſtill be the ſame Poſſibility "of adding on, and increaſing for ever. If any Man will deny "this, he ought to aſſign a Reaſon why after having arrived at "any particular number it ſhould become a Contradiction for it "to increaſe rather than before.

"Thus

Ch. I. §. 2

But fifthly, Supposing (not allowing) Space and Time to be *real*, yet why must they be *Attributes?* I am sure our commonly received Notions and Descriptions of them represent them otherwise. We conceive *Space*, in particular, and treat of it as a *Substance*. We imagine it to subsist of itself, and to want nothing for its Support: We also cloath it with several Properties, as Height, Depth, *&c.* which would be all over absurd if it were only a Property. They could not be applied to it were it no more than bare *Extension* (which yet is the only Sense it can serve in as a Property) as we have already intimated, *p.* 21. and may more fully appear from the Author there refer'd to.

2dly, We not only don't in Fact conceive these as Attributes, but it is impossible they should be conceived as such. All Attributes are *particular*, and cannot *migrare de subjecto in subjectum*, as Logicians speak, or belong equally to different Sub-

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" Thus the very Method whereby our Minds attain their negative Idea of Infinity (which is by repeated Addition of Numbers without End) serves as a Demonstration of the absolute Impossibility of an absolute Infinity *in Nature*. [I would rather say, *in all things which consist of Parts.*] " For if an absolute Infinity of Number is therefore impossible, because 'tis the very Nature of Infinity not to be replete; 'tis manifest that an absolutely infinite Extension of Space must be alike impossible for the same reason.

" This way of arguing Mr. *Locke* thinks sufficient to evince the absolute Impossibility of a positive Idea of Infinity in our Minds, and it is hard to imagine why it should not equally prove the Impossibility of the *Thing* in Nature. For different Dimensions are as distinguishable in Nature as in our Imaginations. An absolute Infinity of Number if (as he grants) it be contradictory in itself, and therefore impossible in Idea, can't but be equally impossible in Nature. Not that our Ideas are the adequate Measures of Reality; but because what is inconsistent in itself, can't but be impossible both in Idea and Reality." *Colliber's Impartial Enquiry*, p. 155, 156. See also *Watts's Essays*, p. 44.

jects,

jects, *i. e.* become *universal*. To conceive a Quality appropriated to ſome particular Being, or to view it in its *concrete*, is one thing; to take it in general, or in the *abſtract*, is the reverſe. But *Space* belongs equally to all Subjects extended; 'tis not my Extenſion, or your's, or that of the World, but it comprehends all particular Extenſions, and is confined to none: It bears no more Relation to one thing than another, is not conſider'd with or applicable to any concrete, and therefore is, and can be nothing elſe, but an *abſtract Idea*; which indeed both that and Duration are ſometimes allowed to be by Dr. *Clarke*, [r] and by our Author himſelf [s]. Space and Time then are *abſtract Ideas* we ſay, not of thoſe other abſtract Ideas, Immenſity and Eternity (as theſe two Authors would perſuade us) but of particular things which are extended and endure, and of them only. To ſay that theſe belong wholly to God, and that his neceſſary Exiſtence *makes* Time and Space, or that they are *Conſequences* of it, [t] is to exclude all other things from their particular Shares of each, which have at leaſt an equal Title to them with the Deity. Is it not full as juſt to affirm that Extenſion belongs to all Matter, as to make it an individual Property of one immaterial Being? And if Duration be an Attribute of God, is not the Time of Man's Exiſtence as much an Attribute of Man; as much a *Conſequence* of his Exiſtence, and equally neceſſary to it?

Mr. *Jackſon*'s Inforcement of the foregoing Argument has been partly conſider'd above, where

[r] See *Demonſtr.* Prop. I. §. 1. and his Anſwer to the Fifth Letter.

[s] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 96.

[t] Ibid. p. 80.

it

it is ſhewn that this *neceſſary Infinity* of Space and Time muſt reſolve into a Power in the Mind of continually repeating thoſe Ideas in an uniform manner, or its never finding any Reaſon to ſtop the Account. But he replies, [v] "It is plainly one "one thing for the Mind to have and retain the "Faculty of adding and repeating, and another "very different thing that it cannot but enlarge "ſome particular Ideas *in infinitum*, and that it "cannot ſet Bounds to them without a Contra-"diction. In extending its Idea of other things "*in infinitum* it is *free and active*, but in theſe it "is *paſſive*."

Ch. I.

I ANSWER, This Neceſſity of enlarging infinitely means no more than that we find an indefinite Increaſeableneſs of ſome of our Ideas, or an Impoſſibility of ſuppoſing any End of them; from whence we juſtly conclude, that theſe can never conſtitute a *Whole*, or belong to any real Exiſtence, which muſt be conceived as a *Whole*, and therefore is repugnant to all ſuch Ideas: But if we could once ſuppoſe an End of theſe, they would be no longer increaſeable, or, which would come to the ſame, we ſhould then loſe our Faculty of adding to them: In this Caſe if we were not obliged *always to go on*, we ſhould be obliged to *ſtop*, or if we were ever able to bound theſe Ideas, we ſhould at the ſame time be unable to enlarge them any farther. So that theſe two things are not ſo *very different* as our Author may imagine.

IF it be ask'd, why we cannot ſet Bounds to thoſe particular Ideas which are meaſurable by Number; I ſhould think it ſufficient to reply with the ſame Author above, [w] that "God hath given

[v] Pag. 83, 86.

[w] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 85.

"the

Ch. I. "the Mind the Faculty of *numbering* and *adding* "*in infinitum*." Though I ſhould not approve of the Reaſon he aſſigns, *viz.* "Becauſe God could, "if he had ſo pleaſed, have made things to exiſt "every where." I take an *infinite* voluntary *Effect* to imply a Contradiction: But this is what our Author ſeems very inclinable to believe; and indeed according to his Scheme he ſhould have ſaid, "Becauſe God *has* made things to exiſt every "where:" Their actual being every where would have follow'd much better from the Idea of Infinite, as he has managed it, than barely a Poſſibility of their being ſo. If this ſame Idea can prove that real Space is every where, I don't ſee why it ſhould not alſo demonſtrate that Matter, Number and all ſorts of Quantity, the Parts of which are equally indefinite, ſhould be every where too: By which means we ſhall have a good deal of ubiquitarian Exiſtences.

From what has been ſaid we may ſee, in like manner, how far the Mind is *paſſive* in forming its Idea of infinite Space: 'Tis no more paſſive in this Caſe than in extending its Idea of all other things which conſiſt of Parts, or are capable of being enlarged or diminiſhed *in infinitum*; 'tis free in the Premiſes, or in taking up theſe Ideas at firſt, but paſſive in the Concluſion, *i. e.* when it has once begun, it muſt always go on with them. 'Tis free in imagining the firſt Inch of real Space, and adding another to it; but when it has done this, it muſt for the ſame Reaſon add another, and ſo on everlaſtingly. We have ſeen that this kind of Infinity follows from the Nature of theſe Ideas, and therefore to ask why we can always add to theſe and not to others, is the ſame as to enquire why ſome Ideas are different from others, and have different Properties.

But

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BUT it has been alſo obſerved that this Infinity is only an Infinity of *the Idea*, and does not prove any thing more; nay, moſt probably ariſes from hence, that there is nothing beſide an Idea of pure Intellect in the caſe; nothing either in Nature or Imagination to induce us to leave adding: On which account we may indeed give over contemplating theſe Ideas whenever we pleaſe, but ſo long as we do contemplate them, we muſt go on enlarging them, and can never find any Reaſon or external Ground to ſtop.

BUT I am weary with repeating theſe things, and ſhall therefore paſs on to his Fifth Argument, which is drawn *ex abſurdo*, and proceeds in this manner.

" IF Space be nothing *real*, there could be no " *Motion*;

" BECAUSE no Space to move in." [z]

I ANSWER 1. If Space be nothing, then a Body in Motion might move on infinitely, becauſe there is nothing to ſtop it. For, as our Author has it below, [y] " Since our Senſes inform us that nothing " hinders or puts a ſtop to Motion but the *Solidity* " of reſiſting Beings; we eaſily conceive that where " there is no *Solidity*, there may be no Reſiſtance " to Motion." Indeed if there be really no *Vacuum*, which both our Author and Mr. *Locke* ſeem to have confounded with *real Space*, tho' they be very different Ideas; [z] or if all were full of the ſame kind of Matter, it would be hard to conceive any Motion in it, ſince the ſeveral Parts of this *Ple-*

[z] Pag. 88.

[y] Pag. 89.

[z] See Note 6. to *King*, p. 25, &c. 2d Edit.

Ch. I. *now* seem every where fix'd by the adjacent ones. Tho' even in this Case, a *Cartesian* would contrive some kind of *circular* Motion, without supposing any void Spaces either for the moving Body to pass into, or to be left behind it, in any Part of its Orbit.

BUT as the Author does not here form his Argument from the Impossibility of Motion on any *Resistance* to be met with, in case of no real Space, but rather on the want of something to move *in*, or of some *Medium thro'* which this Motion is to be perform'd: I answer,

2. THE Ideas of Space and Motion are not of themselves necessarily connected; because Motion does not necessarily require any such Medium. *Motion* is nothing but the *Change of Situation in Bodies with regard to each other*, and of consequence is all *relative*, as will appear immediately: But is not this Idea compleat without the Notion of a Medium *through* which the Change is to be made? Is *Space or Extension prerequisite*[a] to this mutual Change of Situation in Bodies, or in the several Parts of a Body, which we call Motion, as the *Cause* of it? This our Author will never assert. Or is it a *Causa sine qua non*, and necessarily connected with the *abstract Idea of* Motion, as that includes some Change of Situation? No more, surely, than it is with the abstract Idea of *Change* in general, or *Difference of Appearance* in general: All these seem to require no sort of Medium, any more than the *Distance* of two Bodies, or their *not touching* (another Argument of our Author's) requires something to be put *between* them.

IT appears then, I think, that tho' the Idea of Space as a *Vacuum* were requisite to Motion, yet

[a] *Existence and Unity*, p. 89.

as

as a *Medium*, which is our Author's preſent Argument, it is not. Nay the Suppoſition of any ſuch real Medium would deſtroy the Poſſibility of any Motion at all: See the Margin.[b] But if we will connect Ideas together which have no natural Relation, I muſt add with the ingenious Author of the Objection, which Mr. *Jackſon* here recites, that the Idea of mere *Emptineſs*, or Void, is much more conveniently join'd with that of Motion, than that *infinite Fullneſs of Being* which attends this Author's Notion of Immenſity;[c] according to which all things are ſuppoſed to move up and down within the Divine Subſtance, in which Subſtance at the ſame time there is ſuppoſed to be no poſſible Vacuity. Ch. I.

Is it not much more eaſy to conceive how a Subſtance ſhould move without any other Subſtance interfering, than how it ſhould move within another Subſtance infinitely *full*? what Idea ſoever we fix to that Word. In the laſt Caſe we muſt either ſuppoſe theſe two Subſtances to have nothing at all to do with each other; (and then why ſhould one of them be ſaid to move *within* the other?) or we ſhall neceſſarily be driven into, what is the moſt inconceivable thing of all, a *Penetration of Dimenſions*.

THIS Conſequence the learned Objector has fix'd on Mr. *Jackſon*, and 'tis what he can never get clear of by his Diſtinction between things of the ſame and different *Specific Natures*.[d] For as far as

[b] I beg leave here to refer the Reader to *Bayle*'s Dictionary, under the Article *Zeno*, Remarks E and F, where he will meet with ſeveral curious Arguments which ſeem to demonſtrate the Impoſſibility of all Motion on our Author's Principles, *i. e.* on Suppoſition of a real *Space* or *Extenſion infinitely diviſible*.

[c] Pag. 90.

[d] Ibid.

Ch. I. we conceive any other Subſtances to be co-extended with, or to occupy Part of the Divine Subſtance by their particular Extenſions, according to his groſs Notion of the Divine Omnipreſence; ſo far they will neceſſarily coincide or be identified with it. Unleſs he will deny that Extenſion in the whole, or in part, belongs to any thing beſide the Deity, which he ſeems very much inclined to do; [e] or, in the laſt place, will maintain that there are as many different ſorts of Extenſion, or of being long and broad, as there are different kinds of Subſtances in Heaven and Earth: For a full Anſwer to which ſee the ingenious Author of Dr. *Clarke*'s *Notion of Space examined*. [f]

His Seventh Argument ſhall be conſidered next, as it is near a-kin to the foregoing, and built on the ſame Principle.

"If Space be *nothing*, it would follow that if "God ſhould move in a ſtraight Line the "whole material World intire, with any Swift-"neſs whatſoever, it would ſtill always con-"tinue in the ſame Place."

I ANSWER, with Mr. *Leibnitz*, [g] That the foregoing Suppoſition is a *chimerical* and abſurd one, ſince the ſuppoſed Motion in this Argument would be really no Motion; it would neither anſwer the Idea, nor have the Effects of real Motion. The Idea of Motion includes a Change in the Situation of Bodies; but if there were only one Body in Nature, what Change can we conceive to attend

[e] Pag. 91, 92.

[f] Pag. 127.

[g] Fourth Letter, p. 99.

it?

it? Or how ſhall we determine its Situation? Or even imagine it poſſible to be determin'd? It is now ſuppoſed to be in the Center of infinite Space, and when it has moved, according to this Argument, *with any Swiftneſs whatſoever*, it will yet be in the Center (if any ſuch thing can be here ſuppoſed as a Center.) Where's the Difference then between its moving and ſtanding ſtill? This ſame Body is neither going *to* any thing, nor *from* any thing; why then ſhould we ſay that it is *going* at all? This might be ſufficient to convince us that the Idea of Motion is purely *relative*, and that when we are trying to turn it into abſolute, we make an inconſiſtent ſelf-contradictory Idea of it. Indeed in Natural Philoſophy there's a very juſt and uſeful Diſtinction between abſolute and relative Motion; *v. g.* Between that of the Earth, and of the Bodies on it; or that of a Ship, and of the Perſons in it: But this can have no Place in Metaphyſicks, where we are not conſidering this or that particular Motion, and comparing it with a more general one, which with regard to the others may be term'd abſolute; but we contemplate Motion in the abſtract, which is always eſſentially relative, and which will appear to be ſo in any particular Caſe. Thus in thoſe two above-mention'd, the Motion of the Ship is relative to the Sea or Shore, that of the Earth to other Planets; and ſo on, while there is any real Motion left.

Ch. I.

[a] Totus igitur mundus debet ſpectari ut ſtans, ſed motus eſt proprietas partium: Sic v. g. totus exercitus dicitur ſtare, etſi milites excubias agentes moveantur. Imo totum univerſum ſimul transferri, ne quidem concipi poteſt; tum quia motus totius diverſionem & diſtinctionem partium non ſemper facit, tum quia univerſum quod eſt, locum non invenit quo moveatur. *Chauvin. Lex. Philoſ.* under the Article *Motus Localis.*

IT our Author quits the Idea of *abſolute Motion*, and endeavours to ſupport his Argument by making the Motion of the whole relative; *i. e.* to the Parts of infinite Space, through, in, or by which it is ſuppoſed to paſs: I anſwer,

2dly, THAT by this means we may indeed preſerve the Idea of Motion, but then it will be an *ideal Motion* only, becauſe theſe Parts of Space are only ideal. Except therefore we prove the real Exiſtence of ſuch Parts, as we conceive this Motion to be made through, antecedently, and by ſome other Topic than the bare Suppoſition before us, this Argument will be as mere a *Petitio Principii* as ſome of the foregoing. It will amount to no more than this: The Parts of Space are *real* becauſe I can *ſuppoſe* ſuch a Motion as will require them to be ſo; or, if theſe Parts of Space are not imagined to be real, then this ſame Motion of the Univerſe which we have been imagining, will not be real Motion; which is ſupporting one Suppoſition by another, or rather making two Suppoſitions without proving either.

THE Caſe in ſhort is this. Whenever one Body undergoes a Change in reſpect to the Situation of any others, we conclude there's Motion in ſome of theſe Bodies; and this is *real* Motion. Whenever we ſuppoſe it to change its Situation in reference to certain Points of Space, this we may conceive likewiſe to be Motion, but 'tis *imaginary* Motion; becauſe theſe Points are not yet ſhewn to be more than imaginary ones: But in both Caſes the Change, or Motion, is alike *relative*; and to ſuppoſe it *abſolute* in the proper metaphyſical Senſe, would be to ſuppoſe a Change without any thing to refer it to, *i. e.* a Change of nothing, or at the ſame time a Change and no Change.

Dr. *Clarke* indeed has tried to put a Caſe where a real Effect would follow from this ſuppoſed Motion

tion of the whole World, *viz.* that things would receive a *Shock* upon the ſudden *ſtopping* of it.[1] This he repeats,[k] and terms it a *mathematical Argument ſhewing from real Effects that there may be real Motion, where there is none relative*, and appeals to Sir *I. Newton*.[l] I anſwer,

1. *Real* or *abſolute* Motion is allowed in the phyſical Meaning, as oppoſed to a particular relative one, as already obſerved. But this has nothing to do with the metaphyſical Senſe of theſe Words, *i. e.* as oppoſed to all kind of Relation whatſoever; except we will jumble Mathematicks and Metapyhſicks together, and deduce the ſame Conſequences from Terms applied to both, tho' they convey very different Ideas under them: Which indeed ſeems to be the true Ground of all Dr. *Clarke*'s falſe Reaſoning on theſe and ſome other Subjects. But,

2. TAKING this abſolute Motion of the World in the true Senſe, why ſhould any other Effect follow from its ſudden ſtopping, than from its Continuance in the former State? Why might not all Bodies upon our Earth, for inſtance, ſtop together with it? And if ſo, this *Shock* would neither be perceiv'd, nor be capable of being perceiv'd; that is, 'twould be the ſame as no Shock.

3. IF theſe Bodies began to fly off the Earth upon its ſtopping, or, in other words, if they *moved* when the Earth *ſtood ſtill*, this would indeed be real Motion, *i. e.* a Change of Relation between them and the Earth; but this is *relative*, and ſo far from being ſtrictly an *Effect* of any antecedent abſolute Motion, that it could not take place 'till that ſuppoſed abſolute

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[1] Third Reply to *Leibnitz*, p. 79.

[k] Pag. 183.

[l] *Mathem. Princ. Def.* 8.

Motion

Motion were at an end: This ſame *Shock* therefore which Dr. *Clarke* makes the End of abſolute Motion, is to us the Beginning of real Motion; and all that follows from the Caſe is only this, *viz.* That there would be a real Effect of Motion, or we might have an Idea of it, as ſoon as this ſuppoſed abſolute Motion ceas'd, *i. e.* as ſoon as any relative Motion commenced, and not before.

WHAT has been ſaid concerning the ſuppoſed *Motion* of the Univerſe, will hold equally with reſpect to its *Place*, which is as merely chimerical as the former. I ſhall borrow a farther Illuſtration of this from an excellent Writer, to whom I have been often indebted in the Courſe of theſe Papers.

PLACE then has two Meanings: Firſt, It ſignifies *relative Poſition*, as is evident in every Anſwer given to the Queſtion *Where*. In *England*, in *Europe*, in the Room, in our Syſtem, above, below, between, to the right, to the left, *&c.* This Senſe of the Word *Place*, in which it is ſtiled *abſolute*, is built upon the Suppoſition of *Space* ſurrounding and containing every thing, and ſo it is the *Space* which any thing is conceiv'd to fill up or poſſeſs. In this Senſe, if the Univerſe were to move on in a ſtraight Line, it would *change Place* according to the vulgar Conception. But then I muſt inſiſt upon it, that this ſuppoſed *Space* it ſhould leave or take up, is purely imaginary, is nothing at all *ad extra*. When the Univerſe exiſts in Space, we really mean no more than this, that we refer it to a certain Standard or Receptacle lodged in our Mind. We have an abſtract Idea of ſuch a Capacity, which we apply to it, or rather to our Idea of it; that is, the *ideal* Univerſe has an *ideal* Place in our Minds, and nothing more. The *real* Univerſe is in no *Place*. To ſay that it exiſts *ſomewhere*, is no more than to ſay *it exiſts*: Or to ſay that it exiſts in ſo much *Space* as is commenſurate

menſurate to it, is only to ſay that its Bulk is equal to itſelf. [m] Ch. I.

ADMITTING then that the Univerſe, if *removed*, would change Place in our way of conceiving this Matter, the Queſtion ſtill remains whether *Place* be *real* or *imaginary*.

FARTHER, If the Univerſe ſhould paſs out of its preſent *State* into a different *State*, muſt we therefore ſay that it is in the ſame *State*, unleſs *State* be ſomething *real*? No, this is only a vulgar way of expreſſing that the Univerſe is *changed*, as the other is, that it is *removed*: And Space is as mere an *Idea*, or *Ens Rationis*, as *State* is.

LASTLY, If it be maintain'd that ſetting aſide the Conſideration of *Place*, yet Motion is ſomething real, abſolute and diſtinct from *Reſt*, and which will be the ſame in any one Body ſuppoſing all others annihilated; or elſe we muſt affirm that a Body moving is not different from one at reſt, or that theſe two States are in no wiſe diſtinguiſhable from each other.

I ANSWER, 'Tis allow'd that the Ideas of Motion and Reſt are really diſtinct Ideas, and if any thinks he has a clear Idea of the Motion abovemention'd, it may be allowed alſo that this is Motion: But it is ſuch as by the Suppoſition has no Relation to real *Place* or *Space*, and therefore can be of no uſe in the preſent Queſtion.

[m] See Mr. *Locke H. U.* B. II. Ch. xiii. §. 7, 8, 9, 10. and compare theſe Sections with the following Paſſage of Dr. *Clarke*'s fifth Reply to *Leibnitz*, p. 301. "If Matter was *infinite*, yet "*infinite Space* would no more be an Affection of that infinite "Body, than *finite Spaces* are the *Affections* of *finite Bodies*; but "in that Caſe the *infinite Matter* would be as *finite Bodies* now "are, *in* the *infinite Space*." How a thing can be *poſitively infinite*, and yet be contain'd *in* another, is I muſt confeſs, paſt my comprehenſion.

Ch. I.

BUT Mr. *Jackſon* urges,[n] "If Space is *nothing*, "the Situation and Order of things muſt always "be the ſame, becauſe there is nothing to deter- "mine or make the Difference of Order and Si- "tuation." I anſwer,

1. THE different Appearance of things to each other will be ſufficient to determine this, without ſuppoſing any thing extrinſic to them. Their turning different Sides to each other, and altering their apparent Magnitudes, will give us an Idea of their Order and Diſtance; nay the Difference of *apparent Magnitude* is in fact that whereby we do get our Notion of different *Diſtances*, and the only way we have to compute them, as is ſhewn by a very accurate Writer, who has taken ſome Pains to trace this Idea.[o] Mr. *Leibnitz*'s way of accounting for it may be ſeen in the Margin.[p]

2. IF

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[n] Pag. 94.

[o] See Dr. *Smith*'s Opticks, Book I. Ch. v. Art. 138. p. 49. and Art. 155. p. 58, &c.

[p] "We conſider that many things exiſt at once, and obſerve "in them a certain *Order* of Co-exiſtence, according to which "the Relation of one thing to another is more or leſs ſimple. "This Order is their *Situation* or Diſtance. When it happens "that one of theſe co-exiſtent things changes its *Relation* to a "multitude of others, which do not change their Relation among "themſelves; and that another thing, newly come, acquires the "ſame Relation to the others as the former had; we then ſay it "is come into the *Place* of the former: And this Change we "call a *Motion* in that Body wherein is the immediate Cauſe of "the Change. And tho' many or even all the co-exiſtent things "ſhould change according to certain known Rules of Direction "and Swiftneſs, yet one may always determine the Relation "of Situation which every Co-exiſtent acquires with reſpect to "every other Co-exiſtent; and even that Relation which any "other Co-exiſtent would have to this, or which this would "have to any other, if it had not changed, or if it had changed "any otherwiſe. And ſuppoſing, or feigning, that among thoſe "Co-

2. If Space be nothing more than Idea, it is ſufficient to anſwer this Purpoſe, and our Author might as well argue for the Reality of Price, Weight, *&c.* becauſe if theſe were *nothing*, there would be nothing to determine the different Value, or Gravity, *&c.* of things. Ch. I.

The Idea of Space is indeed a very convenient Meaſure ſet up to determine the Relation of things, and a more general extenſive one than moſt others; but it is not abſolutely neceſſary, as we have ſeen; nor if it were, would this prove its Reality *ad extra*, any more than the Reality of theſe and ſome other ideal Meaſures, ſuch as Number, Quantity, Order, Quality, Station, *&c.* without which we can hardly tell how to ſpeak or think of things at all; but yet few are ſo far gone in the viſionary way as to believe them to be real Exiſtences, to be any thing but abſtract Notions of our own inventing.

"Co-exiſtents there is a ſufficient Number of them which "have undergone no Change; then we ſay that thoſe which "have ſuch a *Relation* to thoſe fixed Exiſtents, as others had to "them before, have now the ſame *Place* which thoſe others had. "And that which comprehends *all thoſe Places* is called *Space*. "Which ſhews that in order to have an Idea of *Place*, and conſequently of *Space*, it is ſufficient to conſider theſe *Relations*, "and the Rules of their Changes, without needing to fancy any "abſolute Reality *out of* the things whoſe Situation we conſider," *&c.* Fifth Paper, N° 47. p. 205, *&c.*

Again, p. 205. "I obſerve that the Traces of moveable Bodies which they leave ſometimes upon the immoveable ones, on "which they are moved, have given Men occaſion to form in "their Imagination ſuch an Idea as if ſome Trace did ſtill remain, even when there is nothing unmoved. But this is a "mere ideal thing, and imports only that *if there was any unmoved thing there, the Trace might be mark'd out upon it.* And "'tis this Analogy which makes Men fancy *Places*, *Traces*, and "*Spaces*; tho' thoſe things conſiſt in the Truth of *Relations*, "and not at all in any abſolute Reality."

Ch. I. Mr. *Jackſon* concludes his Arguments for the Reality of *Space* with the old *Carteſian* Plea againſt a *Vacuum*, *viz.*

"If the *Space* or *Diſtance* between two Sides "of a Room be nothing, the Sides would join "together, *i. e.* they would not be *diſtant*, "having nothing between them."

We deny the Conſequence, and aſſign this plain Reaſon, *viz.* the Ideas of joining and not joining are really different Ideas, and therefore want nothing to hinder them from coinciding or to make them not the ſame Idea. However, the Interpoſition of another Idea will keep up the Diſtinction between them without any thing more. I mean, if we place a mere *ideal* or imaginary Object betwixt two others, it will prevent our conceiving the two others to coincide or become one, as much as a *real Object* would; or if we ſuppoſe even a bare *Poſſibility* of placing any thing between them, it will do the ſame: ſo far is it from being neceſſary that we ſhould conceive the two Sides of a Room to touch whenever we ſuppoſe no real thing between them.

But this has been conſider'd under the Third Argument, and is well handled by the ingenious Author of Dr. *Clarke's Notion of Space examined*,[q] to whom I refer.

Mr. *Jackſon* has one Obſervation more on this Head, *viz.* "That Space is diſtinct from the Or-"der and Poſition of things, becauſe the Idea of it is "the Idea of *Quantity*, which Order and Situa-"tion are not." I anſwer,

[q] Pag. 6—17.

[r] Pag. 92.

I. Space

Ch. I.

1. SPACE is not properly the Idea of *Quantity*, but of a *Capacity* to receive or admit Quantity, or rather any *quantum*; as the Diſtance betwixt the Earth and Moon is only a Capacity of receiving a Body equal in Length to 60 of the Earth's Semidiameters; tho' if we pleaſe we may apply theſe 60 Semidiameters to the *Diſtance itſelf*, and call that, Quantity of ſuch a Length: We may likewiſe affirm that it is *real*; for thoſe two Bodies are *really* ſo ſituated with reſpect to each other, and there's a certain Ground for our conceiving them aſunder. But ſtill there's nothing *between* them, no real Subſtance, Mode, or Property; I mean the Idea of their being ſo far diſtant does not require any, as has been ſhewn above.

2. *Order* is as much Quantity, or may have Quantity predicated of it with the very ſame Reaſon as *Space*: See *Leibnitz*'s Reply to this Argument below.[f]

HAVING hitherto endeavoured to ſhew the Inſufficiency of all that Mr. *Jackſon* has advanced in Proof of the real Exiſtence of *Space*, both in his general Obſervations and his ſeven particular Arguments; I ſhould now proceed, according to the Method laid down, to offer ſome poſitive Proof againſt the Reality of Space, but I find it more con-

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[f] "As for the Objection that Space and Time are *Quantities*, "or rather *things endowed with Quantity*, and that Situation "and Order are not ſo: I anſwer, that Order alſo has its Quan- "tity; there is in it that which goes before, and that which "follows; there is Diſtance or Interval. *Relative* things have "their *Quantity* as well as *abſolute* ones. For inſtance, *Ratio's* "or *Proportions* in *Mathematicks* have their Quantity, and are "meaſured by *Logarithms*, and yet they are *Relations*. And "therefore though Time and Space conſiſt in *Relations*, yet they "have their *Quantity*." Dr. *Clarke*'s Anſwer to this may eaſily be retorted with the ſame Force againſt Space either being or having Quantity.

venient

venient to defer this till we have conſider'd in like manner all that has been ſaid in defence of Dr. *Clarke's* Notion of *Time*, *Immenſity*, and *Eternity*, which muſt all ſtand or fall together with it.

CHAP. II.

Of TIME.

Ch. II.

WHAT has been ſaid above againſt the Reality of *Space*, will hold equally againſt that of *Time*, with regard to its being a *ſimple* Idea, its *forcing* itſelf upon us, its having *real Properties*, and being *neceſſarily infinite*. The only Difference between them is this, that of the two Space bids much fairer for Reality, ſince whatever it be, 'tis conceiv'd as exiſting *all at once*, whereas no two Parts of *Time* can be ſuppoſed to exiſt together: And to believe the real Exiſtence of a *Thing* or *Whole*, no two *Parts* whereof can be coexiſtent, muſt appear extraordinary to one who is not much governed by his Imagination. But having been ſo large in anſwer to the ſeveral Arguments and Suggeſtions brought to ſupport the Reality of *Space*, all which Anſwers are equally applicable and generally applied to *Time* alſo, I ſhall diſpatch it here more briefly, by firſt laying down the *Manner* of our acquiring this Idea, from the ſame excellent Writer who ſupplied us with the Account of Space, and then obviating the few diſtinct

ſtinct Conſiderations which Mr. *Jackſon* has be- Ch. II.
ſtow'd upon it.

"THE Idea of Time is a *common Receptacle*, as "well as Space: But it is not ſo eaſy to trace it "up to its Source, or to ſhow from what material "things the Idea was at firſt transferr'd. The "ſteady Motion of the Sun very probably might "give the firſt Hint, and furniſh the Mind with "the Ideas of *Succeſſion*, *Fluxion*, and *Duration*. "It might be obſerved that while the Sun performs "his conſtant Rounds, ſome things ſtart up and "live, and again ſink and die, and ſtill the Sun "continues his Courſe invariable and independently "of any thing in this lower World. The Idea of "conſtant flowing or marching, thus got and lodg'd "in the Memory, may be revived in the Imagina-"tion when the Sun is not ſeen nor thought on, "and applied to an imaginary Subject, called *Time*; "which ſhall be conceived to flow uniformly on, "and to take in all Exiſtences whatever. And "this ſerves for the regulating in our Minds the "orderly Succeſſion of things, and the regiſtering "them in our Memories, every whit as well as if "the Subject were material, and its Courſe viſible "and ſenſible. Thus Time becomes, in Idea, a "*common Receptacle*, independent of any particu-"lar Exiſtences, and applicable to all. Whatever "ceaſes to be, this is ſtill conceived to paſs regu-"larly on; and this Idea of *Independency*, joined "with *Infinity*, belonging to it as a *common Meaſure*, "renders the ſuppoſed Infinity *neceſſary*, in ſuch a "Senſe that we cannot but conceive that it has "been and will be always the ſame. Whether "there be any *real* Exiſtence commenſurate to this "Idea, is ſtill as much a Queſtion as ever. If "there be, we have contrived an Idea large enough "to receive it, and take it in; and the real Du-"ration of that Being will be independent of any

"thing

Ch. II. "thing but its Subject, while Time is conceiv'd,
"it only *imagines* to be ſo, by a Fiction of the
"Mind."

Mr. *Jackſon* allows that we get the Idea of *Time* from obſerving the Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds, or from the Motion of external finite things, which comes to the ſame, ſince theſe are only Ideas as contemplated in the Mind: He allows alſo that it is an *abſtract* Idea, and made by abſtracting this Succeſſion from theſe ſeveral Ideas or outward things[t]. But then his great Difficulty is to conceive how it ſhould become *neceſſary, infinite,* and *independent,* when theſe ſame Ideas or Things are not ſo: He concludes therefore that it is not a *Property* of theſe things; very true: and therefore that we are under a Neceſſity of conceiving it to" be a Property of ſome other Thing infinite and independent; quite the contrary. Therefore we are" under a Neceſſity of conceiving it to be, what it" really is, and what we ourſelves have made it, *viz.*" an *abſtract Idea*; or we are under a Neceſſity of" abſtracting from all Exiſtence at the ſame time that we conſider it. "It is plain, ſays Mr. *Locke*," "that *general* and *univerſal* (I add, ſuch as abſtract Ideas are) "belong not to the real Exiſtence" "of things; but are *the Inventions and Creatures* " "*of the Underſtanding*, made by it for its own" "Uſe, and concern only Signs, whether Words or" "*Ideas*. Words are general, when uſed for Signs" "of general Ideas, and ſo are applicable indifferently" "to many particular things; and *Ideas* are" "general, when they are ſet up as the Repreſentatives" "of many particular things: But Univerſality"

[t] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 52, 54.

[u] Ibid. both Places.

[w] *Hum. Und.* Book III. Ch. iii. §. 11.

"belongs

" belongs not to things themſelves, which are all " of them particular in their Exiſtence." 'Tis therefore the firſt and moſt diſtinguiſhing Property of an abſtract Idea, that it neither has nor can have any Ideatum or objective Reality; and the next, that it becomes an *independent* Meaſure capable of receiving the ſeveral Particulars from whence it was originally collected, without being confined to any.[x] But an Idea which is at once both *abſtracted* and in the *concrete*, which is ſuppoſed to have one Ideatum from which we receiv'd it, and another quite different, to which it belongs, is ſuch an Idea as has not been often heard of. Ch. II.

BUT let us ſee his Objection at full length. " The ſame Error hath poſſeſſed the Author of the " Notes with reſpect to *Time* or *Duration*. Taking " *accidentally* the Idea of it from Reflection on the " Succeſſion of our own Ideas, or of the Moments " of the Exiſtence of finite things, which may be " ſuppoſed not to exiſt, we are apt to think the " Idea of it, *hence abſtracted*, does not prove the " neceſſary Exiſtence of any thing; and that the " Idea of Eternity is wholly owing to the Opera- " tion of our own Minds. But — the Exiſtence of " Time or Duration has no neceſſary Connection " with or Dependence upon the Exiſtence of the " Objects from which we take the Idea of it.—It " is not the Idea of them or their Property. For " whether our Ideas have any Succeſſion at all, or " whether the heavenly Bodies move at all, or any " finite external Objects continue to exiſt at all, " Duration is the ſame invariable ſimple Idea. It " comprehends the Exiſtence of all finite tempo- " rary Beings, but is not comprehended by them:

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[x] See Note 1. to A. Bp. *King*, p. 6. 2d Edit.

"Duration must have existed *before* them, and "cannot but exist *after* them." [1]

1. The Idea of Time is not taken *accidentally* from reflecting on the Succession of our Ideas, or of the successive Existence of finite things, since we could not possibly get it any otherwise; nor can we retain it any longer than while we preserve the Idea of some kind of *Succession*, some *Change* real or imaginary. What Notion could we have of *fore* and *after*, if all things were entirely the same? Or how can we apply *Duration*, any more than *Motion*, to any Being, when there's not the least conceivable Alteration either in himself or others?"

This Author grants in the next Page, that "Duration can no more be conceiv'd with respect "to God, without *actual Succession*, than with re- "spect to the Existence of any other thing:" And whether we can conceive any *actual Succession* before or beside that of *finite changeable* things, shall be farther examined when we come to *Eternity*.

This Idea of *Time* then, as it wholly arises from and is founded on *Succession* of some kind or other, and, as our Author says, is *hence abstracted* by the Mind; it cannot but *be owing to the Operation of our Minds*, and consequently *does not prove the Existence of any thing real* beside those Successions which first occasion'd it, and that Power of the Mind which afterwards enlarg'd it, and does still preserve it, even when any of its former Objects are removed.

And therefore, 2. To speak of *the Existence of Time or Duration*, if any thing more be meant by it than the Existence of the *Idea*, is taking for granted the very Point in Question. 'Tis also af-

[1] Pag. 54.

[a] See Notes to *King*, p. 66, &c. 2d Edit.

serting

ſetting that it exiſts in its *Concrete*, in which only it can be ſuppoſed to *exiſt*, at the ſame time that it is abſtracted from it; or that it is an *abſtracted* Idea, and yet has a real correſpondent *Archetype*, contrary to the very Nature of all abſtract Ideas. Ch. II.

3. As this Idea (for I cannot allow it to be any more) is view'd under that Preciſion which we denote by the Word *Time*, it has indeed, as he aſſerts, *no neceſſary Connection with or Dependence upon the Exiſtence of the Objects from which we take it; it is not the Idea of them or of their Property*: True; on the contrary it is conceived by way of *Subſtance*, or imagined to ſubſiſt of itſelf, *independently* and *invariably*, as all abſtract Ideas are; it is likewiſe a common *Meaſure* for all *finite temporary Beings*, as ſome others are for all things of Value, Weight, Bulk, or Number; and laſtly, as a common *Receptacle* it *comprehends* them all, not excepting even the Deity himſelf, who is generally conceiv'd to exiſt *in* every Part of *Time*, as well as *Space*: Theſe I ſay are both conceived as independent on him (on whom nothing can be really independent) and including him, as well as every thing elſe, and therefore they are not conſider'd either as his *Attributes*, or the Attributes of any particular Being, and therefore can be nothing but mere *abſtract Ideas*.

THIS is the Point we have often inſiſted on, and muſt ſtill, to the Deſtruction, as we apprehend, of our Author's whole Cauſe. If he will endeavour to ſupport it here, and give any tolerable Satisfaction, he has but one of theſe things to do; either, firſt, To ſhew that an *abſtract Idea*, in Mr. *Locke*'s Senſe of that Word, can imply or even admit of any proper *Ideatum*; or, ſecondly, That thoſe above-mentioned are not the Properties of abſtract Ideas, and of conſequence that Space and Time may not be ſuch.

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He adds, [a] "And tho' *one* Moment of Duration "can but exist at once, yet every present Moment "is an immoveable and inseparable Part of Eter-"nity, and is necessarily connected with the Mo-"ment of Duration *past*, and the Moment *to come*, "without any possible Interruption or Vacuity, and "so Eternity is but *one*." I answer,

EVERY present Moment may be said to be *immoveable* till 'tis *past*, and then it vanishes and is no more. To *connect* this with the Moment preceding, which is gone, and the Moment succeeding, which is not come, is to connect it with two nothings; and an Eternity made out of this, will be *one*.... What? One *Moment*, if any thing; for it can never be a *Whole*, or one positive compleat Idea, as is already proved, [b] and will appear more fully below.

Mr. *Jackson* concludes with two Arguments for the real Existence of Time, drawn *ex absurdo* in the same manner as his two last were for the Reality of *Space*, and which may therefore receive the same Solution. The former stands thus:

"IF *Time* is *nothing*, then a *Child* is as *old* as "*Methuselah*, the Difference of Age being a "Difference of *nothing*, *i. e.* no Difference." [c]

I ANSWER with the learned Writer often refer'd to above,

1. THIS is what we are able to account for on our Principles, *viz.* That things may *really differ*, tho' the Difference said to be between them be *nothing real*, be no more than an abstract Idea: But

[a] Pag. 55.

[b] See Note 10. to *King*, pag. 47. 2d Edition, with the Reference.

[c] Pag. 95.

this

this is more than Dr. *Clarke* or our Author could do on theirs. Ch. II.

THEY that make Time a *Property* of God, must have a care of making it a Property of any thing else. It must adhere to his *Essence*, and be his only. An *universal* Attribute, in any other than a notional Sense, is a Contradiction, as was observed above.

SINCE therefore they have appropriated *Time* to God, they must answer for it if there be none left either for a Child or *Methuselah*, or if one cannot be shewn to be older than the other. As when they have made *Space* a Property of God's Substance, they can no longer say that it is the Property of any thing else; so when they have appropriated Time to God, they have discommuned every thing besides. Dr. *Clarke* indeed, after he had appropriated *Space*, contrived *particular Extensions* for Bodies; and so likewise Mr. *Jackson*, after he has made *Time the particular Duration of God* (as he does below) must find out *particular Durations* (let him not call them *Times* for fear of bordering on Blasphemy) for Attributes to every other Being: All which Beings have their individual Continuances, as much as God has his; which Continuances are also as distinct from that of the divine Nature, as their respective Substances are from his: Which one would think sufficient to convince our Author of the Absurdity of making *particular Attributes* of *Universals*, or any *Attributes* of mere *abstract Notions*.

2. THO' Time be only a *general* Notion (and therefore *nothing* real, all real Attributes or Accidents being *particular*, as before observed) yet the *Continuance* of this Child is shorter than *Methuselah*'s was, and therefore the Child is not so old as he: Just as the Reason why our Author is not *so great* as the Archbishop of *Canterbury* is, because his

Ch. II. his *Station* is lower than that of the Archbiſhop's; and yet 'tis no Conſequence that therefore *Continuance* and *Station* are two real things. *Price* is nothing but an abſtract *Idea*, and yet it does not follow that a *Shilling* is as valuable as a *Pound*. *Order* is only an abſtract Idea, and yet it does not follow, that a Prince is not above a Peaſant, or that a Difference of *Price* or *Order* is no *Difference*. *Death* is another abſtract Idea, and yet a *living* and *dead* Man differ. In like manner, tho' *Time* be nothing diſtinct from the things themſelves, yet ſome things *continue* longer, ſome ſhorter. Time is Duration in the abſtract, ſeparate from particular Exiſtences, and conceived as independent of any. *Particular* Durations may be *real*, as indeed they are, as much as any other real Accidents; and one Perſon may be as *really* older than another, as he may be *really* fatter or leaner, lighter or heavier. But it remains to be proved that *Time* is a *particular* Accident or Attribute, and not a common Standard or Meaſure made by the Mind. Put *God's Time* inſtead of *God's Duration*, and obſerve how odly the Expreſſion ſounds.

Mr. *Jackſon's* ſecond Argument for the Reality of *Time* is this:

" If *Time* be *nothing*, it would follow, that if " God had created the World *Millions* of " Ages ſooner than he did, yet it would not " have been created at all the ſooner."

" I ANSWER briefly, That if God had created the World Millions of Ages *ſooner*, it would have been really created ſo much the *ſooner*. But the Queſtion is, what is here meant by *ſooner*? As we have form'd an Idea, which we call *Duration*, and made it ſerve as a common Standard or Meaſure of all particular Continuances, and diſtinguiſh'd it

into

into certain Periods and *Epochs*, which we call *Times*, we can eaſily conceive theſe Periods of Duration independently of the periodical Motions which at firſt occaſioned them, or of any particular things which do *endure*; we can imagine them to ſubſiſt of themſelves, and to flow regularly on: to precede or follow each other, to be paſt or to come, as well to contain the ſeveral Beings which we ſuppoſe commenſurate to them; and we eaſily underſtand what is meant by a thing's being in a *Century* paſt or to come, being two or three *Olympiads* before or after another. There is a real Diſtinction in our Ideas, and we can carry on this Diſtinction *as far as we pleaſe*, even where there are no Differences in things to fix it: We can treat of any part of the *Julian Period* before the World began, or of the whole *Annus magnus*. We can add one of theſe Cycles to another, or place one of them between two others, and ſo on: By which means we may conceive any of theſe to be *ſooner* or *later*, &c. that is, ſooner or later than ſome others to which we compare them. For it is plain theſe Words are *relative*, (as well as high, low, near, far off) as indeed all thoſe muſt be which are applied to *Time*, which is itſelf a *relative Idea*; [a] and

[a] See *Locke*, B. II. Ch. xiv. "Firſt, *Time* in general is commonly taken for ſo much of infinite Duration as is meaſured out by and co-exiſtent with the Exiſtence and Motions of the great Bodies of the Univerſe, as far as we know any of them." Ch. xv. §. 6. "Secondly, Sometimes the Word *Time* is uſed in a larger Senſe, and is applied to Parts of that infinite Duration, not that were really diſtinguiſhed and meaſured out by this real Exiſtence and periodical Motions of theſe Bodies——but ſuch Portions too of that infinite uniform Duration, which we, upon any Occaſion, do ſuppoſe equal to certain Lengths of meaſur'd Time, and ſo conſider them as bounded and determined." *Ibid.* §. 7. and conſequently Time in this Senſe is as much *relative* as

Ch. II. and yet there is often a real Foundation for our
" conceiving these Relations (as well as for a Diffe-
" rence in Order, Place, &c.) that is, things really
" are or may be so related to each other. But this
" does not shew that these Relations are of them-
" selves real Substances or Attributes, or any thing
" different from the things so and so related, as ob-
" serv'd above. However we understand what is
" meant by predicating these Relations of things so
" existing, or Ideas so constituted, and have a clear
" Notion of sooner and later in any determin'd Parts
" of *relative Time*, as all this abovemention'd mani-
" festly is. But in Duration, where there are no
" such determinate Parts, or (as it is absurdly call'd)
" *Time absolute*, which Mr. *Jackson* here contends
" for, the Ideas of *sooner* and *later* are quite lost.
" Because (as the learned Author whom he cites has
" justly observ'd) there neither is nor can be any
" thing to refer to; just as the Notion of *higher* and
" *lower* is lost in the Idea of *Immensity*. For as
" higher signifies *nearer to the Top*, and lower *nearer*
" *to the Bottom*; so sooner, signifies *nearer to the Be-*
" *ginning*, and later, *nearer to the End*; which there-
" fore to apply where there's neither Top nor Bottom,
" neither Beginning nor End, is Nonsense.

" To this, which Mr. *Jackson* stiles the most plau-
" sible Objection that can can be offer'd, after some
" Circumlocution, he comes to reply,* by granting
" one Part of it, *viz.* " That the Idea of *higher* and
" *lower* is a mere Relation of finite things, there
" being in Reality no such thing, nor possible to

as in the other. See also Ch. xxvi. where he shews that all Words answering to the Question, *How long?* or *Where?* are necessarily relative; as also those other Words that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive Ideas, such as *young, old*, &c. §. 3, 4.

* Pag. 98.

" be

“be in abſolute infinite Space, yet (adds he) Time or Eternity (which are not the ſame, but two very different Ideas. See *Locke* above) “tho' infinitely infinite (*i. e.* negatively ſo, or indefinitely) conſiſting of *ſucceſſive* Parts of Duration or Continuance (and conſequently incapable of an abſolute Infinity. See an *infinite Series* below) “we have very clear and diſtinct Ideas of *ſooner* and *later*; not indeed with reference to a *Beginning* or *End*, there being no ſuch marks in it, (which yet the whole Objection was founded on, and not on the *Co-exiſtence* of their Parts, as he would inſinuate) “but with reference to any part of ſucceeding *Portions*, which we can eaſily conceive and aſſign to determine the Ideas of *ſooner* and *later* by.” *i. e.* If we conceive Time to be *relative*, and not elſe; or we may conceive things *relatively* ſooner or later, but not abſolutely ſo; which is the very thing aſſerted in the Objection. He explains himſelf farther in the following Page. “That Thing will be really *ſooner* or *later* than another Thing, the beginning of whoſe Exiſtence will be *nearer* to or *farther* from the preſent Moment of Time; which in both caſes is the Mark to which they are *referred*. *Yeſterday* therefore was really *ſooner* than *To-day* and later than the *Day before*; becauſe the ſucceſſive Moments of Time between the beginning of *Yeſterday* and the preſent Moment, are more than between the beginning of *To-day* and the preſent Moment; and it was *later* than the *Day before*, for the ſame Reaſon that *To-day* is *later* than *Yeſterday*: And *To-morrow* will be *ſooner* than the next Day, becauſe the ſucceſſive Moments of which it will conſiſt, are nearer to the preſent Moment of Time, than the Moments which will make the Day following.” All which is taking marks from the parts of *relative*, not *abſolute Time*, and

ſeems

Ch. II. seems to be making it all necessarily relative, at the same time that he is labouring to have it conceived otherwise. Nay, these successive Moments, Dr. *Clarke* would tell him, *are no aliquot or constituent Parts of infinite Time, nor bear any kind of Proportion to it; nor can be compared at all with it, or be the Foundation of any Argument in any Question concerning it*[f]. But it is only from comparing a thing with these portions of Time, that we can conceive it to be *sooner* or *later*, according to our Author; and therefore, according to the Objection, the very Notions of *sooner* and *later* are lost in Time *absolute*, where there neither are nor can be any such Portions to refer to.

As to the old Notion of the School-men, which he charges upon us[g], viz. a *Punctum stans*, or individual *Instant*; see the Answer given already from *Collier*, in *King's* Origin. p. 69. 2d Edit. or *An Enquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, Page the last.

ALL that our Author has advanced farther on this Head is contain'd in a remarkable Period, which he brings to support Both his foregoing general Arguments for the reality of *Time*; and it is this. "The Idea of the *particular Duration* of "God is the Idea of a *Property* whose Essence con-"sists in a *necessary Succession* of Parts both *from* "and *to* Infinity, which is the true Idea of *Time*. "And 'tis evident this Idea cannot be a *general* "Idea, abstracted from the particular *Continuances* "or *Durations* of sensible Things, which are nei-"ther *infinite* or *necessary*. If it was, the Conse-"quence would be, that the Idea of Time was the "Idea of a *finite* Thing; whereas the *Finiteness* of

[f] Demonstr. 3. Prop. p. 59. 2d Edit.

[g] *Existence and Unity*, p. 100.

a Time

"Time is impoſſible to be conceived. Therefore "it muſt be the abſtract Idea of the *Eternity* of a "*neceſſary exiſting Being*, and ſo can be only a "*Property* of God [a]." All the Abſurdities which we have been examining above ſeem to be crowded together into this one Paragraph.

1. He makes *Time* a *Property* of God, his *particular Duration*, and defines it to be a *Succeſſion of Parts* both *from* and *to* Infinity, which is the vulgar Notion of *Eternity*, not of *Time*; at leaſt by this Definition he will find it hard to diſtinguiſh it from the former, tho' he tries to do this afterwards: However the Definition, let it belong to which he pleaſes, is apparently abſurd, ſince there is no ſuch poſitive Infinity, *to* or *from* which theſe Parts can be conceiv'd to move.

2. He ſays, Time cannot be a *general Idea, abſtracted from particular Continuances*, becauſe theſe are not *infinite*: The very Reaſon why it may, and without which it could not be abſtracted from them. For if they were all infinite, there could be no general Idea made of them, I mean in that reſpect wherein they were infinite; 'twould be no greater nor in any thing different from each Particular, and conſequently would be no *General* at all.

3. *Time*, adds he, *muſt be the abſtract Idea of Eternity, and ſo can be only a Property of God*: Which, beſide the laſt mention'd Abſurdity, is alſo making it an *Abſtract*, and at the ſame time ſuppoſing it to be in its *Concrete*. What we conceive in the Abſtract can be a Property of nothing; and therefore as this is an *Abſtract* of Eternity, which is ſuppoſed to be one of the Divine Attributes, it

[a] Pag. 96.

Chap. II. cannot itself be also a Divine Attribute, or what our Author calls the *particular Duration of God*. I manifestly not able to account for his calling Time an *abstract Idea* of Eternity, except he means by these Words only *a partial Conception* of it, because Partiality, or *Precision*, as the Logicians term it, is one Property of abstract Ideas: (Tho', even here, 'tis hard to conceive how that which reaches *both from and to Infinity* can be term'd a *partial Conception*.) But then he should have remember'd that they have other Properties also, one of which is *Universality*, or a *Comprehensiveness* of all the Particulars they represent, and consequently they cannot be included in any one Particular, nor be received from a Property as large as themselves; nor consequently can *Time*, or any thing else, be an abstract Idea of *Eternity* in any tolerable Sense. In truth, our Author seems to be in very great Confusion whenever he treats of general *abstract Ideas*; or else is very inclinable to confound them with Particulars, in order to conceal the true Consequence, *viz.* that *Space* and *Time* are only such. The latter Case I am unwilling to suppose.

He adds, "And the particular Durations of other things can only be, in reality, their *Co-existence* with particular Portions of the Duration of God, whose Existence alone causes Time to exist, and to be just what it is, though no other Being in the World should exist." To this I shall only reply,

1. That if *enduring* (as well as being *extended*) be no real Property of other things, I cannot see in what Sense they can be *co-existent* with, or occupy any Portions of God's *Duration* (or Extension) were it capable of being distinguish'd into such real Portions.

2. 'Tis equally past my Comprehension how *God's Existence alone causes Time to exist*; how he

makes Time and Space, as Dr. *Clarke* and this Author affirm. In the proper Senſe of *cauſing* them, theſe muſt either be things diſtinct from the Divine Nature, or we muſt ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of God to cauſe his Attributes; neither of which Mr. *Jackſon* will be willing to allow: As to the metaphorical Senſe of cauſing, *viz.* their being *Conſequences* of the Divine Exiſtence, we have ſhewn of Time in particular, that it is ſo far from being *conſequent* on God's Exiſtence, that it is abſolutely *incompatible* with it, and cannot be apply'd to it without an expreſs Contradiction; the Idea either of actual or poſſible *Change* or *Succeſſion* neceſſarily accompanying all Time, as our Author himſelf allows; and *God's ſole Exiſtence* as neceſſarily excluding both; as will, I fancy, be allow'd by every one elſe. See more of this in the Remark c. to Note 10. *King*'s Origin. p. 66, *&c.* 2d Edit.[1] Ch. II.

CHAP.

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[1] "To ſet this whole Matter in a clearer Light, I will beg Leave to inſert a Section from Mr. *Leibnitz*, with Dr. *Clarke*'s Anſwer, and the Judgment of a Learned Writer upon it.

"God's Immenſity makes him actually preſent in all Spaces. "But now, if God is *in* Space, how can it be ſaid that Space is "in God, or that it is a Property of God? We have often "heard that a Property is in its Subject; but we never heard "that a Subject is in its Property. In like manner God exiſts *in* "all Time. How then can Time be *in* God? and how can it "be a Property of God? Theſe are perpetual Alloglotſies." *Leibnitz*'s 5th Paper, §. 45. p. 195.

"God does not exiſt *in* Space, and *in* Time; but *his Exiſt-* "*ence cauſes Space and Time.* And when, according to the "*Analogy of vulgar Speech*, we ſay that he exiſts *in all Space*, "and *in all Time*; the Words mean only that he is *Omnipreſent* "and *Eternal*, that is, that *boundleſs Space* and *Time* are ne- "ceſſary *Conſequences* of his Exiſtence, and not that Space and "Time are Beings diſtinct from him, and *in* which he exiſts." Dr. *Clarke*'s 5th Reply, p. 303.

[1] If

'If you desire to know which of *Leibnitz*'s Arguments appear 'to me to have been but very superficially answer'd by the Doctor, 'please to consider Sect. 45, 46. p. 194. Sect. 48. p. 196. 'Sect. 49. p. 206. Sect. 50, 51. p. 209. The Doctor in An-'swer to the 45th says, *God does not exist in Space and in Time.* 'But certainly according to the common, that is, the true Idea 'of Space and Time, he does exist in both. He exists here, and 'there, and every where, that is, *in all Space*; and also Yester-'day, and To-day, and for ever, that is, *in all Time.* But the 'Doctor adds, that *Space and Time are not Beings distinct from 'him.* Very right, but they are conceiv'd as if they were; in-'dependent of all Existence, common Receptacles for every 'thing. This makes up the Ideas, and at the same time shews, 'that they are nothing but Ideas lodged in the Mind. If the 'Doctor takes other *Ideas*, he may deal with them as he thinks 'fit. But he should not call them *Space* and *Time*, any more 'than he should call *Triangles Squares.* The Doctor says far-'ther, that *Gods Existence causes Space and Time.* That's true 'in one Sense: God makes Bees, and Bees make Honey: He 'makes Men, and Men make abstract Ideas. As to any other 'Sense it is ridiculous. He is as much the Cause of his *Exist-'ence*, as he is of his *Immensity* or *Eternity.* If you say there 'could be no such thing as Immensity and Eternity, unless God, 'who is supposed immense and eternal, existed, I admit your 'Supposition, and it comes to no more than this, That if there be 'not an immense and eternal God, there is not any thing im-'mense or eternal. From hence, it seems, the Doctor infers that 'God *causes Time and Space*, where he takes for granted what 'is manifestly false, that these Ideas are the same with the other, 'and then blunders further, in making Eternity and Immensity 'Consequences of his Existence; as if they were any thing di-'stinct from him; and as if Immensity and Eternity *in the Ab-'stract* were something *real*, as well as in the *Concrete.* With-'out this Supposition (which is apparently absurd) I see not how 'they can be properly called *Consequences.* If there exists an 'immense and eternal Being, what follows? That there exists 'an immense and eternal Being. Immensity and Eternity are 'necessary *Consequences* of Immensity and Eternity. This is all 'the Sense I can make of it.

CHAP. III.

Of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY.

I TAKE these two Notions together, because most of the Arguments I shall use against them are applicable to both. Ch. III.

I HUMBLY apprehend that the *Manner* of the Divine Being ought to be left in its proper *Incomprehensibility*, without determining positively upon it from any of our particular ways of conceiving things; and therefore I should be very unwilling to enter on these two mysterious Subjects, if I were not sensible that the Determinations already made of them by some Writers were not only rash and groundless, but also attended with the worst of Consequences; and, seemingly at least, destructive of the very Point they themselves proposed to establish, namely the Existence of a Divine Being. Now, the only Method, whereby we can come at the Certainty of a first Cause or God, is by shewing the Absurdity of an *infinite Series* of Causes and Effects. Till this is done, each of these Causes may be supposed to have only the same Relation to its particular Effects, as our Parents had to us, and in like manner to cease soon after it has produced

duced them; and there will be no one ſuperior to or independent of another; no firſt, immutable one to protect or preſerve the reſt, to ſupervise and govern them. So that the Suppoſition of an *infinite Series* will always lie in our way when we are going to demonſtrate the Being of a God: And this is not to be confuted by oppoſing it either as *one entire Whole which has no Cauſe within or without itſelf*; or *from its having been originally equally poſſible for none of it to have exiſted, and ſo that it muſt have been all determin'd into Exiſtence by nothing*[a]: For its Defenders will anſwer, that both theſe Arguments *deny* inſtead of *confuting* the Suppoſition. To talk of a *whole Infinite*, ſay they, is ſpeaking of an Infinite which is bounded and limited by its Parts, *i. e.* which is finite; for ſo the Term *Whole* ſignifies. To the former Argument therefore they reply, that an infinite Series of dependent Beings has no *Whole*, and conſequently does not want either an internal or external *Cauſe* for *all* of it: But as for each Link, That depends upon a Cauſe external to itſelf, tho' not to the Series; and therefore each has its ſufficient Cauſe, *viz.* the preceding one, which determines its Exiſtence in its proper Period. They will allow that 'tis abſurd to ſuppoſe a *finite* Series of cauſed Beings without ſuppoſing ſome Agent external to the Series capable of producing it, becauſe the firſt Link of it would be an Effect without a Cauſe. But in an *infinite* Series there is no Link without its prior Cauſe, and no firſt Cauſe at all, in which alone the Difficulty lies.

[a] See Dr. *Clarke's* Demonſtration, 2d Prop. and Mr. *Jackſon's* Exiſtence and Unity.

IN Answer to the second Argument they will deny, that it ever was equally possible for none of it to have existed, because there always actually were some Causes and Effects, *i. e.* this Supposition implies, that some Beings in the Series existed *ab æterno*, and consequently there never was a Time for that *original Possibility* which those Authors mention. This then is so far from being the only way of confuting an *infinite Series* [b], that it appears to be no way at all. But, as Mr. *Jackson* seems determin'd to abide by this Method only, I shall present him with a farther Account of its Insufficiency, even upon his own Principles. See the Margin [c].

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[b] *Existence and Unity*, p. 32.

[c] "Dr. *Clarke*'s second Proposition is, That there has existed "from Eternity some one unchangeable and independent Being: "If not, it is said, there must have been an infinite Succession "of changeable and dependent Beings, produced one from ano- "ther in an endless Progression, without any original Cause at "all. Which is absurd. It should have been here subjoin'd; "Or else, there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and "dependent Beings, one upon another, join'd and cemented to- "gether by a mutual and necessary Dependence of Cause and "Effect, arising from the fixed and unalterable Laws of their "Natures, which act one amongst another by certain establish'd "Rules, and according to which they always did act and ever "will: That is, there's a necessary Dependence of one Thing "upon another, owing to the intrinsic Nature of Things so de- "pending; which Nature of things is necessary and eternal, "and by which *Necessity* all these dependent Beings upon each "other are united together into one System. —— Or, which is "the same, there is a Series of Beings dependent upon each other, "which has a *Necessity* and *Cause*, and therefore a *Reason* of its "Existence from the Nature of the Things themselves, which "constitute this Series, and from which *Necessity* of their Na- "ture they obtain that Relation of Dependence upon each other, "which we observe in them. So that notwithstanding this Pro- "position and the present Demonstration of it, Atheism stands

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If therefore we will confute this Series to any purpoſe, we muſt encounter it directly, and from its own Nature; or, as Dr. *Clarke* ſays, from the Abſurdity of it, *conſider'd barely and in itſelf* [d], (in which way the Doctor did not like to meddle with it, for a very good Reaſon:) And this Abſurdity lies wholly in its being an *Infinite* made up of *Parts*, as we ſhall ſee preſently. But this Abſurdity is the ſame in a Series compoſed either of co-exiſtent or ſucceſſive Parts, and conſequently both theſe are to be excluded from the Deity himſelf, for the very ſame Reaſon that we believe a Deity at all. We ſhall otherwiſe expoſe ourſelves to the eaſy Attack of Infidels, who have nothing to do but turn our own Artillery againſt us, and may reduce us to the ſame Difficulties when we meaſure the Divine Being by Time and Space, when, in a ſhocking manner, we treat of his *Age* and *Extent*, which we charge on their *infinite Matter* or *eternal Generations* of Men.

THESE Abſurdities have been explain'd ſo fully, and made out unanſwerably by ſeveral eminent Authors, that one might think it ſufficient barely to refer to them, as was done in the 3d and 10th *Notes* to A. Bp. *King*, and the Remarks *b.* and *c.* 2d Edit. To which was added a Specimen of their way of Reaſoning on that Head. But, as Mr. *Jackſon* does not ſeem to enter into the Force of this

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"where it did, and the Queſtion ſtill returns, and is not yet "reſolv'd, Whether the Nature of Things is in itſelf eternal, or "whether it is derived from a ſupreme and intelligent Cauſe, "diſtinct from it." *Grove*'s Principles of Philoſophy, Book VI. chap. v. p. 763. He carries on the ſame Argument thro' Dr. *Clarke*'s five following Propoſitions, and ſhews that his *original Neceſſity* may with equal Reaſon be aſcribed to *univerſal Nature*, as to one *Firſt Cauſe*.

[d] *Demonſtr.* p. 19. 2d Edit.

kind of Reasoning, but on the contrary is still of Opinion, that an *eternal Creation*, or an *infinite Series* of *dependent* and *mutable created Beings*, neither has nor can be confuted, and undertakes to shew the Possibility of such a Supposition *; I think my self obliged to lay before him one or two of the many Arguments which may be brought against it in every Case, and which are of equal Force, be its Parts successive or simultaneous, dependent or independent. Thus, in an infinite Series of successive Generations, there will be several Infinites that are *Parts* one of another, and by consequence one *greater* than another; which is an express Contradiction; since the greater must necessarily bound the less, and exceed its Limits by so much as it is greater than it; *i. e.* must make it not infinite. Infinite Generations contain an infinitely greater Infinity of particular Men. An infinite Number of Men must have twice as many Hands, and ten-times as many Fingers, and so on. Infinite Time has an Infinity of Ages, these a much greater Infinity of Years, Days, *&c.* Space likewise has three Dimensions all infinite. Take then an infinite Surface, and it will contain an infinitely greater Infinity of Lines, and these another still greater Infinity of Points. The Case is the same in Number itself, which if you suppose it to contain an absolute Infinity of Thousands, (and you may as well do that as imagine it to comprehend an Infinity of Units) it will contain ten-times as many Hundreds, and these five-times as many Scores, and so on: Nay, all this is only the Indefiniteness of Number, which we in vain attempt to turn into a positive Infinite, and apply it to these several Subjects as was observ'd above. CH. III.

* *Existence and Unity*, p. 33, 34, 35.

Ch. III. Again, add one to any of these infinite Series of Generations, Ages, Lines, or Numbers, as you always find you can; and if they were absolutely infinite before, here's one more than infinite; if they only become so now, then one Finite added to another makes Infinite: If they are no bigger now, then one Part added to another adds nothing: All which are Absurdities. The same will appear if we substract a Part from this supposed absolute Infinite, which may be done in any of the forementioned Subjects, as well as in Motion, Magnitude, and every thing which admits of Parts, or may be taken to Pieces by the Mind. The Case is clearer still in Mr. *Jackson*'s Supposition of *an infinite Duration actually past*; which must imply an Infinite actually terminated both ways *.

Now is all this to be evaded by denying that these finite Quantities are *aliquot or constituent Parts of their several Infinites, or bear any Proportion to them*? Which is a Solution built on jumbling different Sciences together, and converting what may have a good Meaning in one, to another where it is all over Sophism, as was done in the Case of absolute and relative Motion above. In Mathematicks I take these Maxims to be just, where we consider Infinites not absolutely, or in themselves, but relatively, and with regard to each other only; *i. e.* they are applied to things which are of disparate kinds, and which bear no proportion to each other: In Metaphysicks I am sure they are wrong applied, to things of the very same Nature, and which must therefore bear a mutual Proportion; (as one Year,

* *Existence and Unity*, p. 83.

† See the Authors referr'd to in Note 3. p. 15, 16. 3d Edit. of Kor.

‡ Christ. Demonstr. p. 12, 13. 3d Edit.

of

or one Yard, does to another) nay to things which Ch. III.
consist one of another, (as a Year of Days, a Yard of Inches) and which are therefore as strictly related to and connected with each other, as the Ideas of a *Whole* and its *Parts*. In this way therefore of conceiving things, 'tis as necessary for an Infinite to include Finites, as for the General to include Particulars.

Infinite Space and *Time*, as far as these Words have any Sense in them, must consist of *finite* Spaces and Times. He that adds a thousand Yards or Years, adds one of each, and so does he that adds infinite: And the great Absurdity of all is in supposing an *absolute* Infinite to be capable of being made by any such Addition, or, which is the same, to belong to any of these Subjects: It will be contained in another Infinite ten times larger than itself, and may be destroyed by the Addition or Subtraction of an Unite, as we have seen.

WHAT has been said I should think sufficient to convince any indifferent Person of the Absurdities of an *infinite Series*, and also of the Weakness of that Pretence, about its *constituent Parts*, which yet is the only one that can be invented for its Support: And if this be not satisfactory to Mr. *Jackson*, he may see a farther Account of it below.[1] Now

[1] "Reason will assure us that to an absolute Nothing can bear "no Proportion to any real Quantity, for on the contrary, all real "Quantity, how minute soever, must of necessity bear some "Proportion to all other Quantity. For this Proportionateness, "being founded in the very Nature of Quantity consider'd absolutely or in itself, can't possibly be taken away by any merely relative Consideration of Excess or Defect. Wherefore, "since we are Witnesses of the actual Existence of a great Variety of quantitative Parts, 'twould follow that if the whole "was absolutely infinite, these finite Parts would severally bear "a Proportion to an absolutely infinite Whole. But if so, then

Ch. III. Now all these Absurdities follow from the Nature of an infinite Series, *as such*; from the Repugnancy between the Ideas of *Infinite* and *Series*, or from the Impossibility of an absolute Infinite being composed of those things which we can conceive as distinct from each other, as prior and posterior to one another, and which we must consider successively either in their Extent or Duration: And by consequence the same Absurdities will equally flow from the Infinity of Extension and Duration themselves, as was observed above.

THIS Consequence the Defenders of Dr. *Clarke* are fully sensible of, and therefore, notwithstanding all the foregoing Difficulties, they are inclined to allow of this *Series* in general, nay they seem to contend for it in an eternal Succession of created Beings, and yet think to avoid the other Conse-

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"such an infinite Quantity, by the Substraction of a single Par-
"ticle, would become finite. Consequently the Difference be-
"tween finite and infinite would consist but in a single quanti-
"tative Part, and absolute Infinity would be the Attribute of a
"certain determin'd Quantity: Than which nothing can be
"more absurd.

"Some I know have told us that finite Quantities, how great
"or small, how many or few soever, are not to be consider'd
"as *aliquot* or constituent Parts of an Infinite, but as mere ma-
"thematical Points, which bear no Proportion at all.

"But this is contrary to that Proportionateness which we have
"observed to be founded in the very Nature of Quantity. And
"since mathematical Points are mere Nothings, or Creatures of
"Imagination, 'tis in effect to say we must repute the several
"Parts of Extension, when considered with respect to the whole,
"as mere Nothings, divested at once of Extension and Existence.
"—I say, in general, 'tis to divest Quantity of its very Nature.
"For, for the same Reason that we deny any conceivable Part
"of Quantity to be proportionate, we shall be equally obliged to
"deny all others to be so. Yet such Absurdities we shall be re-
"duced to, if we will not allow the Opinion of an absolutely
"infinite Extension to be itself an Absurdity." *Collier's Imperial Enquiry*, p. 117, 118.

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quence, viz. of excluding the Exiſtence of a *Firſt Cauſe*, by aſſerting with Dr. *Clarke*, that the *whole* of this ſame Series would have been *originally* unneceſſary and without Foundation: Whereas the very Suppoſition excludes both *Whole* and *Original*, as has been often obſerved. Let them therefore truſt no longer to ſuch an Evaſion as any one that had a mind to ſet up for an Atheiſt, and underſtood the true Meaning of an infinite Series, would confute. Let them ſpeak out, and either defend the thing in all Caſes, and anſwer the foregoing direct Arguments drawn from the Nature and Idea of it; or elſe give it up in all Caſes; in eternal Motions, or Productions, or in *Time* itſelf, as well as in infinite Number, Matter, and *Space*: and own that they are all equally indefenſible. By which means we ſhall at length be led to that true *Infinite* or *PERFECTION*, which belongs to the Properties of an immaterial Being, ſuch as Power, Knowledge, Goodneſs, *&c.* which are the only Properties, as I apprehend, that we have good Reaſon and Authority to aſcribe to the Divine Being. [x]

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[x] A full Account of this kind of *Infinite* may be ſeen in *Cudworth's Intell. Syſt.* p. 647, *&c.* or in the Notes to *A. Bp. King*, p. 15, 99, *&c.* 2d Edit.

'Tis obſervable that moſt of the antient Philoſophers and Divines applied this Infinite only to the Divine Nature, and generally gave it the Name of *Perfection*. See *Colliber's* Hiſtory of the Word *Infinite*, *Impart. Enqu.* Part I. C. 2. or the Notes to the *Latin* Tranſlation of *Cudworth* by *Moſcheimius*, p. 174, 175, *&c.*

Suarez, Tom. II. Diſp. 30. p. 36. §. 11. Utrum demonſtrari poſſit Deum eſſe infinitum.

Finitum & infinitum, teſte *Ariſtotele*, proprie dicuntur in quantitate molis: Cum ergo hæc in Deo non ſit, ut ſupponimus, non poteſt eſſe hic ſermo de infinito ſecundum hanc proprietatem, ſed ſecundum eam tranſlationem, qua dixit *Auguſtinus* 6. de Trin. 6. §. *In his quamvis mole magna ſunt, idem eſt majus eſſe, quod melius eſſe.* *Vaſquez*,

Ch. III. THE same Medium which we made use of to shew the Impossibility of conceiving infinite Space and Time, viz. from their consisting of *Parts*, may be applied in Proof of the Incompatibleness of Space and Spirit, or the absolute Inconsistency of Extension and Thought in the same Being. And this is in like manner done to our hands by all those Authors [1], who have demonstrated that Matter cannot either think of itself, or have Thought in any wise superadded to it; since the very Reason why Matter

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Vasquez, Q. VII. Art. iii. Disp. 26. p. 95. Concluso est non posse esse Infinitum secundum quantitatem, aut magnitudinem continuam.

"The Truth is, this very Word *Infinite* confounds our Notions of God, and makes the most perfect and excellent Being "the most perfectly unknown to us: For infinite is only a negative Term, and signifies that which has no End, no Bounds, "no Measure, and therefore no positive and determined Nature, "and therefore is nothing: That an *Infinite Being*, had not Use "and Custom reconciled us to that Expression, would be thought "Nonsense and Contradiction, for every real Being has a certain and determin'd Nature, and therefore is not infinite "in this Sense, which is so far from being a Perfection, that it "signifies nothing real.

"But, since Custom has made it necessary to use this Word, it "is necessary to explain what we mean by it: That *an infinite Being* signifies a Being absolutely *perfect*, or which has all possible Perfections; which has no other End of its Perfections but "Perfection itself: That is a finite imperfect Being that wants "any Perfections; that is an infinite Being, not which has no "End of its Perfections, but which actually has all Perfections, and "can be no more perfect than it is: For there is a Measure of the "most absolute, and in this sense infinite Perfections, before which "no Being is absolutely perfect, and beyond which there are no "new Degrees of Perfection; for if we do not grant this, "there can be no Being absolutely perfect.

"As for instance, infinite Wisdom, Knowledge, Goodness, "Justice, Power have fix'd and set Bounds to their Perfections, "beyond which they cannot go. Infinite Knowledge and Wisdom knows all that are knowable, and that are wise, &c." *Sherlock's Vindication of the Trinity*, p. 77, &c.

[1] See many of them referred to in Note 7. to *King*, 2d Edit.

cannot

cannot admit of Thought, is, because 'tis extended, Ch. III.
or has distinct and distinguishable *Parts*? Which
is of the same Force against applying Extension it-
self to any cogitative Being, or Cogitation to any
extended Being, so long as ever we preserve the
Idea of Extension, (*i. e.* of *partes extrà partes*,) or
have any meaning to the Words. Some of their
Arguments are to this Effect:

IF Thought result from or be connected with a material Substance, then either all its Parts contribute their respective Shares of this Thought, or only one; if all of them furnish a Share, and the whole Aggregate of Thought be only the Sum of their respective Portions; then how can it be one single individual Consciousness? Or how come we by that new distinct Species of Thought, which is able to react on and review these several Parts, and compare them together? Can there be any more, or of a different kind in the whole, than there is in all the Parts? And have any one of these Parts by itself a Power of reflecting on itself and others? If not, how comes this new Power to be in the whole or in these Parts taken together? If you say that this Property of reflex Thought does not arise from or inhere in all these Parts, but in some one peculiarly: I ask, Is this one Part itself in like manner divisible? (as you must allow it to be *in infinitum*, or so long as it has Length, Breadth, and Depth.) If it be, the same Consequences will return upon it; if it be not, 'tis no Part of Extension, but something else; *i. e.* a simple unextended Being, which is the thing we contend for.

THESE Absurdities, which necessarily attend the Supposition of thinking Matter, or of superadding Thought to any Substance so long as it is *Matter*, arise only from its *Extension*, as we have seen, or from its being supposed to consist of *Parts*,

as in the former Case; and therefore they will be the same in all Substances to which this Property is applied, or which are conceiv'd to exist in, and be commensurate to, or co-extended, or co-expanded with the Points of *Space*.[a]

NOR will it be of any service here to call these *Continuums*,[b] to say their Parts are not *partable* ones, in a *material* or *corporeal* Sense;[c] not *actually* divisible, but only *ideally* so: For even these will equally hinder our conceiving it possible for such an indivisible Quality as Thought is, to inhere in them; these Parts will be equally distinct in the Mind, and as capable of having very different things (tho' not all the different things) predicated of them,[d] as those of *Matter* itself, the Difficulties of connecting Thought with which do not arise only from hence, that its Parts are so many *really different, divisible and discerpible Beings*, as Dr. *Clarke* maintains,[e] but from the Necessity we find of *conceiving* them as distinct and different in some Respects from each other, which is included in the very Notion of *Parts*, and belongs to all *compound* Beings *as such*. Let them be compounded of Parts homo-

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[a] See an Argument of Dr. *Clarke's* applied to the same Purpose in a Reply to Mr. *Clarke's* Defence of his Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, P. 38, 39, &c.

[b] See a Confutation of this in *Boyle's* Dictionary, p. 3079. and *Watts's* Essays, p. 149.

[c] *Evidence and Unity*, p. 105, 106.

[d] See *Boyle's* Dictionary, p. 3083, and below. Nay Mr. *Jackson* in the Close of his Book undertakes to shew that *real* Divisibility is not necessary to the Conception of *Parts* in Matter, which yet I dare say he will not affirm to be therefore capable of Thought.

[e] Defence of the Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, p. 87, 5th Edit. See a full Answer to it in Dr. *Watts's* Essays, p. 12, 13.

geneous

geneous or heterogeneous, ſo long as theſe are *Parts* in any Senſe of the Word, they cannot ſubſiſt in one another, or be identified; they muſt be conceived as diſtinct from each other, and have diſtinct Affections: [r] And conſequently this Argument will hold as ſtrongly againſt the Cogitation of a *long and broad Soul*, as againſt that of the Body which is ſuppoſed to contain it.

Dr. *Clarke* in his Diſpute with Mr. *Dodwell* was much preſſed with this Conſequence, which he terms *a conſiderable Difficulty*. [s] I apprehend it to be

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[r] "Thus he (*i. e. Spinoza*) is obliged to acknowledge that "Extenſion and God are but one and the ſame thing, and, becauſe he maintains that there is but one Subſtance in the Univerſe, he muſt needs teach that Extenſion is a ſimple Being, "and as much uncompounded as mathematical Points. But "is it not a ridiculous Aſſertion, and contrary to our moſt diſtinct Ideas? Is it more evident that the Number One Thouſand is made up of a thouſand Units, than 'tis evident that a "Body of a hundred Inches is made up of a hundred Parts really "diſtinct one from another, each of which has the Extenſion of "an Inch?

"It were in vain to raiſe any Objections againſt our Imagination and our Senſes: For the moſt intellectual and the moſt "immaterial Notions diſcover to us, with the utmoſt Evidence, "that there is a moſt real Diſtinction between things, one of "which has a Quality which the other has not. The School-men "have been very ſucceſsful in ſhewing the Characters and infallible Signs of Diſtinction: When, ſay they, one may affirm of "one thing, what cannot be affirmed of the other, they are diſtinct: Things that may be ſeparated one from another, either "with reſpect to Time or with reſpect to Place, are diſtinct. If "we apply thoſe Characters to the twelve Inches of a Foot of "Extenſion, we ſhall find a true Diſtinction between them. I "can affirm of the fifth, that it is contiguous to the ſixth, and "I can deny it of the firſt and ſecond, &c. I can remove "the fifth into the Place of the twelfth, and therefore it may "be ſeparated from the fifth, &c." *Bayle's* Dictionary, Article *Spinoza*, p. 2790. See a Paſſage from the ſame Author in *King's* Origin. p. 28, &c. 2d Edit.

[s] Defence of the Letter, p. 87. 5th Edit.

Ch. III. something more; at least 'tis such a Difficulty as I believe his Defenders will never be able to get over.

I HOPE this Notion of *Extension* be too grofs, and carry along with it too notorious Marks of Imperfection to be applied to any thinking Being, much less should we presume to attribute it to that most pure and perfect Being, who is without the least Composition of Parts, as well as the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

PASS what has been said, we may in some measure judge of our Author's Notion of the Divine *Immensity*, which is attended with all the forementioned Difficulties and many more. I shall just mention one or two of them.

IF the Divine Substance be infinitely extended, then there will be Part of it in this Place, and Part in that; one Part will be greater or less than another; above or below; to the Right or to the Left of another: It must be commensurate to all particular Beings, and some will occupy more, some less of its Dimensions. By this Account it will be very proper and philosophical to speak of a Yard or a Mile of the Divine Being; to say that God is not in *Heaven*, but only a *Part* of him; † and that "an Elephant or a Mountain, a Whale or a wicked "Giant, have more of the Essence or Presence of "God with them than the holiest or best Man in "the World, unless he be of equal Size." ‡ All which are at least very harsh and grating Expressions.

THE *Properties* of the Divine Being must likewise be consider'd in the same manner with his

† See Dr. *Waterland*'s First Defence of some Queries, p. 294. first Edit.

‡ *Watts*'s Essays, p. 11.

Substance,

Substance, and we shall have a Piece of his Knowledge, Power, Goodness, &c. in this and that Place; and greater or less than another, in Proportion to the several Parts of his Dimensions, each of which will be equally entitled to its respective share: and this, I think, is a Supposition more harsh, if possible, than the former. CH. III.

In the Divine Attributes are not to be consider'd by way of Parts; (which yet belong to them for the very same Reason that they do to the Subject, and must necessarily be applied to both or neither.) If they be said to exist *compleatly* in every Point of this immense Expansion; then every Part of this Expanse will be omniscient, omnipotent, &c. by itself, and an Inch of it will have as much Wisdom, Goodness, &c. as a Yard or a Mile; and instead of one infinite Wisdom, Goodness, &c. we shall have Millions. For as these Parts of the Substance are conceiv'd distinctly, and one individual Part is not another; so must the *Properties* be likewise, and the individual Power, Knowledge, &c. of one Part will be distinct from that of another [z]; and if so, then these distinct Properties must either inhere wholly in every Part, or a Portion of them in each; we have no other way of conceiving them to inhere at all.

This might be sufficient to shew us the Unreasonableness of supposing *unextended* Attributes in a Subject *extended* [y], or of applying such Properties to a Substance as not only cannot be proved to have any relation to it, or answer the Idea of Properties when so applied; but which cannot even be connected with the Substance, or which may be shewn not to belong to it, in any such manner as

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z See Dr. *Watts's* Essays, p. 132, &c.

y See Dr. *Waterland*, ibid.

other

other Properties belong to their respective Subjects.

I know no way of acquitting our selves here, except we declare with Mr. *Jackson*, that these are only Attributes or Properties in such a Sense as *Existence* is an *annexed Property*[a]; (which is using the Word in a very large Sense indeed) or answer with Dr. *Clarke*, that these are Properties *sui generis*, and that have a peculiar manner of inhering in their Subjects; which is the shortest way to get clear of all Difficulties.

But it is time to come to our Author's Arguments for the Divine OMNIPRESENCE, which he cannot conceive otherwise than by a *local Presence*, or as *co-extended* with the Parts of Matter. "It is agreed, I think, on all hands, that God is "some way or other *present every where*, or hath "an *infinite Presence*; whence I conclude, that the "Existence of Space must be a necessary Conse-"quence of the Existence of his Substance: For if "God is *present every where*, his *Substance* (with-"out which he cannot be present at all) must exist "*every where*, and consequently have an *infinite* "*Expansion*. As God cannot be *present* where "his Substance is not, so neither can he *act* "where his Substance is not; nor can his *Attri-"butes*, by which he acts, exist, where he himself "the Agent, or where his Substance (in which the "Attributes exist) does not exist."[b] All which might be sufficiently answer'd by asking, *Why not?* Is it necessary that he should act by *Contact*, like Bodies? This our Author will not affirm[c]; and if he may act without Contact, why not at any Di-

[a] Pag. 108.

[b] *Existence and Unity*, p. 100, 101.

[c] Pag. 102.

stance,

ſtance, and without any *local Preſence* to the thing on which he acts? Nay, what Idea have we of local Preſence without *Contact*, any more than of Contact without *Solidity*? Or in what caſes is a *real Preſence* neceſſary where neither of theſe are required? Our Author allows that even a Body does not always act by Contact[a]. Is it therefore a Power of acting where it is not? or does it always act by being *really and ſubſtantially* preſent to the Thing acted on? And how can it be really and ſubſtantially preſent to any Thing, but by the Contiguity of its Parts? When our Author ſhews us how Matter can either be preſent to or act upon any Thing without touching it, I will engage to ſhew him how an immaterial, unextended Being is ſo too, and may be conceiv'd to act without any Regard to *local* Preſence. But to be a little more particular.

1. 'As to the Maxim That nothing can act where 'it is not, all the Truth that is in it (ſays an in-'genious Writer, who was no Enemy to the real 'Exiſtence of Space) is no more than this, That 'there can be no Communication of Action and 'Paſſion between two Beings, where there is not 'every thing neceſſary to that Communication. 'But how does this prove God or the Souls of Men 'to be extended, and to exiſt in Space, becauſe 'Body does? Becauſe Body exiſts in Space, can 'nothing act on Body, but what exiſts in Space 'too? This is not ſelf-evident. There is certainly 'ſomething in the Nature of Spirit to make it capable of acting upon Body; but it does not follow 'that that Something muſt be Exiſtence in Space, 'becauſe Body does ſo exiſt. If that Argument 'were good, it would prove more than is intended:

[a] Ibid.

[b] It

Ch. III. 'It would prove that there can be no Communication but between Subſtances of the ſame kind.'

The Error which ſeems to have led our Author into all theſe Difficulties is, his *running into the Notion of Subſtance and Accident*[a]: The former has been long conceiv'd by way of a *Subſtratum*, wherein all the ſeveral Powers or Qualities of every Being are ſuppoſed to *inhere*, which contains and ſupports them, and conſequently beyond which they cannot reach. And theſe ſeveral Powers or Qualities, be they ever ſo *eſſential* to the Thing conceived, ſhall yet be diſtinguiſh'd from its real *Eſſence* by the Name of *Accidents* or Properties; ſhall be ſuppoſed to *ſtick on*, and be *under-propped*[c] by an unknown and unknowable *Subſtance* or *Subſtratum*; and accordingly Philoſophers are obliged to invent as many of theſe *Subſtrata*, as there are particular Beings in Nature, ſome of them larger, ſome leſs, and one immenſely large, which is to be the *Baſis* of all the Divine Perfections. Now, as this ſame Subſtratum, in the very Name and Notion of it, includes ſome kind of *Extenſion*, and is uſed to be apply'd to Beings of all kinds, or of what ſort of Qualities ſoever they conſiſt, the Maintainers of it are led on to affirm, that every Thing which exiſts is extended, or that Extenſion is included in the Idea of Being in general, in Being as ſuch: They muſt apply it to all ſuch Qualities as Power, Knowledge, Goodneſs, *&c.* which neither have, nor can be ſo much as conceiv'd to have the leaſt Relation either to a Subſtratum, or to Length, Breadth, and Depth: which can neither inhere in or flow from the one, nor (which is much the ſame) be co-extended, or co-expanded with the other.

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[a] *Locke* on *Hum. Und.* Book. II. chap. 13. §. 20.

[c] *Locke*, ibid.

In the first Note to Abp. *King*, 2d Edit. I had endeavour'd to shew, that this *Substance* is a mere *abstract Idea*, without any real Foundation in Nature, and just intimated both the Uselessness and ill Consequence of it in Philosophy. I have no occasion to enlarge on this Point since I find it thoroughly discuss'd by Dr. *Watts* in his second Essay; which I must think our Author is particularly concern'd to answer, tho' he has not yet taken the least notice of the Subject.

3. If we set aside this scholastic Notion of a *Substratum*, (which should have been proved a little better before so much was built upon it) then there's an end of all the Difficulties either concerning God's *infinite Presence*, or his *Attributes* acting *without* and *beyond their Substance*[f]; acting where that is not, or where they themselves are not, &c. For as the Perfections of Knowledge, Power, &c. are allow'd by Mr. *Jackson* to have "no Parts and no Extension, and must be conceiv'd "to be individually every where[g];" and as Dr. *Clarke* supposes, that "Extension does not belong "to Thought[h], and that it is improper to say an "Ell or a Mile of Consciousness[i]:" So for the same Reason, say we, none of the Powers or Perfections of the Deity have any Relation to an *extended Substance*, in Whole or in Part; they are neither *within* nor *without* it, they neither act *beyond* nor *beside* it; they are present *no-where*, in the Sense of *local Wherenes*[k]; or as a Body is present;

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[f] *Existence and Unity*, p. 101.

[g] Ibid. p. 109.

[h] Answer to the 2d Letter.

[i] Answer to the 6th Letter.

[k] See *Watts*'s Essay 6. §. 5.

Ch. III.

ſent; but *every where*, to all the Ends and Purpoſes of a Spiritual Being [l]. The Knowledge and Power of God ſees and influences every Thing in every Place; and as theſe are nothing more than partial Conceptions of his individual Nature or Eſſence, we muſt conceive that wherever, and in what manner ſoever theſe Perfections are preſent, (which they cannot be by way of *Extenſion*, as is allow'd on all hands) there, and in the ſame manner, and indeed for that very Reaſon, he *himſelf* is *really and eſſentially* preſent [m], ſince theſe ſeveral Perfections are what really conſtitute the *Eſſence* [n], or, which is the ſame, make up our *Idea* of it, and give us all the *poſitive* Conceptions we are able to receive of that adoreable Being, whom we believe to be *of infinite Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs*, as well as *without Body, Parts, or Paſſions*.

THE Difference then between us and our Author comes at laſt to this: We allow that "God "is ſome way or other preſent every where," but yet deny his Concluſion, that therefore "God muſt "have an infinite Expanſion." We think it is too

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[l] See *Watts*'s Eſſay, p. 167, &c.

[m] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 103.

[n] "As far as I can judge, all this Talk of the *Eſſences* of "Things being unknown, is a perfect Miſtake: And nothing "ſeems clearer to me, than that the *Eſſence* or *Subſtance* of Mat-"ter conſiſts in Solidity, and that the Eſſence or Subſtance of a "Being, diſtinct from Matter, muſt conſiſt in want of Extenſion, "and is truly defined *an unextended Being*. For nothing "can be conceived to be co-extended with the Parts of Space "(if I may ſo ſpeak) but what is ſolid. And therefore to make "immaterial Being extended (as Mr. *Clarke* does) is to make "immaterial Being material; which indeed is but of a piece "with his making an extended Being indiviſible, tho' he has no "other Reaſon to make all Matter diviſible, but becauſe it is "extended." Anſwer to Mr. *Clarke*'s 3d Defence of his Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, p. 83.

great

great Presumption to assign the particular *Mode* of his Existence; such an one especially as is neither agreeable to the Nature of an absolutely perfect Being, nor in the least necessary to the Exercise of any one Perfection which can be proved to belong to him [o]. We allow him to be *present* (if our Au-

Ch. III.

[o] "Extension is of no use but where there is a Multitude or "Diversity of Parts; and such a compound Being can never be "absolutely perfect, because it is made of Parts which are not "absolutely perfect, as no Part can be; and ten thousand im-"perfect Parts can never make up an absolutely perfect Being: "And if what is infinitely perfect can have no Parts it needs "no Extension, and can have none: For what is extended has "assignable Parts, whether they can be divided or not. *Omni-"presence* is a great and unquestionable Perfection, but to be om-"nipresent by infinite Extension (if such a thing could be) would "be no Perfection at all; for this would be to be present only by "Parts, as a Body might be which is infinitely extended; and a "Body is as capable of infinite Extension, as any Man can con-"ceive a Spirit to be; and yet if a Spirit be omnipresent, only "by infinite Extension, the whole Substance of that Spirit is not "present every where, but Part of it in one Place and Part in "another, as many Miles distant from each other, as the Places "are where such Parts of the omnipresent Spirit are. This all "Men will confess to be absurd; and yet if the whole Mind "and Spirit be present every where, it is certain it is not present "every where by way of Extension; for the whole Extension "of an infinitely extended Spirit is not present every where: "And, if Omnipresence itself cannot be owing to infinite Ex-"tension, no Man can tell me, why an infinite Mind should be "extended at all: For Extension itself is no Perfection. Much "less do any other Virtues or Qualities of Bodies deserve the "Name of absolute Perfections, and therefore we must seek for "absolute Perfection only in a Mind; perfect Wisdom, Know-"ledge, Power, Goodness, Justice, make an absolute perfect "Mind; there are no other absolute Perfections but these, and "therefore there can be no other absolutely perfect Being but an "infinite Mind." *Sherlock's* Vindication of the Trinity, &c. p. 80.

"But now, if we could suppose the very Substance of the "blessed God to be really long, broad, and deep, and to be "actually extended thro' the whole Universe of Matter, and "thro'

thor will insist upon this Term) in the only way that we can conceive a *Spirit* to be present; in a much more perfect way, as we apprehend, than by being *stretched* or *spread out*, by having his Parts *diffused* or *dispersed* every where; which is the plain English of *Extension* or *Expansion*, and what they really amount to.

If our Author will have a Name for such sort of Presence, Philosophers and Divines have offer'd several, as Presence by *real Virtue*, *Force*, and *Vigour*; by *Energy*, *Activity*, *substantial Power*, &c.[p] We had much rather content ourselves with affirming, that it is in a manner purely spiritual and incomprehensible; neither need we, nor ought we, I think, to go any farther, except we would destroy the essential Difference between Body and Spirit, and make the Deity altogether such an one as ourselves.

We endeavour to preserve clear Notions of the several Perfections of the Deity, in general, or of the Nature of these Qualities themselves, without attempting to explain the *Manner* how they exist or are united together; there being, as Mr. *Jackson* observes[q], "an Incomprehensibleness in the

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"thro' all imaginary Space, what Advantage would be gain'd "by it toward the aggrandizing of his own Majesty, or our "Ideas of him? What could he do more by this supposed infi-"nite Extension of his Substance than to be immediately con-"scious of all things, and to have an immediate Power and In-"fluence upon all; to know all Possibles, and give them Exist-"ence when he pleases? And this is as fully and as honour-"ably attributed to him, in my way of thinking, without any "of those Inconveniences, and those harsh and absurd Ideas and "Speeches which arise from attributing Extension with all its "Consequences to the Great and Blessed God." *Watts*. Essay, vi. p. 169.

[p] See *Cudworth*, p. 776, 780.

[q] *Existence and Unity*, p. 110.

Manner

" Manner of every Thing, about which therefore " no Controverſy can or ought to be concerned ;" and how Mr. *Jackſon* came to forget this ſo long, or what he has been doing all the while beſide endeavouring to determine the *Modus* of the Divine Nature, is paſt my Comprehenſion. He will not aſſert that Extenſion or Inheſion in a Subſtratum is abſolutely neceſſary to the general Nature or Idea of Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Power, or any other of the Divine Attributes as they are commonly diſtinguiſhed ; neceſſary to *the Things themſelves, and their Reality* :[t] How then come we to be at all concerned either with *Extenſion* or a *Subſtratum* ? I know no other End of introducing theſe Terms, but to fix and aſcertain the *Modus*. This is what our Author muſt ſtill be labouring at, whether he perceives it or not ; I am ſure if he did not appear to me to be doing this, and at the ſame time pitching upon a very improper and unworthy *Modus* both of the Exiſtence and Attributes of God, he would have no Controverſy with me about them. Ch. III.

But, 2dly, Mr. *Jackſon* can never come into any other Notion of *Omnipreſence* than by Extenſion, becauſe it will lead to the *School Jargon* of " *Totum in Toto, & Totum in qualibet Parte*, [u] " which is ſomething if poſſible worſe and more " contradictory than *Tranſubſtantiation* itſelf ; [w] and " which, with reſpect to the *Subſtance* of God, " is errant Nonſenſe. But, adds he, [x] " the perſonal " *Properties* having no *Parts* and no *Extenſion*,

[t] Ibid.

[u] Pag. 109.

[w] Pag. 102.

[x] Pag. 109.

" muſt

"must be conceiv'd to be individually every where:" And what is this but the very *Totum in Toto* which he had been declaiming against? This Principle our Author finds himself obliged to maintain at the same time that he is charging it upon us as one of the greatest Absurdities.

As to the Maxim itself, I have not much to say for it. The Terms *Whole* and *Part* are neither very proper nor intelligible when applied to God; they are relative Ideas of Number,[x] and belong only to finite material Substances, to which alone Number is applicable. If we will transfer them to Beings of another kind, we must understand the Word *Whole* only *negatively*, as Dr. *Cudworth* observes,[y] *i. e.* as implying that in immaterial Beings there is *not* one *Part* of them beyond another, nearer or farther off than another; or that they are not at a greater distance from some of the Parts of any material Being on which they act, than from others; or that they have no Relation at all either to *Division* or *Distance*. If we take the Words in this Meaning, they may serve as well as any others that are entirely borrowed from Sense and Imagination; that are made not for the World

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[x] *Whole* and *Part* are perfectly relative: But the positive Ideas, to which they properly and immediately belong, are Extension and Number, of which alone *Whole* and *Part* are Relations. *Locke* Hum. Und. B. I. Ch. iv. §. 6.

[y] "Wherefore the Word ὅλον in this Form, when it is said "that the *whole Deity* is in every *Part* of the World, and the "*whole Soul* in every *Part* of the Body, is not to be taken in a "*positive Sense*, for a Whole *consisting of Parts*, one without another; but in a negative only, for οὐ μεμερισμένον, *an Whole* "*undivided*: So that the Meaning thereof is no more than this, "that the *Deity* is not *dividedly* in the World, nor the Soul *di*"*videdly* in the Body, a Part here and a Part there; but the τὸ "θεῖον is πανταχοῦ ὅλον καὶ μὴ μεμερισμένον, *every where, all of it* "*undividedly*." *Cudworth*, p. 782.

of

of Spirits, but the World of Bodies." But as we shall have more of this below, I will dismiss it at present with a Passage from Dr. *Fiddes*, which may be enough to satisfy our Author that there is nothing of Popery in the Doctrine. Ch. III.

"IT is not an express Contradiction that the "Divine Essence should be whole and entire in "every Point, and yet but one and the self-same "Being, without Multiplication, in all Points: "This way of Reasoning is allowed to hold cer- "tainly and demonstratively good, with respect to "corporeal Substance, which consists of distant and "separable Parts, and therefore it is invincibly "applied to overthrow the Doctrine of *Transub- "stantiation*: But when it is form'd upon our Ideas "of incorporeal Substance, which is indivisible, "without Parts, and, strictly speaking, without any "intelligible Points, it is altogether inconclusive; "as proceeding from an Impropriety of Expression "which we are necessitated to employ, and not "from the real Nature of the thing. For that it "cannot proceed from the Nature of the thing, is "argued from the Impossibility of conceiving how "an immaterial Substance should be otherways uni- "ted to, or co-existent with corporeal Substance, "than by being all and entire in every Part of it. "Either immaterial Substance must be whole and "entire with every Part of the corporeal Substance "it has an immediate Communication with, or else "it must only be united to it Part by Part; so that "their several Parts shall be equally co-extended. "But this is to confound the Notion of extended "and unextended Substance, and to make that di- "visible, which is confessedly in its own Nature "indivisible.

[a] See *Watts*. Phil. Ess. p. 163, &c.

"AND

" And if this Argumentation be juſt in reſpect " of the Soul of Man, as united to his Body, or " to the principal Parts of his Brain; for the Rea- " ſons hold equally good in both Caſes; it will " ſtill hold with greater Force, in reſpect to the " moſt pure and infinite Being, whoſe Nature im- " plies the moſt perfect Simplicity, and who may be " ſaid, in the ſtricteſt Senſe, and without a Figure, " to be *All in All.*" [a]

IN the laſt Place, Mr. *Jackſon* alludes to an Argument that had been propoſed by a celebrated Writer, and which he ſays is the greateſt Difficulty he has met with. I ſhall beg leave to inſert it here in full, and then take notice of Mr. *Jackſon*'s Anſwer.

' YOUR Hypotheſis ſuppoſes that the ſame ſelf-' exiſtent *Subſtance* is every where diffuſed and fills ' all things. Now may it not be proper to aſk ' whether the Subſtance ſpoken of be *ſpecifically* ' or *numerically* every where the ſame? Is the Sub-' ſtance, for Inſtance, which pervades my Chamber ' the ſame *individual* or *numerical* Subſtance with ' that which penetrates the Sun, Moon, or Stars, ' or any thing elſe whatever? If it be, then the ' ſame *numerical* Subſtance will be greater and leſs, ' and equal to itſelf, will contain and be contained ' by itſelf, with a thouſand other Abſurdities. If ' you ſay it is not *numerically* the ſame, what can ' you call it but *ſpecifick*? And then every Part ' of this Subſtance being an intelligent Part, that ' is, an intelligent Being, or Agent, here will be ' many intelligent Subſtances inſtead of one, and ' as many Gods as there are Subſtances, at leaſt as ' many *Perſons*, according to your Notion of Per-' ſon, as there are Parts.

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[a] Theol. Spec. p. 92, 93.

' AGAIN,

'AGAIN, I ask whether the *Attributes* of that Ch. III.
'Substance which fills my Chamber be the same individual numerical Attributes of that which penetrates the Sun, and is commensurate to it? 'You will answer this perhaps in the *negative*. For, 'as it is evident that the *individual* Extension of 'the one is not the Extension of the other, so the 'same Reason seems to hold for any other Property 'or Attribute. And since it is a Principle with 'you, that an Attribute cannot be where the Sub-'stance, to which it belongs, is not; and since it 'is manifest that the Substance which pervades the 'Sun is not in my Chamber, it evidently follows 'that the Attributes of those two Substances, or 'Parts of one Substance, are not *numerically* the 'same in the strict or proper Sense. Therefore the 'Wisdom, the Power, the Goodness, *&c.* of the 'one is not *numerically* the same with those of the 'other. Here then arises a Difficulty. Are the 'Attributes of each distinctly *finite* or *infinite*? 'You will not say that the Extension of either is 'infinite, being limited and finite; and therefore 'the other Attributes, consider'd as inhering in par-'ticular Parts, are also finite; and, since nothing can 'act where it is not, and there is no infinite Power, 'Wisdom, *&c.* in any Part of this Substance, it seems 'there can be no Act of infinite Power or Wisdom 'any where at all, unless all the Parts contribute 'toward it, that is, unless they act where they 'are not.

'IF you say that every Part can exercise any 'where, or at any time, the Power of the whole; 'then what you deny me of the Substance you'll 'be obliged to grant of every Attribute (which is 'equally strange and unaccountable) that it is *To-'tum in Toto*, and *Totum in qualibet Parte*, and 'so at last we may shake Hands.

"If the Universe be finite, as I suppose you will allow, it can bear no Proportion to infinite, but may be consider'd as a mere *Point* within the infinite Substance which contains it: And that Part of the Substance which is commensurate to it, is but a Point in comparison to the Whole. Now either the Strength, Wisdom, &c. of the Whole is gather'd into this Point, and therefore acts where it is; and then the other Parts have none left, or it remains with them; and then it either acts not at all, or where it is not. Take which way you will, I will venture to predict that you will come to no better or wiser Solution than the *School-mans Cant of Totum in Toto, &c.* which you reject with some Scorn."

Mr. *Jackson* answers this like one resolv'd to answer where there is really nothing to be said. First, he maintains that "the Parts of the Divine Substance are not *numerically* but specifically the same, consider'd as Parts." In the next Page he affirms, that "the whole infinitely expanded Substance is as much one *individually*, or *numerically*, as if it had no Parts at all, if that was possible to be." Which I take to be allowing the Argument in expres Terms, as well as giving up his former Position. As to the Divine *Attributes* he says, "Every one is an individual Property of the whole Substance, Agent, or Person, and cannot be conceived to exist of Parts at all." The same he repeats throughout the four following Pages. Which is just what the learned Objector had told him, *viz.* he is obliged to grant that of every Attribute which he denies us of the Substances

[b] Pag. 105.

[c] Pag. 106.

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stance, and which, as the same Writer observes, is equally strange and unaccountable.

I SHALL only add an Illustration which Mr. *Jackson* has given of the Point before us; and which I should think fully sufficient to discover the Weakness of his Cause. [a] "The *whole Wisdom*, "and *Power*, and *Goodness* of God, &c. exist every "where at once, being not capable of Extension "by their Natures; but the *whole Substance*, which "is necessarily expanded, cannot so exist. Just as "this *individual Moment of Time* (which the Ob-"jector will allow to be an Attribute of Body) is "the same individual Moment in the whole Uni-"verse, and cannot be divided, even in Idea, into "more individual Moments, even tho' the *Sub-"stance* or Being, to whose Existence it is attri-"buted, was infinitely extended."

I ANSWER, The Objector, I believe, will neither allow *Time* to be an *Attribute* of Body, nor this same individual *Moment* to be a *Part* of Time. Time is an independent Standard, set up, as we have seen, to measure all changeable Existences whatever, and can be an *Attribute* of nothing that I know of, except a Clock or a Sun-dial. 'Tis also divisible *in infinitum*, or so long as it is Time, in the same manner as Extension has distinct Parts so long as it is Extension; and a Moment or Instant is no more a constituent Part of the one, than a mathematical Point is of the other. A Person must be hard press'd before he would bring these for *Instances of unextended Attributes in a Subject extended.*

FROM what has been said it may appear, that tho' we do not maintain our Author's Notion of *local Presence* (which in a Being purely immate-

[a] Pag. 108.

CHAP. VIII. rit) is not eaſy to be underſtood) nor any ſuch Preſence as can be repreſented to the *Imagination*, (which is indeed the Ground of all the Objections againſt it) yet we hold ſuch a Preſence as belongs to all intellectual Beings, and which may be conceiv'd by our Ideas of *Intellect*; 'tis the actual Influence and Operation of a *Power* on its *Object*, which is all the Preſentiality it is capable of, except it were render'd viſible or tangible, *i. e.* made ſomething elſe. 'Tis preſent, if this Author pleaſes, to the *Parts* or *Points* of *Extenſion*, but in ſuch a manner as Beings of different kinds muſt neceſſarily be preſent to each other; and to ſay that they muſt all be preſent in the ſame way, or elſe they are *not preſent in rerum natura*, or do *not exiſt at all*, is affirming that they muſt be all of the ſame kind, or not be at all; for which we might expect ſome better Proof than a bare Aſſertion.

IT has alſo no Relation to *greater* or *leſs*, [s] to *finite* or *infinite*, or any Part of Quantity; and therefore can no more be a *Point* or a *Moment*, an Inſtant or an Atom, than a Yard or a Year; nor can its Exiſtence be commenſurate to, or at all compared with either.

"To conclude; Tho' ſome, who are far from "Atheiſts, may make themſelves merry with that "Conceit of *thouſands of Spirits dancing at once* "*upon a Needle's Point*; and tho' Atheiſts may "endeavour to *rogue* and *ridicule* all *incorporeal* "*Subſtance* in that manner; yet does this run upon "a clear Miſtake of the Hypotheſis, and make no-

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[s] See *Cudworth*, p. 779.

[t] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 102. See a full Anſwer to this in *Cudworth*, under *Extenſion and Unity not the ſame*, p. 779, 780.

[u] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 102. See *Cudworth* on *Incorporeals no Points nor Parvitudes*, p. 777.

"thing

"thing at all against it; forasmuch as an *unex-* Ch. III.
"*tended* Substance is neither any *Parvitude*, as is
"here supposed (because it hath no Magnitude at
"all) nor hath it any *Place*, or *Site*, or *local Mo-*
"*tion*, properly belonging to it; and therefore can
"neither dance upon a Needle's Point, nor any
"where else." *Cudworth*, c. v. p. 778. See also the Notes to the *Latin* Translation, p. 782, 783.

So much in answer to what our Author has advanced concerning Space and Time, as well as the Divine Immensity and Omnipresence. I had before given my Notion of *Eternity*, as contradistinguish'd from his, in the Notes to A.Bp. *King*,[h] to which, as he has thought fit to make no other Reply beside barely asserting the contrary, and saying that he *cannot at all see the Force of the Reasoning*,[i] I shall make no farther Addition than just to remind him once more, that the Design of it was neither to explain the *Modus* of the Divine Existence, nor to give us an *Idea* or *Imagination* of Duration *unsuccessive*, but only to shew the Possibility of conceiving an *Eternity* in *Intellect*, by joining the Ideas of Stability, Permanency, and Immutability, &c. with that of pure *Existence*, and cutting off all Change, Motion, Succession, &c. from it[k]: which

[h] Remark I. p. 66. 2d Edit.

[i] *Existence and Unity*, p. 55.

[k] I have lately met with the same Sentiments in a very clear Writer, from whom I shall cite a Passage, in hopes that our Author will more easily see the Force of his Reasoning. "If all "*created Beings* were taken away, all Possibility of any *Mutation* "or *Succession of one Thing to another* would appear to be also "removed. Abstract Succession in Eternity is scarce to be un-"derstood. What is it that succeeds? One Minute to another "perhaps? [*velut unda supervenit undam.*] But when we ima-"gine this, we fancy that the *Minutes* are Things separately ex-"isting, which keep on their own Course, tho' there were no "Being

which is so far from being only an *unreasonable Pugnacity of the School-men*[1], that it has been the

"Being at all existing. This is the common Notion, and yet it "is a *manifest Paralogism*. Time is nothing but the Existence of "created successive Beings, and Eternity the *necessary Existence* "of the Deity. Therefore if this necessary Being hath no Change "or Succession in his Nature, his Existence must of course be "unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double Oversight in this "Case: First, we find Succession in the *necessary Nature* and "*Existence* of the Deity himself, which is wrong: — And then, "we ascribe *this Succession* to Eternity, considered abstractedly "from the *eternal Being*, and suppose it [one knows not what] "a Thing subsisting by itself, and flowing one Minute after an- "other. This is the Work of *pure Imagination*, and contrary to the "*Reality* of Things. Hence the common metaphorical Expres- "sions, "Time *runs* apace." "Let us *lay hold* on the present "Minute:" And the like. The Philosophers themselves mis- "lead us by their *Illustrations*: They compare Eternity to the "Motion of a *Point*, *running* on for ever and making a *traceless* "infinite Line. Here the Point is supposed a *Thing actually sub-* "*sisting*, representing the *present Minute*, and then they ascribe "*Motion* or *Succession* to it; that is, they ascribe Motion to a "mere Non-entity, to illustrate to us a successive Eternity. "Hence all the Perplexities of a *past Eternity*, made up of *finite* "*successive Parts*: and hence the Contradiction of a *Punctum* "*stans*; tho' in this Case a *Punctum stans* is no more a Contra- "diction than a *Punctum movens*: For in truth the *Punctum* is "nothing at all, either to *stand still* or *move forward*. As to the "Expression *nunc stans*, by which some *School-men* have chosen "to describe Eternity; it certainly implies opposite Ideas if ap- "plied to *our Existence*, or if our manner of Existence be ap- "plied to the *Deity*. For then we make [*nunc*] a relative Term, "which hath a Reference to *past* and *future*. But this is a wrong "Application; and if once we allow an *all-perfect Mind*, which "hath an eternal, immutable, and infinite Comprehension of *all* "*things*, *always*, (and allow it we must) the Distinction of *past* "and *future* vanishes with respect to *such a Mind*, and the Ex- "pression *nunc stans* will appear to have Propriety. In a word, "if we proceed Step by Step, as above, the Eternity or Existence "of the Deity will appear to be, *Vitæ interminabilis tota simul* "*& perfecta possessio*, how much soever this may have been reck- "oned a Paradox hitherto." *Enquiry into the Nature of the hu-* *man Soul*, Note the last.

[1] *Existence and Unity*, p. 100.

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tain'd by Men of the clearest Heads among the Moderns, Men who have shewn no great Regard to the Schools on other Occasions. I shall mention one or two, and refer to the Note above for an Account of many others.

"Tho' we cannot *conceive* (says Mr. *Locke*[a]) any "Duration without Succession, nor can put it together in our Thoughts that any Being does now "exist To-morrow, or possess at once more than "the present Moment of Duration; yet we conceive the eternal Duration of the Almighty, far "different from that of Man, or any other finite "Being; Because Man comprehends not in his "Knowledge or Power all past and future Things, "&c." Mr. *Locke* alludes to the same Notion in the beginning of his Chapter of *Infinity*, and expressly distinguishes the *incomprehensible Infinity of the Great God*, from our *Idea* of Infinite as apply'd to *those Things which have Parts, and are capable of Increase or Diminution, such as Space, Duration and Number*[b].

"What Relation or Analogy there is between "*Time* (a Flux of Moments) and *eternal* (unchangeable) Existence; how any Being should be not "older *now*, than he was 5000 years ago, &c. are "Speculations attended with insuperable Difficulties. Many Philosophers therefore have "thought themselves obliged to deny, that God "exists in *Time*." *Wollaston*, Relig. Nat. P. 69. Note *a*.

"We should observe, that it is not the Defect "of our Imagination, that we cannot conceive an "infinite Extension, but Reason tells us, that there

[a] King's Origin. p. 69, 72. 2d Edit.

[b] Book II. chap. 15. §. *ult.*

[b] Book II. chap. 17. §. 1.

"neither

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" neither is, nor can be any such Extenſion, but " what may be extended farther; now what can- " not be, cannot be a real Thing. It is exactly " the ſame Caſe in Numbers: There neither is " nor can be an infinite Number, becauſe there is " no Number ſo great, nor can any Number be " ſo great, but it may be made greater by adding " to it: ſo that Numbers, Extenſion, and the ſame " may be ſaid of *Time* and *Succeſſion*, are called " Infinite; not that they have any real and poſi- " tive Infinity, but becauſe we can add to them " without End; which is a Demonſtration that " they neither are, nor can be infinite; for what is " infinite, is capable of no Additions: And there " can be no Number, Extenſion, or *ſucceſſive Du-* " *ration*, but what is capable of infinite Additions, " and therefore is at an infinite Diſtance from be- " ing infinite." *Sherlock. Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, p. 77.

" And though Eternity in a Succeſſion of deter- " minate Durations was proved to be impoſſible, " yet it is certain that ſomething muſt be eternal, " either Matter, or a Being ſuperior to it, that " has not a Duration defined by Succeſſion, but is " a ſimple Eſſence, and eternally was, is, and ſhall " be the ſame. There is nothing contradictory to " itſelf in this Notion: It is indeed above our Ca- " pacity to form a clear Thought of it, but it is " plain it muſt be ſo, and that this is only a De- " fect in our Nature and Capacity, that we cannot " diſtinctly apprehend that which is ſo far above " us." *Burnet*, Art. 1. p. 23. 4th Edit.

" THE *ſame Objections* have conſtantly lain a- " gainſt the *Eternity of the World*; and theſe have " been ſtrengthened by ſeveral *other Arguments* " drawn from the many *Abſurdities* and *Inconſiſt-* " *encies* that ſeem to be implied in the Notion of " *Eternal Succeſſion.*" *Gaſtrel on Religion in ge-* *neral,*

neral, p. 66. See also *Stillingfleet's Vindication of the Trinity*, p. 285. Ch. III.

NUMBERLESS are the Writers which might be produced to the same purpose [p], but we shall have occasion to say something more of this under the Head of *necessary Existence*. I proceed therefore to the Arguments already promised against Space and Time, and their Infinity; several of them are indeed interspers'd with the Parts going before, but, as I have met with them collected and put into a Form which adds new Light and Force to the Cause I am engaged in, and as they cannot but be acceptable to all such who have any Inclination to see what may said for it, I shall take the Liberty to lay them entire before the Reader.

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[p] See a List of them in *Mosheimius* his Latin Translation of *Cudworth*, p. 780. and his own Opinion. p. 781.

CHAP. IV.

Arguments against SPACE and TIME.

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1. IN the first place I maintain, That Space and Time are not Properties or Attributes of any Thing. All things are conceiv'd to exist in Space and Time. But to exist in an Attribute or Property, which must exist in something else, is Nonsense. Space and Time are considered as absolute Things, independent of any thing: But Attributes and Properties depend on their respective Subjects. Farther, if Space and Time be Properties, they are the same with *Extension* and *Continuance*. But it is manifest they are not so conceived. *Space is extended*, and *Time continues*. These are proper Expressions, answering to the common Sense and Reason of Mankind. But to say that *Extension is extended*, and *Continuance continues*, is mere Solecism and Impropriety. What can be the Reason of this, but that the Ideas Men have of Space and Time are very different from what Dr. *Clarke* supposes? And this sufficiently betrays the Weakness of his Hypothesis.

Is it be pretended that the *Vulgar* only think differently from him in this Particular, that is a Mistake. Propriety of Language is deeper founded than so; and there's no surer Mark, whereby we can discover what Ideas have been affixed to Words by the concurrent Judgment and Joint-consent

consent of Mankind, than by observing what Expressions will bear and pass current in strict Propriety of Speech, and what will not. And I suppose the Doctor, in forming an Argument from the *Ideas* of Time and Space, must take the *Ideas* as they are. For if he takes *other Ideas*, giving them the Names of *Time* and *Space*, then the Argument from the Ideas of Time and Space ceases, and becomes no Argument at all. Ch. IV.

2. If it be true in general, that Space and Time are not Attributes of any thing, it must be true in particular, that they are not Attributes of God's Substance. And this is farther manifest from the palpable Impropriety of such Expressions as these: *The Space of God's Substance, and the Time of God.* His *Extension* or *Duration* might sound well enough; because these two Words denote Attributes or Properties. There may be some Impropriety in the *Thought*, but there's none in the *Expression*; the Reason whereof is because Extension and Duration are consider'd as Attributes, and refer to some Subject. But *Space* and *Time* are consider'd as absolute Things, independent of any Subject. *Time* and *Space* are not God's Eternity and Immensity, nor Parts of them, but very distinct from them, and therefore can be nothing but *abstract Ideas*.

3. All things (according to our way of thinking) are conceived to exist in Space and Time. God himself exists *in all Time*, and is present *to all Space*; but who ever heard of a Substance existing in one of its Attributes, or of its being present to one of its Properties? Such a way of speaking is harsh and unintelligible, and is an Affront to the common Sense of Mankind.

4. If Time exists, it exists *sometime*; and if Space exists, it exists *somewhere*. Which being ridiculous and not Sense, it is plain that they do not exist, but in Idea only.

CH. IV. 5. If *Time* and *Space* exist at all, they exist *neceſſarily*, and are *always* and *every-where*. But Yeſterday is not, and To-morrow is not. And, ſince no Part of Time is neceſſarily exiſting, the Whole cannot be ſo: Wherefore *Time* is nothing *ad extra*, it's an Idea only. As to Space, every Part of it is finite, and confined within certain Bounds; wherefore no part of it is neceſſarily-exiſting; wherefore the Whole of it is imaginary only, a Fiction of the Mind.

6. TIME and *Space* are moſt eaſily and naturally accounted for, ſuppoſing them to be only partial Conceptions of a Subject, conſider'd as having only one Property. *Somewhat* perpetually flowing or continuing is the Idea of Time. *Somewhat extended* is the Idea of Space; in like manner as ſomewhat conſider'd only as *ſolid*, is the Idea of *firſt Matter*. Any thing thus partially conceived under ſuch Preciſion and Formality is manifeſtly an abſtract Idea, and nothing more. The other Attributes apply'd to Space are *negative* only. There's nothing poſitive but *Extenſion* and its Modes, which confirms our preſent Suppoſition.

SINCE therefore Time and Space may be ſo eaſily accounted for, and no ſound Philoſophy will allow us to multiply Entities without occaſion, it is very unreaſonable to believe, that they are any thing more than Ideas of the Mind.

7. IF Space is a Property, it muſt have a Subſtratum or Subject; and that Subject will be extended, ſolid, diviſible, and will have all the Properties of Matter. For, tho' we do not conceive two Surfaces in the Diviſion of the Parts of Space, nor apprehend any Solidity while we conſider it as pure Extenſion, yet if we conſider the Subject ſuppoſed to fill it, no Reaſon can be given why it ſhould not be both diviſible and ſolid, as all extended Things (ſo far as we know) certainly are.

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If you think it proper to apply to the Subject all the negative Properties of Space, it will not only be indivisible, immoveable, and unresisting, but *unactive* and *unintelligent* too. For Length, Breadth, and Thickness are as far from Action and Thought, as they are from Division into two Surfaces, Motion or Resistance. Chuse you then which way you will, you'll find yourself hamper'd with inextricable Difficulties. I affirm you can give no Reason why the several Parts of the *Substratum* of Space are not divisible, moveable, and impenetrable, figured, &c. like all extended Matter, but what will equally prove that they are without Action, Thought, Will or Understanding. The Result of which is, That your Hypothesis makes God corporeal.

8. If the Substratum of Space should happen to be solid (and no imaginable Reason can be given why it should not) your Hypothesis not only makes God corporeal, but in consequence makes every Part of the material World a Part of his Substance, (there being no Room for any else) and if this be not an Absurdity great enough, there's another follows on the Back of it; that there can be no Motion where there's no Room to move in.

An extended Substance must consist of extended Parts, that is, of extended Substances, and will be so much the thicker and denser in proportion to the Number of Parts and their Constipation. A cubick Inch of the Substratum of Space will have a greater Quantity of Substance in it than a cubick Inch of Gold; will be more close and compact, more dense and solid, and can admit of no *Motion*, because it admits of no imaginable *Vacuity*.

† *Essence and Unity*, p. 90.

Upon

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UPON the whole we find, as the Idea of Extenſion is at firſt borrowed from Matter, ſo whenever it is carefully purſued it leads us to Matter again. The *Carteſians* were very right in making *real Extenſion* and *Matter* equivalent or commenſurate one to the other; and their only Miſtake was in ſuppoſing a real Extenſion *ad extra*, where there is none.

I HAVE been content, for the ſake of Brevity, to omit ſeveral good Arguments againſt our Author's Notion of the Divine Immenſity and Omnipreſence, ſuch as theſe;

THAT an extended Subſtance is really nothing elſe but *aliud extra aliud*, a multitude or heap of Subſtances.

THAT one Magnitude cannot ſwallow up another, nor can there be any Penetration of Dimenſions.

THAT every thing extended is alſo *ſolid* and *diviſible*.

THAT there can be no Activity, Life or Thought, no Intellect, Appetite or Volition in an extended Subſtance as ſuch.

THAT it is Nonſenſe to ſuppoſe one Part of Life or Thought to inhere in one Part of the Subſtance, and a Part in another, and therefore the Whole muſt be *undividedly* both in the *Whole* and in every *Part*.

THESE and the like Conſiderations have been touch'd upon above, and are well explain'd in Dr. *Cudworth*, who gives us a full Account of the Reaſonings *pro* and *con*.

I SHALL tranſcribe only a Paſſage or two from him; "By this time we have made it unqueſtion-
" ably evident, that this Opinion of *incorporeal*
" *Subſtance* being *unextended*, *diſtinct*, and *devoid*
" *of Magnitude*, is no novel or recent thing, nor firſt
" ſtarted in the *ſcholaſtick Age*, but that it was the

" general

" general Perſuaſion of the moſt antient and learned " Aſſertors of *incorporeal Subſtance*; eſpecially that " the *Deity* was not Part of it *here*, and Part of " it *there*, nor the *Subſtance* thereof *menſurable* by " Yards and Poles, as if there were ſo much of it " contained in one Room, and ſo much and no " more in another, according to their ſeveral Di- " menſions; but that the whole *undivided Deity* " was at once in every Part of the World, and " conſequently no where *locally*, after the manner " of Bodies." [q]

In another Place he ſays thus:

" HAD every *twentieth* or *hundredth* Part of " this *Extenſum*, not the whole of a *Life* or *Mind* " in it, but only the *twentieth* or *hundredth* Part " thereof, then could none of them have any true " *Life* or *Mind* at all, nor conſequently the Whole " have any. Nor indeed is it otherwiſe conceiv- " able, how a whole Quantity of extended Sub- " ſtance ſhould be *one Thing*, and have *Perſona- " lity*, one *I myſelf* in it all, were there not *one indi- " viſible Thing* preſiding over it, which *held it* all " together, and diffuſed itſelf thro' all. And thus " do we ſee this WHOLE IN THE WHOLE AND " IN EVERY PART (do Men what they can) will " like a Ghoſt ſtill haunt them, and follow them " every where. But now it is impoſſible that one " and the ſelf-ſame *Subſtance* ſhould be both *ex- " tended* and *unextended*: Wherefore, in this Hy- " potheſis of *extended underſtanding Spirits* having " one *Part* without another, there is an undiſcerned " *Complication* of *two diſtinct Subſtances*, *extended* " and *unextended*, *corporeal* and *incorporeal*, both " together, and a *Confuſion* of them into one." [r]

[q] *Cudworth*, P. 776.

[r] Id. p. 814.

He concludes with great Candour and Moderation, like a wise and good Man, in these Words:

"IT is not our Part here to oppose *Theists*, but *Atheists*. Wherefore we shall leave these *two sorts of Incorporealists* to dispute it out friendly amongst themselves; and indeed therefore with the more *Moderation*, *Equanimity*, and *Toleration* of Dissent mutually, because it seemeth that some are, in a manner, fatally inclined to think one way in this Controversy, and some another. And, whatever the Truth of the Case be, it must be acknowledged that this latter Hypothesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some in Theism, who can by no means admit of a *Deity*, or any thing else *unextended*."

I SHALL shut up this Head with a Passage of St. *Austin*, who was once inclined to this Hypothesis, but found Reason afterwards to reject it. *Qui dixerit Deum non distendi per locos neque finitos, neque infinitos, quasi in aliqua parte major, in aliqua minor; sed totum ubique esse præsentem, sicut veritatem, cujus nemo sobrie dicit partem esse in isto loco, & partem in illo, quoniam veritas ubique Deus est.*

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[a] M. p. 833.

[b] Epist. 56.

CHAP. V.

Of SELF-EXISTENCE and NECESSART EXISTENCE.

MR. *JACKSON* having uſed theſe two Terms promiſcuouſly, I find it neceſſary to conſider them together, but ſhall diſpatch them very briefly; ſince the learned Author of the DISSERTATION annex'd has obliged us with ſo full a Confutation of Dr. *Clarke*'s Opinion on the Point. I have therefore only to take notice of what Mr. *Jackſon* offers diſtinct from Dr. *Clarke*, or what relates particularly to myſelf. Ch. V.

HE enters on this Subject with ſtating the Queſtion, and explaining the *Nature and Ground of the Controverſy*; in which I cannot but obſerve ſome Degree of Art;

1ſt, IN his repreſenting us as denying, or at leaſt doubting of, the *Unity* and *abſolute Perfection* of the Deity; whereas we profeſs to believe both, and are only oppoſing the pretended Demonſtration of them *a priori*.

2dly, IN his mixing ſeveral indirect Arguments *ex abſurdo*, [a] in Proof of the foregoing Points, with the Demonſtration *a priori*, tho' they have no manner of Relation to it, and from which therefore

[a] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 67.

Ch. V. that Demonſtration (which alone we are concerned to oppoſe) can borrow no Support, how much ſoever it may appear to want it.

Lastly, In his pleading ſo largely for the great Uſefulneſs and Expediency of this ſame Argument *a priori*, by diſparaging all others, and yet being ſo ſparing in his Attempt to ſhew it to be a true concluſive Argument, which is the chief Part of the Difficulty.

It may be proper to take ſome further notice of the two former Particulars when we come to his diſtinct Arguments for the *Unity*. The laſt is ſufficiently expoſed in the following DISSERTATION.

THE Argumentative Part of Mr. *Jackſon*'s Book begins at *Page* 14. Among the ſeveral Sorts of abſtract Ideas I mentioned mix'd Modes and *Relations*, and under the laſt Head included Identity and *Neceſſity*.[r] Mr. *Jackſon*, probably for want of a diſtinct Pointing in the Edition he refers to, happens to miſtake the Paſſage, as if Neceſſity had been brought for one of the Inſtances of a *mix'd Mode*, and then deſires me to tell him of what it is mix'd or compounded. "Has it, ſays "he, any Degrees or Parts in it? Is it not, on "the contrary, the moſt ſimple, uniform and in-"variable Idea that can poſſibly be conceived in "the Mind? And being ſo, it cannot be a mere "abſtract Idea and Work of the Mind, but muſt "refer to an objective Reality, or Subject *ad extra*, "of which it is a real and poſitive Property."[s] I anſwer,

[r] Pag. 67, &c.

[s] Note to *King*, p. 7, 2d Edit.

[t] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 14, 15.

NECESSITY

NECESSITY is always *relative*, and as ſuch can be nothing more than an abſtract Idea or Work of the Mind: [a] In the preſent Caſe it may denote the Relation or Connexion between the *Manner* of the Divine Exiſtence, *i. e* Uncauſedneſs or Independency, and actual immutable Exiſtence, or an Impoſſibility of ever beginning or ceaſing to be. [b] In which Senſe I had term'd it merely *conſequential*, and intimated that it aroſe wholly from the abovementioned *Negation* of Cauſality or Dependence in that Being, which is therefore ſaid to exiſt of itſelf, or be *ſelf-exiſtent*. From this *Independence* or *Uncauſedneſs* it was alſo ſhewn that eternal or immutable Exiſtence might be inferr'd in the ſame negative way, or from the Abſurdity of ſuppoſing *ſuch* a Being ever to begin or ever ceaſe exiſting; without having recourſe to any poſitive Ground or Reaſon conceived as the *Cauſe*, or prior to the Exiſtence itſelf; without that *abſolute antecedent Neceſſity* which our Author contends for. [c]

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[a] See *Locke* above, p. 36.

[b] See Note 4. to *King*, 2d Edit.

[c] See Note 4. to *King*, and Remark a. 2d Edit.

I have the Pleaſure to find this Way of Reaſoning confirmed by a very able and judicious Writer. "Wherever there is a "*Change* there is a *Cauſe* of that Change; otherwiſe there would "be a Beginning without a Cauſe. The Cauſe of Change in a "Being muſt be either external or internal. But there can be "no external Cauſe of Change in an independent Being, who "exiſts without Cauſe; for then he would be a dependent Be-"ing, dependent on other Beings or Things for Powers, Attri-"butes, and Qualities, which had no Cauſe; which is a Con-"tradiction.

"And for a Being who exiſts without Cauſe to have in him-"ſelf a Cauſe of Change, that is, a Cauſe of not being what he "is, is likewiſe a Contradiction.

WHAT Mr. *Jackson* has objected to this Method of arguing shall be considered in its Place.

He proceeds; "If Necessity of Existence was "the *Work of the Mind*, and a *mere Negation*, it "would be no Contradiction to suppose Nothing or "no Being necessarily existent, and so the Exist-"ence of the first Cause would not be *necessary*." [d] I answer,

THO' *Necessity* of Existence in his Sense of that Word be a mere Fiction of the Mind, and in ours only a Consequence resulting from the negative Idea of Independence, or rather independent Existence; yet it will be a Contradiction to suppose no eternal Being so long as there are Effects which prove its Existence; and the Existence of the First Cause will always be *necessary*, necessary to be *supposed*, or consequentially so, in order to account for these Phænomena. It will also be necessary as a First Cause, or that which never had any Original, or Ground of its Existence, and consequently which can never be deprived of Existence by any thing, and consequently which must always be as it is; 'till

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"It follows then, that a Being who exists without Cause, "must always exist with the same Powers, Attributes, and Qua-"lities." *Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion*, p. 21. 2d Edit.

[d] *Existence and Unity*, p. 15.

[e] "If Matter [any Being] had no Cause of Existence, it "must be *self-existent*, or Existence must belong to its Nature; "there is no Medium: And if it be self-existent, it must exist "*necessarily*: A Thing whose Existence is of itself, and belong-"ing to its Nature, cannot be indifferent to *exist* or *not exist*: And "if it exists necessarily, it must also be *independent* on any thing "else for its Existence. So when we suppose Matter uncaused, "we do as much as if we supposed it *self-existent*, *necessa-"rily existing*, and *independent* on any thing else for its Ex-"istence. And whatever Contradiction there is in supposing "a necessarily existing Being not to exist, the very same there "will

till we can ſuppoſe an Alteration or Effect without any aſſignable Cauſe. Ch. V.

He adds, "But if it be an evident Contradiction to ſuppoſe Nothing or no Being neceſſarily exiſtent, or the Exiſtence of the Firſt Cauſe not to be *neceſſary*; this *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence cannot be a Neceſſity merely *conſequential* either to the Suppoſition of the Exiſtence of other Things, or even to the Exiſtence of the Firſt Cauſe, merely as ſuch. For though the Exiſtence of other Things implies a Firſt Cauſe, or a Cauſe prior to them, yet it does not imply that firſt Cauſe to be *neceſſarily exiſtent*."

In the firſt place, I aſk to what is this an evident Contradiction? There's no Contradiction that we can ſee but only to *Fact* and the viſible Creation; which, as it is an Effect, or once was not, requires a Cauſe; and as there cannot be an infinite Progreſs of Cauſes, we are obliged to ſuppoſe a Firſt; which, as ſuch, muſt be independent of all others, and therefore again neceſſary in itſelf[g]. And thus the Exiſtence of created Things implies, not only a Cauſe prior to them, but One abſolutely firſt or uncauſed, and that Firſt Cauſe likewiſe to be neceſſarily exiſtent.

It implies all this, I ſay, not indeed *directly* or *a priori*, which would be repugnant to the Notion of a firſt Cauſe; but indirectly and *ex abſurdo*; (*i. e.* from the Abſurdities of an *infinite Series of Cauſes and Effects*; and of any *Change* or *Effect* without

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" will be in ſuppoſing an eternal and uncauſed Being not to " exiſt," &c. *Enquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, p. 342.

[f] Ibid, p. 15.

[g] See this Point well proved in the *Enquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, p. 347.

(Change or Cause). It shews his Non-existence to be an express Contradiction, which is the very Definition given of absolute *Necessity*, (and all that is sometimes meant by it;) and the only Difference between us is, that we can point out this Contradiction, which our Adversaries will never be able to do, while they overlook that *a posteriori*, and are seeking for an *immediate* one *antecedent* both to the Supposition of the Existence of created Things, and the Existence of the First Cause itself.

WHAT Mr. *Jackson* adds here about conceiving an *eternal* and *infinite* Nothing, is deserting his Argument *a priori*, and recurring to a very different one drawn from our Ideas of *Eternity* and *Immensity*, which is consider'd in its Place. See also the Postscript to *King's Origin of Evil*[h].

Mr. *Jackson* next excepts to our making *Independence*, *Self-existence*, or *necessary Existence* (which *with* him stand all for the same thing) *Negative*. "It is, says he, a Property or Attribute of God; "and all Attributes are *real* and *positive* in the "Thing or Being, howsoever they may be express'd "by *negative* Terms. A *negative* Attribute is in "strictness of Speech Nonsense: For whatever "Sound Words, by defect of Language, may have, "yet, in every negative Word expressing a Pro-"perty, something positive is always understood." He proceeds to instance in Immensity, Eternity, &c. I answer: Whether Independence, &c. may be call'd *Attributes* or not, (which is a mere verbal Consideration) 'tis plain they are negative both in Name and Notion. They refer to the Question *Whence* God is[i], and consequently are no more

[h] Pag. 7. 2d. Edit.

[i] See Dr. *Waterland's* 2d Defence of Queries, p. 428, 429. 2d Edit.

than

than Negations, as he himſelf is from *none*. 'Tis plain, *Independency*, whether in Idea or Reality, can only be *Independency*; that is, a *Negation* with reſpect to our Idea, and *Abſence* of Dependence in the Thing; unleſs any will ſay, that being without a Cauſe is ſomething as poſitive as having one. Nay, our Ideas in this Caſe can never poſſibly reach beyond what is negative. When we ſuppoſe the *Manner* of exiſting expreſs'd by *Aſeity*, or *Independence*, or abſolute *Neceſſity*, to denote any thing farther, we are aſſigning a *Cauſe* of the firſt Cauſe, and attempting to derive that Exiſtence which is confeſſedly *underived*. It is not then becauſe we want Ideas, or becauſe we are forced to expreſs Poſitives negatively, that theſe are merely negative, but becauſe 'tis contrary to our cleareſt Ideas to ſuppoſe them any thing more; it would imply ſomething above the higheſt, and antecedent to the firſt: It would imply that his Exiſtence is derived either from *without*, or from *himſelf*, or from one of his *Properties*, all which are equally abſurd. See Dr. *Waterland*, ibid.

Ch. V.

But tho' *Self-exiſtence*, &c. as far as it relates to the Manner how God is, or the ſuppoſed Ground of his Exiſtence, be purely negative, yet it contains *ſomething poſitive* under it, together with that Negation. The common Idea of *Infinite* is a poſitive Conception of a great-deal, with the Negation of any Bounds. So Independence, Incorruptibility, Immutability, &c. include the poſitive Idea of *Exiſtence*, together with the Negation of Dependence, Corruption, or Change. They may likewiſe be reduced to the poſitive Ideas of All-ſufficiency, Stability, Certainty of Exiſtence or Permanency; or rather theſe laſt may be inferred from them; but yet they are not the ſame Ideas with thoſe, nor are they properly included in them. Thoſe (and many others) as commonly underſtood,

and

and denoted by the above-mention'd negative Terms, are mere *Negatives*; and we have as much ground for predicating such Negations of the Deity, as for attributing to it the above-named positive Qualities. Whether Mr. *Jackson* will allow them the Titles of *Attributes*, or not, is of small Consequence. Tho' there are Authors who have thought a Negative Attribute no Absurdity, provided we include bare Existence, as aforesaid [k].

ALLOWING then that "Absence of Dependence certainly implies a *positive* Mode or Attribute which is opposite to it [l], *viz.* All-sufficiency, Stability, *&c.*" yet this can be of no Service to our Author in his Proof *a priori*, unless he will argue that there is Something all-sufficient, *&c.* Therefore that Something exists.

BUT he proceeds [m]: "I believe the Author of the *Notes* himself will admit, that if *Necessity* of Existence be a *real internal Property* at all, it must be conceived as *prior* in Order of Idea and Nature——to the Substance itself of which it is a Property, and as the *Ground* and *Foundation* of the Existence."

Answ. IF Necessity of Existence be any real *internal* Property, properly so call'd, it must be conceiv'd as *posterior* in the Order of Ideas and Nature also to the *Substance itself* of which it is a Pro-

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[k] Attributum apud Logicos est quodlibet prædicatum, seu quicquid de re aliqua vere potest enunciari aut affirmari. Vulgo distribuitur in *positivum*, quod aliquid rei concedit; ut cum animatum dicitur de homine, vitam ei tribuit; vel *negativum*, quod aliquid a re tollit, ut cum inanimatum dicitur de lapide. That *Self-existence* can be no more than negative, see *Waterland*. 2d Defence, *ibid.* and *Pearson* on the Creed, Art. 1. p. 43. 2d Edit.

[l] *Existence and Unity*, p. 19.

[m] Ibid.

perty,

perty, and therefore cannot be any Ground or Foundation of its Exiſtence, without manifeſt Abſurdity. All Attributes or Properties, as ſuch, preſuppoſe a Subject in which they inhere, and from which they flow; they are conceiv'd as ariſing from, and grounded on, the Subject of which they are Properties, (which is the very meaning of that old Diſtinction between Subject and Attribute, and is Dr. *Clarke*'s way of arguing on other occaſions, See his Anſwer to the 4th Letter) and not that on them *. Who ever heard of a Subſtance ſpringing from and ſupported by one of its *Accidents*, or a real *internal* Mode or Quality *prior*, even in Conception, to the Thing whereof it is conceiv'd to be a Mode or Quality, and in which it is included? What is this but confounding both Ideas and Language? Indeed *Neceſſity* conſider'd as *cauſal*, or as a Principle *extrinſick*, may be antecedent to the Thing of which it is predicated, and *a priori* infer its Exiſtence; but when apply'd to a Being which always actually was, and conſequently whoſe Exiſtence could never admit of any kind of Cauſe or Antecedency whatever; as is the preſent Caſe: When it relates not to the *Why*, or *Wherefore*, but only the *What*; not to the *Original*, but the *Manner* of its Being, and is included *in the Nature of the Thing itſelf*, (as Dr. *Clarke* aſſerts †) among its other Properties and Perfections: In this Caſe it, as well as every other Perfection, muſt (as the ſame Author allows ‡) *preſuppoſe Exiſtence*; it muſt come after the Subject of which it is predicated, in the natural order of our Ideas; *at leaſt* it can

* See the following *Diſſertation*, p. 58.

† Demonſtr. 3d Prop.

‡ Anſwer to the 6th Letter.

Ch. V. never precede it in any Sense, either in Idea or Reality.

'EXISTENCE, says a very accurate Writer, is 'prior in Conception to Independency, Immutability, and the rest of the Attributes, because that 'expresses barely *Being*, the rest express the *Manner* of it. And the first Question always is, whether a Thing exists; and the Question *How* follows after. *Modal* Being supposes *pure* Being, as 'every *particular manner* of Existence supposes '*Existence*; and that because it *includes* it, being 'a farther Addition to it. *Existence* therefore is 'prior in Conception to what you call *Necessity*; 'that is, a *Mode* of Existence, or Complexion of 'other Attributes, expressing the *Manner* or *Perfection*, of it. And since Existence itself presupposes and implies a *Subject* existing, it is manifest, that the Subject or Substance is first in order of Nature, and first in order of Conception, 'and cannot be conceived otherwise.'

Mr. *Jackson* adds, "For as nothing can be conceived *prior* to absolute *Necessity* of Existence, so "it is absurd to suppose it in any respect *posterior* "or *consequent* to any Thing; but it must in the "Nature of it be conceived to precede every Thing, "and to be the first and highest Perfection[q]." Which is an Assertion so perfectly arbitrary and incapable of Proof, that it may be retorted with equal Force against this antecedent Necessity itself; nay, as we apprehend, it will much better suit the Existence of a first Cause, which, as such, may properly be said to *precede every Thing, and to be the first and highest Perfection*; and which cannot therefore be supposed to be *in any respect posterior or consequent* to any kind of Necessity, Cause,

[q] *Existence and Unity*, p. 20.

Ground,

Ground, or Reaſon; any Thing, Mode, or Quality whatſoever. The Paſſage which Mr. *Jackſon* here cites from Dr. *Clarke's* Anſwer to the 7th Letter is fully confuted in the following Diſſertation[e], to which I refer. Ch. V.

He ſubjoins[f], "This I think to be Demonſtration; and, if the Author of the *Notes* is not ſatisfy'd that it is ſo, he muſt ſhew, either that "the *Firſt Cauſe* is not *neceſſarily exiſtent* at all; "or that he has *neceſſary* Exiſtence only becauſe he "*exiſts*; or that he exiſts, and cannot but exiſt, "without any *Ground* or *Reaſon* at all of his Exiſtence; which may as well be affirm'd of every "Thing, as of the Firſt Cauſe. This laſt is certainly a great Abſurdity; and nothing, I think, "can be more ſelf-evident than that, as Dr. *Clarke* "ſays[g], "Whatever exiſts has a Cauſe, a Reaſon, "a Ground of its Exiſtence; a Ground or Reaſon "why it doth exiſt, rather than not exiſt." *Lett.* 6, *&c.*

Anſw. We allow him to be *neceſſarily Exiſtent* in one Senſe, *i. e.* ſuch as can be proved *a poſteriori*, or from the Abſurdity of the contrary Suppoſition; ſuch as is conceiv'd poſterior to his actual uncauſed Exiſtence and inferred from it, as explain'd above; but not in this Author's Senſe of antecedent Neceſſity or internal Cauſe, which we apprehend to be flatly repugnant to the very Nature and Idea of an independent, uncauſed Being, or to the Suppoſition of any Firſt Cauſe. We ſay farther, that he is neceſſarily exiſtent; not *only becauſe he exiſts*, but, becauſe he exiſts in ſuch a

[e] Pag. 65, 66.

[f] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 21.

[g] Demonſtr. 2d. Edit. p. 15.

Manner, as to make it impossible for him (or rather for *us* to *conceive* him) either to have once begun, or ever to cease existing; *i. e.* independently, or without any, either external or internal, Ground or Cause [t]. Nor can this be *as well affirm'd of every thing as of the First Cause*, except every Thing were alike Eternal and Independent, and by consequence Immutable and All-sufficient [u].

In the last place, as to that Position of Dr. *Clarke*'s, than which our Author thinks nothing can be more self-evident; *viz.* 'Whatever exists has a 'Cause, Reason, *&c.*' I must think it is so far from being a self-evident Truth, that it is manifestly false, since it appears to be repugnant to the Notion of a First Cause, which is demonstrable [v].

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[t] See the Dissert. concerning the Argument *a priori*, p. 65.

[u] Dissertation, p. 71.

[v] See *Wollaston*'s Demonstration of the following Proposition, 'Wherever there is a Subordination of Causes and Effects, there 'must necessarily be a Cause in Nature prior to the rest, uncaused.' *Rel. Nat. Del.* p. 65, &c.

"Again, *Every Thing must have a Cause*: Though I find it "so set down for one by your Lordship, yet, I humbly conceive it "is not a true Principle of Reason, nor a true Proposition; but "the contrary. The certainty whereof we attain by the Contemplation of our Ideas, and by perceiving that the Idea of "Eternity, and the Idea of the Existence of Something do agree; "and the Idea of Existence from Eternity and of having a Cause "do not agree, or are inconsistent within the same Thing. But "*every Thing that has a Beginning must have a Cause*, is a true "Principle of Reason, or a Proposition certainly true, which we "come to know by the same way, *i. e.* by contemplating our "Ideas, and perceiving that the Idea of *beginning to be*, is necessarily connected with the Idea of *something operating*, which "we call a Cause, and so the beginning to be is perceived to "agree with the Idea of a *Cause*, as is express'd in the Proposition." *Locke*'s Letter to the Bp. of *Worcester*, p. 371, Folio; or 134, 8vo.

Nay,

Nay, it deſtroys the very Notion it is brought to eſtabliſh. For if a Cauſe, Ground, *&c.* muſt be found for every thing that exiſts, in order to fix and preſerve it from the Danger of Non-exiſtence, then there's the ſame Neceſſity for ſeeking one for this *internal Cauſe* or *antecedent Ground* our Author ſpeaks of; and that alſo, if it be any thing real, will want another real Cauſe or Ground, and ſo on infinitely. We ſhall always be obliged to find a Reaſon *a priori* for the foregoing, or elſe, according to our Anthor's Argument below,[*] "it "muſt be at leaſt equally poſſible in Nature that "*it* might not have exiſted, as have exiſted, there "being no more Reaſon for its Exiſtence than for "its Non-exiſtence." Ch. V.

THIS is a Difficulty which will always return upon us, and as often as it is brought againſt the *Firſt Cauſe*, may be retorted againſt the *antecedent Ground* introduced to ſupport it. For to ſtop at any ſuch antecedent Ground, and call that the *laſt* and *higheſt*,[†] is perfectly unreaſonable, and contradictory to the whole Tenour of the preſent Argument. 'Tis what to every one in this way of thinking muſt appear to be the moſt arbitrary and unphiloſophical Suppoſition of all, as is obſerved in the following *Diſſertation*, p. 56.

THIS Argument therefore not only proves what it ſhould not prove, but falls ſhort of what it ſhould prove, *viz.* the Certainty and Stability of the Firſt Cauſe or God. Nay it is ſo far from fixing and ſecuring it, that it manifeſtly tends, as far as it has any Tendency, to unfix and render it precarious, as is alſo ſhewn in the *Diſſertation*, p. 62, 63.

[*] Pag. 21.

[†] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 41.

If his *Existence* had any *Ground*, *Cause*, or *Foundation*, it would be dependent on the Ground, and less firm or stable than the Ground which supports it, and so would not be the most *perfect* Existence: He would not be that self-existent, self-sufficient Being which we suppose, needing no Ground or Support whatever; and consequently above all kind of Dependency, and without all Possibility of Change or ceasing.[b] But more of this when we come to our Author's Question, Why God will exist *to-morrow*?

After he has recited some Passages out of the Notes to A. Bp. *King*, tending to prove that we can only infer the Existence and Continuance of a First Cause in a negative way, *viz.* from the Absurdity of supposing Effects without a Cause, which must necessarily be the Case if we suppose him either once not to have been, or ever to cease: He proceeds, "Here in Answer I cannot but in the first "Place observe, that supposing all that this Au-"thor has said to be true, yet his Reasoning no "way infers the *Unity* and *Infinity* of the First "Cause. If he could prove (*a posteriori*) the Eter-"nity and what he calls *consequential* Necessity of "the First Cause without the Supposition of any "Ground of the Existence; yet it is certain and evi-"dent that if there is no *absolute* Necessity of Ex-"istence, which is the *MODE*, *Ground*, *Reason*, or "*Foundation* of the Existence of the First Cause; "he may as possibly be *finite* as *infinite*; and there "may, without any Reason, exist *numberless*, *finite*, "*dependent* (tho' necessarily existent) first Causes "of *like* or of different Nature and Substance, as "well as that there should exist, without any Rea-"son, *one* only *infinite*, *independent* First Cause." [c]

[b] *Dissertation*, p. 70.

[c] *Existence and Unity*, p. 23, 24.

Answ.

Anſw. 1. We don't want to infer the *Unity* and *Infinity* of the Firſt Cauſe *a priori*, nor do we think they can be ſo infer'd: As will be ſhewn hereafter. But,

2. As to the latter, we apprehend that there is good Proof of it, in our Senſe of the Word *infinite*, *i. e.* as implying *Perfection* in every Attribute from *independent* Exiſtence, which as ſuch excludes all Limitation and Defect; ſince it is equally repugnant for that which has both its Exiſtence and the manner of its Exiſtence, and every Quality from itſelf or in its own Nature, either to admit of any Reſtraint or Limitation of Exiſtence or Attribute from without, or to contain within that ſame Nature any Principle of Annihilation or Diminution, or of being any thing elſe but what it always independently or in its own Nature actually was. This Deduction of *Infinity* from *Independence* is, I think, at leaſt as good a one as that from *antecedent Neceſſity*, were the Notion conſiſtent. But, in truth, our Author himſelf ſeems to quit it here, by terming this *abſolute Neceſſity* a *Mode* of the Exiſtence, (which as ſuch is ſubſequent in Idea to pure Exiſtence [a]) and in the ſame Page, ſome *Quality, Mode, or Property originally in the Nature of the Firſt Cauſe. Quality, Mode, Property*; all of them in Idea preſuppoſing the Exiſtence of the Thing to which they are attributed, and in reality *included in its Nature*, inſtead of *originally preceding* it. If our Author will give up all this Antecedency, and ſtick to a *modal* Neceſſity ſubſequent in Order of Conception to independent Exiſtence (of which below) we are ready to cloſe with him, and conclude the Debate; ſince the *Argument a priori* is then at an end.

[a] See the *Diſſertation.*

3. As

3. As to the *Unity* I muſt think it as far from being demonſtrable on this Author's Hypotheſis, as on ours: For if his Ground of all Exiſtence be without any antecedent Ground, as he contends, why may there not, according to his own way of arguing, exiſt numberleſs *Grounds*, *Cauſes*, *Neceſſities*, without any Reaſon, as well as one? If any one Ground, Cauſe, or Neceſſity ſubſiſts without an original Reaſon, why not a hundred, of like or of different Nature?[e] So that this is not removing any Difficulty, but ſhifting it a little higher, and making it rather greater than before. But,

Laſtly, If it were poſſible on our Scheme to ſuppoſe *numberleſs* and *finite* Firſt Cauſes, yet how theſe ſhould be *dependent* is perfectly inconceivable. *Dependent* and *Firſt Cauſe*, or dependent and *neceſſarily exiſtent*, are to me Ideas as directly oppoſite as dependent and independent. What can that be dependent on, which neither derives its Exiſtence nor the manner of its Exiſtence from any thing in Nature? Who has every thing that it has neceſſarily and in itſelf?[f]

Mr.

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[e] *Diſſertation*, p. 79, 80.

[f] "If a *neceſſary Being* might have the manner of its Exiſtence changed by any *other Being*, it muſt depend on that other Being for the manner of its Exiſtence: And if it depended on another Being for the *manner* of its Exiſtence, it muſt depend on that Being for *Exiſtence itſelf*; ſince it cannot exiſt but in *ſome manner*. Exiſtence taken ſeparately from all manner of Exiſtence is an Impoſſibility, the Negation of Exiſtence. But it hath been ſhewn (ſee a Paſſage from the ſame Author above in p. 140.) "that a ſelf-exiſtent Being muſt be alſo independent for its Exiſtence, and therefore for the manner of its Exiſtence. Nay, ſo independent is the manner of neceſſary Exiſtence that it is even abſurd to ſuppoſe it to depend on the *neceſſary Being itſelf*, or to be determined by it: For it ought to exiſt before it could determine the manner of its own Exiſtence, and therefore to exiſt without determining the manner

of

Mr. JACKSON's next Obſervation is yet of leſs Moment.[a] "2dly, I cannot but obſerve that the "Author of the *Notes*, in ſome Part of his Argu- "ments, ſeems to feel the Force of that very *Ground* "of Exiſtence inferring itſelf, even whilſt he is "oppoſing it. Why elſe does he ſay that *From* "*the Order of Cauſes we gather that the Firſt* "*Cauſe muſt neceſſarily have been from all Eter-* "*nity?* How comes the Word *neceſſarily* in, un- "leſs it be to ſhew the *Reaſon* or *Ground* of the "eternal Exiſtence?"

Ch. V.

Anſw. IT comes in to ſhew the Abſurdity of the contrary Suppoſition, *a poſteriori*, or from Effects without any Cauſe. It is a *Logical* or *Phyſical* Neceſſity,[b] which is all that we have occaſion for in this Place; and was inſerted to ſhew in what Senſe that Word might and always ſhould be uſed on this Occaſion.

BUT, if this Author is diſpoſed to be critical, I would deſire him to obſerve farther, that it is not ſaid that the Firſt Cauſe *muſt have been neceſſarily*, but *muſt neceſſarily have been*, i. e. *certainly* or

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"of its Exiſtence; or to exiſt in a neceſſary and independent "manner. Or thus. It ought to exiſt before it could determine "the manner of its own Exiſtence, and yet to determine the "manner of its Exiſtence before it could exiſt, ſince the manner "of its Exiſtence is ſuppoſed dependent on, and therefore de- "termined by itſelf: Which is repugnant. In a word, if the "manner of neceſſary Exiſtence were *dependent*, it would be *ef- "fected*: And, as we ſuppoſe it dependent on another Being, or "the neceſſary Being itſelf, it would be effected by one or other "of theſe reſpectively. And ſince Exiſtence cannot be without "a manner, the Suppoſition ends in this palpable Contradiction, "That an *uncauſed* Being is *cauſed* by another Being, or by it- "ſelf." *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, p. 346, 347.

[a] Pag. 24.

[b] See the *Diſſertation*, p. 48, 49.

Ch. V. *unavoidably*, on account of the 'forementiond Absurdity; which we apprehend to be sufficient for our Purpose, without attempting to shew *why* that was which was *eternal*, or assigning a *Ground* or *Reason* for the first of all conceivable Grounds and Reasons.

He adds, "3dly, If this Author could prove in "his way (*a posteriori*) that *Necessity* of Existence "was a *Consequence* either of the Existence of the "First Cause as such, or of his eternal Existence "arising from the Absurdity of the contrary Supposition, he would have reason'd so far well; "and this would be a sufficient Proof of the necessary Existence; and its being *consequentially* "inferred would be as good a Demonstration of it, "as if it was directly, or *a priori*, inferr'd; and "that way too it would be prov'd to be a *real, original, positive* Property of God —— from whence "he may and ought to infer back again, or *a priori*, not only *Eternity* of Existence, but also the "*Unity, Infinity*, and *Immensity* of the Being and "Attributes of the First Cause."[1]

Answ. This would be altogether quibbling upon the several Senses of the Word *Necessary*, and confounding Arguments *a priori* with those *a posteriori*; which I cannot but think our Author too frequently guilty of.

Modal Necessity is allowed to be a *positive Property* of God: And what then? This does not *infer*, but *presuppose* his eternal independent Existence. A *consequential* Necessity implies the same eternal independent Existence, but will never shew us *why it* is *eternal* or *independent*, or how it comes to be so. The Existence of a First Cause is *necessary* to account for *the things that are made*,

[1] *Existence and Unity*, p. 25, 26.

but

but will the Conſequence hold that therefore it is *neceſſary in itſelf*, or *antecedently* to the Suppoſition of any thing elſe? No: This kind of Neceſſity is wholly founded in the Suppoſition that other Beings have exiſted (as he has it below) and may be removed together with that Suppoſition; ſince where there are no Effects there is no occaſion nor room for a Cauſe. Ch. V.

WHICH way ſoever therefore we take it, we are obliged to ſtop at the *actual Exiſtence* of the Firſt Cauſe, and can never aſcend one Step *a priori*; nor can we infer from either of theſe Neceſſities that there is but *one* independent Being, or ever be able to determine whether he is *finite* or *infinite*.

BUT Mr. *Jackſon* urges again, "4thly, That, "by denying a *poſitive Ground* of the Exiſtence of "the Firſt Cauſe, we cannot prove either the *Eter-* "*nity* or *Exiſtence* of a Firſt Cauſe, or if we could "prove both, this would not infer the *Neceſſity* (any "Neceſſity) or *Immutability* of his Exiſtence.—— "For, adds he, if the Exiſtence was *originally* "cauſed or *determined* by Nothing, or was actually "without any *Reaſon* of the Exiſtence at all, cer- "tainly it might be *temporary*, it might have *begun* "at any time or *aroſe* from Nothing, *i. e.* without "any *Reaſon*, as well as have exiſted always *by* "*Nothing*, *i. e.* without any *Reaſon*; and ſo may "as well and poſſibly ceaſe to exiſt by Nothing, *i. e.* "without any *Reaſon*, as continue always to exiſt "*by Nothing*, *i. e.* again without any *Reaſon*." [k]

Anſw. THE Caſes are very different. In the two laſt a Cauſe or Reaſon is abſolutely neceſſary; in the firſt it is abſurd and impoſſible. Whatever is *eternal* can have nothing *antecedent* to it by the

[k] Pag. 27, 28.

Terms; and consequently no Cause, the very Notion of which must imply some Antecedency to its Effect, or else we leave no manner of Distinction between *Cause* and *Effect*.

WHATEVER therefore is eternal cannot *arise from*, or be *caused* or *determined by*, any Thing; it cannot *arise* at all, or admit of any *Cause* or *Determination*, in any proper Sense of these Words. But, on the contrary, that which is *temporary*, or *began* to be, must evidently require Something from which it arose and received its *Beginning*; so long as positive Effects require a real Cause.

A TEMPORARY *Change* likewise in an eternal Being, or a *ceasing* to be what he always was, must for the same Reason require a Cause; but there can be no Cause of this, as was shewn above;[l] and therefore no such Change or Ceasing can be supposed without a Contradiction.[m]

THUS

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[l] Pag. 139, 140.

[m] "*No Substance or Being can have a natural Tendency to Annihilation or to become nothing.* That a Being which once exists "should cease to exist is a real Effect, and must be produced by "a real Cause: But this Cause could not be planted in the Nature of any Substance or *Being*, to become a Tendency of its "Nature: for *it could not be a free Cause*, otherwise it must be "a *Being* itself, the Subject of the *Attribute Freedom*, and therefore not the Property of another Being: *Nor a necessary Cause*; "for such a Cause is only the Effect of Something imposing that "Necessity, and so no Cause at all. *Necessary Causes* and *passive Powers* deny the thing they seem to express. This Effect therefore must be the Operation and Efficiency of another *Being ad extra*. One of our Prejudices here is, that we imagine *Beings* may have a natural Tendency to change their Nature: But "then their Nature would be inconsistent and destructive of itself.—A Tendency to persevere in the same State of Nature, "and a Tendency to change it, are Contradictories, and impossible to be planted in the same Subject at once: Or (not to "urge the Contradiction) if the last prevailed, the remaining in "the same State, for any given time, would be impossible.

THUS far the ſingle Argument from Cauſe and Effect is able to carry us. We may add, that the ſame Reaſons which proved that a First Cauſe always did actually exiſt, or that Exiſtence was of its Nature as a First Cauſe, ſhew'd alſo that he muſt have a *Power* or *Ability* of Exiſting, a *Self-Sufficiency*, *Strength*, or *Stability* of Nature, which (if I may ſo ſpeak) *ſupports* his Exiſtence, and renders it *fix'd*, *permanent*, and *immutable*. This, I conceive, is what the learned Author of the following *Diſſertation* ſtiles *modal* or *metaphyſical* Neceſſity, or a Connexion between *Exiſtence* and the *Subject* of it [a]; and which may be applied to the Exiſtence of the First Cauſe, as that is proved to be *independent*, *i. e.* to be in ſuch a *manner* as makes it impoſſible for us to ſuppoſe it ever not to be. Not that this Neceſſity is in any reſpect *antecedent* to his Nature, or capable of being conſider'd as a *Cauſe* why he is, in any Senſe of that Word. 'Tis only a partial Conception of his Nature itſelf, and always included in it: It ariſes from a Conſideration of the *Mode* of the Exiſtence already proved, and muſt be ſubſequent to it in the Order of our Ideas, and can afford no more than an Argument to us *that* he is, always was, and will be.

THIS *Power* or *Ability* to exiſt Mr. *Jackſon* ſeems firſt to conceive as *antecedent* to the Exiſtence itſelf, which is both groundleſs and repugnant; and then is led on to confound it with a *Cauſe* of Exiſtence, which it cannot be in the preſent Caſe

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"*No Being, though it hath Power, can have ſuch a Power as* "*to annihilate itſelf*: For then it ought to have Power to effect "that it ſhould have no Power, which is contradictory; ſince "we are forced to ſuppoſe the Thing ſtill remaining, which we "ſuppoſe taken away." *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, P. 98, 99.

[a] Pag. 49, 50, 51.

without

without a Contradiction; but which yet it muſt be, or elſe there can be no kind of *Antecedency* in it, and the whole Argument *a priori* falls to the Ground.

FARTHER, the Foundation of this and the following Objections ſeems to lie wholly in theſe Terms, *Originally cauſed* and *Originally determin'd*, which our Author has ten times over in half the number of Pages, and which he applies with wonderful Impropriety to the Exiſtence of the Firſt Cauſe, to a Being confeſſedly *eternal*, and conſequently without any kind of *Original*; to that Being on whom every Thought or Thing, every Mode or Property, every *Cauſe* and *Determination* hangs, and whoſe Exiſtence muſt be ſuppoſed before we can ſuppoſe any thing elſe.

Laſtly, THIS, like the reſt of his Arguments, appears to be of no Force at all, ſince it is of the ſame Force againſt his own Hypotheſis of an *antecedent Ground*; and capable of being retorted in the very ſame manner; *viz.* If the Exiſtence of That was originally cauſed or determin'd by Nothing, or was without any Reaſon, then certainly it might be *temporary*, it might have *begun* without any Reaſon, it may *ceaſe*, &c. It may be mutable or corruptible in its Nature (as he has it again, p. 30.) "and ſo may carry within itſelf the "Cauſe, Ground, or Reaſon of its ceaſing to be:" *i. e.* may have in itſelf a Principle of not being what it is. Thus the ſame Argument will always do of either ſide, only by changing one of theſe Terms for the other; and the ſame Anſwer, which he gives for his *antecedent Ground*, will ſerve equally for the Exiſtence of a *Firſt Cauſe*.

WHAT has been ſaid, I think, contains a ſufficient Anſwer to his remaining Objections, as "5thly, admitting the Eternity of the *Firſt* Cauſe, "or that he has exiſted always,——how does Eter-

"nity

"nity *a parte ante*, or having exiſted *always*, Ch. V.
"prove that he muſt *continue* to exiſt *always*?"

Anſw. 1. IT proves this *ex abſurdo*, or from the contrary being a poſitive *Effect* or *Change*; which, as ſuch, muſt have a *Beginning*, and therefore a *Cauſe*; which Cauſe cannot be aſſign'd without a Contradiction.

2. IT proves it from the *Manner* of the Exiſtence of that which was always, *viz. Independence* or *Self-exiſtence*; for that which was *ab æterno*, muſt be in ſuch a manner, and conſequently muſt have an infinite Firmneſs or Stability of Nature, or be infinitely *able* to be: Exiſtence muſt belong to his Eſſence, and be always included in it: it will be as much his Property always to *exiſt* independently, as to be Omnipotent, All-ſufficient, *&c.* of himſelf, or independently. He adds, "It is "certain, that what *always* was, unleſs it was *ne-* "*ceſſarily exiſting*, *in ſe*, always was, and always "will be under a *Poſſibility* of not being, *&c.*"[*]

Anſw. WE allow him to be *neceſſarily* exiſting, but in a *Modal*, not the *Cauſal* Senſe. Whatever always was *independently*, will always be; tho' *why*, or for what Reaſon he always was and now is, we know not, any more than why he is independent. Indeed whatever always was, was *independently*, notwithſtanding what this Writer may inſinuate; but that is not now the Queſtion. "Sup- "poſe *Matter* had been always (as I ſhall prove "preſently that it might be by the Will of God) "would it thence have follow'd, that it never "was under a *Poſſibility* of not being, or of "being otherwiſe than it actually was? Could not "the ſame Power which *produced* it, have either

[*] Pag. 28.

"annihilated,

"annihilated, or have changed the Mode of its "Existence?"

Answ. If Matter always was *in esse*, as the Schools speak, or had *actual* Existence, it never could be *in fieri*, or have a bare *potential* Existence, by the Supposition, and consequently could never depend on any other Being for its Existence, or any Thing that belongs to it. An Author must certainly have very different Ideas to his Words from those that are commonly received, or else labour under great Confusion of Ideas, when he talks of that being *produced* which *had been always*; or *annihilated* or *changed* by an external Power, which neither owed its Being, nor the Mode of it, to any Thing external; which never *owed* or *received* any Thing at all. As to Mr. *Jackson*'s Supposition of *eternal Matter*, I refer him to the Author cited in the Margin, who has consider'd the Point at large [p].

"I should be glad to have a Reason given, why "Continuance always *a parte ante*, or from Eter-"nity, should prove Continuance *a parte post*, or "to Eternity; more than Continuance *a parte* "*post*, or to Eternity, should prove Continuance "*a parte ante*, or from Eternity [q]."

Answ.

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[p] *Existence and Unity*, p. 29.

"[q] And for this Reason, that a Thing must be done in some "Time, Matter cannot be *an eternal Effect* of an eternal Cause; "——The supposing an *Action*, such as the effecting of Matter "must be, destroys the Idea of Eternity in *the Thing effected*, by "the Action. Every Action must have a *Beginning* and an *End*; "these are included in the Conception of Action; for, if it were "without a Beginning, the Thing is not yet begun, or never "was begun; and what was never begun, cannot be now end-"ed, as the Production of Matter is. The denying *these Limits* "to Action amounts still to an absolute Negation of it. And

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Anſw. BECAUSE the Latter of theſe may be owing to the Will or Efficacy of a Prior Cauſe, but the Former cannot, except we ſhall maintain with our Author, that Cauſe and Effect may be co-eval, *i. e.* co-incident, or the very ſame thing. See *P. S.* to the 2d Edit. of A.Bp. *King*, p. 30.

HIS ſixth Argument againſt the Exiſtence of a Firſt Cauſe, from the *Poſſibility* of an *infinite Series* of *dependent Beings* [r], has been conſider'd already in p. 99, 100. where his Method of confuting it, from the want of a *Ground* or *Foundation* for the *Whole*, was ſhewn to be inſufficient, and another more direct one propoſed, from the Nature of an *infinite Series*, as ſuch; from the Repugnancy of *Infinite* and *Series*, or the Impoſſibility of a *poſitive Infinite* conſiſting in any Collection of *Parts*. I call this of our Author's an Argument againſt the Exiſtence of a Firſt Cauſe, ſince it muſt prove againſt that, if it prove any thing. For whether an infinite Series can be confuted, or not, upon our Principles, his own Hypotheſis is never the better; whatever Difficulties may remain with us, we ſhall never mend ourſelves by running into a plain Abſurdity, ſuch as that of a Cauſe prior to the Firſt. But I think it has been ſhewn above,

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"to ſay Matter was produced without Action, is as much as to "ſay, it was effected without *Agency* or *Efficiency*.

"It will be ſaid, *God* is eternal and naturally active, there- "fore an Action may be eternal: For the *Philoſophers*, who ſay "Matter is an *eternal Effect*, are no *Atheiſts*. But though it be "certain, that the *Agent* is eternal, it will never follow that any "*particular Act* is eternal. It is the Nature of any particular "Act to be *circumſcribed* and *temporary*; that is, in other Words, "to be limited both *before* and *behind*, which is a Condition "inconſiſtent with Eternity." *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, p. 357.

[r] Pag. 31, 32.

that there's no Danger in the preſent Argument: We may add, that if there be any Force in it, it concludes for an eternal Series of *Grounds*, *Cauſes*, *Neceſſities*, &c. and thereby eſtabliſhes that very Difficulty which it deſign'd to remove. He adds, "Or I might put him to prove the Impoſſibility of "a *finite* or *temporary* Series, being the Whole of "exiſtent Beings; for he can prove nothing *Eter-*"*nal* upon his Scheme[s]."

Anſw. I CAN only prove the Impoſſibility of it from ſome one Part of this *finite*, *temporary* Series once receiving its Exiſtence from Nothing, or being an Effect produced without any Producer or Cauſe; which to me ſeems a Contradiction, but which, I ſuppoſe, may be no Abſurdity with him, who can maintain an Effect *co-eval* and *co-equal* with its Cauſe, and ſo has the ſame Reaſon to make either of the two Cauſe or Effect, or to ſuppoſe the latter without the former; "an Effect no "otherwiſe requiring a Cauſe than as *every Thing* "preſuppoſes a Reaſon why it is, rather than is "not," as he ſays above[t]: Which latter Propoſition we acknowledge not to be true. We only require a Reaſon for every Thing which once *was not*; and if a *Firſt Cauſe* can admit of no ſuch Reaſon, and therefore be, in Mr. *Jackſon*'s Opinion, as great an Impoſſibility as an Effect without a Cauſe, we cannot help it.

Mr. JACKSON's ſeventh Objection is, That *mere Eternity* does not infer *neceſſary Exiſtence*, becauſe there might have been an eternal Series of created dependent Beings: For either God muſt have been

[s] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 32.

[t] Pag. 35.

[t] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 30.

able

able to have created Beings from Eternity; or, 1. He was a whole Eternity without a Power of creating: And, 2. There muſt have been ſome Cauſe, external or internal, to hinder him from all Eternity; which Cauſe, being always the ſame, will hinder him to all Eternity; and conſequently the Deity muſt either have had a Power of acting from Eternity, or elſe he can never act at all [x]. Ch. V.

Anſw. THE Deity is always without the Power of effecting what is implied in an eternal Creation, *i. e.* Of making a Thing *begin to be* which *always was*, or working a Contradiction. That any Thing ſhould once be created or *produced*, or from Non-exiſtence brought into Being (which is what all the World underſtands by Creation) which yet was really never in a State of Non-exiſtence, or Producibility, (if I may ſo ſpeak) includes Ideas that are manifeſtly repugnant, and therefore is no Object of Power; and there wants neither external nor internal Cauſe to hinder any Being from effecting it: The Abſurdity of the Suppoſition itſelf is a ſufficient Bar; and while that remains we cannot conceive even infinite Power able to do it [y]: It would imply a Power of *doing that which is Nothing*, as Dr. *Clarke* ſays [z]; that is, *no Power at all*. But ſuppoſe a Thing once out of Being, and

[x] Pag. 33, 34.

[y] "Seeing we have diſcover'd an intrinſical and natural Impoſſibility, that a ſucceſſive Duration ſhould be actually eternal; it is no leſs than a Contradiction to itſelf, that the World ſhould be created from everlaſting: And therefore it is no Affront to the Divine Omnipotence, if, by reaſon of the formal Incapacity and Repugnancy of the Thing, we aver that the World could not poſſibly have been made from all Eternity, even by God himſelf." *Bentley's Boyle's* Lect. Serm. 6. p. 24. 2d Edit.

[z] Demonſtr. Prop. 10.

this Contradiction ceaſes, and the Production of it immediately becomes poſſible; or, if our Author will have it ſo, the Deity acquires a Power of creating it. Not that any one imagines him to receive a Quality or Perfection which he had not before; tho', for want of Language, we may be obliged to uſe ſuch improper metaphorical Expreſſions as ſound like it: The Alteration is not in *God*, but in our Manner of conceiving the Thing, or in the Nature of the *Suppoſition*. But this Objection has been ſo clearly and compleatly anſwer'd by the ingenious Author of *Dr. Clarke's Notion of Space examin'd*[a], that I have reaſon to hope we ſhall hear no more of it.

Mr. JACKSON proceeds, in the next place, to anſwer the Difficulties charg'd upon his own Hypotheſis: As 1ſt, That the firſt of all Cauſes cannot have any thing in any manner of Conception *prior* to it. This he allows to be very true in that Senſe in which it is the Firſt Cauſe, *viz.* the firſt *Efficient*: But adds, "This Author knows very "well, that the Ground of the Exiſtence of the "Firſt Cauſe, under debate, is not alledg'd to be "an efficient Cauſe, or Agent; in which Senſe it "would be moſt abſurd to argue for a Cauſe of "the Firſt Cauſe[b]."

Anſw. BUT I know likewiſe, that, unleſs it be an *efficient Cauſe*, it will not ſerve our Author's Purpoſe; and that therefore he muſt either drop his Argument, or be driven into that which he confeſſes to be moſt abſurd. What other ſort of Cauſe can be conceiv'd as *antecedent* and *operating* at all Times, and in all Places? In what other Senſe can it, *a priori*, infer the *Infinity* and *Unity* of the Firſt Cauſe, or, as our Author ſays below, *make it*

[a] From Pag. 89, to 103.

[b] Pag. 37.

eternal

eternal and independent? [c]. See the following *Diſſertation*, p. 57, 58, 60. Ch. V.

He adds, "In reality and order of *Time*, all "the eſſential Attributes of God are abſolutely "*co-exiſtent* and *co-eval* with the Subſtance, and "cannot exiſt without each other: Yet, as moſt of "the Attributes are conceiv'd as derived from, and "conſequent upon, the Exiſtence of the Subſtance, "and as flowing from it, as from a *Foundation*; ſo "*Neceſſity* of exiſting is a *Property* which cannot but "be, in order of Nature and Conception, *antecedent* "both to the *Subſtance* and *conſequent* Attributes." [d]

Anſw. All *Attributes* or *Properties*, as ſuch, are unavoidably conceiv'd as inhering in and flowing from the *Subject* to which they are attributed, and by which they are ſupported. A Property *before* its Subject, or *independent* of it, is indeed a Property *ſui generis*, and without Parallel, and therefore exempt from any Rules of Logick now extant; and, 'till ſome new ones be made in its Favour, we muſt conclude that this *Neceſſity*, if it be a real Property or *Mode* of Exiſtence, as our Author terms it in this Place, it muſt preſuppoſe the Exiſtence of which it is a Mode or Property, and cannot be underſtood otherwiſe. If it be in any reſpect *antecedent* to it, it immediately becomes *cauſal*, or reſolves into a *Principle extrinſick*, as has been often obſerv'd. There's nothing will ſerve the Purpoſes intended by it, but making it both of theſe at the ſame time.

Mr. Jackson comes next to reply to that unſurmountable Difficulty which he has been often preſs'd with, *viz.* That if he require a *Cauſe* for the firſt of all *Beings*, he will for the ſame Reaſon be obliged to find another Cauſe for that, and ſo

[c] Ibid.

[d] Pag. 38.

on.

on. But, as his Reply will appear to conſiſt of the the moſt arbitrary Poſitions and Aſſertions without Proof, and which have been over and over again confuted and retorted on himſelf by Dr. *Gretton* and the learned Author of the following *Diſſertation*, I ſhall be excuſed for not ſtaying to examine this Point very minutely.

"As it hath been proved that the Firſt Cauſe "cannot exiſt without ſome Ground or Reaſon of "his Exiſtence, ſo when this Reaſon or Ground "is diſcover'd, it is impoſſible to go any farther; "becauſe this is the laſt poſſible Reaſon in the "Nature of things."[e]

WHY is it not as poſſible and neceſſary to go farther, as to proceed ſo far? How can this be the *laſt poſſible Reaſon*, if *every thing* muſt have a Reaſon, a Cauſe, a Ground, an antecedent Neceſſity to fix and ſupport it? Or, if we muſt ſtop ſomewhere, why not at a Firſt Cauſe or *Being*? This we affirm with much more Reaſon to be the laſt ſolid Reſort in the Nature of Things and Cauſes. All beyond is empty and chimerical; either Sound without Senſe, or ſome abſurd and repugnant Senſe. See *Diſſertation*, p. 57, 58.

AGAIN, "As there muſt be (*a priori*) a Rea-"ſon why the three Angles of a Right-lin'd Triangle "are equal to two Right ones, and not to two and "a half. —— So this Reaſon can be nothing but "abſolute Neceſſity in the Nature of the thing, "*&c.*"[f]

THIS abſolute Neceſſity is nothing but another Name for a Connexion of Ideas, diſcovering to us the Nature of the Propoſition; which at laſt reſolves into this, That every intuitive Truth, or firſt

[e] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 39.

[f] Pag. 40.

Principle,

Principle, is what it is, without any Reaſon *a priori* for it. All ſelf-evident Axioms, otherwiſe called Indemonſtrables, are what they are without any Cauſe or Ground; they are immutable, fix'd, and permanent, that is *modally neceſſary*; and if a thouſand Cauſes or Reaſons could be given for them, inſtead of making them more evident or certain, they would be leſs evident and leſs certain than they are by their own Light. [g] Ch. V.

IN like manner, *Neceſſity*, as applied in the other Caſe, means only an inſeparable *Connexion* between the Divine Eſſence and Exiſtence, expreſſing *what* he is, not *why*. It denotes Stability, Permanency, Immutability; it is the higheſt Certainty, above and beyond all *cauſal* Neceſſity, which would render it dependent on ſomething elſe, and conſequently more precarious than it is without it. [h]

AGAIN, "We muſt neceſſarily ſtop at this "Ground or Reaſon; and to ask what is the *Rea-* "*ſon* of this *Reaſon*, which is in the Nature of "things the laſt of all Reaſons, is as abſurd as it "would be to ask what is the Cauſe (the efficient "Cauſe) of the Firſt (efficient) Cauſe." [i]

THIS is the very Abſurdity which the Author himſelf runs into, and which we have been all the while oppoſing. After we have proved that there is a Firſt Cauſe, a Ground, and Foundation of every thing beſides him, we think it neceſſary to ſtop: But he goes on to find a Cauſe of that Cauſe, which in the Nature of things is the laſt of all *efficient, operating* Cauſes, which are in truth the only Cauſes to his purpoſe, and which he is often obliged to make uſe of; as obſerved above. We prove *that* there is ſuch a Being independent and

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[g] See Dr. *Gretton's* Review, c. 25.

[h] See *Diſſertation*, p. 66.

[i] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 40.

all-

Ch. V. insufficient; he wants to know why he is so; we shall say in his own Words, that this is as absurd as to ask what is the Cause of the First Cause. We maintain that the last Result of all Reasoning is, that every Thing is *what* it is, as he has it above, and there would gladly terminate our Enquiries.

ANALYSIS, "This being the *highest* and *last* Reason that can be, or be assigned for the Existence "of any Being, it is plainly absurd and contradictory to demand, or to suppose it possible that "there should be a Reason for this Reason, which "is the *highest* and *last* Reason possible in the Nature of Things."[1]

ALL which is only borrowing our Answers to him when he demands a Reason *a priori* for God's Existence. Instead of *Reason* or *Necessity* we need but put in God the First Cause, Substance for Shadow, and then every Argument of his becomes our own. Thus *God* being the highest and last *Cause* that can be, or be assigned, it is plainly absurd and contradictory to demand or suppose it possible that there should be any *Cause* for this Cause, which is the highest and last *Cause* possible in the Nature of Things,——and which cannot but be *what it is*.

THUS we may appear well enough in our Scheme of an absolutely first uncaused Being; but it is totally inconsistent with our Author's Principle of demanding a Reason why every *Thing* or *Circumstance* of a Thing is, rather than is not, and continues to be what it is, rather than is changed into another Thing.

NOR is this Hypothesis *Antecedent Necessity* itself, if it be any real Thing or Circumstance, must like-

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[1] Pag. 41.

[2] *Existence and Unity*, p. 30. Conf. Dr. *Clarke*. Answ. to the 6th Letter.

wise

wiſe have a Reaſon why it is, rather than is not, Ch. V.
and why it continues to be what it is: We muſt demand why it *cannot but* be, and why it might not *originally* have not been, or may not ceaſe to be; or why there might not once have been, or may not now be, ten thouſand antecedent Neceſſities as well as one. The Caſe I apprehend to be perfectly parallel, and the Force of the Retorſion irreſiſtible.

Mr. JACKSON has an Obſervation or two more, relating to the Proof of a God from the *Idea*, which may properly come under this Head. In *Page* 47. he attempts a Diſtinction between the *Scholaſtick* Proof and that of Dr. *Clarke*. The former, he ſays, "depends merely on forming in the Mind the Idea, "or making a Definition (which yet was own'd to "be imperfect) of a perfect Being, Part of whoſe "Perfection is *Self-Exiſtence*; and then ſuppoſing "the Being, ſo defined, actually to exiſt."

Anſw. Tho' this Proof be a poor one, yet 'tis better than that other which depends on forming in the Mind the Idea of a Cauſe antecedent, or a Principle extrinſick, to the ſelf-exiſtent Being, which is ſuppoſed originally to determine its Nature, and be the Ground of its actual Exiſtence. The former is only a ſmall *Petitio Principii*, the latter is a plain and groſs Abſurdity. Neither is this ſame *Neceſſity* leſs a Fiction or Formation of the Mind, than the *Idea* of the Schoolmen: Whether it be an extrinſick Principle or an intrinſick Property, whereby the Firſt Cauſe is ſuppoſed to exiſt; whether it be Cauſal or Modal, 'tis but *ſuppoſed* ſtill, (ſetting aſide all Arguments *a poſteriori*) and ſure the Schoolmen did not come behind the Doctor in *ſuppoſing*. It may indeed often *force itſelf upon us*, (as he urges below) that is, upon our Fancy or Imagination; but it can never force our Reaſon and Judgment; and Neceſſity of Perception will by no

means prove the Exiſtence of an external Nature like to our Idea, much leſs its neceſſary Exiſtence; as has been ſhewn above.

"THE Point, he ſays, is this: If, upon abſtracted Conſideration, we find that any Perfections neceſſarily pre-ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of the Subſtance, and appear not to have any Ground of Exiſtence, but upon firſt ſuppoſing the Exiſtence of a Subſtance in which they inhere, ſuch Perfections are plainly *conſequent* and *poſterior*, in order of Nature, to the Exiſtence of the Subſtance. But if we find any one Perfection of ſuch a Nature, that in our Thoughts we can more eaſily ſuppoſe the Non-exiſtence of the Subſtance than of this *Property*, and even could ſuppoſe the Subſtance not to be, or to be otherwiſe than it it is, if it was not for this Perfection inferring it; —— Such a Perfection evidently *infers* the Exiſtence of the Subſtance, and *precedes* it in the order of our Ideas, juſt as the Subſtance *infers* and *precedes*, in our Conception, the Exiſtence of the other Attributes; and ſuch a Perfection is *Self-Exiſtence*."[†]

Anſw. 1. LET us abſtract as long as we pleaſe, we can never make a *Property* antecedent in Conception to the *Subject* in which it inheres, as all Properties are conceiv'd to do: To prove the Exiſtence of any Property, is to prove that it exiſts in ſome Subject, and conſequently the Exiſtence of the Subject is neceſſarily ſuppoſed prior to the Property; the contrary would be inverting both the order of Nature and our Ideas.[‡]

WE may as well conceive Exiſtence prior to the *Thing exiſting*, as ſuppoſe *Self-Exiſtence*, or any

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[†] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 48.

[‡] See the two Paſſages from Dr. *Clarke* in the *Diſſertation*, p. 59.

Perfection

Perfection whatever, prior to the *ſelf-exiſting* Subject. This indeed, or any other Perfection, conceiv'd as a *Principle extrinſick*, may *precede* and *infer* the Subſtance; but as a *Property* (the Name it here goes by) it evidently cannot, unleſs we will deſtroy the very Notion of a Property, and confound the plaineſt Signification of Words. Beſides, Ch. V.

2. How can this Perfection *infer* the Exiſtence of any Subſtance, if it would continue even tho' the Subſtance were ſuppoſed not to exiſt, or to be otherwiſe than it is? If it owe its own Exiſtence to Nothing elſe, and want nothing for its Support?

In the laſt Place, 'Tis the greateſt Abſurdity to ſuppoſe the Subſtance away, and this Neceſſity remaining; to conceive it thus antecedent, and, as it were, *more ſelf-exiſtent* than the Subſtance itſelf.

'Tis plain, that what miſleads our Author into this muſt be ſome confuſed Idea of *Cauſality*, which the Word Neceſſity carries along with it. Let us but put other Words in its room, which are equivalent to it, namely *Independence*, or *Immutability*, and we ſhall readily perceive that they pre-ſuppoſe ſomething independent or immutable, and cannot be conceiv'd to remain while the Subject is ſuppos'd to ceaſe. If the Subſtance be taken away, they fall of courſe; or if any Thing be conceiv'd not as a Subſtance, nor as depending on the Suppoſition of any Subſtance, like Time and Space, 'tis a clear Argument to me that it is nothing real, but a mere floating abſtract Idea.

"When we are imagining no Being in the "Univerſe to exiſt, we find a Neceſſity of the Ex-"iſtence of ſome Property, as of the Infinity of "Time and Space, or of Eternity and Immenſity,

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[m] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 48.

"which, whether we will or not, *infers* the Exist-
"ence of a Being, of which these are Properties;
"and which it is as impossible to suppose remov'd
"out of the Universe, as it is to remove the Equa-
"lity of twice two to four; and the Consequence
"of removing which would be to suppose an *eter-*
"*nal* and *infinite* NOTHING, than which nothing
"can be supposed more contradictory and absurd."[a]

As to the *Infinity* of Space and Time, and their being *Properties*, we have consider'd it before. We think these Ideas may easily be remov'd out of our Minds, at least we can conceive the Possibility of removing them, and that they cannot be proved from Reason to be necessary: And, if so, we may conceive *absolute Nothing*, if we please; I mean notwithstanding any Reason that appears *a priori*. The Argument will amount to this only, *viz.* To suppose that there once was Nothing, implies that there never could be any Thing; but Something now is, therefore the former Supposition is absurd. This is all the Absurdity that follows from the Supposition of *mere Nothing*, and by it we prove the *Eternity* of Something, or some one First Cause. But none are obliged to maintain that other Absurdity of an *infinite eternal* Nothing, except such as are possess'd with the Ideas of *Infinity* and *Eternity*, even tho' they cannot prove the Existence of any real Being to apply them to, at least by any other Argument than barely their *having* these Ideas; which must be allowed to be a very feeble one, except either these same Ideas were innate, or shewn to be as universal and necessary as if they were so. If that was the Case, there would be no Dispute about them: If not, the Difficulty (of an *eternal* and *infinite* Nothing) concerns only the Gentlemen in our Author's way of Thinking, who

[a] *Existence and Unity*, p. 48.

have

have got ſuch Ideas into their Heads, and are not able to get rid of them again. But this likewiſe has been anticipated already. Ch. V.

All that remains on this Subject is the following Note in *Page* 47. "The ſtrongeſt Proof of "the Exiſtence of God drawn from the Idea of "him I take to be this; *viz.* If I have a real and "poſitive Idea of a ſelf-exiſtent Being; or if *Self-exiſtence*, applied to *Being*, is no Contradiction, "it hence follows, that the Exiſtence of a ſelf-exiſtent Being is *poſſible*:—But if the Exiſtence of a ſelf-exiſtent Being is *poſſible*, it thence follows, that ſuch a Being does *actually exiſt*; becauſe the Suppoſition of the *poſſible* Exiſtence of any Being, without the Suppoſition of the Exiſtence of a ſelf-exiſtent Being, is an expreſs Contradiction. So that *poſſible* Exiſtence (with reſpect to a ſelf-exiſtent Being) infers *actual* Exiſtence. If there is any Fallacy in this Argument, I ſhould be glad to ſee where it lies."

It lies in this, that it proceeds to determine of the *Poſſibility* without firſt enquiring into the *Fact*; when there is really no certain way of knowing whether it be *poſſible* or no, but by conſidering what *actually* is. We know not how a ſelf-exiſtent, uncauſed Being can exiſt; we have not ſufficient Data, or Compaſs of Thought or Ideas, to go upon in the Queſtion of *Poſſibility*, if made previous to the other. See above, p. 6, 7.

It alſo takes the Word *poſſible* in two Senſes; firſt, as appearing ſo to *us*, or implying no Contradiction to our Ideas; ſecondly, as being really ſo *in itſelf*, or including the actual Exiſtence of a *Power* requiſite to, or a ſufficient *Ground* of Exiſtence; the latter of which will by no means follow from the former. See above, p. 10. The Truth of the Caſe is this: The Suppoſition of any *dependent* Being implies a Neceſſity for ſomething inde-

independent; becauſe an infinite Series of dependent Beings is an expreſs Contradiction: This is all the Suppoſition that requires his actual Exiſtence, or makes it *neceſſary*. But this Neceſſity is *a poſteriori*, drawn from the ſuppoſed Exiſtence of ſomething *beſide him*, not from the *Idea of him* only: And any other Neceſſity but this will prove equivocal, and take for granted the very Thing in Queſtion. It will be a *Neceſſity* for his Exiſtence *ex Hypotheſi* that he does *actually* exiſt; otherwiſe it will be as ſtrong a Neceſſity for his *not exiſting*; ſince, if we ſuppoſe a ſelf-exiſtent Being once out of Being, it will be impoſſible for him ever to come in. In ſhort (excluſive of all Reaſons *a poſteriori*) it is a Neceſſity which does not affect the *Thing* one way or other, but terminates in our own arbitrary *Suppoſitions*. If there *can* be a ſelf-exiſtent Being, then 'twill be a Contradiction that there ſhould not be one; or, if there *may be* a Firſt Cauſe, there *muſt be* one, for the Reaſon above; tho' whether there really can be one or not (*i. e.* whether there *is* one, otherwiſe it can never be) without this Reaſon, is ſtill as much a Queſtion as ever. Is it not then both a much ſhorter and a ſurer way to begin with this Reaſon itſelf, which ſhews (*a poſteriori*) that he *muſt be*, and therefore concludes irrefragably that he *is*? Would it not be full as well to reſt contented with ſuch Arguments as are ſufficient to eſtabliſh the *Fact*, as thoſe *a poſteriori* are, rather than be perpetually hunting after other *Reaſons*, which are of no force till that Fact is eſtabliſhed, and never fit for any thing but to perplex and unſettle it again?[a]

HAVING endeavour'd to ſhew the Inconcluſiveneſs of all Mr. *Jackſon*'s Arguments in ſupport of

[a] See a full Anſwer to the Proof of the Exiſtence of a God from the *Idea*, in all its various Shapes, by the learned *Moſheimius*, in the Notes to his *Latin* Tranſlation of *Cudworth*, p. 896, &c.

his

his *antecedent Neceſſity* or *internal Cauſe* of God's Exiſtence; having alſo ſhewn the Inſufficiency of his Reply to my former Objections, I ſhall conclude with ſome more poſitive Arguments againſt the Poſſibility of it, from the ſame Learned Writer who has obliged us with thoſe againſt Space and Time. The Reader will obſerve that they all center in this one Reaſon, *viz.* That there is no Cauſe prior to the Firſt. Ch. V.

1. If there be any Internal Cauſe, Reaſon, Ground or Foundation, it is either the Subſtance itſelf, or ſome Property of it. But the Subſtance is not the Cauſe of itſelf, nor is any Property a Cauſe of the Subſtance. Therefore, *&c.*

The *Minor* is evident. For, to make the Subſtance the Cauſe, Reaſon, Ground or Foundation of itſelf, is to make it prior to itſelf, dependent and independent; which is an expreſs Contradiction.

And to Suppoſe any Property or Properties to be the Cauſe, Reaſon, Ground or Foundation of the Subſtance, is ὕστερον πρότερον; is making Subjects flow from their Properties, inſtead of the Properties flowing from their Subjects; which is infinitely abſurd.

2. The Queſtion, Whether *there is* any internal Cauſe, *&c.* amounts to the ſame with this; Whether there *exiſts* any internal Cauſe of the Firſt Cauſe, or of God's Exiſtence? But this is the very ſame as to aſk whether God exiſts, and is tantamount to it. Therefore, *&c.*

The Reaſon is manifeſt. For, to aſk whether ſuch or ſuch a *Property* exiſts, is the ſame as to aſk whether it has a real *Subject*; and the Subject in this Caſe is ſuppoſed to be God himſelf, or Nothing.

And therefore the τὸ ὅτι in this Caſe reſolves into the τὸ ἐστι only; wherefore there is no ſuch thing as internal Cauſe.

3. Existence

Ch. V. 3. EXISTENCE and *Eſſence* in God are the very ſame; and conſequently to aſk after a Reaſon, Cauſe, Ground or Foundation of his *Exiſtence*, comes to the ſame as to enquire after a Reaſon, Cauſe, Ground or Foundation of his *Eſſence*, that is of himſelf.

AND therefore all Pretence to any *internal Cauſe*, is only, in other Words, to make the Thing the Cauſe of itſelf, which is either abſurd, or ſaying nothing; either Senſe without Truth, or Sound without Senſe: Therefore, in Strictneſs and Propriety, there is no ſuch thing as an INTERNAL CAUSE, which was to be proved.

CHAP. VI.

Of the UNITY.

Ch. VI. HAVING been ſo large already in confuting the Principles upon which our Author's ten following Demonſtrations of the *Unity* of God are built, I might, for the ſame Reaſon that I did before, decline any farther Examination of them. But, as Mr. *Jackſon* ſeems to have ſome Opinion of them, by his giving himſelf the Trouble of publiſhing moſt of them a ſecond time, I ſhall not grudge the Labour of conſidering them particularly.

BUT I muſt premiſe a few Things, in order to take off an invidious Inſinuation or two, as if, becauſe we cannot allow the *Unity* to be demonſtrable *a priori*, that therefore we don't think it capable of

of any Proof, or don't at all believe it, or oppoſe it purely out of a *Prejudice in favour of the Scheme of Polytheiſm, or Ditheiſm, or Tritheiſm* [a]. Ch. VI.

ON the contrary, I think the common Arguments *a poſteriori* for the Unity of the Divine Nature, drawn from the *Order* and *Harmony* of the World, very good and ſufficient. They make the Point morally certain, and render the other ſide of the Queſtion highly improbable and *unreaſonable*, as was ſaid before [b]. And, if St. *Paul* [c] had not thought ſo too, he would ſcarce have pronounced the Heathens *without Excuſe* for neglecting them, *Rom.* i. 20. For I fancy our Author does not imagine that the Apoſtle intended any Argument *a priori* in that place. But *Probability* is one thing, and *Demonſtration*, in the proper Senſe, (which the Author, I dare ſay, would have it here taken in) is another: And, if we cannot arrive at abſolute Certainty in this great Point by the Light of Nature, we ought to be the more thankful for the Benefit of Revelation, which has put it paſt Diſpute. As to the received Doctrine of the *Trinity*, which, I ſuppoſe, our Author means to ſtigmatize with the hard Names above, I can aſſure him, that I have ſcarce ever thought of it in the courſe of this Debate. But, to obviate all Suſpicions of this kind, it may be proper here to produce the Sentiments of one whom Mr. *Jackſon* will acknowledge to be far from being prejudiced in favour of any *Ditheiſtick or Tritheiſtick Hypotheſis*; I mean the Learned Mr. *Nye*, who was one of the ſhrewdeſt *Unitarians* that perhaps *England* ever bred. The

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[a] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 6.

[b] Note 10 to A. Bp. *King*, and Remark g, p. 80. 2d Edit.

[c] See *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 4.

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moſt or beſt of the *Socinian* Pamphlets, if I am not miſinform'd, were his; yet he gave up the natural Proof of the Unity very deliberately, and went not a Step farther than I have done [d]. I ſhall give his own Words as they are found in his Diſcourſe concerning Natural and Revealed Religion [e]. "As "the Beauty, Immenſity and Deſigns of the "World and all its Parts evince to us, that there "is an all-wiſe and all-powerful Mind, the Cauſe "of them; ſo they no way prove, or ſo much as "intimate, that there are more ſuch Minds, or "more Gods. They demonſtrate beyond Excep-"tion that ſuch a Mind and Power there is; but "not that there is more than one: Therefore, as "to the Unity of God, we may properly ſay, that "we own but one all-powerful and all-knowing "Mind, or but one God, *becauſe we know of no* "*more*; of one we are certain, of more than one "there is no manner of Intimation in all Nature.

"I THINK it may be proper and convenient to "abide by this Argument for the Unity of God, "and *what may be inferred from it*: We ought "not (in my Judgment) to look out for all manner "of little Congruities, Umbrages and Shadows of "Argument, in a Point of ſo great Conſequence "as is the Unity of God.——I ſaid it might be "convenient to abide by the afore-mentioned Ar-"gument of the Unity of God, and *what may be* "*inferred from it*: That which may be inferred "is, that as we diſcern by the World and its Parts "an almighty and all-wiſe Mind, without any the "leaſt Signification that there are more ſuch Minds; "ſo, if indeed there were more whom we ought to "acknowledge and worſhip, it would have been

[d] Notes to *King*, ibid.

[e] Pag. 40, 41, &c.

"ſome

" ſome way as plainly ſignified to us in the Works of the Creation, as 'tis ſignified by theſe Works that there is at leaſt one ſuch Mind. 'Tis not likely, if there were more Gods, or more Creators, that they would give no Intimation of it, neither in the Works of Creation, nor of Providence; that we might not omit to pay them that equal Veneration, which their Benefits to us, and the Excellence and Dignity of their own Natures require of us. Ch. VI.

" It ought not to be objected to this Argument, that 'tis neither direct nor demonſtrative; but only negative and probable: For 'tis *as good an Argument as in this Caſe we need.* The Argument for the Being of God muſt be poſitive, direct and demonſtrative; becauſe we affirm ſomething, namely that God is; but the Proof of the Unity of God needs only to be negative, becauſe we meddle not with affirming any thing; but content ourſelves, that, becauſe we know of no more Gods, therefore we are no way concerned how we may honour, or pleaſe, or approve ourſelves to more. Though in very deed the Argument ſeems more than probable and negative; we may ſay it has a Moral Certainty though not a Phyſical: For it will hardly (I think) be denied, that 'tis morally certain that if there were more Gods, or more Creators, this would have been ſome way clearly ſignify'd, by the manner of Creation, or by ſome Circumſtances either of *That*, or of Providence. Elſe how ſhould we pay to them the Adoration and Acknowledgements, which (as their Creatures, and on the Account of their Perfections) are naturally due to them from us?"

Mr. Jackson's firſt Demonſtration is as follows;

" God being *neceſſarily exiſtent* (or neceſſary Exiſtence being a poſitive Property of God) it is

Ch. VI. "a Contradiction in Reaſon to ſuppoſe him not to "exiſt.——But it is not a Contradiction to ſuppoſe "*no more* than *One* neceſſarily exiſtent Being to "exiſt; therefore *no more* than *One* can exiſt. For, "if *Two* or more ſuch Beings could exiſt, we ſhould "not only have as clear an Idea of the neceſſary "Exiſtence of *Two* or more, as we have of One, but "it would equally imply a Contradiction to our "Ideas for any One of them *not* to exiſt, as it is "a Contradiction to ſuppoſe *One* not to exiſt: "Whereas, in reſpect of *One*, we ſee a plain Con-"tradiction to ſuppoſe it *not* to exiſt, but in reſpect "of more than one we ſee no ſuch Contradiction [f].

In what Senſe *neceſſary Exiſtence* can be a *Property* of God, has been at large conſider'd. But, what Senſe ſoever we take it in here, I think it will be of ſmall Service to the preſent Argument. In the *Modal* Senſe of Neceſſity (*i. e.* as a Connection of actual Exiſtence with Independence) every independent Being will be neceſſarily exiſtent, and it will be an Impoſſibility in Nature for every ſuch Being not to exiſt: And how do we know (*a priori*) that there are not a hundred ſuch independent Beings, and by conſequence all neceſſarily exiſtent? In the *Cauſal* Senſe of the Word (*i. e.* as antecedently inferring Exiſtence) every Being originally *grounded* on ſuch Neceſſity cannot, without a Contradiction, be ſuppoſed away; but how do we know again (*a priori*) that there may not be Twenty ſuch antecedent, original Grounds; or why might not the ſame abſolute Neceſſity have *operated* as eaſily in ſeveral Beings, as One?

Again, This Neceſſity of Exiſtence in either of the two Senſes may be *real* or *ideal* only; if our Author ſpeaks of the former, he can never prove it (*a priori*) except he could look into the Eſſences

[f] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 116.

of

of all Things, and ſee how Exiſtence does, or does not reſult from each of them. He muſt therefore beg the Queſtion of a *real Neceſſity* for any *One*, and why may we not do the ſame for a Hundred? If his Neceſſity be *ideal* only, then the Eſſence of every Thing, into which this Idea enters, will be equally neceſſary; and why cannot I connect it with a Thouſand as well as One? Gods (three or four ſuppoſe) being in this Senſe *neceſſarily exiſtent*, as our Author ſays, or *neceſſary Exiſtence being the Property of them*, it is a Contradiction to ſuppoſe any of them not to exiſt; it is equally a *Contradiction* to ſuppoſe all of them not to be, (all being previouſly ſuppoſed neceſſarily exiſting) as to ſuppoſe it of One: The Argument is the ſame for as many as ever you'll pleaſe to *ſuppoſe*. For if the *Idea* of Self-exiſtence or neceſſary Exiſtence, abſtracting from other Conſiderations, can infer Exiſtence, it is very plain that we may apply it to as many Subjects as we have a mind; and the ſame Idea will ſtill be of the ſame Force, and equally prove all, or none. We muſt therefore enquire into the Nature of Things, and not imagine that the making a *mental Propoſition* ſhall ſtand for Demonſtration of *Realities ad extra*. If we look into Fact we ſee indeed *a plain Contradiction* (as our Author ſays) in ſuppoſing no one independent Being to exiſt; becauſe the whole Univerſe would depend on Nothing: And we ſee no Neceſſity for more than One ſuch Being, becauſe One is ſufficient; Independence implying Self-ſufficiency and the higheſt Perfection: But this does not prove that more Cauſes than one might not poſſibly concur in the Production and Preſervation of the World, tho' One was really ſufficient. *Neceſſity* then (as well as *Contradiction*) admits of two Senſes more, viz. *a priori* and *a poſteriori*. The former can never be made out; or if it could, 'twould prove nothing

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Ch. VI. thing to the preſent Purpoſe; the latter is obvious, and proves concluſively that there is one Self-exiſtent Being *at leaſt*, One or more, and that's all: It does not amount to *One only*, or to One excluſive of all others, which is what this Demonſtration wants. If the Author abides by the firſt, it is as eaſy to prove the Exiſtence of a Thouſand as of One; ſince it is only putting neceſſary Exiſtence into the Definition of every God. If he abides by the ſecond, he only proves that Effects muſt have either *Cauſe* or *Cauſes*: The Queſtion of the *Unity* then remains as before. I ſuppoſe he will take Neceſſity in the former Senſe; and then, beſide the foregoing Defects, his Demonſtration takes for granted the three following Propoſitions. 1. That if there be any real Neceſſity it muſt *appear*. 2. That ſuch a Neceſſity *does appear*. And 3. That it can be *applied to the Exiſtence* of the Firſt Cauſe, and made the *Ground* thereof without a Contradiction: All which Propoſitions we deny, and have, we think, given ſufficient Reaſons for denying them above.

2. "To ſuppoſe *Two* or more neceſſarily exiſtent "Beings to exiſt, is to ſuppoſe this plain Contra- "diction; that any one of them, as being *inde- "pendent* of the others by its *neceſſary Exiſtence*, "may exiſt alone, and conſequently may exiſt with- "out the Exiſtence of the others; and this conſe- "quently is to ſuppoſe that none of them are *ne- "ceſſarily exiſtent*, at the ſame time that they are "ſuppoſed *neceſſarily exiſtent*." [6]

NECESSITY is uſed here in two different Senſes, both as *abſolute* and *relative*. In the former, neither of the two Beings can exiſt without the other, *i. e.* without our ſuppoſing the other to exiſt alſo, ſince that is equally neceſſary. In the latter, either of them may exiſt alone, *i. e.* without the Help of

[6] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 117.

the

the other, or without the Suppoſition of the other as requiſite to its own Exiſtence. The Conſequence therefore, that either of them may exiſt alone, and ſo neither of them are neceſſary, is a mere *Equivocation* on *Neceſſity*, uſing it both in an abſolute and relative Senſe at the ſame time. Ch. VI.

Or thus: Any of theſe Beings may or might exiſt alone, were nothing elſe conſider'd but their *mutual Independence*; but, when we conſider that all (be they ever ſo many) are equally ſuppoſed *neceſſarily exiſting*, none can be ſuppoſed to exiſt *alone* without Contradiction. In one view it might be ſuppoſed to exiſt *alone*, but upon the whole it cannot. So this is nothing more than the known Sophiſm, *A dicto ſecundum quid ad dictum ſimpliciter.*

3. "Two or more neceſſarily exiſtent Beings "implies another plain Contradiction, *viz.* That, "whilſt they are ſuppos'd to be each *independent* "in Exiſtence of the others, they are yet neceſſarily "*dependent* on each other; and, being *equal* and of "the ſame kind, cannot exert the leaſt degree of "Power without mutual Conſent; conſequently "none of them are *ſupreme*, abſolutely *independent*, or *all-perfect* [h]."

Anſw. They are not dependent on each other, either for their *Exiſtence* or any of their *Perfections*, being all by the Suppoſition abſolutely *uncauſed*, and conſequently *independent* on every Thing for what they are, and always were. In this Senſe they are all of them as much independent as any one could be. *Independency* in another Senſe of the Word, *i. e.* implying an abſolute *Supremacy* [i] over every other Being in Nature, as it

[h] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 118.

[i] "As to that part of the Argument which makes *Supremacy* "a neceſſary Character of an all-perfect Being, it ſeems to carry "ſtill

Ch. VI. it is founded on a Suppoſition that there are no other Beings *of the ſame kind*, is what ſhould not have been *ſuppoſed* but demonſtrated; otherwiſe it is a manifeſt *Petitio Principii* [k]. As to the *Actions* of theſe ſeveral independent Beings, ſince they are all ſuppoſed to be equally good, wiſe, &c. they may be conceived to conſpire together in every thing that is good and wiſe: The ſame eternal and immutable *Relations of Things*, which the Author ſuppoſes our Creator always determin'd by, will equally and invariably determine each of them [l]. Nor will ſuch acting in concert render them properly *dependent* or *imperfect*, ſince it is the intrinſic Perfection of each, and not the Will of another which makes him ſo to act. Ten Clocks may ſtrike together without depending one upon another, and ſo may as many voluntary Beings *agree in one*. They may all have the ſame Perfections in the

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" ſtill leſs Weight and Evidence in it. Supremacy cannot be an " abſolute or eſſential Character of the Divine Nature, becauſe it " is a relative Term, and only ſuppoſes, that when God has " made any Thing, he has a Right of Dominion over it; but it " does not follow, that if he had never proceeded to make any " Thing, or to operate externally, this Attribute could in a pro- " per Senſe have belong'd to him. To ſay that he muſt have " been Supreme without his creating any Thing dependent on " him, is plainly to beg the Queſtion, and proves nothing againſt " the Poſſibility of other independent Beings, equal in Power " and every other Perfection to him." *Fiddes. Theol. Spec.* p. 98.

[k] See Notes to *King*, p. 81. 2d Edit.

[l] " It muſt be acknowledg'd, the Diſtinction of a moral and " a free Agent, when refer'd to God, is of leſs Force to thoſe " who believe, that, notwithſtanding the perfect Freedom of his " Choice, he is always under a Neceſſity of doing what is beſt " to be done, and in the beſt manner: And if he can only act as " infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs direct, then, ſuppoſing more " Gods than one, and all of them infinitely wiſe and good, they " muſt ſtill will the ſame Thing, and deſign the ſame Method " of executing it." *Fiddes. Theol. Spec.* p. 96.

ſame

same Degree, *i. e.* the highest, and exert them freely, without any kind of Influence on each other, or Possibility of interfering. And, if our Author will contend for any other *Perfection* than this, it is his business to prove it. Ch. VI.

4. "It is a Contradiction to the Nature of *Perfection* to suppose Two or more *necessarily-existent perfect* Beings of the same kind; because One of them, by the Supposition, having all the Perfections which are or can be in more than One, more than One cannot be *necessary*, either in respect of *Nature* or *Perfections*; *i. e.* cannot be at all, or in any respect *necessarily existent*, consequently not God. [m]"

Here the Author plays upon the equivocal Word *Necessary*; and his Argument, if put into Syllogism, will have more than three Terms. What mean the Words *more than One cannot be necessary?* Does he mean that there's *no Need* of more, or *no Cause* for more, or *no Reason* for asserting more? All this may be allow'd, and yet, for any thing we know, there may be *actually* more. Does he mean Necessity *a priori*, or *a posteriori? ideal* or *real?* Whatever he means, it is only blending the several Notions of *Necessity* (Logical, Moral, Physical, Metaphysical) which should be kept distinct, but upon confounding which most of his Arguments depend.

He seems also to have pitch'd upon two distinct Mediums here, *viz. Perfection* and *Necessity*, without making any proper use of either. He has not proved that a self-existent Being must have all conceivable Perfections *absolutely* or *numerically*, (if I may so speak) which would indeed exclude every thing else; but only *specifically*, or Perfections of every *sort*: Which may consist with a Plurality of

[m] Pag. 119.

ſelf-exiſtent Beings, either All but One remaining unactive, or Each exerciſing his own Perfections in his particular Syſtem, or All conſpiring in the Government of one. Whether there is any other Perfection in Nature but this, is the only Queſtion; and that there really is, neither has, nor can, I think, be proved from the *Idea* of abſolute *Neceſſity*, or of *Perfection*, unleſs *ſuppoſing* one individual Being to be endow'd with all poſſible Perfections, both *ſpecifick* and *numerical*, were the ſame as demonſtrating him to be ſo.

5. "THERE cannot be more Gods than *One*, for "this plain Reaſon, becauſe *One* is ſufficient; the "*Sufficiency* of *One* deſtroying the *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence, and conſequently the *Exiſtence*, of another: For that Being cannot be *God*, which is "not *neceſſarily exiſtent*. And to ſay, it is *neceſſary* for more Gods than *One* to exiſt, is to ſay "that *One* is not *ſufficient* [a]."

HERE the Author ſeems to be guilty of the ſame Equivocation in the Word *Sufficient*, as before in *Neceſſary*. He blends the Ideas of *ſelf-ſufficient* and *ſufficient* to an *End*. *A poſteriori* it does not appear but that *One* God is ſufficient, and conſequently no more are neceſſary, *i. e.* to account for the Phænomena of Nature. But ſuch a Sufficiency as this is far from excluding the Exiſtence of more. *A priori*, or antecedently to all Creation, there may, for any thing that appears, be many *independent* and *all-ſufficient* Beings; and therefore neceſſary *in ſe*, or *modally* ſo, tho' their Exiſtence be not neceſſary for any thing elſe; and conſequently the Exiſtence whereof we are neither able to prove nor diſprove. So that here again his *Medius Terminus* is double, and the Syllogiſm conſiſts of four Propoſitions. He adds [b]:

[a] Pag. 119.
[b] Pag. 120.

"Bur

"BUT ſeveral ſuppos'd neceſſary exiſtent Be-
"ings, equal in Power, &c. are none of them
"*independent*, *ſupreme*, *omnipotent*, &c. becauſe
"not ſo in reſpect of each other; nay, none of
"them have the leaſt Degree of *Power*, &c. *abſo-*
"*lute* and *independent*, every Degree of it being
"*limited* by every equal Degree of the *Power*, &c.
"of the other ſuppos'd neceſſarily-exiſtent Beings."

Anſw. THERE is no ſuch *Limitation* where there can be no *interfering* or *claſhing*; And there can be no claſhing where all are abſolutely perfect, infinitely wiſe, good, &c. as was ſhewn above. Beſides, if we ſhould affirm that each of theſe ſelf-exiſtent Beings has only Power over the Syſtem which he produced; how will our Author ſhew the contrary? I'm ſure any other *Power*, &c. than this, remains yet to be proved, and to be proved from ſome better Topick than the bare *Idea* of it.

6. "IF it be ſaid, that there may poſſibly be
"*Two* or more neceſſarily exiſtent Beings of *dif-*
"*ferent kinds*; this is the very ſame as ſaying,
"that there may poſſibly be *Two* or more *ſame*
"things in kind of *different* kinds, which is a Con-
"tradiction: For *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence is the moſt
"*ſimple uniform* Idea that can be conceiv'd, hav-
"ing no conceivable *Difference* or *Variety* in it.[p]"

7. "To ſuppoſe *Two* or more neceſſarily exiſtent
"Beings *different in kind*, is to ſuppoſe the neceſ-
"ſarily exiſtent Perfections of each Being to be
"different in kind, and no One of the neceſſary
"exiſtent Beings to have the Perfections which are
"in the others, as being different in kind; conſe-
"quently that no One of theſe ſuppoſed Beings is
"*abſolutely perfect*, being perfect only in its re-
"ſpective kind, but imperfect in reſpect of the Per-
"fections of the other Beings which it wants[q]."

[p] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 120.
[q] Ibid.

Answ. 1. THIS cannot be said, while these several self-existent Beings are supposed equally perfect both in *Kind* and *Degree*; all *absolutely* good, wise, &c. which is our present Supposition. So these two Arguments are foreign to the Point.

BUT, 2. If it should be said that they are of *different* Natures in some Respects, and each only perfect in its *kind*, wanting some of the Perfections of the rest; how will our Author shew the contrary? How do we come at our Notion of the several Qualities or Perfections which we attribute to the Maker of the World, but only from observing them in some degree in his Works? Do we know directly and *a priori* all the several sorts of Perfection which may be connected with Self-existence, so as to be able to determine that all are necessarily included in one self-existent Being? Or can our Author describe all that results from his own Principle of *antecedent Necessity*? Dr. *Clarke* could *not see the immediate and necessary Connexion of it with* INTELLIGENCE;[r] and, but for our Proofs *a posteriori*, I fear we should be hard put to it to discover any thing of the Divine *Wisdom* or *Liberty*; nor ever be able to demonstrate against the Supposition of an eternal, absolute, and *blind Fatality*; a *Supposition* which, I think, appears much more agreeable to our Author's Principle than the contrary.

LASTLY, Why may not different self-existent Beings, or Beings endowed with different kinds of Perfection, all be supposed to flow from this one *simple uniform* Necessity, as well as that Variety of Perfections belonging to the Deity,[s] all which our Author must derive from the very same *simple* Necessity of Existence by which he conceives the

[r] *Demonstr.* Prop. viii. p. 50. 7th Edit.

[s] Notes to *King*, p. 53. 2d Edit. *Collier's Impartial Enquiry*, p. 179.

Deity himself to subsist? Let us see how he clears this Difficulty. Ch. VI.

"If it be said, that one and the same Necessity "of Existence may be the Reason or Ground of "*different* necessarily existent Beings, as well as of "*different* necessarily existent Properties in one Be-"ing; the Answer is, That different Properties "are the Effect, Result or Consequence of *one* "Necessity, because they exist in and flow from "*one* and the *same* Being or Substance, in which "the Necessity itself exists, as the Reason or Ground "of the Existence of the Being or Substance. So "that the Necessity is the Ground or Reason of "the Existence of *One* Being only, tho' the different "Properties of the Being (which are essentially in-"separable from it, and constitute the Being *what* "*it is*, and so are not really different from it) are "and cannot but be necessarily existent; because "the Being or Substance of which they are *essential* "Properties, is necessarily existent; but different "necessarily existent Beings——must infer the in-"ternal Necessity or *Mode* of their Existence to be "different in kind." [t]

THE Meaning of which, as far as I can under-stand it, is this: That the *Substance* only flows from this uniform Necessity, and therefore can be but *one*; whereas the *Properties* flow, not from it, but from the Substance, and therefore may be *diverse*.

TO which I reply, 1. According to Dr. *Clarke* this same Necessity is the *Ground and Foundation both of the Divine Substance and of all the Attributes*;" [u] and consequently they should both flow equally from it, and be equally affected by it.

2. THESE Properties are either something different from the Substance, or they are not: If they

[t] *Existence and Unity*, p. 122, 123.

[u] Answ. to 7th Letter, Line *ult.*

are

are *not really different* from the Subſtance, and yet are different from one another, then things of a different Nature may flow from the ſame Neceſſity, according to our Author himſelf, who ſuppoſes this Subſtance to flow from it. If they are different from the Subſtance, as well as from each other, and this Neceſſity be only the Cauſe of That, and not Them, then might the Subſtance (notwithſtanding ſuch Neceſſity) have had other very different Properties, which amounts to the ſame thing; and by the ſame Reaſon there may be variety of other Properties in other Subſtances, tho' theſe ſame Subſtances were all alike neceſſarily exiſtent. Not to inſiſt upon the Abſurdity of ſuppoſing That to be the Cauſe of God's Exiſtence, which is not the Cauſe of his Attributes.

If this Subſtance be nothing elſe but an aggregate or entire Collection of all the eſſential Properties, which I take to be the Truth of the Caſe, (tho' the Author ſeems here deſirous to make it both the ſame with them and not the ſame, in order to guard againſt both Sides of the Dilemma) and if ſeveral diſtinct Qualities may exiſt together and compoſe *one Subſtance*, and yet all flow from the ſame uniform Neceſſity; it ſeems as eaſy to conceive ſeveral *diſtinct Subſtances* proceeding in like manner from the ſame Source; at leaſt 'twill not be eaſy to demonſtrate the contrary. Tho' in Truth 'tis not very difficult to demonſtrate any thing from ſuch a Principle as this of *abſolute Neceſſity*, which will be whatever the Demonſtrator pleaſes to make it.[x]

In the laſt Place, this Neceſſity is here term'd the *Mode* of the Exiſtence of theſe Beings; which therefore muſt, as ſuch, preſuppoſe their *actual Exiſtence*, and cannot be the *original Ground* or *Reaſon* of it, as the Author has ſaid juſt before: It muſt alſo preſuppoſe the ſeveral *Attributes*

[x] See *Diſſertation*, p. 55.

of

of theſe ſelf-exiſtent Beings, and can really *effect* nothing in relation to them, nor infer any more than that they are and will be neceſſarily and immutably what they are and always were, be they few or many.

"8. To ſuppoſe *Two* or more neceſſarily exiſtent "Beings to be *finite* in their Exiſtence, *finite* in "Place or Extenſion, is to ſuppoſe them *imperfect* "Beings.——Neceſſity of Exiſtence has no Rela- "to *Place*, any more than it has to Time; and "whatever is neceſſary at all, is and muſt be ne- "ceſſary *in all Places* alike, as well as *in all Time*. "——Therefore the Exiſtence of *One* neceſſarily "exiſtent Being does, by the Neceſſity of its Ex- "iſtence, which is and muſt be *unlimited* and *ab- "ſolutely immenſe*, neceſſarily exclude the Exiſtence "of another ſimilar or neceſſarily exiſtent Being. "And to ſuppoſe *Two* or more ſuch abſolutely im- "menſe uniform Beings, is a plain Contradiction; "becauſe it implies that each being *uniformly* and "equally in the ſame manner immenſe with the "other, there is and can be no *Difference* between "them; conſequently that they are but *One*, even "whilſt they are ſuppoſed *Two* or more than *one*." [y]

1. WE don't ſuppoſe the Deity to be extended at all, and therefore cannot allow him to be either *finite* or *infinite*, in our Author's Senſe: Which would not only be the greateſt of Imperfections, but is itſelf an Impoſſibility, and has, we think, been ſufficiently ſhewn to be ſo in Chap. III.

2. WE maintain and can prove that the Deity is *preſent* to all his Works, preſent in ſuch a manner as to perceive and influence them; and any other Preſence beſide this would be ſo far from a Perfection, that it would ſerve to no one Purpoſe whatſoever, as was obſerved in the ſame Chapter.

[y] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 123, 124.

3. If Neceſſity has *no Relation* to Place, any more than to Time, how does it follow that the Being which exiſts by it muſt be in *all* Places and Times? One would think it a more natural Conſequence to infer that therefore the neceſſarily-exiſtent Being has likewiſe *no Relation* to Place, and therefore may be ſuppoſed to exiſt *in none*; or, if at all, *in any one*. To draw the intended Conſequence, it ſhould have been ſaid that *Neceſſity* has Relation to *all Places*: Which it has juſt as much as a *Truth* or an *abſtract Idea* has, which are commonly ſaid to be the ſame at all Times and in all Places, becauſe they have nothing at all to do with either Time or Place.

4. If this ſelf-exiſtent Being ſhould poſſeſs an *unlimited Extenſion*, yet why may not another do the ſame, and they be both commenſurate? Why muſt one *abſolutely immenſe* Being exclude the Exiſtence of another ſuch, any more than that of any other Subſtance whatever? Is it becauſe one leaves no room or place for another? How then is there room for any thing? On this Suppoſition indeed there will be no *ſpecifick Difference* between theſe *Two*; but they may be at leaſt *numerically diſtinct*, and from *ſpecifick* to *numerical* there's no Conſequence. They are *but one* in *Preſence*, while two in *Number*, which is all that the Argument proves. If we conceive *Omnipreſence* in the groſs manner that this Author does, *i. e.* by way of Extenſion (of which above) yet, as he allows Subſtance to be co-extended with Subſtance and a Penetration of Dimenſions, by what Logick can he prove that one infinite Extenſion muſt exclude another, any more than it excludes finite?[z]

Anſw.

[z] "Another Argument for the Unity is taken from the Immenſity of God; and the Strength of it ſeems to lie in this, "that we cannot ſuppoſe Two or more Beings every where preſent,

Ch. VI.

9. "LIMITATION of Exiſtence, with reſpect to *Place*, does neceſſarily infer *Limitation* of *Power*, "*&c.* which is incompatible with the Nature and "Idea of God, or a neceſſarily exiſtent Being. The "Power of God can only be exerciſed where *He* is, "or where his Being or Subſtance (in which his "Power is inherent) is preſent. *Power*, which is "a *Property*, cannot exiſt where the Subſtance of "which it is the Property does not exiſt; and "God cannot *act where He is not*, any more than "He can act without exiſting; and He has no Ex-"iſtence *where He is not*. So that *Two* or more "neceſſarily-exiſtent Beings, *limited* in their Pre-"ſence or Place of Exiſtence, muſt be alſo limited "with reſpect to *Power* and the Sphere of Action[a]."

Anſw. THE Perfections of Power, Knowledge, *&c.* having no relation to Place, or Extenſion, it

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"ſent, or perfectly in the very ſame Place, without deſtroying the "Nature of them, and making them extended and unextended, "penetrable and impenetrable, at the ſame time. But when we "reaſon concerning the Exiſtence of Spirits and immaterial Sub-"ſtances in Place, we reaſon upon inadequate Ideas, and are "forced to employ improper Terms. The manner of their exiſting "is ſo wholly different from that of Bodies, that we can have "no imaginable Ground for drawing Concluſions in one Caſe to "the other. This, however, ſeems in itſelf a very clear and rea-"ſonable Concluſion, that, if Two Beings may be any where in "the ſame Place, it implies no Repugnancy in the Nature of the "thing, but that Two or more Beings, ſuppoſing them infinite, "may be every where in the ſame Place. Now granting the "Immateriality of thinking Beings, and that there is no Place "from which God is excluded, we are under an abſolute Ne-"ceſſity of ſuppoſing that immaterial Subſtances not only may, "but do in fact, ſomewhere co-exiſt; and, tho' after a manner un-"known to us, perfectly in the ſame Place: From whence this "Argument to prove the Unity from the Immenſity of God, as "it denotes his Omnipreſence, has been thought by learned "Men inſufficient to the End for which it is produced." *Fiddes. Theol. Spec.* p. 97.

[a] *Exiſtence and Unity*, p. 124, 125.

can never be proved that the Being, of which theſe are Properties, has any; or that its being confined to a particular part of Space (if that could be ſuppoſed) has any Connection with a Limitation in the Degree of theſe and the like unextended Perfections; as has been made appear in the third and fourth Chapters, where this Argument is anſwer'd at large, and the Difficulties ſhewn to be at leaſt equal on this Author's Hypotheſis of an infinitely extended Deity. *v. g.* It may be ask'd, with as much Reaſon, Whether he can *act* where only a *Part* of him exiſts? Or, Whether any one *Part* has the Power, Knowledge, *&c.* of the *Whole*? It may be aſſerted, that the whole Deity muſt act on the leaſt Portion of the Univerſe, which can only be commenſurate to a Part of his Subſtance, and conſequently all the other Parts of it muſt *act where they are not.*

THESE and the like inſuperable Difficulties, which have been ſhewn to attend this Author's Notion of the Divine Omnipreſence, one would think ſufficient to diſcourage any Perſon from inſiſting upon it excluſive of all others, or from pretending to dive at all into the *Modus* of that Being which is acknowledg'd to be incomprehenſible.

Mr. JACKSON's laſt Argument is this:

10. "IF Space exiſts at all, it is neceſſarily exiſt-
" ent and *abſolutely immenſe*, in an uniform manner;
" And being ſo, whether it be taken for a *Property*
" a *Subſtance*, (and it muſt be one or the other, or
" there being nothing *real* which is neither *Sub-*
" *ſtance* nor *Property*) it infers a neceſſarily exiſt-
" ent and *uniformly immenſe* Being. But to ſup-
" poſe *Two* or more ſuch *uniformly immenſe* Beings,
" is to ſuppoſe *Two* or more *immenſe* neceſſarily
" exiſtent *Spaces*; which is an evident Contradicti-
" on; becauſe, being *uniform* and *ſimilar*, they muſt
" co-incide and become *One*, even whilſt we are en-
" deavouring

" deavouring to ſuppoſe them *Two*, or more than *One*." Ch. VI.

1. THIS Author knows very well that we do not allow Space to be either *Subſtance* or *Property*, or any Thing *real*; we ſay 'tis only an *abſtract Idea*, and therefore infers nothing more than a Power in the Mind of making ſuch Ideas; and we have given our Reaſons for ſaying ſo at large.

BUT, 2. Suppoſing this Space to be either a Subſtance or Property, why may not other Subſtances or Properties be commenſurate to or co-extended with it, as well as they are co-exiſtent with each other? The Difficulty is the ſame in both Caſes, as was obſerv'd under the eighth Demonſtration. If therefore by their *co-inciding* our Author here means the ſame as being *identified*, we deny it; If he means only co-exiſting in the ſame Place, of which Identity is the Conſequence, then we deny that Conſequence. He himſelf ſuppoſes ſome *Part* of God's Subſtance to co-incide with the *Moon*, to be co-extended with it, and compreſential to it. The *Moon* is preſent where that *Part* is alſo preſent; and ſo far the two Subſtances, according to him, muſt *co-incide*; and yet they do not exclude each other, nor become numerically *One*; and therefore from *Co-incidence* of Preſence to *numerical Unity*, or abſolute Identity, *non valet Conſequentia*.

THUS I have endeavour'd to give a plain and ſatisfactory Anſwer to this Author's Arguments, and have omitted none that I know of, tho' I did not purſue him Paragraph by Paragraph; which, 'twas conceiv'd, would make the Work too confuſed, as well as too long and tedious, for the generality of Readers. I have not deſignedly uſed him

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[b] Pag. 126.

ill,

Ch. VI. ill, or endeavour'd any where to misrepresent his Meaning. I shall make no other Excuse for attempting to overturn the Principles on which Dr. *Clarke*'s celebrated Demonstrations are founded, beside the Love of Truth, and Pleasure of detecting Fallacies, especially in Subjects of so great Importance as those that concern the Being and Attributes of God. The Learned know very well what Uses have been or may be made of these Principles against some of the prime Articles, nay, the very Foundation both of Natural [c] and Reveal'd Religion. The Consequences of the *Argument a priori* afford sufficient Matter of Apology for enquiring into this dark Subject; but these are fully set forth in the following Dissertation; from which I'm unwilling to detain the Reader any longer.

Mr. JACKSON's *Appendix*, concerning the Ground and Obligation of *Morality*, will shortly be examin'd by another Hand.

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[c] I should be glad to see a clear Answer to what has been objected by a thoughtful Writer; that "The Supposition of such "an absolutely unlimited, and, as it were, *antecedent* Necessity, "from which some derive their main Proof of an *absolute Infi-* "*nity*, leads directly to *Pantheism*, or tends to oblige us, with "*Spinoza* (who likewise supposed such an absolutely unlimited "Necessity to support his *absolutely infinite* Nature) to infer, that "all *Action*, as well as *Existence*, is absolutely necessary. For, "it is plain, that an independent and absolutely *unlimited* Ne- "cessity cannot be confined or *limited* to the Divine *Existence*, "but must extend itself likewise to the Divine *Action*, and even "to our own both Existence and Action. But this Inference "would deprive us of the Subject on which we are going to "treat, by destroying the very Notion of *Religion*." Mr. *Collier on Natural and Revealed Religion*, Pref. p. 9, 10.

A DIS-

A

DISSERTATION

UPON THE

Argument *a Priori*

For proving the EXISTENCE of a

FIRST CAUSE.

In a LETTER to Mr. LAW.

SIR,

WHEN I laſt had the pleaſure of your Converſation, in company with one or two more ingenious Friends, I remember we ſoon fell to asking each other, What News from the *Republick of Letters*; What freſh *Pamphlets* ſtirring; What Works, relating either to *Religion* or *Science*, had appeared lately, or were ſoon likely to

appear. Hereupon ſeveral Things were mention'd, and paſs'd off in Diſcourſe: But what we happen'd more particularly to dwell upon, was the Conſideration of ſome Metaphyſical Pieces concerning the proving the Exiſtence of a Deity *a priori* (as the Schools term it) that is to ſay, from ſome ſuppoſed *antecedent* Neceſſity, conſidered as a *Ground*, or *Reaſon*, or *Foundation*, or *internal Cauſe*, or *formal Cauſe* of the Divine Exiſtence. And here, if I remember, we were inquiſitive to know, what thoſe Scholaſtick Terms *imported*, and whether the Thought contain'd in them was entirely *new*, a recent Product of the eighteenth Century; as alſo what Weight or Solidity there was in it: And if there were none, Whether it portended any Detriment to *Religion*, or *Science*, and might be worth the oppoſing or confuting. Upon the debating and canvaſſing the Particulars now mention'd, my Opinion then was, and I am ſince more and more confirm'd in the ſame, that Thoſe who have appeared as Advocates for that Argument *a priori*, ſeem to have had no clear Notion of the Thing itſelf, or of the Terms they make uſe of; that the *Thought* however was not a *new Thought*, tho' perhaps it might be juſtly called a *new Tenet*, as having been conſtantly exploded for many Centuries upwards, and never once maintain'd by *Metaphyſicians* or *Divines*; that moreover it was abſolutely untenable, yea and carried its own Confutation along with it, as ſoon as underſtood; and laſtly, that ſuch Principles might be prejudicial, in ſome meaſure, both to *Religion* and *Science*, if they ſhould happen to prevail; and that conſequently it would be doing good Service to Both, if due Care were taken, in a proper manner, to prevent their Growth.

With theſe Sentiments (which ſeem'd alſo to be pretty nearly the common Sentiments of all then preſent)

preſent) I departed from you at that time. And no ſooner was I return'd to my Books, and had ſome vacant Leiſure on my hands, but I thought of throwing out what occurred to me on thoſe Heads into Paper, digeſting it into a kind of Diſſertation, which I here ſend you for your Peruſal, and which I leave entirely to your Diſpoſal. The Method, which I have chalk'd out for my ſelf, in the Eſſay here following, is;

I. To give ſome *Hiſtorical* Account of what the moſt eminent *Metaphyſicians* and *Divines* have taught, ſo far as concerns the Point in Queſtion.

II. To conſider the *Argumentative* Part, in order to take off the Ambiguity of *Words*, and thereby to prevent Confuſion of *Ideas*.

III. To examine into the *Tendency* of the new Tenets, with reſpect either to *Religion*, or *Science*.

These Three Heads will furniſh out ſo many diſtinct Sections, or Chapters.

CHAP. I.

Containing an Hiſtorical View *of what Metaphyſicians or Divines have formerly taught, ſo far as concerns the Argument* a Priori *for the Divine Exiſtence.*

I SHALL begin with Two antient *Theiſts*, Both of the ſame time, or nearly, and Both declaring againſt the Poſſibility of demonſtrating *a Priori* the Exiſtence of a Deity, or Firſt Cauſe. One of them was a *Chriſtian Divine*, and the other an acute *Pagan Philoſopher*.

THE Chriſtian Divine was *Clemens* of *Alexandria*, who flouriſh'd about *A. D.* 192. He expreſſes himſelf thus in Dr. *Cudworth*'s [a] Tranſlation:

" GOD is the moſt difficult Thing of all to be " diſcourſed of: Becauſe, ſince the *Principle* of " every thing is hard to find out, the *firſt* and moſt " *antient* Principle of all, which was the Cauſe to " all other Things of their being *made* [*and of " their Continuance after they were made*] muſt " needs be the hardeſt of all to be declared, or " manifeſted. ——— But neither can [God] be " apprehended by any *demonſtrative* Science: For

[a] Cudworth *Intellect. Syſt.* p. 716.

" ſuch

" ſuch Science is from Things *before* [in order of Nature] and more knowable; whereas nothing " can exiſt *before* that which is altogether un- " made [b] [or ſelf-exiſtent.] " Ch. I.

THE other antient *Theiſt* is *Alexander Aphrodiſienſis*, a celebrated *Peripatetick*, who flouriſh'd between *A. D.* 199, and 211. [c] After he had propoſed an Argument for the Exiſtence of a Firſt Cauſe, drawn from the Conſideration of *Motion*, according to the *Ariſtotelick* Principles, he proceeds to obſerve as follows: " This Argument [or Proof] " is in the way of *Analyſis* only, it being not poſ- " ſible that there ſhould be a [ſtrict] *Demonſtration* " of the *Firſt Principle* of all: Wherefore we " muſt here fetch our Beginning from things that " are *after* it and *manifeſt*, and thence by way of " *Analyſis* aſcend to the Proof of that *Firſt Na-* " *ture* which was before them. [d] " So Dr. *Cudworth* renders the Paſſage: And the Reflection or Comment, which he makes upon what has here been quoted from theſe two antient *Theiſts*, is in theſe Words: " The true meaning of thoſe an- " tient *Theiſts*, who denied that there could be " any *Demonſtration* of a *God*, was only This, that " the Exiſtence of a God could not be demon-

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[b] Ναὶ μὴν ὁ δυσμηχανοχειριστότατος περὶ θεῦ λόγος ἐντός ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως κὰ ἡ πρώτη κὴ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσβατός ἐστιν, ἥτις τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία ἔσται κὴ γνῶσις κὴ γινομένοις εἶναι. ——— Αλλ' ἀνὴ ἐπιστήμη λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων κὴ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· ἔστι δὲ ἀγένητον ἀνὴν προϋπάρχειν. Clem. Alex. p. 696. Edit. Oxon.

[c] *See an Account of him in* Fabricius. Bibl. Græc. Lib. IV. cap. 25. p. 62.

[d] Ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν· ἐ γὰρ οἷόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δι' ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε κὴ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συζῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνε φύσιν. Aphrodiſ. Phyſic. Schol. lib. I. c. 1.

" ſtrated

Ch. I. "ſtrated *a priori*, Himſelf being the *Firſt Cauſe* "of all Things."

Such were the Sentiments of *Metaphyſicians* and *Divines* at that time, founded upon plain and cogent Reaſon, ſuch as muſt equally hold at all times, and ſuch as ſeem to evince, not that the Exiſtence of a *Firſt Cauſe* may be demonſtrated *a priori*, but rather that it is really demonſtrable *a priori*, if not ſelf-evident, that no ſuch Proof can be made, being indeed contradictory and impoſſible, repugnant to the very Nature or Notion of a *Firſt* Cauſe. But I ſhall ſpeak to the *Argumentative* Part afterwards: I am now upon the *Hiſtorical*. It is certain that the *Fathers* of the Church, *Greek* or *Latin*, never admitted any ſuch Proof *a priori* of the Divine Exiſtence, but either directly or indirectly, either expreſsly or implicitly, condemned it all along. It would be tedious to enter into a particular Detail of their Sentiments, in relation to the Proof of the Exiſtence: I ſhall content myſelf with one general Obſervation, That they had not ſo much as the *Terms* or *Phraſes* of *Neceſſary-Exiſtence*, or *Neceſſity of Exiſtence*, but utterly rejected the very Name of *Neceſſity*, as not applicable to the *Deity* at all, underſtanding it conſtantly in its antient, proper, *compulſive* Senſe.* Now, it is very well known, that the ſuppoſed Proof *a priori*, lately contended for, is built in a manner entirely upon the Word *Neceſſity*, and inſtantly ſinks without it. For, put *immutable*, or *natural*, or *independent*, or *emphatical* Exiſtence (according to the antient way) inſtead of *neceſſary* Exiſtence, or *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence, and then it is certain that the very *Medium*

* *See* Waterland's *Second Defenſe*, Qu. VIII. p. 252, &c. *Preface to* Sermons, p. 21.

of

of the whole Argument drops and vaniſhes, and there is not ſo much as any Colour or Appearance of the Proof left. I ſay then, ſince it is undoubted Fact that the *Fathers* all along admitted of no ſuch Terms as *Neceſſary* or *Neceſſity*, in this caſe, but rejected them as not applicable either to the Divine *Exiſtence*, or *Attributes*; it is very plain, that they therewith rejected any ſuch pretended Argument *a priori*, as has been ſince raiſed from thoſe *Terms*. Ch. I.

To ſhew how late it was before *Neceſſity* gain'd admittance in the Church, and became as it were chriſtianized, with reſpect to our preſent Subject, I may obſerve that Archbiſhop *Anſelm* [f] of the eleventh and twelfth Century, yea and *Alexander Hales* [g] of the thirteenth, were yet ſcrupulous of making

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[f] Deus nihil facit *neceſſitate*, quia nullo modo *cogitur* aut *prohibetur* aliquid facere. Et cum dicimus Deum aliquid facere quaſi *neceſſitate* vitandæ inhoneſtatis, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum eſt quod facit *neceſſitate* ſervandæ honeſtatis: Quæ ſcilicet *neceſſitas* non eſt aliud quam *immutabilitas* honeſtatis ejus, quam a ſeipſo & non ab alio habet; & idcirco *impropriè* dicitur neceſſitas. *Anſelm.* Opp. Tom. III. p. 55.

[g] Ad aliud vero quod objicitur de *neceſſitate* bonitatis, dicendum eſt quod nomen *neceſſitatis* non congrue hic dicitur de Deo. Unde *Anſelm. In Deo nulla cadit neceſſitas.* Neceſſitas enim videtur dicere *coactionem*. Sed nec eſt *neceſſitas utilitatis* a parte ſua, ſicut habitum eſt in præcedente autoritate. Si vero dicatur *neceſſitas congruitatis*, ſive *idoneitatis*, ſicut tangitur in quadam authoritate, tunc poteſt dici quod ex *neceſſitate* bonitatis condidit res. Non tamen videtur congruere quod dicatur *ex neceſſitate naturæ*: Licet enim ſit idem bonitas quod natura ejus, tamen ſi diceretur *ex neceſſitate naturæ*, videretur poni talis *neceſſitas* qualis eſt in rebus naturalibus. In rebus enim naturalibus ignis ex *neceſſitate naturæ* generat ignem, & homo hominem: non ſic autem eſt cum creaturæ fiunt a Deo. *Alex. Aleuſ.* Part II. p. 15.

N. B. *This Author flouriſh'd about* 1230, *died* 1245. Albertus Magnus, *who flouriſh'd about* 1260, *and died in* 1280, *made*

Ch. I. making uſe of the Term, and were very tender of applying it to the divine *Acts* or *Attributes*, except it were with great Caution, Awe, and Reſerve; at the ſame time owning the Word to be both harſh and improper. And as to applying it to the divine *Exiſtence*, I do not find that they ventured upon it at all; tho' others frequently did it afterwards in the Decline of the thirteenth Century, and downwards, when *Ariſtotle*'s Metaphyſicks, tranſlated into barbarous *Latin*, and the *Arabian* Philoſophy (of *Avicen*, *Averroez*, and *Algazel*) had paved the way for it. [h]

Let us ſee however, how this matter ſtood after thoſe improper Terms were brought in, and ſoften'd into a qualify'd Senſe; whether any *Schoolmen* or others (now they might ſeem to have ſome handle for it) ever attempted to draw out any ſuch Argument *a priori* for the Exiſtence of a Firſt Cauſe, and to commend the ſame as true and ſolid Reaſoning. I would here obſerve by the way, that the *Schoolmen*, though they deſervedly lie under a Diſrepute for their Exceſſes in many things, may yet be juſtly look'd upon as carrying great

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made no Scruple of applying the Word neceſſary, *or* neceſſity (*in a ſober but new Senſe*) *to the divine* Eſſence *or* Exiſtence: *And it is very plain that he learn'd that Language from* Ariſtotle's *Philoſophy, to which he refers for his ſenſe of thoſe Terms. See* Albert. Mag. Comment. in L. I. Sentent. Diſt. VI. Opp. Vol. XIV. p. 121. Edit. Lugd.

[h] Quievit autem & ſiluit philoſophia *Ariſtotelis*, pro majori parte, —— uſque poſt tempora *Mahometi*, quando *Avicenna* & *Averroes* & cæteri revocaverunt philoſophiam *Ariſtotelis* in lucem plenam expoſitionis. Et licet alia logicalia & quædam alia tranſlata fuerunt per *Boetium* de *Greco*, tamen tempore *Michaelis Scoti*, qui annis Dom. 1230 tranſactis apparuit, deferens librorum *Ariſtotelis* partes aliquas, *&c.* remagnificata eſt philoſophia *Ariſtotelis* apud Latinos. *Rog. Bacon*, p. 37. Conf. p. 45, 262, 420.

Authority

Authority with them in a point of this Nature, where they had no Byaſs to miſlead them, (being inclined to the ſide of *Theiſm*) and where a Queſtion turn'd upon a right underſtanding of *Technical* Terms or Phraſes, and a thorough Acquaintance with *Logick*, and *Metaphyſicks*; being a matter of pure abſtract Reaſoning. They were undoubtedly great Maſters in that way: For *where they argued barely upon the Principles of Reaſon* (as a very judicious Writer obſerves) *they have often done exceeding well*, and have *improved natural Reaſon to an uncommon Height.*[1] And I will venture to add, that if the ſharpeſt Wits of theſe later Days ſhall undertake, upon their own Stock, to furniſh out a new Scheme of *School-Divinity*, or *Metaphyſical Theology*, it will be a long while, perhaps ſome Centuries, before they arrive to ſuch Perfection in ſome part as many of the *Schoolmen* arriv'd to; unleſs they ſhall be content within a while to take thoſe deſpiſed School-men into Conſultation with them, and to extract the beſt Things from them. This I hint by the way, in order to remove Prejudices, with reſpect to my citing (as I am now going to do) *School-men* in this Cauſe; tho' I intend not to cite them only, but other the moſt judicious and learned *Divines* and *Metaphyſicians*, who have come after them, and have entirely agreed in this Article with them. However, as I have already intimated, the *Schoolmen* are moſt certainly proper Judges within their own Province, and in a point of *School-Divinity*: And this which we are now upon is very plainly ſuch, as the pretended Argument *a priori* proceeds altogether upon *Scholaſtick* Terms; and is managed in a *Scholaſtick* way, and therefore muſt at length ſtand or Ch. I.

[1] *Reflections upon Learning*, p. 217, 227.

Ch. I. fall by *Scholaſtick* Principles, and *Scholaſtick* Reaſonings. Theſe Things premiſed, I may now proceed in the *Hiſtorical View*, according to order of Time, beginning from thoſe Days when *Neceſſary Exiſtence*, with other the like Terms or Phraſes, had gotten ſome Footing in the Chriſtian Theology.

A. D. 1260. Albertus Magnus.

ALBERTUS, ſurnamed the *Great*, on account of his great Learning and Abilities, was one of the moſt conſiderable among the *Divines* or *Metaphyſicians* of the Age he lived in. He was one of the firſt (I mean, among *Chriſtian* Writers) that took upon him to give God the *Metaphyſical* Title of a *neceſſary* Being. Yet he preſumed not to found any Argument *a priori* for the Exiſtence upon it, but denied expreſsly, or in Words equivalent, that any Argument of that kind could be made. He allows, that upon the Foot of mere natural Light, God may be known *a poſteriori* by the *Creatures*, and no otherwiſe [k]: For, he admits it as a true Principle, that a *Philoſopher* can ſearch out God no other way than by the *Creatures*, as a *Cauſe* is known from the *Effect* [l]. Which amounts to the ſame with ſaying, that Philoſophy affords no Proof *a priori*.

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[k] Poſita creatura tanquam *effectu* dei, neceſſe eſt deum creatorem poni*: & ſic *a poſteriori* ex creatura poteſt deus cognoſci. *Albert. Magn.* in Lib. I. Sentent. Diſt. III. Opp. Tom. xiv. p. 66.

[l] Philoſophus non inveſtigat eum in philoſophia niſi per *creaturas*, ſicut cauſam per effectum. *Ibid.* p. 55.

A. D. 1270. THOMAS AQUINAS.

FROM the Maſter or Præceptor I may next deſcend to the Scholar, who was almoſt twenty Years younger than *Albertus*, but died ſome Years before him, namely, in the Year 1274. I need ſay nothing of the Fame or the Abilities of *Aquinas*, ſurnamed (according to the faſhion of thoſe Times) the *Angelical* Doctor. He frequently enough makes uſe of the Phraſes of *neceſſary* Being, or *Neceſſity* of *exiſting*, but yet never builds any Argument *a priori* for the Exiſtence upon it, but conſtantly maintains, that every Proof of the Exiſtence is *a poſteriori*, from the Effects. In one Place he writes thus, "There are two kinds of "*Demonſtration*. The firſt is by the *Cauſe*, and "has its Name from ſhewing *why* the thing is, "and it proceeds upon ſomething *ſimply prior*. "The ſecond is by the *Effect*, and has its Name "from ſhewing *that* the thing is, and it proceeds "upon things *prior* with *reſpect to us*. —— Now "the Exiſtence of God, as it is not knowable *in* "*itſelf*, is demonſtrable *to us* by the *Effects* to us "known. [m]" That is to ſay, the Exiſtence of God cannot be demonſtrated *a priori*, but *a poſteriori* only: And ſo the Title of that Article explains it [n], in ſome Editions of his *Sum*. In ano- Ch. I.

[m] Duplex eſt demonſtratio. Una quæ eſt per *cauſam*, & dicitur *propter quid*; & hæc eſt per *priora ſimpliciter*: Alia eſt per *effectum*, & dicitur demonſtratio *quia*; & hæc eſt per ea quæ ſunt priora *quoad nos*. —— Unde deum eſſe ſecundum quod non eſt *per ſe* notum, *quoad nos* demonſtrabile eſt per effectus nobis notos. *Aquin. Summ.* Q. II. Art. 2. p. 14. Edit. Lugd. 1588.

[n] Deum eſſe, quamvis non *a priori*, *a poſteriori* tamen demonſtrari poteſt ex aliquo ejus notiori nobis *effectu*. *Aquin. Summ.* Q. II. Art. 2. p. 4. Edit. Paris. 1615.

Ch. I. ther Work, *Aquinas* maintains the ſame thing in Words ſomewhat different, thus: "In Arguments "brought to prove the *Exiſtence* of the Deity, it "is not proper to argue from the *divine Eſſence*, "or from *what he is*, but inſtead thereof to ar-"gue from the *Effects*, like as in the Demonſtra-"tions *a poſteriori*: And from ſome ſuch *Effect* is "the Name of *God* taken. [o]" I uſe a little Liberty in rendering his Words, to make his Senſe appear the clearer. It is very plain from Both the Paſſages here cited, that he utterly rejected all Arguments *a priori* for the proving the *Exiſtence* of a Deity. Yet I ſhall not conceal from you, that he elſewhere argues from *Neceſſary-Exiſtence* to the *Eternity* of the Divine Being [p]; which may be thought to be arguing *a priori*. I will not ſay, that it is not arguing *a priori*: But then it is not arguing from *Attribute* to *Exiſtence*, but from one Attribute to another, from Exiſtence and one or more Attributes before proved, to an Attribute not yet proved; which is a fair and juſt way of Reaſoning, and may perhaps not improperly be called arguing *a priori*; though ſome would ſcruple the giving it that Title. However, as to this By-point, I ſhall have occaſion to ſay more in the Sequel, and ſo may diſmiſs it for the preſent, and proceed in my Method.

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[o] In rationibus autem in quibus demonſtratur deum eſſe, non oportet aſſumi pro medio divinam eſſentiam, ſive quidditatem, ſed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio *effectus*, ſicut accidit in demonſtrationibus *quia*; & ex hujuſmodi effectu ſumitur ratio hujus nominis *deus*. *Aquin. Summ. contr. Gentiles*, L. I. c. 12. p. 14. Edit. Lugd. 1587.

[p] Oportet ponere aliquod *primum neceſſarium* quod eſt *per ſe ipſum* neceſſarium; & hoc eſt deus, cum ſit *prima cauſa* ut dictum eſt: igitur deus *eternus* eſt cum omne *neceſſarium per ſe*, ſit æternum. *Aquin. contr. Gentil.* L. I. c. 14. p. 21.

A. D. 1276. Roger Bacon.

ROGER BACON, of the Order of *Friars Minor*, was a Perſon of ſtrong Parts, and clear Judgment, and had perhaps a greater Compaſs of Erudition than any other of that Age. He was ſtiled the *Admirable* Doctor, after the way of giving Titles at that time. It will not be improper to ſhew what his Judgment was upon the preſent Queſtion, as he occaſionally delivered it. "In "*Metaphyſicks* there can be no *Demonſtration* "made but by arguing from the *Effect*: Becauſe "Things *Spiritual* are diſcovered by the *ſenſible* "*Effects*, and the *Creator* by the Creature, as is "manifeſt in that Science. [q]" From which Words it is plain that he rejects all Pretence to arguing *a priori* in the Queſtion of the *Exiſtence*, and allows of nothing in that caſe, but the Proofs *a poſteriori* only. Ch. I. §. 7.

A. D. 1290. Richardus de Media Villa.

RICHARD of MIDDLETON was a Man famous in his Time, dignified with the Title of the *Solid* Doctor. His Determination of the Queſtion about proving the Exiſtence *a priori*, is clear and full; as here follows: "There is one kind "of Demonſtration *propter quid* [from *antece-* "*dent* Reaſon] in which what belongs to the Sub- "ject is demonſtrated by its *Cauſe*: And there is

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[q] In metaphyſicis non poteſt fieri demonſtratio niſi per effectum: quoniam inveniuntur ſpiritualia per corporales effectus, & creator per creaturam, ſicut patet in illa ſcientia. *Rog. Bacon. Opus majus.* p. 62. Edit. Jebb. 1733.

Ch. I. " another kind of Demonſtration *quia* [from ſub-
" ſequent Reaſon] in which the Cauſe is demon-
" ſtrated by the *Effect*. In the former way of De-
" monſtration, I ſay, we cannot demonſtrate the
" Exiſtence of God, becauſe the divine Exiſtence
" has no *Cauſe* prior to found ſuch Proof of the
" Exiſtence upon: But in the latter way of Proof
" from the *Effect*, I aſſert that we can demon-
" ſtrate the Exiſtence of the Deity by variety of
" Arguments. [r]" Here we may obſerve, as like-wiſe in the three Authorities before cited; that it was not thro' Haſte, Overſight, or Forgetfulneſs, that they avoided arguing *a priori* in that Inſtance, but thro' deep Conſideration and Judgment. They had all thought of the thing, and very deliberately rejected it, as amounting to a palpable Abſurdity, making a Cauſe *prior* to the *Firſt*.

I MAY further take notice, that this Author has beſides, a whole Chapter about the conceivable or notional *Order* of the Divine Attributes well worth the Peruſal, for the right underſtanding how, or in what Senſe one may be ſaid to argue *a priori* from *Exiſtence* to *Attributes*, or from *Attribute* to *Attribute*. I ſhall cite ſome Parts of that Chapter for a Specimen [s]: But the whole deſerves a Reader's

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[r] Eſt quædam demonſtratio *propter quid*, qua demonſtratur paſſio de ſubjecto *per cauſam*: Et eſt quædam demonſtratio *quia*, in qua demonſtratur cauſa per *effectum*. Loquendo de prima demonſtratione, dico, quod non poſſumus *demonſtrare* deum eſſe, quia *eſſe dei* cauſam non habet, per quam poſſimus ipſum demonſtrare de deo: Loquendo de demonſtratione quæ eſt per *effectum*, ſic dico quod poſſumus demonſtrare deum eſſe multipliciter. *Rich. de Med. Vill.* in IV Libr. Sentent. L. I. Diſt. iii. Q. 3. p. 41.

[s] Non eſt inconveniens ponere quod inter divina attributa ſit aliquis ordo *ſecundum rationem* intelligendi, in quantum intellectus noſter *priorem* conceptionem de uno facit quam de alio. Unde

a Reader's careful notice, for the ſolid Judgment appearing in it. The Sum is, that the Divine *Exiſtence* is conſidered in the firſt Place, and after That, the *Attributes* in their moſt natural Order of Conception. And when they are ſo placed or ranked, we may argue from them in that *Order*; and ſuch arguing may, without Impropriety, be ſtiled Arguing *a priori*, as arguing from ſomething *antecedent*, in natural order of Conception, to ſomething *ſubſequent* in Conception to it. I know not whether the judicious Author has marſhall'd the Attributes with the utmoſt Exactneſs, or has aſſign'd to every one of them its moſt proper Place: But he appears to have determined very right in the main Point, and to have digeſted every thing with a kind of maſterly Hand. Had thoſe matters been conſidered always with the like Care and Judgment, there could have been no Room for arguing Ch. I

Unde prius in noſtra ratione intelligendi eſt *divinum eſſe* quam aliquod *attributum* ejus, & *intelligere* quam *velle*, & attributa reſpicientia *intellectum* priuſquam reſpicientia *voluntatem*. ——inter ſitas perfectiones *priores* ſunt, in noſtra ratione intelligendi, illæ quæ reſpiciunt ipſum in quantum eſt *eſſentia*, quam illæ quæ reſpiciunt ipſum in quantum eſt *vita*: Et inter primas, prior eſt *unitas*, ſecunda *ſimplicitas*; communior eſt enim ratio unitatis quam ſimplicitatis: omnis enim ſimplex unum eſt, ſed non convertitur &c. ——— Ratio ſummæ *ſimplicitatis* & *unitatis* ſunt in divina eſſentia ratio *infinitatis*: Et iſta tria, ratio *immutabilitatis*; & immutabilitas cum prædictis, ſunt ratio *eternitatis*. Unde inferius per divinæ eſſentiæ *ſimplicitatem* probabitur in divina eſſentia eſſe *infinitas*, & per divinam *ſimplicitatem* & *infinitatem*, *immutabilitas*, & per immutabilitatem *eternitas*. Inter perfectiones etiam quæ conveniunt deo in quantum eſt *vita*, priores ſunt illæ, in noſtra ratione intelligendi, quæ reſpiciunt *ipſum intelligere*, quam illæ quæ reſpiciunt *ipſum velle*; & inter primas, prior *veritas* quam *ſapientia*. ———Inter perfectiones quæ reſpiciunt divinum *velle*, prima eſt *bonitas*, ſecunda *miſericordia*, tertia *juſtitia*. *Ricard. de med. Vill.* Lib. I. Diſt. 2. Q. 4. p. 32, 33.

a priori

Ch. I. *a priori* to the Exiſtence at all, nor for arguing to any *Attribute* from any thing conceived as *antecedent*, in order of Nature, to the Exiſtence. But *Exiſtence* and ſome *Attributes* may rationally be conceived as *antecedent*, in order of Nature, to *other* Attributes: And this kind of arguing *a priori*, which is reaſonable, ought not to be confounded with the other, which is manifeſtly ὕστερον πρότερον, and palpably abſurd. But I paſs on.

A. D. 1301. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS.

JOHANNES DUNS, ſurnamed *SCOTUS*, and dignified with the Title of *Doctor Subtilis*, was conſiderable enough to ſupport a kind of Rivalſhip againſt *Thomas Aquinas*, and to be Founder of a new Sect or Diviſion among the School-men. However, their Difference in other Points makes their Authority the greater as to thoſe Articles in which they agree: And it is certain that both *Thomiſts* and *Scotiſts* do agree in condemning and rejecting all Argumentation *a priori* in Proof of the *Exiſtence* of a Firſt Cauſe, as manifeſtly abſurd. *Scotus* declares in expreſs Words, that it is not poſſible for us to demonſtrate as from a Cauſe, or antecedent Principle [*propter quid*] the *Exiſtence* of an infinite Being, but that we may demonſtrate it *a poſteriori* [demonſtratione *quia*] from Effects, namely from the *Creatures*. [t] He further obſerves and proves, that the Firſt Cauſe is abſolutely *uncauſed*, having neither *external* nor *internal* Cauſe; neither *efficient*, nor *final*, nor

[t] De Ente infinito non poteſt demonſtrari eſſe *propter quid* quantum ad nos (licet ex naturâ terminorum propoſitio eſſet demonſtrabilis *propter quid*) Sed quantum ad nos propoſitio eſt demonſtrabilis demonſtratione *quia*, ex creaturis. *Scot. in Libr. Sement.* L. I. Diſt. II. Q. 2. p. 28.

material,

material, nor *formal*, and conſequently none at all. His Reaſoning is indeed wrapp'd up in a moſt wretched Style, and very barbarous *Latin*: But it may perhaps be thrown into intelligible *Engliſh*, and will be found to contain excellent Senſe. It runs thus: "[v] If the Firſt Cauſe is above any *effi-* "*cient* Cauſe, it muſt of conſequence be abſolutely "*uncauſed*, ſince it cannot have any other kind of "Cauſe, as *final*, or *material*, or *formal*. As to "*final* Cauſe, that it cannot have any ſuch, is proved "thus: Inaſmuch as it has no *efficient* Cauſe, it "follows of courſe that it can have no *final*: Be- "cauſe a *Final* Cauſe is no more than a *metapho-* "*rical* Cauſe, moving the *efficient* to act; nor does "the Exiſtence of the Thing ſo cauſed eſſentially "depend upon it, as prior to it, in any other "view. Now nothing can be juſtly look'd upon "as a Cauſe in itſelf, unleſs the Thing cauſed eſ- "ſentially depends upon it as prior to it; [which "cannot be ſaid of a final Cauſe.]

"As to the other two Conſequences before "hinted (that if a Being has no *efficient* Cauſe,

Ch. I.

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[v] Si illud primum eſt *ineffectibile*, ergo erit *incauſabile*; quia non *finibile*, nec *materiabile*, nec *formabile*. Probatur prima conſequentia, videlicet quod ſi eſt *ineffectibile* ergo non eſt *finibile*, quia cauſa *finalis* non cauſat, niſi quia metaphorice movet ipſum *efficiens* ad efficiendum: nam non alio modo dependet ab ipſo eſſentialiter entitas finiti, ut *a priore*. Nihil autem eſt cauſa *per ſe*, niſi ut ab ipſo tanquam *a priore* eſſentialiter dependet cauſatum.

Duæ autem aliæ conſequentiæ (videlicet, quod ſi eſt *ineffectibile*, ergo *immateriabile* & non *formabile*) probantur ſimul: quia cujus non eſt cauſa *extrinſeca*, ejus non eſt cauſa *intrinſeca*. Quia cauſalitas cauſæ *extrinſecæ* dicit perfectionem ſine imperfectione: cauſalitas autem cauſæ *intrinſecæ* neceſſario requirit *imperfectionem* annexam, quia cauſa intrinſeca eſt *pars* cauſati. Ergo, ratio cauſæ *extrinſecæ* eſt naturaliter *prior* ratione cauſæ *intrinſecæ*: negato ergo priore, negatur poſterius. *Scot. ibid.* p. 10.

Ch. I. "it can have neither *material*, nor *formal*) They
"follow of courſe, and are proved at the ſame
"time: Becauſe whatever is without any *external*
"Cauſe, muſt of conſequence be without any *inter-*
"*nal* one. An *external* Cauſe carries with it a
"*perfect* Cauſality, which is more than an *internal*
"Cauſe does; for an *internal* Cauſe carries *Imper-*
"*fection* along with it, as being only a *Part* of
"the Thing cauſed. Wherefore if there be no
"room, as in this caſe, for an *external* Cauſe,
"which naturally is *prior* to the internal, much
"leſs can there be any for the *internal* Cauſe,
"which preſuppoſes the other." I have been forced to render the Paſſage paraphraſtically, to make the Senſe clear, and to do Juſtice to the Argument contained in it. It amounts to a Demonſtration, that a *Firſt Cauſe* muſt be abſolutely, and in every view, *uncauſed*. And I judged it worth the noting, becauſe it has been ſometimes ſuggeſted, that tho' abſolute *Neceſſity* cannot be deem'd a Cauſe of a Firſt Cauſe *by way of efficient Cauſe*, yet it may *by way of formal Cauſe* be the ground of that Exiſtence.[x] *Duns Scotus* has here effectually confuted or obviated any ſuch Thought, by obſerving, that every *formal*, every *internal* Cauſe is but a *Part*, or a *partial* Conception of the Thing itſelf, *preſuppoſing* the Thing, and therefore properly not prior in Conception to it, nor the Cauſe of it.

He has a ſecond Argument in the ſame Place, to enforce the former, and it is to this Effect: That *internal* or *intrinſick* Cauſes owe their very Nature and Being as *Cauſes*, or as *conſtituent* Cauſes, to ſome *external* Efficient; for they are

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[x] *See Dr.* Clarke's *Anſw. to the ſixth Letter, p.* 33. *Edit.* 6th.

not

not Cauſes in *in themſelves*, but by the external *Agent* which makes them ſuch. [y] Therefore where there is no external *efficient* Cauſe, there can be no *internal* Cauſe properly ſo call'd. The Force of the Argument, as I underſtand it, lies here: That *Matter* and *Form* (called *internal* Cauſes) are, in *themſelves* conſidered, no more than conſtituent *parts* of the Compound, not *Cauſes* of it. It is their ſuppoſed relation to ſome external *Agency*, which alone makes them carry an Idea of *Cauſality* along with them. If therefore we ſuppoſe all external *Agency* or *Efficiency* to be away (as we muſt in this caſe, reſpecting the divine Being which has no *efficient* Cauſe) the very Idea of *Cauſality*, as to any *internal* Cauſe, ceaſes and vaniſhes at once; it cannot be conſidered as a *Cauſe* at all. [z] Wherefore, any Being that is above having any *efficient* Cauſe is much more above any other kind of *Cauſe*, is abſolutely *uncauſed*, which was the Thing to be proved. Ch. I.

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[y] Aliter probantur eædem conſequentiæ: quia cauſæ *intrinſecæ* ſunt cauſatæ ab *extrinſecâ*, vel ſecundum *eſſe* earum, vel in quantum *cauſant* compoſitum, vel utroque modo. Quia cauſæ intrinſecæ non *ſeipſis*, ſine *agente*, cauſant compoſitum, vel conſtituunt. *Scot. ibid.* p. 30.

[z] *The Argument may receive ſome Light from a Paſſage in* Durandus, *relating to this Head.*

Quod compoſitum ex *materia* & *forma* cauſam habeat, patet; habet enim duas cauſas *intrinſecas*, ſcilicet, *materiam* & *formam*, ex quibus componitur: habet etiam cauſam *efficientem*, quia unio materiæ & formæ fit per *agens* quod introduxit formam in materia. Unde *Philoſophus*, 8 *Metaphyſicæ*, cum quæreret quare ex *materia* & *forma* fit unum, dicit, quod non eſt aliqua cauſa, niſi *unum principium* motus, quod eſt *cauſa agens*. *Durand.* Lib. I. Diſt. viii. Q. 4. fol. 3. *Edit. Paris.*

A. D. 1591. GREGORIUS DE VALENTIA.

Ch. I.

THIS Writer in his Commentaries upon *Aquinas's Sum*, expresses himself fully and clearly to our Purpose. "The Existence of God cannot be "evidently shewn *a priori*: In this point *All are "agreed*. For the Existence of the Deity admits "of no *Cause* whereby it should be demonstrated "*a priori*. Neither can it be demonstrated from "the divine *Essence*, considered as prior in *Con-"ception*. 1. Because the *Existence* of a Being "ought not to be proved by the *Essence* of that "Being, since the Question of the *Existence* [whe-"ther any thing is] must precede the other Que-"stion concerning the *Essence* [what it is] as *Aqui-"nas* rightly observes. 2. Besides, the Essence of "God is not sufficiently known to us." [a]

HERE it is observable, that this Author look'd upon it as a ruled Point, a Thing *universally agreed to*, that there neither was nor could be any Demonstration *a priori* of the Existence of God. It may be observed also by the way, that the Phrase of *Demonstratio a priori* was now become a more familiar Phrase than formerly. The elder Writers which I have cited, used to call it *Demonstratio*

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[a] Deum esse non potest evidenter demonstrari *a priori*: de hac inter omnes convenit. Nam *Dei esse* nullam habet *causam* per quam *a priori* demonstrari possit: neque etiam id potest demonstrari per *essentiam* & *quidditatem* Dei, tanquam per aliquid prius secundum rationem. 1. Quia *esse* rei non debet demonstrari per *quidditatem* rei, cum quæstio *an sit* prior sit quæstione *quid sit*; ut recte D. Thom. &c. 2. Nam quidditas Dei non satis est nobis nota. *Gregor. de Valent.* Tom. I. Disp. 1. Q. 2. p. 59. *Edit. Lugd.*

propter

propter quid, anſwering to the Greek διότι. Both ſignify a Proof drawn from ſome prior *Cauſe*, or from ſomething naturally, or in the natural order of Conception, *antecedent* to the Thing demonſtrated by it. [b] *A poſteriori* is juſt the Reverſe. [c] Ch. I.

A. D. 1600. VASQUEZ.

GABRIEL VASQUEZ, another eminent School-man of that time, declares his Sentiments to the ſame Purpoſe; that there can be no Demonſtration *a priori* of the Exiſtence of a Deity, but a *poſteriori* only. [d]

A. D. 1614. SUAREZ.

SUAREZ, the famous Schoolman and Jeſuit, deſerves a more particular Conſideration, becauſe He really had a ſtrong Inclination to make out Something that ſhould look like an Argument *a priori*, or however ſhould (for Oſtentation ſake, I ſuppoſe) be ſet forth with that *Name*: For, in reality, he expreſsly and abſolutely condemn'd all Reaſoning *a priori* to the *exiſtence* of a Deity, as others before him had done; and yet by a kind of artificial Turn, by interpreting the proof of the *Unity* ſo as to amount to the ſame with the proof of

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[b] Demonſtratio *a priori* ea eſt qua probatur effectus per *cauſam*, ſive proximam ſive remotam, aut probatur concluſio per aliquod *prius*, ſive ſit *cauſa*, ſive *antecedens* tantum. *Chauvin. Lexic.* p. 170.

[c] Demonſtratio *a poſteriori* dicitur illa, qua vel probatur cauſa per *effectum*, vel concluſio per aliquod *poſterius*, ſive ſit effectus ſive conſequens. *Chauvin. ibid.*

[d] Deum eſſe, non poteſt *a priori* demonſtrari: *A poſteriori* tamen & per *effectus* demonſtrari poteſt. *Vaſq.* Q. 2. Art. 2. p. 60.

a *Deity*,

a *Deity*, he conceived he had done the *Thing*, only by changing of *Names*. But let us obſerve how he managed the whole Affair: We ſhall ſee afterwards what Cenſures were paſſed upon it by the judicious, tho' it was moſtly a difference in *Words*. He ſtates the main Queſtion thus: *Whether the Exiſtence of God may in ſome Sort* [or, in ſome ſenſe] *be demonſtrated a priori*:[e] And he determines in the Affirmative. The whole Tenor of his Reaſoning is as here follows. [f] "We are firſt to premiſe that "abſo-

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[e] Utrum aliquo modo poſſit *a priori* demonſtrari deum eſſe. *Suarez. Metaphyſ.* Tom. 2. Diſp. XXIX. Sect. 3. p. 28.

[f] Supponendum eſt, ſimpliciter loquendo non poſſe demonſtrari *a priori* deum eſſe; quia neque deus habet *cauſam* ſui eſſe, per quam *a priori* demonſtratur, neque ſi haberet, ita exacte & perfecte a nobis cognoſcitur deus, ut ex propriis principiis (ut ſic dicam) illum aſſequamur. Quo ſenſu dixit *Dionyſius*, capite ſeptimo *de divinis nominibus*, nos non poſſe deum ex propria natura cognoſcere.

Quanquam vero hoc ita ſit, nihilominus poſtquam *a poſteriori* aliquid de deo demonſtratum ſit, poſſumus ex *uno attributo* demonſtrare a priori *aliud*: ut ſi ex *immenſitate*, *v. g.* concludamus *localem immutabilitatem*. Suppono enim ad ratiocinandum *a priori*, modo humano, ſufficere diſtinctionem *rationis* inter attributa.

Reſolutio Quæſtionis. Ad hunc ergo modum dicendum eſt: Demonſtrato *a poſteriori* deum eſſe Ens *neceſſarium* & *a ſe*, ex hoc attributo poſſe *a priori* demonſtrari, præter illud non poſſe eſſe *aliud* ens *neceſſarium* & *a ſe*, & conſequenter demonſtrari *deum* eſſe.

Dices, Ergo ex *quidditate* dei cognita, demonſtratur deum eſſe, quia *quidditas* dei eſt quod ſit ens *neceſſarium* & *a ſe*: hoc autem plane repugnat, quia quæſtio *Quid eſt* ſupponit quæſtionem *An eſt*; ut recte ad hoc propoſitum notavit divus *Thomas*. I. Part. Q. 2. Art. 2. ad ſecund.

Reſpondeo, Formaliter ac proprie loquendo, non demonſtrari *eſſe dei* per *quidditatem* dei ut ſic, quod recte argumentum probat; ſed ex quodam *attributo* (quod re ipſa eſt eſſentia dei, a nobis autem abſtractius concipitur ut *modus* entis non-cauſati) colligi *aliud attributum*, & ita concludi illud ens eſſe *deum*. Unde ad

conclu-

" absolutely speaking, The Existence of God *can-* Ch. I.
" *not be proved a priori*; as well because God has *no*
" *Cause* of his Existence whereby it should be prov'd
" *a priori*, as also because if he had, yet we have
" no such exact and perfect Knowledge of God as
" might enable us to trace Him up (if I may so
" speak) to his own proper principles. To which
" purpose *Dionysius* (in his seventh Chapter of the
" *divine Names*) observes, that *we cannot know*
" *God according to his proper Nature.*

" But tho' that be so as I have here said, yet
" notwithstanding, after we have once demonstrat-
" ed *a posteriori* something concerning God, we
" may go on to demonstrate *a priori* one *Attribute*
" from another: As for Instance, when we infer
" *Unchangeableness of Place* from the *Omnipre-*
" *sence* before proved. I suppose all the while,
" that a *notional* distinction of the divine *Attri-*
" *butes* (after an human way of Conception) is
" Foundation sufficient for reasoning *a priori*.

" Now, for the Resolution of the *Question*, I
" proceed thus: Having demonstrated *a posteriori*,
" that God is a *necessary* and *self-existent* Being,
" we may be able to prove *a priori* from this At-
" tribute [of *Necessary-existence*] that there can-
" not be *Another* necessary and self-existent Being
" besides That one; from whence it follows, that
" That Being is *God*.

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concludendum hoc modo, esse *deum*, sub ratione *dei*, supponitur esse probatum, dari ens quoddam per se *necessarium*, nimirum ex *effectibus* ejus, & ex negatione processus in infinitum. Atque ita quod primum de hoc ente probatur est *esse*; deinde esse ab intrinseco *necessarium*; hinc esse *unicum* in tali ratione ac modo essendi; ideoque esse *deum*. Atque in hunc modum prius aliquo modo definitur quæstio *An est*, quam *Quid est*. *Suarez.* ibid. p. 28.

" You

Ch. I.

"You will object, that This is proving the *Exiſtence* of God from the *Eſſence* of God before known (For it is ſuppoſed that the *Eſſence* of God is that He is a *neceſſary* and *ſelf-exiſtent* Being) which is plainly repugnant; ſince the Queſtion *What He is* preſuppoſes the other Queſtion *Whether He exiſts*; as St. *Thomas* [*Aquinas*] has juſtly obſerved on this Head. *Part I. Q. 2. Art. 2.*

"I anſwer, that ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, we infer not the Exiſtence of God from his *Eſſence*, conſidered as ſuch (which the Objection juſtly excepts to) but from one certain *Attribute* (which tho' really identified with the Eſſence, is yet conceived abſtractedly by us as a *Mode* of the Being *uncauſed*) we deduce *another Attribute*; and ſo we at length prove that That Being is *God*. Wherefore in order to prove in this way that *there is a God*, preciſely conſidered as *God*, we ſuppoſe it proved before-hand, that there is a certain Being *neceſſary* in Himſelf; proved namely from his *Effects*, and from the *Abſurdity* of an *infinite* Progreſſion. So, the firſt Thing we prove of This Being is, that *He exiſts*; the next, that He is *Neceſſarily-exiſting*; then, that He is the *only One* exiſting in ſuch a way; and ſo of conſequence he is *God*. And thus, after ſome ſort, we do firſt determine *Whether He exiſts*, and next the other Queſtion, *What He is.*"

THUS far the acute and learned *Suarez*; of whom I have many things to obſerve, before I go on to other Writers; 1. That he appears to have been *ambitious* to make out ſomething that ſhould be *called* an Argument *a priori*, and was probably *able* to do *as much* in it as any one before or after him can juſtly be preſumed to be. 2. That the *Method* which he took for it, proving firſt

ſome-

ſomething *a poſteriori*, and then proceeding to argue *a priori* for the reſt, is very like to That which others have taken ſince. 3. That he differs however from thoſe later Advocates for the Argument *a priori* in the main Thing of all, and determines expreſsly againſt their Notion, that *Neceſſity* can be conceived *antecedent* to Exiſtence. He look'd upon That as flat *Abſurdity*, and *Self-Contradiction*, utterly repugnant to the Nature of a *Firſt Cauſe*; and ſo he made no uſe of *antecedent* Neceſſity, or *internal* Cauſe, or *formal* Reaſon, Ground, or Foundation, in proving his Point: He was too knowing a *Logician* and *Metaphyſician*, to offer any thing of that kind. 4. All that he admits is, that after the *Exiſtence* and one or more *Attributes* have been proved *a poſteriori*, we may then proceed to argue *a priori* for the reſt: Not from *antecedent* Neceſſity, not from any thing conceived as *prior*, in order of Nature, to the *Exiſtence* itſelf; but from the *Exiſtence* and one *Attribute* or more conſidered as before proved, and as *prior* in Conception to all the reſt. 5. One thing *Suarez* was very *ſingular* in, and upon That the whole ſtreſs of his Cauſe lies, ſo far as concerns the making out an Argument *a priori* for the *Exiſtence* of *God*: He would have it *ſuppoſed* that God is not proved to be *God*, 'till the *Unity* is proved; and ſo he ſuſpends, as it were, the Proof of a *Deity* upon the Proof of the *Unity*. This was an ingenious Thought, but too weak to bear. For in that way there could be no room for the Queſtion whether *God* be *One*, ſince the very *Name* would imply it: Beſides, it is univerſally allow'd, that the Proof of the *Exiſtence* of a *Deity* is both clearer and ſtronger than any Proof of the *Unity*, and is ſufficiently determined and ſettled in the firſt Place, before the conſideration of the *Unity* comes in at all. When we have proved, for inſtance, that there is an *intelli-*

Ch. I.

Ch. I. *gent, eternal, ſelf-exiſtent* Being, (one or more) which is moſt eaſily proved from our *own Exiſtence*; we have then competently proved that *there is a God*, tho' we have not yet proved, or conſidered every *Attribute* that belongs to him. Such has been the way of *Divines* and *Metaphyſicians*, firſt to prove the Exiſtence of a *Deity*, under that confuſe general Conception; and next to proceed to the Proof of the *Unity* and other *Attributes* in due Place and Order: And it is not reaſonable to ſuggeſt, that if a Man ſhould fail in the Proof of the *Unity*, or of ſome other divine *Attribute* (for the Reaſon is the ſame in all) that he has therefore failed in his Proof of a *Deity*. That would be going againſt Rule, and risking the whole for a Part; and, in ſhort, reſting the Proof of a Deity (the plaineſt thing in World) upon very obſcure Conditions, very unequal Terms. But we ſhall have more of this Matter in the Sequel, as we take in other later Writers, who have directly or indirectly paſſed their Cenſures upon *Suarez* for his exceſſes on this Head. 6. Upon the whole, one may obſerve, that this pretended Proof of a *Deity*, as drawn *a priori*, is rather a Fetch, or a Subtlety of that great Man, than any thing ſolid; a *nominal* Proof, rather than a *real* one; or an affected manner of miſcalling things by wrong Names.

A. D. 1610. CHRISTOPH. GILLIUS.

CONTEMPORARY with *Suarez* lived *Chriſtopher Gillius*, a *Spaniſh* Divine and Jeſuit, one of a ſubtle Wit and penetrating Genius. He has a pretty large Chapter [s], ſpent entirely upon our

[s] *Gillii* Commentationes Theologicæ de eſſentia & unitate dei. L. I. Tract. 8. c. iv. p. 391—396.

preſent

preſent Queſtion. He takes notice, that there were not wanting ſome of that Time who contended that the *Exiſtence* of a Deity might be proved *a priori*[1]. He had *Suarez* in his eye, as is plain enough (tho' he does not name him) becauſe, a little after, he quotes the very Words which *Suarez* had made uſe of in that Argument. He mentions alſo *Scotus*, and ſome of his Followers, as aiming at the like Concluſion in a more far-fetch'd and round-about Way[k]; allowing, that if God ſhould extraordinarily or ſupernaturally *infuſe* ſome higher degrees of Knowledge, then ſome kind of Proof *a priori* (however fruitleſs, and ſuperſeded by ſuch *Illumination*) might be made from it. See how ſolicitous and induſtrious ſome have been in ſearching for every Appearance of a Proof *a priori*, as much as others have been in ſearching for *the Philoſopher's Stone*, or for *the Squaring* of the *Circle*, or the like, and with the like Succeſs. Ch. I. §. 7

OUR judicious Author firſt obſerves, that all Pretences of any formal Demonſtration of that

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[1] Non deſunt *recentiores*, qui affirmant eſſe demonſtrabilem *a priore*, etiam reſpectu viatorum, ſi non per ſe primo, ſaltem poſita cognitione dei acquiſita per diſcurſum: Quoniam, inquiunt, poſtquam ex creaturis convincitur deum eſſe *ens neceſſarium*, & *a ſe*, & *unum*, neceſſario concluditur *a priore* hunc eſſe deum—&c. Ibid. p. 391.

[k] Alio modo eandem concluſionem tuetur *Scotus* in I. Diſt. 2. Q. 2. Cum *Scotiſtis* interpretibus ibidem: *Occamus* in I. Diſt. iii. Q. 4. Lit. F. *Gabriel.* Q. 4. Concluſ. 3. *Rubionius*, Diſt. ii. Q. 1. Art. 2. Concl. 4. Nam quamvis exiſtiment de lege ordinaria non haberi a nobis demonſtrationem *propter quid*, hujus propoſitionis *deus eſt*; cenſent tamen fieri poſſe ut demonſtretur, ſi deus *infunderet* alicui notitiam evidentem eorundem terminorum, vel ſaltem termini *dei*, &c. p. 391.

Ch. I. kind had been utterly exploded [l] by the judicious; particularly by *Albertus Magnus*, and *Henricus de Gandavo*, and *Richardus de Media Villa*, and *Scotus*, and *Lyra*, and *Gaſp. Caſalius*, and many others referred to elſewhere [m]: So that it might be juſtly look'd upon as a ruled Point, that no proper Demonſtration *a priori* could be made of the Divine *Exiſtence*; all ſuch Attempts at length reſolving either into ſome *Petitio principii*, or ſome *Equivocation* of Terms, or other the like Fallacy, or foreign Subtlety.

He proceeds to examine the Queſtion with the utmoſt Strictneſs and Nicety, traverſing it through all its Mazes, and unravelling every Ambiguity and ſubtle Intricacy, whereby ſome had endeavour'd to ſupport what they would call a Demonſtration *a priori* in that Caſe; and ſhewing that none of them ſufficiently anſwer'd the Purpoſe, or came up to the Point [n]. From whence we may remark,

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[l] Propoſitio, *deus eſt*, ſub neutra acceptatione ex prædictis, eſt viatoribus de lege formaliter demonſtrabilis *a priore*. Hæc eſt *Alberti* in Summa, Tract. iii. Q. 17. *Henrici* in Summa, Art. xxii. Q. 4. *Richardi*, in I. Diſt. iii. Art. i. Q. 1. *Scoti*, in I. Diſt. ii. Q. 2. & quodlibeto 7. *Lyrani* in Sapient. xiii. *Gaſpa Caſalii*, L. I. de Quadripart. juſtit. C. xvi. Concluſ. 2. Et eſt de mente doctorum quos referam Cap. ſeq. Num. 7. Qui omnes non agnoſcunt demonſtrationem *dei* niſi ex *creaturis*.——Notitia vero ſumpta ex creaturis non poteſt eſſe *a priore*, ut patet. *Gillius*, ibid. p. 392, conf. p. 394.

[m] Gillius, c. v. p. 400.

[n] Ex his conſtat firmum non eſſe fundamentum ſententiæ aſſerentis demonſtrari deum eſſe *a priore* per rationem *neceſſitatis*, quoniam non eſt radix attributorum habentium ordinem ad creaturas: Et quamvis eſſet, cum ipſa non cognoſcatur a nobis *a priore*, vel ex terminis evidenter conjuncta cum deo ſub ratione illa attributalis fieri nequit ut eadem demonſtratio ſit formalis *a priore*.—— primum initium illius demonſtrationis ſumitur ex cognitione *creaturarum*,—reſolvitur in principia cognita ex *poſteriore*, & ideo demon-

remark, that *Suarez*'s Attempts that way were not approved by the moſt judicious Divines of his own Time, but were condemned by the Generality, and even by thoſe of his own Order (for *Gillius* was a *Jeſuit*) and that *ſoon* after: For, as his *Metaphyſicks* had firſt appeared in 1600, ſo this Cenſure of *Gillius* was finiſhed and licenſed in 1606, tho' not publiſhed before 1610. Ch. I.

A. D. 1615. Estius.

At the ſame time with *Gillius* liv'd the learned *Eſtius*, who deliver'd his Sentiments of the preſent Queſtion in the manner here following. "[n] As "there are, among *Logicians*, two kinds of *De-* "*monſtration*, one demonſtrating the Effect from "the *Cauſes*, and the other, the Cauſe from the "*Effects*; it is manifeſt that the *Exiſtence* of a "*Deity* cannot be proved in the former way of

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demonſtratio non conſtat formaliter *ex primis*.—Quodnam peto eſt *ens*, de quo primum probatur *eſſe*? Ipſene eſt *deus*, an vero *ens neceſſarium*? Si *deus*, totus diſcurſus ſequens erit ſuperfluus, quoniam procedit ad probandum id quod *ſupponitur* probatum: ſi *ens neceſſarium*, aut ſumitur ſecundum abſolutam & omnimodam neceſſitatem, & tunc hoc ipſo *ſupponitur* eſſe neceſſarium ab intrinſeco; aut, &c.—Ita patet ex illo principio, *ens neceſſarium eſt*, nullo modo demonſtrari poſſe *a priore* hanc propoſ. *deus eſt*. *Gillius*, p. 396.

[n] Cum duplex ſit apud dialecticos demonſtratio, alia quæ ex *cauſis* effectum, alia quæ contra ex *effectis* cauſam monſtrat; manifeſtum eſt, priori demonſtrationis modo non poſſe doceri deum eſſe, cum nec *dei* nec ejus *exiſtentiæ* poſſit in *ullo genere* cauſa proferri. Poteſt autem demonſtrari poſteriori modo, quemadmodum recte *S. Thom.* I. Q. 2. *Art.* 2, & 3. Et in univerſum Scholaſtici circa hanc diſtinctionem tradunt. *Eſtius* in Libr. Sentent. Comm. Tom. 1. p. 4.

So Cardinal Lugo *alſo, a little later in the ſame Age.* Dico tertio, *deum eſſe*, non eſt demonſtrabile *a priori*. Sic cum Sancto *Thoma*, cæteri fere doctores, & latiſſime *Gillius*. *Lug.* Lib. I. Diſp. xiv. c. 2. S. 8.

" Demon-

" Demonſtration, ſince no *Cauſe* in any kind can " be aſſign'd either of *God*, or of his *exiſting*. But " it may be demonſtrated in the latter way, as " St. *Thomas* [*Aquinas*] rightly judges (I. Q. 2. " *Art.* 2, 3.) and as the School-men upon this *Di-* " *ſtinction* do *univerſally* teach."

A.D. 1647. JOHANNES PUTEANUS.

THIS Writer expreſſes his Judgment in the Terms here following. [o]

" THO' the Exiſtence of a Deity cannot be " demonſtrated *a priori*, yet it muſt be allowed, " that as to ſome of the divine *Attributes*, They " may be demonſtrated *a priori*.

" 1. AS to the firſt Particular, it is plain from " hence; that every Proof *a priori* proceeds by " *Cauſes* either *real* or *virtual*, or, which comes to " the ſame, by *ſome prior Reaſon*; but of the *di-* " *vine* Exiſtence there are no *Cauſes* real or virtual,

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[o] Licet *exiſtentia* deitatis nequeat demonſtrari *a priori*, concedendum tamen eſt de *quibuſdam attributis* divinis, quod poſſint demonſtrari *a priori*.

1. Prima pars concluſionis ex eo innotefcit, quod demonſtratio quælibet *a priori* conſurgat ex *cauſis* vel *veris*, vel certe *virtualibus*, aut, quod idem eſt, ex *ratione aliqua priori*. Exiſtentiæ autem divinæ *nullæ ſunt cauſæ*, nec *veræ*, nec *virtuales*, nec *ratio prior*: Hæc enim includitur in conceptu formali *eſſentiæ* divinæ, & quidem ita, ut impoſſibile ſit concipere *eſſentiam* divinam quin concipiatur *exiſtens*. Eſt enim eſſentia divina ens *ſimpliciter neceſſarium*; repugnat autem enti ſimpliciter neceſſario, non habere *exiſtentiam*: definitur enim hoc communiter, *id quod ita eſt ut non eſſe nequeat*.

2. Poſterior vero pars conſtat ex eo, quod *æternitas* demonſtretur per *immutabilitatem*, hoc modo: *Omne immutabile eſt æternum*; *Deus eſt immutabilis*: *ergo*, *Deus eſt æternus*. *Ubiquitas* etiam divina demonſtratur communiter per *immenſitatem*; & ſic in aliis multis. *Joan. Puteanus*, Opp. Tom. I. Part. i. Q. iii. p. 24.

" not

" not any *prior Reaſon*: For *Exiſtence* is included " in the formal conception of the *divine Eſſence*, " inſomuch that it is impoſſible to conceive the di- " vine Eſſence but as *exiſting*. The divine Eſſence " is *Being* ſimply *neceſſary*: Now it is contradicto- " ry to the Notion of Being ſimply *neceſſary*, not " to have *Exiſtence*; for it is uſually defined as " *That which ſo exiſts that it cannot but exiſt.*

" 2. As to the ſecond Particular, it is manifeſt " from hence, that *Eternity* is demonſtrated from " *Immutability* in this manner: *Every thing im-* " *mutable is eternal: God is immutable: There-* " *fore God is eternal.* In like manner, the divine " *Ubiquity* is commonly proved from the *Immenſity.* " And ſo in many other Caſes."

THE Author here well diſtinguiſhes between arguing *a priori* from *Exiſtence* and *Attributes* already proved, to other Attributes, and arguing *a priori* from Attributes, or from any Thing elſe, to the *Exiſtence* itſelf. The one he allows as juſt and rational, the other he rejects as manifeſtly abſurd: And ſo far he is certainly right. Some indeed may ſcruple to call it arguing *a priori*, when a Man argues from *Attribute* to *Attribute*; conceiving that it ſhould rather be ſtyled arguing *ex abſurdo*, and that nothing ſhort of a *real* (as oppoſed to *notional*) priority, is ſufficient to denominate or conſtitute an Argument *a priori*. But that I take to be a fruitleſs Nicety, and ſuch is not worth the inſiſting upon; for at laſt it will terminate in a Diſpute about *Words*. It is ſufficient, that there is nothing *prior* to the *Exiſtence*, no not ſo much as in Order of Nature, or Notion, or Conception; and ſo all arguing *a priori*, as to that Caſe, is for ever excluded. But as to the other Caſe, the Manner of arguing is undoubtedly right, whatever *Name* we give to it: And there ſeems to be no juſt Objection againſt calling it *a priori*, ſo long as the *Exiſtence*

ence is look'd upon as always *firſt* in Conception, and that the moſt *natural* Order of Conception be followed in arguing from *Attribute* to *Attribute*, and the Proceſs be not made too *arbitrary* [p].

A. D. 1642. Rodericus de Arriaga.

This acute Metaphyſician and Divine delivers his Sentiments as follows: "The *Being* or *Exiſtence* of God cannot be demonſtrated *a priori*. "So St. *Thomas*, *Albertus*, *Durandus*; and of our "Order (of *Jeſuits*) *Valentia*, *Molina*, *Suarez*, "and *Vaſquez*, whom *Tanner* mentions and follows." [q] After this, he enters minutely into the Merits of the Queſtion, aſſigning his Reaſons why the *Exiſtence* cannot be proved *a priori*: which being much the ſame with thoſe before-mention'd, I chuſe, for Brevity ſake, to omit them, and proceed. Only, I may obſerve, that here are three Authors, *Durandus*, *Molina*, and *Tanner*,

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[p] *Richardus de Media Villa*, in a Chapter before referred to, obſerves well to this Purpoſe, That the *Order* of the Attributes ought not to be ſettled in an *arbitrary* manner, but as *Reaſon* requires.

Nec loquor hic *de ordine* qui tantum eſt ex parte *voluntatis* (quia tali ordine poſſet, in noſtra ratione intelligendi, quandoque unum eſſe *prius*, quandoque *poſterius*, ſicut *placeret* nobis) ſed loquor de ordine qui eſt in conceptionibus noſtri intellectus intelligentis divina *attributa* ſecundum illum ordinem ſecundum quem *magis ſunt apta nata* intelligi: & ſic intelligendo divinas perfectiones, eſt talis *ordo* ex parte noſtra. Prius enim, ſecundum rationem intelligendi, intelligimus *divinum eſſe*, quam aliquam ejus perfectionem; ſecundo, ſuum *intelligere*; tertio, ſuum *velle*. *Ricard. de Med. Vill.* L. I. p. 32.

[q] Prima concluſio, deum *eſſe*, ſeu *exiſtere*, non poteſt demonſtrari *a priori*. Ita D. *Thomas*, *Albertus*, *Durandus*: & e noſtris, *Valentia*, *Molina*, *Suarez*, & *Vaſquez*, quos refert & ſequitur *Tannerus* loco citato. *Roderic. de Arriag.* Tom. I. p. 30.

beyond

beyond what I have quoted upon the Queſtion: And it is further obſervable, that he takes in *Suarez* amonſt them, as one that had declared againſt the Argument *a priori*; as indeed he *really* had, tho' *verbally* he might ſeem to differ, as I have before hinted. So *univerſal* hitherto had been the Agreement of *Metaphyſicians* and *Divines* in this Article. Ch. I.

A. D. 1644. Dionysius Petavius.

The very learned *Petavius* is but ſhort upon this Queſtion, mentioning it tranſiently as it came in his way: But he is too conſiderable a Perſon to be omitted in this recital. He takes notice, that the *Exiſtence* of a *Deity* is not to be proved from any Thing *prior* or *antecedent*, but from *Effects* only, and *a poſteriori*; and from the *Abſurdities* which lie againſt the contrary Perſuaſion. [r]

A. D. 1652. Nathanael Culverwell.

I shall now mention a *Proteſtant* Writer of our own, of ſome Note in his Time. He was Fellow of *Emanuel* College in *Cambridge*. In his Book entituled, *An elegant and learned Diſcourſe of the Light of Nature*, he occaſionally drops a few Words to our purpoſe: "There can be no

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[r] Verum hæc iiſque ſimilia tum nos commoverent, ſi probationum id genus ageretur quod ex *antecedentibus* & *prioribus* ducitur, ac *demonſtrationem* & *ſcientiam* parit: Ejuſmodi enim locum in deo non habent.—Nihilominus ex *effectis* & iis quæ *poſteriora* ſunt, atque etiam iis ex *incommodis* & *abſurdis* quæ in contradicentium altera parte cernuntur, argumenta licet colligere, quibus deus eſſe monſtretur. *Petav. Dogm. Theolog.* T. I. l. 1. c. 1. p. 2, 3.

Ch. I. "Demonſtration of him [God] *a priore*; for he "is the *firſt Cauſe*: And all Demonſtrations fetch'd "from ſuch *Effects* as flow from him, they do "only ſhew you that he is; they do not open and "diſplay the Divine Eſſence," &c.[f]

A. D. 1658. Bp. BARLOW.

A MORE conſiderable Writer of our own, ſo far as concerns the preſent Queſtion, was *Thomas Barlow*, then Fellow of *Queen's-College, Oxon.* and afterwards (*A. D.* 1675.) Biſhop of *Lincoln.* He publiſhed ſome *metaphyſical Exerciſes*, wherein he diſcovers great Learning, and no leſs Acuteneſs. The Edition of 1658, which I follow, is the Second Edition. I ſhall produce his Sentiments at large, becauſe he enter'd deep into the Queſtion, view'd it on every ſide, and withal paſs'd his Cenſure (tho' rather too ſevere) upon the learned *Suarez.*

He writes thus: "Our Knowledge of God, "ariſing from the Light of Nature, is not *a priori*, "and &c. The Reaſon is, becauſe then God "could not be *eternal*, if there were any Principle "*prior* to God: For *Eternity*, in the very Notion "of it, excludes any *prior* Principle. Conſequent-"ly, if God be eternal, there cannot be any *prior* "Principle whereby he may be known *a priori*. "-----Were there any Principle by which God "might be known *a priori*, then, 1. God would "not be the *firſt* Original and *firſt Cauſe*, as "having by the Suppoſition another *Cauſe prior* "to him. -----2. That ſuppoſed *antecedent* Prin-"ciple, by which the Exiſtence of God ſhould be "proved, muſt be either *external* (of the *final* or "*efficient* Kind) or elſe *internal*, of the *material*

[f] Culverwell, p. 212.

of

" or *formal* kind. Now it cannot be of the *final* Ch. I.
" kind, becauſe God is the *chief End*, and there
" cannot be any *higher* final Cauſe, whereby to
" demonſtrate *a priori* the Exiſtence of God. It
" cannot be of the *efficient* kind; becauſe if God
" had any antecedent *efficient* Cauſe, then God
" would be an *Effect*, &c. ------- Neither can it
" be ſaid, that ſuch prior Cauſe is either *mate-*
" *rial* or *formal*: For the perfect *Simplicity* of the
" Divine Nature admits not of any ſuch *Cauſes*, as
" is ſelf-evident: Conſequently there is no room
" for any *Cauſe* whereby to demonſtrate *a priori*
" the Exiſtence of a Deity." [t]

Our learned Author here enters into the Heart of the Queſtion, and reaſons his Way through, like a knowing and judicious Man. Only he ſeems rather too ſhort as to what concerns the two internal *Cauſes*, called *Material* and *Formal*: But that Brevity of his may be competently ſupplied from what has been ſaid above, under *Duns Scotus*. I proceed to obſerve how he animadverts upon *Suarez*.

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[t] Hæc noſtra de deo cognitio, a lumine naturali orta, non eſt *a priori* & δι' ὅτι. Ratio eſt, quia ſic deus non eſſet *æternus*, modo eſſet aliquod principium deo *prius*: Ipſa enim *æternitas* intrinſeca dicit negationem principii; & per conſequens, ſi deus ſit æternus, non poteſt eſſe aliquod principium *prius*, per quod *a priori* cognoſcetur.——Si eſſet aliquod principium quo deum *a priori* cognoſceremus; tum, 1. Deus non eſſet principium *primum* & *cauſa prima*, utpote qua alia cauſa eſſet *prior*.—2. Principium *prius* ex quo probari poſſit *a priori* deum eſſe, vel erit *externum* (*finale* vel *efficiens*) vel *internum*, ſcil. *materiale* vel *formale*. Non *primum*, quia cum deus ſit *finis ultimus*, non poſſit eſſe cauſa *finalis prior*, per quam demonſtrari poſſit δι' ὅτι deum eſſe. Non *ſecundum*, quia ſi deus habuiſſet cauſam *efficientem* priorem, tum deus eſſet *effectus*, &c.—Nec dici poſſit, quod illa cauſa ſit *materialis*, aut *formalis*, ſumma dei *ſimplicitas* tales cauſas non admittit, ut manifeſtum eſt: Et per conſequens non eſt *cauſa ulla*, per quam *a priori* demonſtrari poſſit eſſe deum. *Barlow*. Exercit. Metaph. IV. p. 18.

"I AM aware, that *Suarez* is of opinion, that "we may, in ſome ſort, demonſtrate *a priori* the "Exiſtence of a Deity: Not by the *Eſſence* of "God as ſuch, but by ſome certain *Attribute* "which is *really* the Eſſence of God, only conſi-"dered by us, in an abſtract way, as a *Mode* of "the uncauſed Being. But, to ſay the Truth, I "approve not this *bold* Aſſertion of the learned "*Jeſuit*. Becauſe it is a manifeſt Contradiction "to ſay, that the *Exiſtence* of God can be proved "*a priori* from any Attribute whatever, when every "Attribute, *as ſuch*, in the very notion of *it* de-"notes ſomething *poſterior* to the *Eſſence* of which "it is the *Attribute*. For if the Attribute be "*really* diſtinct [from the Eſſence] then it is *really* "ſubſequent to it: Or if it be only *notionally* di-"ſtinct (which is the Caſe in the *divine* Being) "then it is likewiſe *notionally* ſubſequent to the "*Eſſence* whoſe Attribute its conceiv'd to be. It "is not poſſible ſo much as to imagine any *Attri-"bute* but what *pre-ſuppoſes* ſome *Eſſence* whoſe "Attribute it is. Conſequently our Knowledge "of God's Exiſtence is *a poſteriori* only: And of "that kind are all the Demonſtrations brought by "Metaphyſicians and School-men."[v]. The learned Author

[v] Novi quod *Suarez* putat, nos poſſe aliquo modo *a priori* demonſtrari deum eſſe: non per *quidditatem* dei, ut ſic, ſed ex quodam *attributo* quod reipſa eſt *eſſentia* dei, a nobis autem abſtractius conſideratur ut modus entis non cauſati, &c. Sed ut quod res eſt dicam, non probo hoc docti *Jeſuitæ* audax pronuntiatum. Quia manifeſte implicat deum eſſe demonſtrari poſſe *a priori* per attributum quodcunque, cum attributum omne, qua tale, intrinſeca dicit aliquid *eſſentiæ* illa *poſterius* cujus eſt attributum.—Nam ſi ſit attributum *re* diſtinctum, tum *re vera* eſt poſterius; ſi ſit attributum ſolum *ratione* diſtinctum (quod in *divinis* accedit) tum eſt etiam *ratione* eſſentia poſterius, cujus attributum concipitur: cum attributum nec fingi poſſet quin *præſupponitur* eſſentia aliqua cujus

Author here argues the Point againſt *Suarez* with great Strength and Acuteneſs: Only he ſeems to fix an Opinion upon *Suarez* which never was his: For *Suarez* himſelf plainly diſowned any ſuch arguing *a priori* for the Exiſtence, in that crude and groſs Senſe which *Barlow* appears to take it in, while he is diſputing againſt it. All that *Suarez* really meant, as I have before-hinted, was, that the *Unity* might be proved *a priori*, after having proved the Exiſtence *a poſteriori*: And ſuch Proof of the *Unity* he improperly called, or erroneouſly conceived to be, proving the Exiſtence of *God a priori*, inaſmuch as God ſhould not be deem'd to be *God*, till proved to be *one*. Our Author afterwards very well confutes that peculiar Fancy, which *Suarez* and ſome few others had countenanced in that Article: I ſay, our Author well confutes that Notion, by obſerving, that the *Exiſtence* of a *Deity* is ſufficiently proved, as ſoon as an *infinite, eternal, uncreated, independent* (he ſhould have added *intelligent*) *Being* is proved; and that the Queſtion of the *Unity* comes not properly in till afterwards [x]. *Valentia* had effectually obviated Ch. I.

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cujus eſt attributum. Et per conſequens *deum eſſe* non niſi *a poſteriori* cognoſcimus: Tales enim ſunt demonſtrationes *omnes* a metaphyſicis & ſcholaſticis adducta ad oſtendendum deum eſſe; ut videre eſt apud *Fran. Suarez.* Metaph. p. 2. Diſp. 29. Sect. 2. Num. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. *Aquin.* contra Gent. L. I. c. 13. p. 11. & *Ferrarienſ.* ibid. *Nazarium* in I. P. Q. 2. Art. 3. & apud *Aquin.* I. P. Q. 2. Art. 3. & commentatores. *Barlow.* ibid. p. 129, 130. conf. p. 165, 186.

[x] Hoc dato, quod non oſtendunt deum eſſe *unum*, tamen & adhuc erunt argumenta prædicta ſatis valida, & in demonſtrationem theſis antedictæ valitura: Quia in præſenti hoc ſolum demonſtrandum ſuſcepimus, nempe eſſe aliquod ens quod *deum* dicimus, *infinitum, æternum, increatum*, & *independens*. Sed an hoc ens *unum* ſit aut *multiplex*, alterius eſt loci & quæſiti opus demonſtrare. *Barlow.* Exercit. IV, p. 161.

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that Pretence of *Suarez*, ſome time before, in what he had ſaid againſt *Cajetan*, who had been beforehand with *Suarez* in that Piece of Subtlety.

ONE Thing further I would obſerve of *Barlow*, before I diſmiſs him, that he was very ſcrupulous as to admitting that any of the divine *Attributes* might be demonſtrated *a priori*. For, tho' he allowed the way of arguing from one Attribute before proved, to another not proved, and makes uſe of it himſelf more than once; yet conſidering that the *Attributes* are in *reality* (however *notionally* diſtinguiſhed) identified with the *Eſſence*, he apprehended ſuch Reaſoning could not juſtly be accounted Reaſoning *a priori*[z], ſince the divine

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[y] In propoſito igitur, cum *dei* nomen audimus, communiter ſolemus concipere imperfecte & confuſe, vel *primam cauſam*, vel *primum movens*, vel alia quæ rationes *Thomæ* concludunt. Quamobrem rationes ejuſmodi, quæ ſcilicet probant eſſe aliquod *primum movens*, *efficiens*, &c. etſi non probant *quid*, & *quale* illud ſit, ſcilicet *immateriale*, *infinitum*, *unum* numero, &c. ſatis tamen probant *deum* eſſe. Illa enim alia probare, pertinet ad quæſtionem de *natura* & *quidditate* divina, & probantur etiam non admodum difficulter, conſtituta jam veritate *divinæ entitatis*, juxta quæſtionem *an eſt*. Atque hinc fit quod D. *Thomas* non niſi poſt expeditam hanc quæſtionem *an eſt*, diſputat de *unitate*, *ſimplicitate*, *æternitate*, & aliis ejuſmodi perfectionibus divinis, ut videbimus in ſequentibus quæſtionibus. Quocirca cum *Cajetanus* hic negat, probari *per ſe* his rationibus D. *Thomæ*, deum eſſe, eo quod non probatur illis dei *unitas*, & *infinitas*; & concedit tantum, id probari *per accidens*, (ut ſcilicet ejuſmodi rationes concludunt eſſe quædam prædicata quæ ei rei veritate ſoli deo conveniunt) non ſatis diſtinxiſſe videtur inter quæſtionem *an eſt*, & *quid eſt*. *Greg. de Valent.* Tom. I. p. 64.

[z] Fateor *Suarezium* & *ſcholaſticos* uſitate affirmare *æternitatem* (ut & alia nonnulla *attributa* dei) demonſtrari poſſe *a priori*, & admittere medium *ratione* prius; ita ut illud *medium* licet *in re ipſa* non ſit æternitate prius, tamen quoad modum noſtrum *concipiendi*, imperfectum poſſit eſſe prius. Sed, ut quod ſentio libere proferam, minutias has ſcholaſticas non probo, & tutius eſſe judico, & deo dignius, ſi de deo & perfectionibus ſuis loquamur *prout ſunt*, non prout ab intellectu noſtro fingantur. Et ſic rectius

divine Eſſence could not be conceived *prior* to itſelf. There is certainly Weight in the Suggeſtion. But the Point is not worth the conteſting, as I have before intimated, ſince it will terminate only in a Diſpute about *Words* or *Names*. That it is reaſonable and right to argue from *Exiſtence* and *Attributes* proved, to other Attributes not proved, is agreed on all hands: And whether ſuch arguing ſhall be called reaſoning *ab abſurdo*, or *a priori*, is not very material. I have hinted above, under what Reſtrictions or Cautions I conceive it may be juſtly term'd reaſoning *a priori*. But whatever way this By-point, of ſlight Conſideration in the main, be determin'd, the other more material Queſtion concerning the arguing *a priori* for the Exiſtence (or for any of the Attributes from any Thing conſidered as *antecedent* to the *Exiſtence*) is no way affected by it. For ſuch kind of arguing will undoubtedly be ſtill condemned as wrong, in every View, and in every Conſtruction, and upon every the moſt favourable Suppoſition that can with any colour of Reaſon be made for it. Ch. I. §. 3

A. D. 1662. Franciscus Bonæ Spei.

This Author likewiſe declares his Judgment, that there can be no Demonſtration *a priori* of the *Exiſtence* of God, and further teſtifies, that it was then a ſettled Point amongſt *all*, about which there was no Diſpute. [a]

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rectius dices *æternitatem a priori demonſtrari non poſſe*, quia in *re ipſa* ita eſt prout affirmatur, quam *æternitatem poſſe a priori demonſtrari*, cum in *re ipſa* non ita ſit, nec eſſe poſſit medium ullum *in re prius*, ut ſupra demonſtravimus. *Barlow* Exercit. V. p. 187.

[a] Dico, Deum exiſtere demonſtrari non poteſt demonſtratione *a priori*: Ita *omnes* communiter. *Franc. Bon. Sp.* Diſp. I. Dub. 2.

A. D.

A. D. 1678. Dr. Cudworth.

Dr. *CUDWORTH*'s Judgment in this Article cannot but be of great Weight, as he was a Person of eminent Learning and Abilities, a *Protestant* Writer, and therefore the less apt to take any thing implicitly from the *Popish* School-men; extremely desirous besides, to draw together every plausible Argument, that could with any shew of Reason be urged for the Existence of a Deity, and to make the utmost Improvement of them. Notwithstanding all which he frankly declares, in his *Preface* to his great Work, his Judgment against the Argument *a priori*, in these remarkable Words: "We do therein also *demonstrate* the absolute impossibility of all *Atheism*, and the actual "Existence of a God: We say, demonstrate; "not *a priori*, which is *impossible* and *contradictious*, but by necessary inference from Principles "altogether undeniable." [b]

In the *Book* itself he has a great deal more to the same purpose, Part of which has been cited above; and for the rest I am content to refer the Reader to the Pages where he will find it. [c].

A. D. 1683. Le Blanc.

LE BLANC is another *Protestant* Writer, of great Learning and Judgment, who freely declares his Sentiments against the possibility of demonstrating *a priori* the Existence of God. He does it nearly in the same Words [d] with *Estius* above-cited;

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[b] *Cudworth*'s Intellect. Syst. *Preface.*

[c] *Cudworth*, Book I. ch. iv. p. 715, 716.

[d] Cum duplex sit demonstratio apud dialecticos, altera quæ ex *causis* effectum, altera vero quæ contra ex *effectis* causam monstrat,

cited; tho' without taking notice from whom he borrowed them. Ch. I.

A.D. 1690. ABp. TILLOTSON.

THIS great and good Prelate ſeems to have thought, that neither the *Exiſtence* nor the *Attributes* of God could be demonſtrated *a priori*, falling in with the Sentiments of Bp. *Barlow*, mention'd above. He expreſſes himſelf in theſe Words, ſpeaking of the divine *Spirituality*: "This is not "to be proved by way of *Demonſtration* (for there "is nothing *before* God, or which can be a *Cauſe* "of him) but by way of *Conviction*, by ſhewing "the Abſurdity of the contrary." [e]

AGAIN, ſpeaking of the divine *Immenſity*, he ſays, "I have told you formerly, there being no-"thing *before* God, nor any *Cauſe* of his Being, "his Perfections cannot be proved by way of "*Demonſtration*, but of *Conviction*, by ſhewing "the *Abſurdity* of the contrary." [f] He repeats the ſame Obſervation afterwards, applying it to the divine *Eternity*. [g] In a popular Diſcourſe, he avoided the *Latin* and ſcholaſtick Phraſe *a priori*. But it is very plain from his manner of expreſſing himſelf, that he meant the ſame as to ſay, there could be no Demonſtration *a priori*, either of the *Exiſtence* or *Attributes* of the Deity; and that as to the *Attributes* in particular, the way of

ſtrat, manifeſtum eſt, priori demonſtrationis modo non poſſe doceri deum eſſe, cum nec *dei* nec ejus *exiſtentiæ* poſſit in ullo genere *cauſa* proferri: Sed demonſtrari poteſt poſteriori modo, nimirum ex *effectis*. *Le Blanc.* Theſ. p. 91.

[e] *Tillotſon*'s Serm. 100. Vol. II. p. 671. fourth Edit.

[f] *Tillotſon.* ibid. Serm. 101. p. 678.

[g] Ibid. Serm. 102. p. 683.

Ch. I. reasoning by a *Reductio ad absurdum* was the best we could have, the utmost we could come up to. Indeed, the reducing the contrary Persuasion to a flat *Absurdity*, is a kind of *Demonstration*, and such as the *Mathematicians* themselves frequently make use of: But then it must be owned, that it is the *lowest* kind of *Demonstration*, (as not *directly* and *immediately* inferring the Thing to be prov'd [h]) and comes not up to the Perfection of the direct *ostensive* Demonstration *a posteriori*, much less to the Demonstration *a priori*. It is a good and sufficient Proof, but not the highest kind of Proof; sufficient for *Conviction*, but not amounting to *Demonstration* emphatically so called: which is what our judicious Prelate had an eye to, in the Distinction which he thrice made use of.

A. D. 1712. Mr. Humphrey Ditton.

I shall close this *Historical Account* with a very good Writer, and close Reasoner, Mr. *Humphrey Ditton*, who appeared after the Time that the *new* Tenet of an Argument *a priori* had been offered to the World. He either knew not of it, or was not aware of its Force: For he determines as the whole Stream of *Metaphysicians* and *Divines* had before done, "That our Demonstra-"tions of the *Existence* of a God, are *all of* "*them a posteriori*, as proceeding from "the Effects." [i]

Now, to sum up the Amount of this *Historical View*, it appears at length, that as to the Point of demonstrating *a priori* the Existence of a Deity, it

[h] See *Ditton* on the Resurrection of Christ. p. 135.
[i] Ibid. p. 134.

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is no *new Thought*, but very *antient*, and what has been turned and tried every way, and very maturely conſidered time after time, and as often rejected and thrown aſide as contradictory and abſurd; by Men of the brigheſt Parts and cooleſt Judgment, and Men no way *prejudiced* againſt it, but ſincerely diſpoſed to accept it, and make uſe of it, if it had been capable of ſerving. It has been frequently and ſeriouſly conſider'd by Perſons of different Times and Tempers, Parties and Profeſſions; by *Antients* and *Moderns*, by *Philoſophers* and *Divines*, by *Pagans* and *Chriſtians*, by *Fathers* and *School-men*, by *Realiſts* and *Nominaliſts*, by *Thomiſts* and *Scotiſts*, by *Romaniſts* and *Reformed*; and by all of them, as it were with one Voice, condemned and exploded. One ſhall ſcarce meet with ſo clear and ſo univerſal an Agreement for the Reception of any Article, as there appears to have been for the Non-reception of this, among Perſons every way well qualified to judge of it, and fitly diſpoſed for judging right, and having all the Light before them which any one can now have, or which ever could be neceſſary for determining the Point, to the entire Satisfaction of the *common Reaſon* of Mankind. Beſides thoſe whom I have mentioned (to which many more of like kind might be added) as *expreſsly* rejecting all Demonſtration *a priori* in reſpect of the divine *Exiſtence*, great numbers might be further mentioned, who *tacitly* diſregarded it, and made no uſe of it in proving the *Exiſtence* when occaſion offered: And they alſo may be juſtly look'd upon, for the moſt part, as Witneſſes againſt it, ſince they could not well be totally ignorant of it, nor unwilling to take it in and make the beſt of it, were it really of any force. For what man of Diſcernment would not prefer an *oſtenſive* Demonſtration, where it can be had, before any other of

Ch. I. §2

Ch. I. a leſs perfect kind? Or who would not chuſe an Argument *a priori* to come at his Concluſion by, rather than be content to work his way by *Effects* only, which, in compariſon, is feeling in the dark? Yet ſuch is the Method that the ableſt and wiſeſt Men have taken, aiming no higher: Biſhop *Ward* for inſtance, in his Treatiſe of the *Exiſtence* and *Attributes*, and Biſhop *Wilkins* in his, and Biſhop *Pearſon* on the ſame Subject, and Dr. *Barrow*, and Mr. *Locke*, and Mr. *Wollaſton*; beſides a great many more: Men, that could not have failed to take in the Argument *a priori*, had they not been perſuaded that there was no Soundneſs, no Solidity in it.

IF now it ſhould be aſk'd, of what uſe or ſervice this *Hiſtorical View* can be, in a Point of pure reaſoning, and not depending at all upon *Authorities*; I anſwer, that it may be ſerviceable for ſeveral good Ends and Purpoſes.

1. AS it is not merely *Hiſtorical*, but in part *argumentative* alſo; as diſcovering the *Reaſons* upon which wiſe Men before us have proceeded in forming their Judgment upon the Queſtion in hand: And poſſibly thoſe *Reaſons* may meet with the more favourable Attention and Reception, on account of the hands they come from. For *Demonſtration* it ſelf muſt often be content to borrow all its *relative* Force from the Inſtrument of Conveyance.

2. IT is of uſe in all Queſtions which have before paſſed through many Hands, and have been often and carefully conſider'd, to look back to what others have thought and determin'd upon them. For it may reaſonably be preſumed, in ſuch Caſes, that the Point has been carried to as great Perfection as it is capable of, ſince the Extent of *Human Reaſon*, in all Ages where the Light is equal, is very nearly the ſame. Beſides, it ſeldom happens, that a ſingle Perſon, who takes upon him to

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go on *proprio marte*, without conſulting others, will be able at once to view the Argument on all ſides, or to be aware of every Difficulty which may occur in it. *Plus vident oculi quam oculus: In a multitude of counſellors there is Safety.* I am aware that ſometimes attending too much to others may foreſtal a Man's own better Judgment, or cramp a good Invention. But then, on the other hand, the following one's own Thoughts too much, diſregarding what others have ſaid or written, is often a means to make a Man ſelf-conceited and ſuperficial. The way therefore to avoid both Extremes, is to try firſt, how far we can go with our own unaſſiſted Enquiries, upon any Queſtion of pure abſtract Reaſoning; and afterwards to compare what we have done, with what others have done in the ſame kind before us. Ch. I.

3. To ſuch as chuſe to be led by *Authority* and *great Names*, in Points of an abſtruſe Nature (which they have neither inclination nor leiſure to enquire cloſely into) it is of uſe to know on what ſide the *Authority* and the *great Names* really are, antient and modern. And it may reaſonably be preſumed, that *Truth* is with them; unleſs ſome fair Account can be given, how it came to paſs that ſo many wiſe and great Men, ſo well prepared to make a true judgment, and ſo fitly diſpos'd for it, ſhould notwithſtanding widely miſtake in it.

However, I mention not theſe things as if any *Authority* ought to prevail over clear and cogent *Reaſon*, or as if the Queſtion now in hand wanted any *Authority* at all to decide or determine it. The ſame *Reaſons* which obtained formerly, are of equal force now, and are never the worſe for the wearing, as Time can never alter eternal Truths. I proceed therefore to examine this Queſtion over again, (as if it had never been debated or conſidered before) and to ſee how it will now ſtand at the Bar of ſober and impartial *Reaſon*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Conſidering the Merits of the Debate about the Argument a priori.

Ch. II.

HERE it will be proper to ſhew, but as briefly as may be, 1. That the ſuppoſed Argument *a priori* is very *looſe* and *precarious*, having nothing in a manner to ſtand upon, except it be an ill uſe made of *equivocal* Terms, or Phraſes. 2. That it is, moreover, when fully underſtood, palpably *wrong* and *abſurd*. 3. That the ſeveral *Pleas* or *Excuſes* invented for it, are fallacious, and of no real Weight.

1. I WOULD obſerve, that the ſuppoſed Argument *a priori* is at the beſt very *looſe* and *precarious*, having nothing to ſtand upon, but an Abuſe of *equivocal* Terms or Phraſes. The whole ſeems to amount to little more than the ringing of Changes upon the Word *Neceſſity*; as ſhall be ſeen preſently. But becauſe that Word is capable of *many* Senſes, and conſequently apt to uſher in *many* Fallacies; it will be proper here to note the *various* Acceptations of that *inſtrument* of Deluſion.

Neceſſity is but of modern date (comparatively ſpeaking) in our Language. It comes from the *Latin Neceſſitas*; which, tho' otherwiſe *antient* enough, yet ſeems to have been brought but late into our preſent Subject.[1] I know not what good the *Schools* did by introducing it, or by ſubſtituting

[1] *See above*, p. 6, 7, 8.

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the improper and ambiguous Phraſes of *neceſſary Exiſtence*, or *Neceſſity* of *Exiſtence*, inſtead of the more antient and more proper Expreſſions; ſuch as *natural* Exiſtence, or *emphatical* Exiſtence; or ſuch as *eternal*, *immutable*, *un-made*, *independent*, *permanent*, and the like. The *new* Word *Neceſſity*, as here applied, and as oppoſed to *precarious* or *contingent*, affords no *new* Idea beyond the other, but is apt to excite falſe Conceptions, and to promote falſe reaſoning. But ſince the Miſchief is already done, as to the *introducing* this improper Pagan Term into Chriſtian Theology, and it is now too late to undo it; the only way left to provide againſt the Miſapprehenſions ariſing from it, is to *diſtinguiſh*, as carefully as we can, the *ſeveral* Senſes which have been commonly affix'd to the Words *Neceſſary* or *Neceſſity*. The moſt comprehenſive Diviſion of *Neceſſity* is into four Kinds; *Logical*, *Moral*, *Phyſical*, and *Metaphyſical*. Let us take thoſe kinds ſingly in their order, and minutely examine what they mean. Ch. II.

(1.) *Logical* Neceſſity is, where it is an expreſs Contradiction to ſay the contrary.[k] Which reſolves into this, that the *ſame Idea*, under different Terms, or Expreſſions, is ſtill the *ſame Idea*, and neceſſarily *agrees* with itſelf. Thus there is a *Neceſſity* that *Man* ſhould be *rational*, as Rationality is implied in the general *Idea* of *Man*. Not that there is any *phyſical* Neceſſity that this or that Man ſhould be ſo (for he may ceaſe to be *rational*, or to exiſt at all) but there is a *logical* Neceſſity, that the *Definition* ſhould agree to the Thing *defined*, and that the *Idea* expreſſed by the

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[k] Neceſſarium *logicum* eſt, cum ex terminis repugnat non eſſe. Sic *neceſſarium* eſt, hominem eſſe rationalem. *Chauvin.* p. 435.

Word

Word *Man*, ſhould be what it is, while ſuppos'd to be ſo. This kind of *Neceſſity* is otherwiſe called *Neceſſity* of *Predication*; importing an *ideal* and undeniable *Connexion* between *Subject* and *Predicate*.[l] As if Man is ſaid to be *rational*, or to be an *Animal*. To the Head of *Logical Neceſſity* is to be referred what the Schools call *Neceſſitas Conſequentis*, and likewiſe *Neceſſitas Conſequentiæ*, expreſſing the indiſſoluble *Connexion* between *Premiſes* and *Concluſion*;[m] that is, again, between one Idea and another, or between Propoſition and Propoſition, or one part of a Propoſition and another part. In ſhort, *Logical Neceſſity* is nothing elſe but a Name for the ſuppoſed inviolable *Connexion* between *Idea* and *Idea*, or between *Propoſition* and *Propoſition*, or between *Subject* and *Predicate*.

(2.) *Moral Neceſſity* imports a *Connexion*, but not ſo conſtant and invariable, between *End* and *Means*.[n] As when we ſay, There is a *Neceſſity* of Temperance to preſerve Health; or if it be ſaid, That Man is under a *moral* Neceſſity of doing his Duty, as it is a *Means* to Happineſs, his chief *End*. It is called *Moral*, in oppoſition to *Phyſical*, which comes next to be mention'd. If any Man is violently forced or compelled to any thing, he is then under a *phyſical* Neceſſity, and ſo far ceaſes to be a *moral* Agent.

(3.) *Phyſical Neceſſity* imports an inviolable *Connexion* between natural *Cauſes* and *Effects*.[o]

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[l] Neceſſarium in *prædicando* dicitur, quando datur *neceſſitas* enuntiationis, ſeu in enuntiatione. Pendet a *connexione* neceſſaria *prædicati* cum *ſubjecto*; id eſt, ex inſolubili harum partium nexu, adeo ut prædicatum non poſſit negari de ſubjecto: ut cum dicitur, *Homo eſt animal*. Chauvin. p. 435.

[m] *See* Chauvin. ibid.

[n] Neceſſarium *morale* eſt id ſine quo, quamvis abſolute fieri poſſit effectus, nunquam tamen, vel raro fit. *Chauvin.* ibid.

[o] Neceſſarium *phyſicum* eſt, quod ex *cauſis* naturalibus tale eſt: ut neceſſaria eſt eclipſis ſolaris ex interpoſitione lunæ. *Chauv.* ibid.

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This is often called *abſolute* Neceſſity, in oppoſition to *moral*, which is not *abſolute*, but *conditional*, or *hypothetical*, or liable to ſome Exceptions or Limitations. It is called *cauſal* Neceſſity, when intended to expreſs what Influence the *Cauſe* will have in producing the Effect: As there is a *cauſal* Neceſſity for the appearing of Light when the Sun is riſen. An *antecedent* Neceſſity, or a Neceſſity *a priori*, denotes the ſame thing. But a Neceſſity *a poſteriori* is a Name intended to expreſs what Reference the *Effect* has to ſome Cauſe or Cauſes: As if there are things *made*, there is a *Neceſſity* of a *Maker*. There cannot be *Motion* without a *Mover*; nor external *Light* without a luminous Subſtance.

(4.) The fourth kind of Neceſſity is *metaphyſical*, and imports *immutable* Exiſtence proper to God only. It is oppoſed to *mutable*, *precarious*, *contingent*, *dependent* Exiſtence. It is the ſame with what Dr. *Cudworth* ſomewhere calls a *neceſſary Scheſis* to Exiſtence, expreſſing the inſeparable *Connexion* between the *Exiſtence* and the *Subject* of it, between *Exiſtence* and *Eſſence*. Creatures are conſidered as coming from *Non-exiſtence*, and as being liable to loſe the *Exiſtence* which they enjoy; therefore their Exiſtence is *precarious* and *periſhable*. But the Deity never wanted *Exiſtence*, never can ceaſe to exiſt; therefore his Exiſtence is *immutable*, *unperiſhable*, *firm*, *ſtable*, and *enduring* (independently) from everlaſting to everlaſting. This Permanency of Being is conſider'd as a *Mode* of Exiſtence, *pre-ſuppoſing* Exiſtence, as *modal* Being always ſuppoſes *pure* Being.[q] It may be called *modal*

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[p] Neceſſarium *metaphyſicum* eſt quod immutabiliter exiſtit: ut Deus. *Chauvin.* ibid. p. 435.

[q] *Neceſſarium* dicitur illud quod *non poteſt non eſſe*, *aut aliter ſe habere*. Quocunque autem modo definiatur vel deſcribatur,

Ch. II. *modal* Neceſſity, as expreſſing that perfect *Manner* of Exiſtence proper to the Deity: God's *Manner* of exiſting is above all Chance, Change or Failure. This *modal* Neceſſity, or Self-ſufficiency, ought to be carefully diſtinguiſh'd from *cauſal* before-mentioned, *metaphyſical* from *phyſical*. Cauſal Neceſſity *is antecedent, effective, operative*; Modal is *poſterior*, and *ſubſequent*, in order of Nature and Conception, to the *Exiſtence* or exiſting Subject, whereof it is the *Mode*, and to which it is referred up as to its Source or Center, its *Subſtratum* or Support.

HAVING thus competently explained the ſeveral kinds of *Neceſſity*, I have one thing to obſerve of them, that the Idea of ſome ſort of firm *Connexion* runs thro' them all; and that is the proper general Import of the Name *Neceſſity*. Connexion of *mental* or *verbal* Propoſitions, or of their reſpective *Parts*, makes up the Idea of *logical* Neceſſity. Connexion of *End* and *Means* makes up the Idea of *moral* Neceſſity. Connexion of *Cauſes* and *Effects* is *phyſical*. And Connexion of *Exiſtence* and *Eſſence* is *metaphyſical* Neceſſity. This laſt is what our preſent Argument is ſolely concerned in. It has been ſometimes ſtiled *ſimple* or *abſolute* Neceſſity, as oppoſed to *relative*. For

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duo importat. Quia, quod non poteſt non eſſe dicit *eſſe*; & præterea negat *deſitionem* in eſſe. Quod vero dicit rem ſeſe aliter habere non poſſe, Rem *præſupponit* eſſe, eamque exiſtere ait cum *modo* immutabilitatis. Adeo ut *neceſſarium* formaliter debeat explicari per remotionem *mutabilitatis*, idque ad oppoſitionem *contingentiæ*. Chauvin. p. 434.

Neceſſitas accipitur pro vehementia eſſendi illius quod per ſe & primo eſt *neceſſe eſſe*, quod eſt Deus, & ſic proprie definiri non poteſt. Deſcribitur tamen & notificatur utcunque, & hoc melius per *affirmationem* quam *negationem*; ſcilicet per *vehementiam* & *firmitatem* eſſendi, quam per *impoſſibilitatem* ſeu *non-poſſibilitatem* non eſſendi. *Bradwardin.* de cauſa dei. p. 678.

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tho' *phyſical* Neceſſity may alſo be called *abſolute*, as oppoſed to *limited* or *conditional* (as before hinted) it is not *abſolute* as oppoſed to *relative*; becauſe it ſtands in the *Relation* between Cauſes and Effects. But metaphyſical Neceſſity has no *relation* to any thing extraneous to the Subject of it; it ſubſiſts only in the divine *Eſſence*, conſider'd as inſeparably connected with its own *Exiſtence*. This is that pure, ſimple, abſolute, tranſcendental *Neceſſity*, which the later *School-men* and *Metaphyſicians* ſpeak of. Ch. II.

THESE things premiſed, I may now proceed to enquire what the Argument *a priori* (as it is called) has to ſtand upon, or how it is ſupported. The way of coming at it is firſt to prove *a poſteriori* the *Exiſtence* of an *independent* Being, thus: *Something now is, therefore ſomething has exiſted from all Eternity*; therefore ſome one *unchangeable* and *independent* Being, one at leaſt; therefore there is ſome one *ſelf-exiſtent* or *neceſſarily-exiſting* Being. Thus far is right and well, for the coming at *neceſſary Exiſtence* in the way of arguing *a poſteriori*. Call it *Neceſſity* of *Exiſtence*, and then that *Neceſſity* imports a *Mode* of the Exiſtence before proved, *ſubſequent*, in order of Nature and Conception, to the *Exiſtence*, and referred up to the *Subject* of it. This *modal* Neceſſity is a *Property* of the independent Being, denoting his immutable Permanency, his infinite Stability. But it happens, that the Word *Neceſſity* often ſtands for *cauſal* and *phyſical* Neceſſity (very different from *modal* and *metaphyſical*) and ſo here begins the firſt Double. The *ſubſequent* Neceſſity is ſoon after dropp'd, and *antecedent* Neceſſity is ſlipp'd upon us in its room. Under the cover of an ambiguous

[a] *See Dr.* Clarke's *Demonſtration*, &c. Prop. 1, 2, 3.

Ch. II. Name, the *Idea* which we began with is firſt changed for another, altogether new and foreign, and then enters the Argument *a priori* with all its Train. There is now conceived I know not what *antecedent* Neceſſity, and internal *Cauſe*, and *prior* Reaſon, *Ground*, and *Foundation* of the independent Being; and all built upon nothing but the *Equivocation* of a Word, or a quick *Tranſition* made from *Neceſſity* conſidered in the *modal* and *proper* Senſe, to *Neceſſity* taken in a *cauſal* and *foreign* Meaning. This *Neceſſity*, it is ſaid, muſt be *antecedent, in the natural Order of our Ideas, to our Suppoſition of its Being.*[9] Why muſt it be *antecedent?* No Neceſſity had been proved before, but what was conceived *ſubſequent* (in the natural order of our Ideas) to the *Exiſtence* of the independent Being, being a *Mode* of it, and referred up to it: Why then muſt it be *antecedent?* There is no Reaſon at all for it; unleſs it be that an Argument *a priori* required ſuch an *Antecedency*, and would drop without it. The ſuppoſed *Antecedency* in this Caſe appears to be all Fancy and Fiction, not collected from what went before, by any regular Deduction, but *arbitrarily* fetch'd in, under the Umbrage and Protection of an *equivocal* Name. Put but *Immutability* of Exiſtence, or *Independence*, or *Durability*, inſtead of *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence (which really ſignifies no more than the other) and then it will be preſently ſeen how the Notion of *Antecedency* drops and diſappears: Which makes it plain, that the Notion is here falſe and foreign, not deducible from any regular Train of *Ideas*, but brought in, at all adventures, only becauſe the technical Term *Neceſſity* admits of *two* Senſes, and is a ſerviceable Word for the ſinking one *Idea*, and bringing up *another*.

[9] *Clarke.* ibid. p. 14. ſixth Edit.

But

Ch. II.

BUT to favour this new Notion of *Antecedency* (ſo arbitrarily introduced) it is added, "This Neceſſity muſt *antecedently* force itſelf upon us whether we will or no, even while we are endeavouring to ſuppoſe that no ſuch Being exiſts. For example; when we are endeavouring to ſuppoſe, that there is *no Being* in the Univerſe that exiſts *neceſſarily*, we always find in our Minds (beſides the foregoing Demonſtration of ſomething being *ſelf-exiſtent*, from the *Impoſſibility* of every thing's being *dependent*) we always find in our Minds, I ſay, ſome Ideas, as of *Infinity* and *Eternity*; which to remove, that is, to ſuppoſe no Being, no Subſtance in the Univerſe, to which theſe Attributes, or *Modes* of Exiſtence, are neceſſarily inherent, is a Contradiction in the very Terms. For Modes and Attributes exiſt only by the Exiſtence of the *Subſtance* to which they belong." [*]

IN Anſwer to this Paragraph, I may obſerve briefly, 1. That there is no arguing from *ideal* to *real* Exiſtence; unleſs it could firſt be ſhewn, that ſuch *Ideas* muſt have their *objective Realities*, and cannot be accounted for, as they paſs *within*, except it be by ſuppoſing ſuch and ſuch *real* Exiſtence *ad extra* to anſwer them. 2. Allowing that we find ſuch *Ideas* in our Minds, and that they *antecedently* force themſelves upon us, this proves no more than a kind of order of *Antecedency* in our Conceptions, but does not prove any real *Antecedency* with reſpect to the divine *Exiſtence*, as if that were preceded by ſomething *prior* in order of Nature to it. 3. Whatever Neceſſity we may find ourſelves under as to *conceiving*, or *imagining* thus or thus; yet we are under no antecedent Neceſſity of *believ-*

[*] *Clarke.* ibid. p. 15.

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ing that theſe *Conceptions* or *Imaginations* do infer the Exiſtence of a Deity, 'till it be regularly *proved* to us, or 'till it can be clearly ſhewn what certain *Connexion* there is between *Ideas* and *Realities*, between *Thoughts* and *Things*. 4. If ſuch certain *Connexion* could be proved, yet ſuch Proof would not amount to a Demonſtration *a priori*, being that the Proceſs of ſuch an Argument is altogether *a poſteriori*, from *Effects* to *Cauſes*, from things *poſterior* to ſomething *antecedent*. For the Proceſs runs thus: We have ſuch and ſuch *Ideas*, which Ideas muſt have *objective Realities* as their Cauſe or Ground; and thoſe objective Realities, or *real Attributes*, muſt have their *Subject*, as all *Modes* and *Attributes* have: And thus at length by this *Analyſis*, or in the way of *Aſcent*, we come up to a *Firſt Cauſe*, which is *antecedent*, in order of Nature, to every *Mode* and *Attribute* ſuppoſed to inhere in it, and to belong to it. So that, even in this way, we can never arrive to any thing which can be juſtly conceived *prior* or *antecedent*, in order of Nature, to the *Exiſtence* of a Firſt Cauſe. It appears then that *antecedent* Neceſſity is very *arbitrarily* introduced into this Subject, having no regular chain of Reaſoning, no proper connexion of Ideas, nor indeed any thing, but an *Equivocation* upon the Word *Neceſſity*, to ſupport or countenance it.

I WOULD next take notice, that the *Uſe* made afterwards of this *antecedent* Neceſſity is altogether as *arbitrary* and *fanciful* as the introducing it. The *Uſes* it is made to ſerve are, to prove the *Eternity*, [v] *Omnipreſence*, [w] and *Unity* [x] of the ſelf-

[v] Demonſtrat. p. 39.
[w] Ibid. p. 41.
[x] Ibid. p. 44.

exiſtent

existent Being. And here it is observable, that Necessity is furnished with *Epithets* (all in the *arbitrary* way) just as the Occasion requires; *Epithets* suitable to the Points to be proved. When it is to prove the *Eternity*, then it is to be stiled *absolute, not depending on any thing external, always unalterably the same.*[y] When it is to prove the *Infinity*, or the *Omnipresence*, then it is characterized as being again *absolute* in itself, and *not depending on any outward Cause*; and now it must be *every where*, as well as *always*, unalterably the same; having no relation to *Time*, or *Place*, or *any thing else.*[z] But when it is to serve for Proof of the *Unity*, then it is to be *simple*, and *uniform*, and *universal*, without any possible *Difference*, *Disformity*, or *Variety* whatsoever.[a] That is to say, it shall be what the Demonstrator pleases to make it, that he may adapt it variously to the various Purposes he intended by it. The neater and shorter way would have been, to have denominated it an once an *absolute, omni-modous, all-perfect* Necessity; and then not only *Eternity*, and *Omnipresence*, and *Unity*, but infinite *Wisdom*, *Power*, and *Goodness*, and every *Perfection* whatever might have been instantly inferred from it. For it might have been pleaded, that such *Necessity* had no relation to one Perfection more than to another, being *uniform* and *universal*, extending equally to *all*, and *operating*[b] as much with respect to *every* Perfection, as to *any*, having nothing to *limit* it, nothing to *controul* it. This Reasoning appears equally clear and forcible with the other: And both are Ch. II. § 2

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[y] Demonstrat. p. 39.

[z] Ibid. p. 41.

[a] Ibid. p. 44.

[b] *See* Letters, p. 19, 34.

alike

Ch. II. alike weak and precarious, having no ſolid Foundation of Reaſon to reſt upon; nothing but an obſcure unintelligible Principle, floating in the Mind, and managed at pleaſure, to make ſome *Appearance* of *Demonſtration* in a way wherein none can be had, or to cover a *petitio principii*, which yet betrays itſelf immediately in every Inſtance.

I HAVE hitherto been obſerving, that the pretended *antecedent* Neceſſity is arbitrarily *introduced*, and then as arbitrarily *carried on*: And now I am only to remark farther, that it is, at length, as arbitrarily *diſmiſſed*. For indeed there is as much reaſon for going on with it *in infinitum*, as for taking it in at all: And there is no more reaſon for ſtopping at *one* freſh antecedent Neceſſity, than for ſtoppping at *five hundred*; nor any more reaſon for ſtopping there, than for going on *infinitely*. If every Thing that *exiſts*, and every *Circumſtance* of it, muſt have a *Reaſon a priori* why it *is*, rather than *not* [c] (a Suppoſition which the Argument *a priori* is built upon) then the *antecedent* Neceſſity itſelf muſt have a Reaſon *a priori* to fix and determine it, and that another, and ſo on infinitely. Wherefore if we admit but one *antecedent* Neceſſity as *prior*, in order of Nature, to the *Firſt Cauſe*, there is no Reaſon at all for ſtopping at the firſt Remove, or for diſmiſſing the Notion of an *antecedent* Neceſſity ſo ſoon, or at all. The ſame Thought, the ſame Suggeſtion will come over again at every new Advance higher in the Series of *antecedent* Neceſſities: For every one of them will want a *new* Ground, a new *internal Cauſe*, a new *antecedent Neceſſity*, to determine its Being; and all for the ſame Reaſon as the *Firſt Cauſe* was ſuppoſed to want one. Therefore, I

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[c] *See* Letters, p. 33.

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ſay, it is perfectly *arbitrary* and *unaccountable*, to make a full pauſe at one ſingle *antecedent* Neceſſity, and not to continue and carry on Neceſſities higher and higher, without number, and without end. Thus much may ſuffice for expoſing the *precarious* and fanciful Nature of the pretended Proof *a priori*. Ch. II.

2. BUT I proceed farther to obſerve, that it is not only *precarious*, but manifeſtly *abſurd*. It is demonſtrable *a priori*, that there neither is nor can be any Proof *a priori* of the Exiſtence of a *Firſt Cauſe*, becauſe there is no Cauſe *prior* to the *Firſt*. [a] But, to be a little more diſtinct and particular, imagine ſomething *prior* or *antecedent*, in order of Nature or Conception, to the *Firſt Cauſe*, what muſt that *ſomething* be? There are but three poſſible Suppoſitions, and all of them flatly contradictory and abſurd. Suppoſe either the *Subſtance* itſelf, or ſome *Property* of that Subſtance, or ſomething *extrinſick* to both, to be that *antecedent* Ground, Reaſon, or Foundation, prior in Conception to the *Firſt Cauſe*: They are every one of them uncapable and incompetent for it.

(1.) To begin with the laſt of them, a *Principle extrinſick*. One would think by the turn of the Argument, in ſeveral Paſſages where it is handled, that the *antecedent* Neceſſity were conſidered as ſomething *extrinſick* to the Firſt Cauſe: Particularly where it is repreſented as *operating*

[a] Hæc propoſitio *deus eſt*, non habet *medium* terminum quo *a priore* demonſtretur.——Non poteſt dari medium deſumptum a *cauſa extrinſeca*, nam *deus eſt*, a ſeipſo, independens omnino ab alia re: non poteſt etiam ſumi medium a *cauſa materiali intrinſeca*, nam hoc non cadit in deum: Non a *formali*, nam in deitate non eſt ulla ratio formalis prior *ipſo eſſe divino*, quæ noſtro modo intelligendi ſit ratio cur deus ſit. *Gillius*, p. 386.

[a] Letter, p. 19, 34.

Ch. II. every where, and always, ſo as to make the divine Being *eternal* and *omnipreſent*, or the like. And indeed if the Words carry any *Idea* at all in them, and any *force* of Argument, they muſt be ſo underſtood; juſt as we underſtand them of any external Cauſe producing its Effect. But, as an *extrinſick* Principle is *abſurd* in itſelf, and is beſides expreſsly rejected [f] by the Advocates for the Proof *a priori*, I need not here ſay a word more of it.

(2.) TAKE we then next the *Subſtance* itſelf, and conſider whether that can be conceived as *prior* or *antecedent* to itſelf. It is very plain, that it cannot: And ſo much alſo is confeſſed on all hands [g], and therefore we may diſmiſs this Article, and proceed.

(3.) THE only remaining Suppoſition is, that ſome *Attribute* or *Property* of the ſelf-exiſtent Being may be conceived *antecedent*, in order of Nature, to the ſame Being. But that is, if poſſible, ſtill more *abſurd* than the laſt preceding. An *Attribute* is *attributed* to its Subject as its Ground and Support; and a *Property*, in the very notion of it, is *proper* to the Subſtance whereunto it belongs, and *ſubſequent* in order of Nature and Conception to it. An *antecedent* Attribute, or Property, is as great a Soleciſm, and almoſt as flat a Contradiction, as an *antecedent Subſequency*, or a *ſubſequent Antecedency*, underſtood in the ſame ſenſe, and ſame reſpect. Every Property, or Attribute, as ſuch, *preſuppoſes* its Subject, and cannot be underſtood otherwiſe. To make the Property *antecedent*, is inverting the natural Order, and confounding the Idea; and, in ſhort, is denying it to be what it is. The Truth of what is

[f] Letters, p. 32.

[g] Letters, p. 33, 40. Demonſtration, &c. p. 21.

here

here ſaid, is ſo glaring and forcible, that it ſometimes extorts the Aſſent even of thoſe who upon other occaſions affect to gainſay it. It is confeſs'd, that "The ſcholaſtick way of proving the *Exiſtence* of the ſelf-exiſtent Being from the abſolute *Perfection* of his Nature, is ἀπὸ τρόπου πρὸς τρόπον. For, "[*N. B.*] all or any Perfections *preſuppoſe* Exiſtence; which is *Petitio principii.*" † If therefore Properties, Modes, or Attributes in God be conſidered as *Perfections* (and it is certain they muſt) then by this account they muſt all or any of them *preſuppoſe* Exiſtence. Indeed it is immediately added, in the ſame Place, *That bare Neceſſity of Exiſtence does not preſuppoſe, but infer, Exiſtence.* That is to ſay, if ſuch Neceſſity be ſuppoſed to be a Principle *extrinſick*: But if it be a *Mode* or *Property*, it muſt *preſuppoſe* the Exiſtence of its Subject, as certainly and as evidently as it is a *Mode* or a *Property*. It might perhaps *a poſteriori* infer the Exiſtence of its Subject, as Effects may infer a Cauſe: But to *infer* in the other way *a priori*, is altogether as impoſſible as that a *Triangle* ſhould be a *Square*; which is joining repugnant Ideas together. Ch. II.

In another Place, it is obſerved by the ſame learned Author, "That the Idea of *Space* (as "alſo of *Time* or *Duration*) is an Idea of a certain Quality or Relation, which not being itſelf "a *Subſtance* [*N. B.*] neceſſarily *preſuppoſes* a Subſtance without which it could not exiſt." ‡ Now if the *Neceſſity* ſpoken of be a *Property* or *Mode*, and not a *Subſtance*, it muſt, for the very ſame Reaſon, neceſſarily *preſuppoſe* a Subſtance without which it could not exiſt. So true it is, that a

† Letters, p. 33.

‡ Letters, p. 25.

Ch. II. *Mode* or *Property* cannot be conceived *antecedent* in order of Nature to its *Subject*, without running into a flat Abſurdity, and the greateſt Confuſion of Ideas imaginable.

THE Sum then is, that, to make out an Argument *a priori*, there muſt be a *Cauſe*, or however a *Priority* or *Antecedency*, brought in to argue upon, and to draw an *Inference* from, to the *Exiſtence* of a Deity: And yet no ſooner is the Idea of *Cauſe*, or *Priority*, or *Antecedency* (tho' in Conception only) introduced, but we immediately ſubvert the Idea of a *Property*, and of a *Firſt Cauſe*. It is a vain thing to inſiſt one while upon the *Antecedency*, for the ſake of the pretended *Demonſtration*, and then preſently to drop it, by retreating to the Idea of a *Property*, for the ſake of warding off inſuperable Objections. Either there is no *Antecedency* in this caſe at all, to form the *Argument* upon; or, if there be, the *antecedent* Principle is no *Property*, but a Principle *extrinſick*. So then either the *Antecedency* muſt drop, and the *Argument a priori* drop with it: Or if the *Antecedency* be kept up, the Idea of a *Property* is deſtroy'd inſtantly, and we are yet to ſeek for a *Firſt Cauſe*. Turn we the thing which way we will, the preſumed Argument *a priori* is all over contradictory and abſurd. It is not merely abſtruſe or unintelligible, but plainly and clearly repugnant to Reaſon, and to itſelf. It is tacking together disjointed and incompatible Ideas, which can never ſtand together, but muſt inevitably claſh and deſtroy one another. However, as there is no Cauſe whatever ſo defenceleſs and deſtitute but that ſomething or other may be pleaded for it, and a skilful Advocate may lay Colours upon any thing: So it is here. A very ingenious Defence has been drawn up for the Argument *a priori*, in which we have the Spirit and Quinteſſence of what the Cauſe can afford.

afford.[k] A juſt Reply was made to it ſome time after,[l] by a very good Hand, which might ſave me the Labour of ſaying any thing more to it: But perhaps it may be of ſervice, to have the ſame things repreſented in different lights; or if it be only abridging what has been ſaid before more at large, even that perhaps may not be altogether without its uſe. I proceed then, Ch. II. § 2

3. To examine the ſeveral *Pleas* or *Excuſes* invented for the Support of the Argument *a priori*, in order to ſhew that they are none of them ſufficient for the Purpoſes intended. I ſhall break the Diſcourſe into ſo many diſtinct *Parts*, or *Pleas*, for the diſtinct and methodical Conception of the Subject.

PLEA I.

"THOUGH it is indeed moſt evident, that "no *Thing*, no *Being* can be *prior* to that Being "which is the *Firſt Cauſe* and *Original* of all "things; yet there muſt be in Nature a *Ground* "or *Reaſon*, a permanent Ground or Reaſon, of "the *Exiſtence* of the Firſt Cauſe: Otherwiſe its "Exiſtence would be owing to, and depend upon "*mere Chance*."[m] To which I anſwer,

(1.) IF by *Ground* or *Reaſon* be meant a *Cauſe*, the Idea of it is repugnant to the Notion of a *Firſt Cauſe*, which muſt be abſolutely *uncauſed*, both with reſpect to itſelf, and to every thing elſe. But if by *Ground* or *Reaſon* be meant only a

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[k] Anſwer to the ſeventh Letter, p. 40, &c.

[l] Dr. *Gretton*'s Review of the Argument *a priori*. *Printed for* B. Lintot. A. D. 1726.

See alſo Concio ad Clerum, *upon the ſame Subject, and by the ſame Author.* Cantabrigiæ, 1732.

[m] Anſwer to the ſeventh Letter, p. 40.

Ground

Ground or Reaſon for *aſſerting* ſuch Exiſtence. That we may readily admit, as meaning only that there is a Reaſon *a poſteriori* whereby we prove the Truth of the thing that ſo it is. *Reaſon* and *Ground* are ſofter Names in this Caſe than *Cauſe* is, and may ſometimes ſerve to hide the *Abſurdity* which appears at once upon the naming of a *Cauſe* prior to the *Firſt*. It may, or rather muſt be allowed, that there is *a Reaſon for every Exiſtence*, a Reaſon of one kind or other, either *a priori*, or elſe *a poſteriori*: But it is nevertheleſs certain, that there is not a Reaſon *a priori* for every thing, becauſe there muſt be a *Firſt* in the aſcending Line; as alſo, on the other hand, there is not a Reaſon *a poſteriori* for every thing, becauſe there muſt be a *Laſt* in the order of Deſcent. [a].

(2.) Tho' the *uncauſed* Being has neither *Ground* nor *Cauſe* to determine its Exiſtence, yet it is not *owing to*, or *dependent* upon *mere Chance*, becauſe it is not *owing*, or *dependent* at all, but intirely *underived* and *independent*. If the Force of the Objection lies in this, that unleſs the Exiſtence be *dependent* on ſomething, it cannot be *firm* and *ſtable*; this amounts to ſaying, that a *Firſt* Cauſe, or an *independent* Exiſtence, is a contradictory Notion in itſelf. It is certain, that if the Exiſtence be *dependent* on any thing, it is not

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[a] Obſerva, multas veritates poſſe *a priori* & *poſteriori* ſimul demonſtrari: Ut v. g. eſſe *Admirativum*, demonſtratur *a priori* per rationale, *a poſteriori* vero per riſibile. Alias vero eſſe veritates quæ tantum vel *a priori*, vel *a poſteriori* demonſtrari poſſunt: Quia cum neceſſario ſiſtendum ſit in aliquo *primo concepto*, ante quem non ſit alius, inde ſit, illum non poſſe demonſtrari *a priori*, quia *nullam* habet *cauſam* ſui: E contrario vero etiam ſiſtendum ſit in *aliquo ultimo*, poſt quem non ſit alius, inde rurſus ſequitur, illum non poſſe demonſtrari *a poſteriori*, quia (ut ſupponimus) nihil habet *poſtenius* ſe. *Roderic. de Arriag.* Curſ. Philoſ. p. 222.

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the *firmer*, but may be the more *precarious* for being ſo. The higheſt poſſible *Stability* is to be abſolutely *independent*, abſolutely *uncauſed*: This is the ſtrongeſt Security againſt all poſſible *Chances* or *Failures*: And therefore it never can be allow'd, that aſſigning it a *Cauſe*, a *Ground*, or *Foundation*, is *fixing* the Exiſtence; when the ſuppoſing it to have no *Cauſe*, no *Ground*, &c. nor to *need* any, is really the Top Perfection of Being, the very higheſt and beſt thing that we can either ſay or conceive of it. Ch. II.

(3.) But ſuppoſing that there might yet remain ſome *Difficulty* in our Scheme (as Difficulties there muſt be in conceiving *Eternity*, and in ſearching the *myſterious* Nature and Exiſtence of the *unſearchable* Being) yet if the Difficulty be rather *ſhifted* than taken away, by the Expedient here propoſed, or if *Abſurdities* be brought in inſtead of *Difficulties*, how then are we at all relieved by it, or the better for it? That ſuch is the Caſe here, is plain at firſt ſight. For what if we go on to aſſign a *Cauſe*, a *Ground*, or a *Foundation* for the *Firſt Cauſe*, it is but going one ſtep farther, and there the ſame *Difficulty* occurs as before, beſides ſeveral new ones. That *Cauſe*, that *Ground*, that *Foundation*, that *antecedent* Neceſſity (or whatever elſe we call it) will ſtill want another *Cauſe*, another *Ground*, another *Foundation*, another *antecedent* Neceſſity, to fix and ſupport it; or elſe, by the ſame reaſoning, its Exiſtence will be *owing to*, and *dependent upon*, *mere Chance*.[a] If we ſtill go higher up, to a ſecond or a third Remove, or to as many more as we can think on, the ſame Difficulty will haunt us all the way in the wandring Progreſs, and we ſhall never find reſt for the Sole

[a] *See* Dr. *Gretton*'s Review, p. 25.

of

of our Foot, 'till we return to the Place where we firſt ſtepp'd aſide, till we come back to the *Firſt Cauſe* of all things, and there terminate our Enquiries. They that attempt to move but one ſtep higher, are ſure to involve themſelves in inextricable Mazes, and are doubly to blame: Firſt, for inventing a Cauſe *prior* to the *Firſt*, or a Reaſon *higher* than the *higheſt*; and next, for making that newly-invented Support (according to their own Argument) owe its Exiſtence to mere *Chance*. Let the diſcerning Readers therefore judge upon the whole, who it is that makes the divine Exiſtence *contingent* and *precarious*, they or we.

PLEA II.

"THE Exiſtence of the Firſt Cauſe is *neceſſary*, neceſſary *abſolutely* and in itſelf; and therefore *that Neceſſity* is *a priori*, and, in order of Nature, the *Ground* or *Reaſon* of its Exiſtence.[p]"

To which I reply,

(1.) IT is allowed that the Exiſtence of the firſt Cauſe is *neceſſary*, not *contingent*: And becauſe that *Neceſſity* is only a *Mode* of the *preſuppoſed* Exiſtence, therefore it is not *a priori*, or, in order of Nature, an *antecedent* Ground or Reaſon, but it is *ſubſequent* and *poſterior*, in order of Nature and Conception, to that whereof it is the *Mode*: For all *Modes*, as ſuch, are *ſubſequent* to their *Subject*, which is the *Ground* and *Support* of them.

(2.) NECESSITY *abſolute* (in the *metaphyſical* Senſe, as here uſed) is a Contradiction to the Notion of *antecedent* Ground, or *Cauſe*, having no *Relation*[q] to any thing of that kind. It im-

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[p] Anſwer to ſeventh Letter, p. 41.

[q] *See above*, p. 49, 50.

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ports an inviolable *Connexion* between the *Eſſence* and the *Exiſtence* in a Being *uncauſed* and *independent*. To make Connexion the *Ground* and *Reaſon* of the *Exiſtence*, either means that the Eſſence is the Ground of *itſelf*, or means nothing; amounting only to ſo many Words of Amuſement. Ch. III.

PLEA III.

"THAT which exiſts *neceſſarily* (or in the "Idea of which *Exiſtence* and *Neceſſity* are inſe- "parably and neceſſarily *connected*) muſt either "therefore be neceſſary becauſe it *exiſts*, or elſe "it muſt therefore exiſt, becauſe its Exiſtence is "*neceſſary*." [r] I anſwer,

(1.) IT is improper to ſay, that *Exiſtence* and *Neceſſity* are *connected*: For ſince *Neceſſity*, as here applied, imports nothing but *Connexion*, it amounts to ſaying, that *Exiſtence* and *Connexion* are ſo *connected*; whereas, in Truth and Propriety, the *Exiſtence* and the *Eſſence* are what are here ſuppoſed to be *connected*. But all the Confuſion ariſes from want of diſtinguiſhing between *cauſal* and *modal*, between *phyſical* and *metaphyſical* Neceſſity.

(2.) WE do not ſay, that the Firſt Cauſe is therefore *neceſſary* becauſe it *exiſts* (for then every thing *exiſting* would be neceſſary) but rather, becauſe it exiſts in *ſuch a manner*, exiſts *independently*. Not that *independency* is properly the *Cauſe* of *neceſſary Exiſtence*, or *vice verſa*, (for both are but Names or Expreſſions for one and the ſame Property or Perfection) but all reſolves into this; that God is *what* he is, and ſuch as we prove him, *a poſteriori*, to be. We can go no higher than to ſay, that his Nature is *ſuch*, that he exiſts *independently*;

[r] Anſwer to ſeventh Letter, p. 41.

Ch. II. *pendently, immutably, neceſſarily,* as oppoſed to *Contingency.* It is wrong to aſk for a *Wherefore* in this Caſe: It is ſuppoſing no *Firſt Cauſe* at all. The *Plea* ſets out upon a falſe Principle, that a *Therefore* muſt be given in every Inſtance aſſignable, or a Reaſon *a priori* admitted. We have done with Reaſons *a priori*, as ſoon as we are arrived to the Top of all Exiſtence. For as in abſtract *neceſſary* Truths, the higheſt pitch we can come up to, is, that the *ſame Idea is the ſame Idea*, or every Idea *is what it is*; ſo in our running up to the Top of *real* Exiſtence (as oppoſed to *ideal*) the higheſt Pinnacle of all is, that the *ſame Being is the ſame Being*, or *is what it is.* Such then is the Nature or Perfection of the Deity, that he exiſts *independently.* To aſſign a *Cauſe* for that Exiſtence, is to make it *leſs*; it is to ſuppoſe it *dependent* on ſomething elſe: It is deſtroying with one Hand what we build with the other. We pretend not therefore to give a Reaſon *a priori* why God exiſts *neceſſarily* (for if ſuch Reaſon could be given, it would ſink the Idea of *neceſſary* inſtead of raiſing it) but we aſſign Reaſons *a poſteriori* why we believe and maintain it; which is giving the τὸ ὅτι, not the τὸ διότι, and is all that can be or ought to be given in this Caſe, as is ſelf-evident.

(3.) BUT ſuppoſe we ſhould attempt to go higher up beyond the *Firſt* Cauſe, to ſomething conceived *prior* or *antecedent* to it, will not the ſame Difficulty recur in every Stage of the Progreſſion? The ſame Dilemma is applicable to the next higher Cauſe, and to every other, *in infinitum.* For it may ſtill be pleaded, that ſuch *antecedent Ground* muſt either be neceſſary becauſe it exiſts, or elſe muſt therefore exiſt becauſe its Exiſtence is *neceſſary*; and ſo the Mind is again ſet afloat, without Stay or Anchor, in an endleſs Purſuit after more and more *antecedent* abſolute *Neceſſities.*

PLEA

Ch. II.

PLEA IV.

"THE *Eternity* of God can no otherwiſe be "proved, than by conſidering *a priori* the Nature "of a neceſſary or ſelf-exiſtent Cauſe.-----That "the Firſt Cauſe has exiſted *from Eternity*, and "ſhall exiſt *to Eternity*, cannot be proved from the "*temporary Phænomena*, but muſt be demonſtrated "from the intrinſick Nature of *neceſſary Exiſtence*."

I anſwer,

(1.) THE Queſtion here is not, by what *other* ways the *Eternity* can be proved, but whether it can be proved in this. Be the other Proofs, which proceed *a poſteriori*, ever ſo lame or inſufficient, their *Defects* will be of no ſervice for the healing the *Abſurdities* of this: So the Plea is foreign, and wide of the purpoſe; unleſs the Deſign were to plead for the *Uſefulneſs* of a Proof, which cannot be ſhewn to be a *Proof*.

(2.) THE Suggeſtion here offered is not *true*, eſpecially as to God's exiſting *from Eternity*. The natural, regular, and indeed the common way has been to prove the *Eternity* before the *neceſſary Exiſtence*; and that is the very way which the Author himſelf took, to come at *neceſſary Exiſtence*:[r] And no one has better anſwered this *Plea* than *himſelf* hath done in another Place.[s]

(3.) I

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[r] Demonſtration, Prop. II. p. 11.

[s] "Not to *Philoſophers* only, but even to the *meaneſt Capa-* "*cities*, are there obvious Arguments in *Reaſon*, to *prove clearly* "the Neceſſity of this divine Perfection [*Eternity*] and to ſet it "before them in a practical and uſeful Light. For, ſince it is "in ſome degree a Perfection *to be*; and a greater degree of that "Perfection to *continue in being*; it is evident, when we con- "ceive of God the *moſt perfect* Being, we muſt conceive him to "be *infinite* in this *Perfection* alſo, as well as in others.—

Ch. II.

(3.) If any one were firſt to prove the *Exiſtence* and an *Attribute* or two more, and then proceed to demonſtrate the *Eternity* from the *Exiſtence*, &c. before proved, ſuch a Method of arguing *a priori* we ſhould not except to, neither do we condemn it [v]. All that we object to, is the imagining any *Ground*, *Cauſe*, or *Neceſſity*, (or whatever it be called) *antecedent*, in order of Nature, to the *Exiſtence*. One Attribute may perhaps rationally be conſidered as *prior* in Conception to another, and *Exiſtence* as prior to all: [w] Therefore the way of arguing *a priori* from *Exiſtence* and *Attributes* before proved, to other Attributes not yet proved, we may allow of as a rational and juſt Procedure. We diſtinguiſh here between arguing *a*

" Again: 'Tis evident even to the meaneſt Capacity, which " conſiders things at all; that he who firſt gave being to all " *other* things, could not poſſibly have any *Beginning* himſelf, " and muſt therefore neceſſarily have exiſted *from all Eternity*: " And that he who hath already exiſted *from all Eternity*, inde- " pendently, and *of himſelf*, cannot poſſibly be liable to be de- " prived of his *Being*, and muſt therefore neceſſarily exiſt for an " Eternity to come." *Clarke's* poſthumous Sermons, Vol. I. p. 80.

[v] The Schoolmen have often taken that Method of proving the *Eternity*, underſtanding it to be arguing *a priori*: And it ſeems that it may properly enough be ſo ſtiled; tho' ſome would ſcruple to give it that Name, becauſe there is no *real Order* among the Attributes. (See Bp. *Barlow* on this Head, *Exercit.* IV. p. 183, &c.) But if there may be an order of *Conception*, it ſuffices: And that there may appears very plainly. See *Richard. de Media Vill.* who handles this Queſtion at large, Lib. I. Diſtinct. ii. Quæſt. 4. p. 32. And *Gillius*. Lib. II. Tr. 2. c. 9. p. 538.

[w] Vera *ſuperiora* ſunt, quæ in ſolo *deo* conſiſtunt; ut deus eſt *potens*, *ſapiens*, atque *bonus*. Horum autem hæc quidem ſunt quodammodo *poſteriora* naturaliter, hæc *priora*. Poſterius enim eſt deum *velle*, quam *cognoſcere*; & *cognoſcere* quam *eſſe*: *Eſſe* enim naturaliter hæc præcedit, & univerſaliter omnia talia *attributa*. *Bradwardin.* in cauſa dei, L. I. c. 12. p. 201.

priori

priori to Attributes, and arguing in like manner to *Exiſtence.* Ch. II.

(4.) It is ſelf-evident that nothing can be proved by a *repugnant* Notion of *antecedent* Neceſſity, conceived *prior* to the Exiſtence: And therefore *Eternity* both *a parte ante*, and *a parte poſt*, muſt either be proved ſome other way, or not at all. That it may be proved in another way, and without the Help of *antecedent* Neceſſity (proved, I ſay, *a poſteriori*, yea and perhaps *a priori* alſo) is abundantly manifeſt from the many excellent Treatiſes which have handled that Point at large; And St. *Paul* himſelf has teſtified the ſame thing; namely, that the *temporary Phænomena* are ſufficient to make Men *clearly ſee* the *eternal* Power and Godhead of their Creator, and to render them *inexcuſable* in their disbelief of it, or diſregard to it. [x]

PLEA V.

"If the Firſt Cauſe exiſts abſolutely without "any *Ground* or *Reaſon* of Exiſtence, it might as "poſſibly in Times paſt, *without any Reaſon*, have "not exiſted; and may as poſſibly in Times to "to come, *without any Reaſon*, ceaſe to exiſt. "Can it be proved *a poſteriori*, that the firſt Cauſe "of all Things will exiſt to-morrow? Or can it "be proved any otherwiſe than by ſhewing that "*Neceſſity* is a *certain* ground of *future*, as well "as of *preſent* Exiſtence." [y] I anſwer,

(1.) By asking, what muſt be the *certain* ground of that *Neceſſity*'s exiſting? Or how will it be proved that That *prior* Neceſſity will *exiſt to mor-*

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[x] Rom. i. 20.

[y] Anſwer to ſeventh Letter, p. 42.

row,

Ch. II. *row*, unleſs it be by aſſigning another Neceſſity, and ſo on infinitely? * This kind of Reaſoning, if it proves any thing, proves that there neither is, nor can be a *firſt Cauſe*: And ſo it is chuſing to admit a manifeſt *Abſurdity*, only to avoid an appearing *Difficulty*.

(2.) To anſwer more directly, it is not poſſible in the nature of Things to have any higher or ſtronger ſecurity as to the *Firſt Cauſe*'s exiſting *to-morrow* than this; that he never had any *Cauſe*, *Ground*, or *Support* of his Exiſtence, never *needed* any, being *independent*, and *ſelf-ſufficient*, * the Prop and Stay, the *Ground* and *Foundation* of all Exiſtences. If indeed He himſelf were to have any *Ground*, *Foundation*, or *Cauſe* of his Being, we might then have ſome handle for doubting whether his Relation to that Ground might continue, or how long it might ſubſiſt: But when he is above and beyond all *Grounds* and *Cauſes*, we have all the Reaſon in the World to believe, that he is infinitely ſecure from *Change*, is independently the ſame, *yeſterday*, *to day*, and *for ever*. It is very odd to think of *aſcertaining* his Exiſtence by aſſigning him a *Prior Cauſe*, which is the only way to unſettle it, and to make it leſs certain than it is: But it is a great confirmation of the *Truth* of our Doctrine in this Particular, that every Argument form'd againſt it, is at length found to ſtand on its ſide, and to make for it.

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* See Dr. *Gretton*'s Review, p. 74.

* Nam, quod eſt *a ſe*, & non *ab alio*, non habet principium durationis. Cum enim in ſeipſo habet ſufficiens principium exiſtendi, & exiſtat per *eſſentiam*, concipi nequit non-exiſtens antequam exiſtat; atque adeo non habet principium durationis. Præterea, id quod non eſt *ab alio*, non habet in ſuo eſſe admiſtam *potentiam* ad *non eſſe*; ac proinde non eſt vertibile in *non eſſe*, atque adeo eſt æternum. *Gillius*, p. 1032.

PLEA

PLEA VI.

"WHEN Atheiſtical Writers affirm, that the "Material Univerſe, and every exiſting Subſtance "in particular, was eternal, abſolutely *without* any "*Ground* or *Reaſon* of Exiſtence, can this Aſſerti-"on be confuted by him who ſhall himſelf affirm "that God was eternal abſolutely without any "*Ground* or *Reaſon* of Exiſtence?" [b] *Anſw.* Yes, very eaſily, by ſhewing, that what thoſe Men fooliſhly aſcribe to the *Material Univerſe* (ſubject to innumerable Changes and Imperfections [c]) does and can belong only to ſome *unchangeable, independent* Being, whoſe Exiſtence we can demonſtrate *a poſteriori*. It is his Privilege, and his only, to be above all *ground* or *antecedent* Reaſon of Exiſtence, to be abſolutely *uncauſed*, being indeed the *Firſt Cauſe*. But thoſe *Atheiſtical* Writers, moſt certainly, never can be ſolidly confuted by one that ſhall aſſert a Cauſe *prior* to the *Firſt*! Becauſe it is, in effect, denying any *Firſt Cauſe* at all, and maintaining an *endleſs* Progreſſion; which is what every *Atheiſt* would readily come into! Not to mention how eaſy it were for them to play with *antecedent* Neceſſity (an arbitrary Principle) adapting the ſame to their own Schemes. [d]

PLEA VII.

"THE *Infinity*, or *Immenſity*, or *Omnipreſence* "of God can no otherwiſe be proved, than by

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[b] Anſwer to a ſeventh Letter, p. 43.

[c] See *Wollaſton*. p. 76.

[d] See Dr. *Gretton*, p. 21, 22, 23, &c.

"conſidering

"considering *a priori* the Nature of a *Neceſſary* or *Self-exiſtent* Cauſe. ——— That this Author of Nature is himſelf abſolutely *immenſe* or *infinite* cannot be prov'd from the *finite* Phænomena, but muſt be demonſtrated from the intrinſick Nature of a *Neceſſary-Exiſtence*.[a]" To which I rejoin;

(1.) FROM *antecedent* Neceſſity, or from any thing *prior* to a Firſt Cauſe, (a Notion ſelf-contradictory, and palpably abſurd) nothing at all can be proved. So then whatever becomes of other Proofs for the *Immenſity*, it is certain and manifeſt, that nothing can be done with This, which is no Proof at all.

(2.) AS to *Neceſſary-exiſtence*, ſoberly and juſtly underſtood in the *modal* Senſe, and as *ſubſequent* in order of Nature to its *Subject*, (amounting to the ſame with *independent*, *immutable*, or *infinitely* durable Exiſtence) we have nothing to object againſt *arguing* from it, ſo far as it may carry us, or againſt calling it arguing *a priori*, as it is inferring one or more *Attributes* from *Exiſtence* and ſome Attribute or Attributes before proved. This is quite another thing from the *Argument a priori* contended for, and ought to be carefully diſtinguiſh'd from it, we find no Fault with any one's arguing from Attribute to Attribute: But what we blame is, the arguing from a ſuppoſed *Ground*, *Foundation*, or internal *Cauſe* of Exiſtence, to either Exiſtence, or Attribute.

(3.) AS to *Immenſity*, or *Omnipreſence*, if the *finite Phænomena* are ſufficient to prove that it extends to all *real* Exiſtence, it ſuffices: No one, after that, will ſcruple to admit as large an *Infinity* as can be deſired, tho' the Proof be not drawn

[a] Anſwer to the ſeventh Letter, p. 43.

but

out in Mood and Figure. Miſchief is often done by pretending to ſtrict and rigorous *Demonſtrations*, where we have no occaſion for them, and where the Subject is too ſublime to go far in, with clear and diſtinct Ideas. Such Attempts ſerve only to make that become matter of *Queſtion*, which before was *unqueſtionable* while ſtanding only on *reaſonable* Preſumption, or *moral* Proof. Ch. II.

PLEA VIII.

"IF the Firſt Cauſe exiſts, abſolutely without "any *Ground* or *Reaſon* of Exiſtence, it may as "poſſibly be *finite* as *infinite*; it may as poſſibly be "*limited* as *immenſe*."[f] I anſwer,

THIS is Repetition of the ſame Argument a little diverſified, and ſo has been ſufficiently anſwer'd in the Articles preceding. But I may briefly obſerve, that the ſuppoſed *Ground* or *Reaſon* is ſo far from ſecuring us that the *Firſt Cauſe* ſhall not be *finite* or *limited*, that it ſeems to endanger it the more, by making it *dependent* upon a *Ground*, and ſubject to a *prior* Cauſality. Beſides, what ſhall ſecure that *Ground* itſelf from being *finite* and *limited*? Muſt it be another *Ground*, and then another, and ſo on infinitely? Such Reaſoning deſtroys itſelf.[g] And how are we at all the wiſer for being told, that the abſolute Neceſſity muſt be *every where*, or that it muſt operate *every where* alike?[h] If a *petitio principii* were allowable, it were better to ſay (and it is as eaſily ſaid) that the *independent* Firſt Cauſe muſt be *every where*,

[f] Anſwer to the ſeventh Letter, p. 43.

[g] See the *Plea* ſtrongly retorted in Dr. *Gretton's* Review, p. 80.

[h] Letters, p. 13. Demonſtrat. p. 43.

and in *all Places* alike; for this is Senſe at leaſt, if it does not amount to a *Proof*. While the other is as much a *petitio principii* (for who knows *how* or *where* ſuch imaginary Cauſe muſt operate?) and beſides is talking either without *Ideas*, or with *contradictory* Ideas, as has been often ſhewn. To be ſhort, our *phyſical*, *moral*, or *ſcriptural* Proofs of the *Omnipreſence* are *clear* enough, and *full* enough, to anſwer all Intents and Purpoſes, and to ſatisfy every reaſonable Mind; [1] as the Author allows elſewhere. [k]

PLEA IX.

"THE *Unity* of God (which, I think, has al-
" ways been allowed to be a Principle of *natural*
" Religion: otherwiſe St. *Paul* could not juſtly
" have blamed the Heathen as *inexcuſable* in that
" they did not retain God in their Knowledge,
" &c.) The *Unity* of God, I ſay, can no other-
" wiſe be demonſtrated, than by conſidering *a priori*
" the Nature of a *neceſſary* or *ſelf-exiſtent* Cauſe.
" ——That this ſupreme Author and Governour
" of this Nature, or of theſe Phænomena, is the

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[1] See Bp. *Barlow*. Exercitat. VI. p. 283, &c. Bp. *Wilkins*. Nat. Relig. p. 117, &c.

[k] "It cannot but be evident, even to the *meaneſt* Capacity, upon careful Conſideration, that he who *made* all things, as he could not but be *before* the things that he made, ſo it is not poſſible but he muſt be *preſent* alſo with the things that he made and governs. For things could not be *made* without the *actual Preſence* of the Power that made them; nor can things ever be *governed* with any Certainty, unleſs the Wiſdom that governs them be *preſent* with them. Whatever Arguments therefore prove the *Being* of God, and his *unerring Providence*, muſt all be underſtood to prove equally likewiſe his *actual* Omnipreſence." *Clarke*. Poſth. Sermons, Vol. I. Serm. viii. p. 173.

" ſupreme

"ſupreme Author and Governour of *univerſal Na-* Ch. II.
"*ture*, cannot be proved by us from our partial
"and imperfect Knowledge of a *few* Phenomena,
"in that *ſmall Part* of the Univerſe which comes
"within the reach of our Senſes, but muſt be de-
"monſtrated from the intrinſick Nature of *neceſ-*
"*ſary Exiſtence.*" [1] To all which I reply diſtinctly, as follows.

(1.) It looks not well to make the *Unity* a Principle of *natural* Religion, and at the ſame time to declare that there is no Proof of it from *natural* Reaſon, excepting only this pretended Proof *a priori*; which, by the Confeſſion of its greateſt Advocates, is not *capable* of being underſtood but by a *few*, and thoſe very *attentive* Minds, never to be made *obvious* to the *generality* of men; [m] which moreover has been as *univerſally rejected* by the *Learned* who have thought of it, as it has been totally *unknown* to the *Vulgar* in all paſt Ages; and which, laſtly, is not only an *inconcluſive* Argument for the *Unity*, or for any thing elſe, but demonſtrably *abſurd*. If *Natural* Religion affords no other Argument of the *Unity* but this now mentioned, it is evident that the *Unity* is no *Principle* of it.

(2.) It looks ſtill worſe to plead St. *Paul's* Authority in this Caſe, who if he thought of the *Unity* at all, in the Texts cited, or referred to, yet certainly had no view to this Argument *a priori*, as rendering the Heathen *inexcuſable*. For how could they be *inexcuſable* for not ſeeing what none but a *few*, and not without very *attentive* Minds, can ſee, what can never be *obvious* to the *generality*, what the wiſeſt and moſt thoughtful Men have conſtantly

[1] Anſwer to a ſeventh Letter, p. 44.

[m] Anſwer to a ſixth Letter, p. 32.

Ch. II. rejected as *abſurd*, and what plainly and inevitably is ſo? If St. *Paul* had any view at all to the Proofs of the *Unity* in that Place (which is queſtionable[n]) it was to ſuch only as may be drawn *a poſteriori* (from the *few* Phænomena in our *Syſtem*, or from *Tradition*) which the *Plea* rejects as *no Proofs*.[o] Therefore St. *Paul*'s Authority is very improperly alledged to give ſhelter or countenance to the Argument *a priori*.

(3.) MEN may be very blameable for not admitting the *Unity*, tho' it be ſuppoſed that they have only *moral Preſumption*, or *traditional* Proofs of it; becauſe the *greater Probability* ought to determine their Judgment, and becauſe it is unqueſtionable Matter of Duty, in *dubious* Caſes, to take the *ſafer* Side. There was plain Reaſon for receiving and worſhipping *one* God, while there was no apparent Reaſon at all for worſhipping *ma-*

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[n] See Dr. *Gretton*, p. 84.

[o] But the learned Author elſewhere allows them to be *ſufficient*, and ſo in effect has obviated or anſwer'd this Plea himſelf. His Words are:

"The plain Connexion of one thing upon another, thro' "the whole material Univerſe, thro' all Parts of the Earth, and "in the viſible Heavens; the Diſpoſition of the Air, and Sea, "and Winds; the Motions of the Sun, Moon, and Stars; and "the uſeful Viciſſitudes of Seaſons, for the regular Production "of the various Fruits of the Earth; have always been *ſufficient* to make it *evidently appear*, even to *mean* Capacities "(had they not been perpetually *prejudiced* by wrong Inſtruction) "that all things are under the Direction of *one Power*, under "the Dominion of *one God*, to whom the whole Univerſe is "uniformly ſubject. And in fact,—the *wiſeſt* and *beſt* Men, in "all *Heathen* Nations, have ever ſeen, and in good meaſure "maintained, this great Truth.—But it is with *greater Clearneſs* from all appearance of Doubt, and with *greater aſſurance* "of *Authority*, confirming the Dictate of Reaſon, that the *Scripture* ſets forth to us this Firſt Principle of Religion." *Clarke.* Boyle. Serm. Vol. I. Serm. ii. p. 29, 30.

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ny, but rather the contrary. Therefore the Heathen were blameable in admitting a *Plurality*; and yet much more ſo for admitting *ſuch* a Plurality as they did; which St. *Paul* chiefly alludes to, condemning their *Creature-Worſhip*[p] as altogether *inexcuſable*. Ch. II.

(4.) A DISTINCTION ſhould have been made, as in ſome former Articles, between the different ways of arguing *a priori*. It is not amiſs to argue for the *Unity* from the *Exiſtence* and ſome one *Attribute* or *Attributes* (as *Omnipotence*, *Immenſity*, *Independence*, &c.) before proved; nor ſhould we ſcruple the Propriety of calling it an Argument *a priori*: But as to any arguing from *antecedent* Neceſſity, or from any *Ground*, *Cauſe*, or *Reaſon*, conſider'd as *prior* to the Exiſtence (which is the way of arguing now contended for) that is what we can never admit of. Such *antecedent* abſolute *Neceſſity* carries no more Idea with it than antecedent abſolute *Non-entity*; unleſs it means a *Cauſe* prior to the *Firſt*, which is infinitely abſurd.

(5.) ALLOWING that the *natural* Proofs of the *Unity* are probable only, not *demonſtrative*, and that upon the foot of mere Reaſon it is a Tenet rather to be reckoned among the *pia credibilia*, than as a *demonſtrated* Truth; this is ſaying no more than what ſeveral very wiſe and good Men have made no ſcruple to confeſs:[q] And if ſuch be really

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[p] *Rom.* i. 23, 24, 25. compare *Gal.* iv. 8.

[q] *The learned* John Gerhard, *and* John Voſſius *cite* Gabriel Biel *to this purpoſe, adding their own Reflections upon what* Biel *had ſaid.*

Sed *Biel* (1. Sant. Diſt. 2. Q. 10. Art. 3.) ſtatuit quod tantum *unum* eſſe deum, ſit *creditum*, & *non-demonſtratum* ratione naturali nobis in via poſſibili. Id nos ita interpretamur; etiamſi ex *naturæ libro* rationes *non contemnenda* pro *unitate* divinæ eſſentiæ

Ch. II. really the Caſe, we are the more obliged to *Scripture* for *aſcertaining* to us that great Truth, as well as for placing it in a clear and juſt Light. *Demonſtrations* (ſtrictly ſo called) are very good things where they are to be had: But when we cannot come at them, ſtrong *Probabilities* may properly ſupply their Place. It is certain, that the Bulk of Mankind are not fitted for *Metaphyſical* or Mathematical *Demonſtrations*; nor was it ever intended that *Moral* or *Theological* Matters ſhould be govern'd by them. Bleſſed are they, who having neither had *ocular* nor other *Demonſtration*, but moral *Probabilities* only, have yet *believed*. Such Conduct is juſtly accounted rational in *Secular* Affairs of greateſt Moment; and it ought to be ſo accounted in *Religious* alſo. The Adverſaries may have a crafty Deſign in requiring more than is *neceſſary*, and perhaps more than our *Faculties* can reach to; and it may often be expoſing a good Cauſe, and giving the common Enemies a needleſs Advantage, to enter the Liſts with them upon ſuch

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eſſentiæ aſſerenda erui poſſint, eas tamen ad Fidei πληροφορίαν cordibus noſtris ingenerandam, non ſatis efficaces eſſe. Ergo mens prius confirmanda eſt ex *verbo dei*; & illuſtribus teſtimoniis in quibus ſe deus generi humano patefecit: Poſtea utiliter poteſt addi conſideratio *philoſophicarum* demonſtrationum. *Gerhard.* Loc. Comm. Tom. I. p. 106.

Diſſentit *Gabriel Biel*, qui ante annos hinc 140 *Tubingenſi* Gymnaſio præfuit. Is cenſet *probabiles* magis rationes eſſe quam *evidentes* & *certas*. —— Verum eſto ſane; ut ſolæ non ſint ἀναπόδειϰται: At magnum iis pondus addit *traditio* vetus; tum autem quod argumenta iſthæc, ſi non prorſus ἀναπόδειϰτα, ſaltem uſque adeo *probabilia* ſint, ut τῶν πολυθείων Patroni nihil ullius momenti adferre valeant, cur pluſquam unum ſtatuere deum potius conveniat. *Veſſ. De Idololatr.* Lib. I. c. 2. p. 6.

Note: There were ſeveral other School-men, *beſides* Biel, *who would not allow that the* Unity *could be demonſtrated: See them numbered up in* Gillius. Lib. II. Tract. 3. cap. 7. p. 573.

unequal

unequal Terms. But this I hint by the way only, and paſs on.

PLEA X.

"IF the Firſt Cauſe exiſts abſolutely without "any *Ground* or *Reaſon* of Exiſtence, it is altoge-"ther as poſſible, and as probable, and as reaſon-"able to ſuppoſe, that there may, *without* any "*Reaſon*, exiſt *numberleſs* finite independent co-"exiſtent Firſt Cauſes —— in different Parts of the "immenſe Univerſe, as that there ſhould, *without* "*any Reaſon*, exiſt *one only*, infinite, immenſe, "omnipreſent Firſt Cauſe, Author and Governour "of the whole." [1] To which it may be replied:

(1.) THAT This amounts to ſaying, that unleſs there be a Cauſe *prior* to the *Firſt* (for a Reaſon *a priori* means a *Cauſe*) there may as well be *numberleſs* Firſt Cauſes as *one*: which is directly arguing, as uſual, againſt the very name and notion of a *Firſt Cauſe*. But tho' a Firſt Cauſe may or muſt be allowed to be *myſterious* and *incomprehenſible*, yet it ſhould not be thus conſtantly treated as an *impoſſible* or *contradictory* Idea. If there is any ſuch thing as a *Firſt Cauſe*, it muſt be *uncauſed*, and can have no Reaſon *a priori* for it. Therefore to what purpoſe is it to diſpute how *many* Firſt Cauſes there might be, when if this way of Reaſoning be juſt and concluſive, there could not not be ſo much as *one*?

(2.) THE Queſtion about the *number* of Firſt Cauſes can never be determined by taking in *antecedent* Neceſſity; becauſe the ſame Difficulty will always recur, *toties quoties*, about the *number* of

[1] Anſwer to ſeventh Letter, p. 44, 45.

antec-

Ch. II. antecedent Neceſſities. For if every one of them, in the long Progreſſion, has not *another* to fix and determine it, there will ſtill be the like danger of *numberleſs* antecedent Neceſſities,[f] or Reaſons *a priori*, at every Remove higher, *in infinitum*.

(3.) SCRIPTURE has very plainly and fully determin'd the Queſtion: And both *Tradition* and *Reaſon* are on the ſame ſide. For tho' there is not perhaps ſtrict *Demonſtration*, yet there are fair *Probabilities* (as before hinted) both in the *moral* and *metaphyſical* way, well known to Divines; and there is no colour of Reaſon for the contrary ſide. Theſe are ſufficient to build a *rational* Belief upon: And with theſe we ought to reſt content.

PLEA XI.

"To argue *a priori* concerning the Exiſtence "and Attributes of the Firſt Cauſe is *no Abſurdi-"ty*: For, tho' no *Thing*, no *Being* can indeed "be *prior* to the *Firſt* Cauſe, yet Arguments may "and muſt be drawn from the nature and conſe-"quences of that Neceſſity by which the Firſt "Cauſe exiſts."[g]

Anſw. IT is allowed, that Arguments may or muſt be drawn from the nature and conſequences of *That Neceſſity by which the Firſt Cauſe exiſts*, but not from the nature and conſequences of *That Neceſſity by which the Firſt Cauſe does not exiſt*. Now, the Firſt Cauſe (if it be proper to ſay it exiſts by any Neceſſity) exiſts by a *modal*, not a *cauſal* Neceſſity; by a *metaphyſical* Neceſſity, not a *phyſical*; by a Neceſſity *ſubſequent* in order of

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[f] See *Gretton*'s Review, p. 90.

[g] Anſwer to the ſeventh Letter, p. 45.

Nature,

Nature to the *Exiſtence* (whereof it is the *Mode*) not by any *antecedent* Neceſſity. Therefore let us keep to the Idea of *modal* Neceſſity (meaning *Permanency, Stability, Non-contingency, Independency, Immutability*, and the like) I ſay, let us keep cloſely to that Idea of *modal* Neceſſity, without changing it into *cauſal*; and then, if any *Arguments* can be juſtly drawn from the Nature and *Conſequences* of it, let them be admitted. But it is very certain and ſelf-evident, that no Arguments can be drawn *a priori* to the *Exiſtence*, from a *mode* of the ſame Exiſtence, *ſubſequent* and *poſterior*, in Conception, to it. Ch. II.

PLEA XII.

"MATHEMATICAL *Neceſſary* Truths are "uſually demonſtrated *a priori*, and yet nothing is "*prior* to Truths eternally neceſſary. To confine "therefore the *uſe* of the *Term* to Argumentations about ſuch things only as have other things "*prior* to them in *Time*, is only quibbling about "the ſignification of *Words*."

Anſw. No one goes about to *confine* the notion of *Priority* to Priority in *Time* only: It is allowed, that there is a Priority of *Order*, or of *Nature*; or of *Conception*, where there is no Priority in *Time*. But it is inſiſted upon, that there is nothing at all *prior* to the Exiſtence of the *Firſt* Cauſe, in *any ſenſe* of Priority whatever; nothing *prior* to it ſo much as in *Conception*, or *order* of *Nature*; and therefore there is no arguing *a priori* at all in That Caſe. The inſiſting upon This is not *quibbling* about *Words*, but reaſoning juſtly and ſoberly about *Things*, and Things of the greateſt *Conſequence*. The fundamental Doctrine of a *Firſt Cauſe* is directly concern'd in it, and ſeveral other very important Articles hang upon it.

Ch. II.

(2.) As to mathematical *Neceſſary* Truths, they may be demonſtrated *a priori*, as long as there is any other Truth *prior* in *Conception*, or order of Nature, to them: But when once we aſcend up to *firſt* Principles or *Axioms*, which have no Truths *prior* in Conception, there is then no more arguing *a priori*, no aſcending up *higher* in the Scale of Ideas, or in the Chain of Truths.[v] In like manner, as to *real* Exiſtences there is a *Firſt*, which is at the Top of that Scale; and we can go no *higher* than to the *higheſt*. There all Reaſoning *a priori* ceaſes, or ought to do ſo; becauſe there is no Exiſtence *prior*, in order of Nature or of Conception, to argue from; no poſſible *Cauſality*, no imaginable *Antecedency* to build ſuch Reaſoning upon. There all our Searches muſt terminate; there our aſpiring and wearied Thoughts take reſt. And though an *uncauſed* Being is an unfathomable Abyſs, and we can ſcarce forbear asking childiſhly, *how* and *why*, or for *what Reaſon* it exiſts, and muſt exiſt? yet our recollected Thoughts muſt tell us, that ſuch Queſtions are improper and impertinent, and reſolve only into a fond Conception, or contradictory notion of ſomething ſtill *higher* than the *higheſt*, and *prior* to the *firſt*.

PLEA XIII.

"To the Objection, that an *Attribute* cannot "be the *Ground* or *Reaſon* of the *exiſtence* of the "*Subſtance* itſelf (which is always, on the contra-"ry, the *Support* of the *Attributes*) I anſwer, that "in ſtrictneſs of Speech *Neceſſity* of *Exiſtence* is "not an *Attribute* in the Senſe that Attributes are "*properly* ſo ſtiled; but it is (*ſui generis*) the

[v] See Dr. *Gretton's* Review, p. 95.

"*Ground*

" *Ground* or *Foundation* of *Exiſtence* both of the " *Subſtance* and of all the Attributes." [x]

Ch. II.

Anſw. THE Sum of this evaſive Plea is, that *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence (ſince it is abſurd to make an Attribute *antecedent*) muſt be a kind of *Attribute* which is no Attribute *properly* ſpeaking; an Attribute *ſui generis*, a privileged Attribute, not ſubject to the ordinary Rules and Laws, to which all Attributes, *as ſuch*, muſt be ſubject: A *Poſtulatum* too large, and too arbitrary to be granted by any Man that will not be content to take Sound for Senſe, or Words and Syllables for Ideas. Either let this admired *Neceſſity* be called an *Attribute*, and acknowledged to be *ſubſequent* to its *Subject*, and then there is an End of the Argument *a priori*: Or if it muſt be *antecedent*, for the ſake of the Argument, let it be called (what it is ſuppoſed confuſely to be) a *Principle extrinſick*, and ſo it will import a *Cauſe prior* to the *Firſt*. One of theſe Titles it muſt wear: For there is no breaking the Horns of the Dilemma; that the ſaid Neceſſity muſt either be *ſubſequent* as an Attribute; or elſe a Principle *extrinſick*, if it be ſuppoſed *antecedent*. The Truth is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *Neceſſity* in this caſe is not the Attribute, but *Neceſſary-Exiſtence* is; and the *Neceſſity* conſidered abſtractedly, or by it ſelf, is the *mode* of ſuch Exiſtence, expreſſing the *Manner* or *Perfection* of it. Now certainly, if every *Attribute*, in the very Notion of it, is *ſubſequent* to the *Subſtance* whereby it is *ſupported*; a *Mode*, which is ſtill one Remove farther off, and ſo much the more *ſubſequent*, in order of Nature and Conception, can never be look'd upon as *antecedent*, in any View whatever.

[x] Anſwer to ſeventh Letter, p. 46.

PLEA XIV.

Ch. II. Sect. 22. "THUS, in other Inſtances, *Immenſity* is not an "*Attribute* in the Senſe that *Wiſdom*, *Power*, and "the like, are ſtrictly ſo called, but it is (*ſui ge-*"*neris*) a *Mode of Exiſtence* both of the *Subſtance* "and of *all the Attributes*. In like manner, *Eter-*"*nity* is not an *Attribute* or *Property* in the Senſe "that other Attributes, inhering in the Subſtance, "and ſupported by it, are properly ſo called, but "it is (*ſui generis*) the *Duration* of the Exiſtence "both of the *Subſtance* and of *all the Attri-*"*butes*."

(1.) THE Deſign of this Plea is to intimate, that Attributes may be diſtinguiſh'd into ſeveral kinds; which is not diſputed. Nevertheleſs all Attributes agree in that which makes or denominates them to be *Attributes*; namely, in being *attributed* to ſome *Subject* conſidered as their *Support*, and of courſe *antecedent* in Conception to them.

(2.) AS to *Immenſity* and *Eternity*, conſidered either as *Attributes* of the divine Being, or as *Modes* to other Attributes, they are under one Conception *ſubſequent* to the *Subſtance*, and under the other Conception *ſubſequent* both to the *Subſtance* and *Attributes*; that is to ſay, ſtill *more ſubſequent*. And ſuch alſo is the Caſe of *Neceſſity*, as abſtracted from Exiſtence, it is a *mode* of Exiſtence, and ſo it is *doubly* ſubſequent under that Formality; which the Author himſelf ſeems to have been ſenſible of, and therefore was afraid of calling it a *mode* of Exiſtence, tho' he allows it of the other Two.

PLEA

PLEA XV.

"ATTRIBUTES or Properties, ſtrictly ſo called, cannot be predicated one of another: *Wiſdom* cannot be properly ſaid to be *powerful*, or *Power* to be *wiſe*. But *Immenſity* is a *mode* of Exiſtence both of the divine *Subſtance* and of all the *Attributes*. And *Neceſſity* is the *Ground*, or *Reaſon*, or *Foundation* of Exiſtence both of the divine Subſtance, and of all the Attributes." [7]

Anſw. (1.) *EXISTENCE* being *common* to whatever is, no doubt but it may be *predicated* both of the *Subſtance* and the *Attributes*: And as *Neceſſity* in this Caſe is a *mode* of the Exiſtence, and ought to have been called ſo as well as *Immenſity*, and is predicated even of Exiſtence, it muſt of courſe be predicated of every divine Attribute, becauſe the *Exiſtence* which it goes along with, and adheres to, is ſo predicated. But to infer from thence, that *Neceſſity*, a *mode* of Being, is a *Ground*, or *Reaſon*, or *Foundation* of Being, is jumping to a *Concluſion* without any *Premiſes*; yea and *againſt* the Premiſes; becauſe a *mode* of Exiſtence *preſuppoſes* Exiſtence. To be ſhort, all thoſe Words, *Ground*, *Reaſon*, *Foundation*, internal *Cauſe*, and the like, are only ſo much foreign Language, fetch'd from another Subject, and improperly brought in here: *Sounds* and *Syllables* only, if they do not mean a *Cauſe prior* to the *Firſt*; flat *Contradiction* and palpable *Abſurdity*, if they do. But the Word *Neceſſity* ſeems to carry a kind of a Charm in it to deceive the Eye or to beguile the Fancy, while by a ſubtle ſort of *Leger de main* it ſteals away the *true* Idea intruſted with it, and returns you a Counterfeit for it.

[7] Anſwer to ſeventh Letter, p. 46.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Briefly intimating the hurtful *Tendency of inſiſting ſo much upon the pretended Argument* a priori, *both with regard to* RELIGION *and* SCIENCE.

Ch. III. IT would not be worth the Time or the Pains, to confute any *falſe* Notion, were there no *harm* in it, or if it no way tended, directly or indirectly, to the Prejudice of the World. But whatever hurts *Religion* or *Science*, hurts the *Publick* of courſe; and that theſe *new* Principles are of ill Tendency, in that reſpect, will appear from diverſe Conſiderations, which come now to be mention'd.

1. IT may be of ill conſequence to reſt any *important* and unqueſtionable Truth upon *precarious* Principles, too weak to ſupport it. It tends to *expoſe*, rather than to *ſerve* the Cauſe ſo pleaded; to render it *ſuſpected*, rather than to bring *Credit* to it; and to give the Adverſaries a handle for Ridicule or Triumph. One would not indeed altogether diſcourage any religious and well-meant Endeavours to ſtrike *New* Light into an important Subject, and to confirm eſtabliſh'd Truths by additional Topicks, or ſupplemental Reinforcements. Were it not for the Attempts of that kind, made by lively and enterpriſing Geniuſſes, time after time, we ſhould, no doubt, have wanted many

many conſiderable Improvements both in *Philoſophy* and *Theology*, which we rejoyce in at this Day: And were there not Scope given for Eſſays or Trials which may happen to fail (as all cannot hit) we ſhould ſcarce have Field large enough for thoſe that might be approved, and ſtand. Nevertheleſs in Truths which have already paſs'd thro' an infinite number of Hands (ſuch as is the *Exiſtence* of a *Deity*) there is the leſs occaſion for looking after *New* Topicks. Probably, there are no *new* ones now to be thought on, after the utmoſt ſtretch of human Faculties has been long exerciſed upon the Subject; but thoſe that appear *new* will be commonly found no other than old exploded Speculations. Thus it happen'd to *Des Cartes*, who ſeems to have valued himſelf for the inventing a *new* Argument for the *Exiſtence*; and He had ſeveral Admirers and Followers, for a time, of conſiderable Name and Figure, who cloſed in with it, conceiving it to be firm and ſolid. But within a while, it was ſuſpected to be no better than a *Paralogiſm*; and not only ſo, but was found to have been of *antient* Date too, as early as *Anſelm*, and confuted afterwards by *Thomas Aquinas* [a], and others, and at length dropp'd by all, becauſe it had been weigh'd in the Balance, and proved wanting. So it will rarely happen, that any *new* Thought can be offered upon a Subject ſo trite, and well-nigh exhauſted: Or, if there ſhould be any *new* Topick invented, it will

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[a] Vid. *Parker.* Diſputat. de Deo. p. 567.

Conf. *Gillius.* Lib. I. Tract. 8. c. 3. p. 385, &c.

In Gillius *may be ſeen a Liſt of thoſe* School-men, *who adhered to* Anſelm *in That Argument; as alſo a Recital of others who appeared againſt it, and confuted it.*

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Ch. III. probably be found much ſhort in Value and Efficacy of the more common ones, which have been of long ſtanding. The *commoneſt* Argument, in ſuch caſes, may be juſtly look'd upon as the *beſt*; becauſe they have been proved and tried, and have ſurvived many others of inferior Note, by reaſon of their known Weight and Significancy above the reſt. *Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.* For the maintaining of Doctrines, which have been univerſally received in all Places and Times, there is more need of *Judgment* than *Invention*, in making choice of the *beſt* Proofs that had been before offered, rather than offering *new* ones; which will not come up to the other, but are likely to fail upon Trial, however they may pleaſe for a while by their *Novelty*. The more important a Cauſe is, the more need of Caution: Becauſe there is a particular Reverence due to ſuch a Cauſe, and the Risk is the greater, if it be made to lean on Quirk and Subtlety, upon weak and ſandy Foundations. Now there cannot be a more important Cauſe than the Cauſe of *Theiſm*; neither can we any where more dangerouſly give a Looſe to Fancy, than upon that Head.

2. It is ſtill worſe to reſt ſuch a Cauſe upon Principles, which are not only too *weak* to bear it, but which alſo in their obvious natural Tendency threaten to *overturn* it: Such is really the Caſe with reſpect to the Argument *a priori*; which is ſo far from eſtabliſhing the *Exiſtence* of a *Firſt Cauſe* (the Point aim'd at) that it proceeds upon ſuch Premiſes as admit no *Firſt Cauſe* at all. The *Pleas* made for it directly ſtrike at the very Notion of a *Firſt Cauſe*, proving (if they proved any thing) that there can be no ſuch thing as a Being *uncauſed*. This has been obſerved over and over

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in the preceding Chapter; and ſo I need only refer back thither for the Proof of what I here ſay. Such an Argument therefore, however piouſly intended, and offer'd with very upright Views, yet cannot but be look'd upon as an Argument of pernicious Tendency: And every true Lover of *Theiſm*, who perceives where ſuch Reaſoning terminates, cannot be too jealous of it. When *Des Cartes* propoſed a new Argument (as it was thought) for the Exiſtence of a *Deity*, all the hurt of it was, that it fell ſhort of the Point, and diſ-ſerved the Cauſe, only by reſting it upon what would not bear: But this other Argument, beſides its being *inconcluſive* for the Purpoſe aim'd at, is attended with this further Inconvenience, that it proceeds upon Principles, which run directly croſs to it, and which make it impracticable to prove any *Firſt Cauſe* at all. For if every Cauſe muſt have a *Cauſe* (which is the *Maxim* it ſets out with, and proceeds upon all the way) the Conſequence is inevitable, that there can be no *Firſt Cauſe*. It is highly proper to declare againſt ſo pernicious a Maxim, which can tend only to *undermine* the Proofs of a *Deity*, inſtead of *improving* them. Ch. III.

3. THERE is another Circumſtance in this matter which deſerves Conſideration, namely, that this pretended Demonſtration is not only offered as a Proof, but is zealouſly inſiſted on, and highly magnified above the many ſolid and ſtanding Demonſtrations which have hitherto been received and approved by the *common Reaſon* of Mankind; as if it were not ſufficient to give us a *Paralogiſm* for *Demonſtration*, but every other *Demonſtration* (juſtly and properly ſo called) muſt be undervalued and ſlighted in compariſon. For Inſtance, it is alledged that the Arguments *a poſteriori* (tho' the

Ch. III.

beſt that we have) for the divine *Eternity* and *Omnipreſence* are ſhort of *Proof*: Which is not *true*, even in the ſtricteſt Senſe of *demonſtrative* Proof: And if it were true, yet ſo long as there is other *ſufficient* Proof (ſuch as every reaſonable Man muſt readily acquieſce in) it ſhould not be ſlightingly ſpoken of; neither ſhould it be ſuggeſted that thoſe Attributes *cannot be proved*. The *moral* Proofs, after all, if not ſo ſtrictly *demonſtrative* as the *metaphyſical*, are yet better ſuited to common Capacities, and apter to perſuade the Bulk of Mankind; [b] and are therefore of more extenſive *Uſe*, and conſequently of more intrinſick *Value* than the other. However that be, it is certainly of ill Conſequence to *depretiate* the ſolideſt Arguments hitherto urged in Proof of the *Exiſtence*, for the ſake only of *magnifying* a Flight of Fancy. When an *imaginary* Proof is thus advanced as a *real* one, and not only ſo, but *ſuperior* to all others, it then becomes more and more *dangerous*, as doing great Diſſervice to the Cauſe of God and Religion. [c]

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[b] "The Proof *a poſteriori* is level to all Mens Capacities: becauſe there is an endleſs *gradation* of *wiſe* and *uſeful* Phænomena of Nature, from the moſt *obvious*, to the moſt *abſtruſe*; which afford (at leaſt a *moral* and *reaſonable*) Proof of the Being of God, to the ſeveral Capacities of all unprejudiced Men, who have any Probity of Mind. And this is what, I ſuppoſe, God expects (as a *moral* Governour) that moral Agents ſhould be determined by." *Anſwer to ſixth Letter*, pag. 31, 32.

"The Proof *a priori* is —— capable of being underſtood by only a *few attentive* Minds; becauſe it is of uſe only againſt *learned* and *metaphyſical* Difficulties." *ibid.*

[c] What Mr. *Locke* ſays, in relation to another ſophiſtical Argument for the *Exiſtence*, once contended for by the *Carteſians*, is very applicable in this Caſe:

"It

4. I MUST farther remark, that this Argument *a priori*, or ſome Appendages of it, look not very favourably towards *Revealed* Religion, particularly as to the Article of the *Trinity*; as hath been obſerved at large by a learned Hand,[d] and need not here be repeated. This is an additional Evidence of the *miſchievous* Tendency of thoſe falſe *Metaphyſicks*, which as they do in one view ſap the firſt and fundamental Article of *natural* Religion, by deſtroying the Notion of a *Firſt Cauſe*; ſo do they, in another view, ſtrike at ſome of the prime Fundamentals of the Goſpel.

5. ADD to this, the Miſchief done to *true Philoſophy*, by adopting one *abſurd* Principle, which may probably draw after it many other, (as one Error leads to more) or may introduce a fallacious way of Reaſoning, ſuch as may affect *Science* in general. For example: In order to maintain *antecedent* Neceſſity, the Ideas of *Infinity* and *Eternity* are fetch'd in as *antecedently* forcing themſelves upon us;[e] and it is ſuppoſed to be *intuitively* evi-

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"It is an ill way of eſtabliſhing this Truth, and ſilencing "*Atheiſts*, to lay the whole ſtreſs of ſo important a Point upon "that ſole Foundation ——— and out of an over-fondneſs of "that Darling Invention caſhier, or at leaſt endeavour to inva-"lidate, all other Arguments, and forbid us to hearken to thoſe "Proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our *own Exiſtence* "and the *ſenſible Parts* of the Univerſe offer ſo clearly and co-"gently to our Thoughts, that I deem it impoſſible for a con-"ſidering Man to withſtand them. *Locke. Hum. Underſt.* B. IV. C. 10. S. 7. Letter 1. to *Stillingfleet*, p. 112.

[d] Dr. *Gretton*'s Preface to his Review, p. 5, 6, *&c.*

[e] Demonſtration, p. 15.

Ch. III. dent,[f] that those *Ideas* have their objective Realities *ad extra*. Then *Space* and *Time* are advanced, as amounting to the same with *Infinity* and *Eternity*, and are supposed really to exist *ad extra*, and as *certainly* as that *twice two* makes *four*: Whereupon they are exalted into *Modes*, or *Attributes*, or *Properties* of the *divine Substance*,[g] and God himself is imagined to be the *Substratum* of both.[h] Besides all which, the Idea of a *necessarily-existing* Being is made to be the Idea of a Being, the Supposition of whose not existing is an *express Contradiction*: And *Necessity* is interpreted a *plain Impossibility*, or *implying a Contradiction*, to suppose the contrary, like the Relation of Equality between twice *two* and *four*.[i] Nay it is further said: "If "I have in my mind an Idea of a Thing, and cannot possibly in *my Imagination* take away the "Idea of That Thing as actually existing, any "more than I can change or take away the Idea "of the Equality of *twice two* to *four*, the *Certainty* of the *existence* of that Thing is the same, "and stands on the same Foundation as the Certainty of the other Relation."[k] It is said further, "That *absolute Necessity* (that is, *antecedent*) "is the Cause of the unalterable Proportion between twice *two* and *four*."[l] Now it is more than probable, that this whole train of Suppositions, or Assertions, brought in as part of the Retinue to

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[f] Demonstration. *ibid.* Letters, p. 34.

[g] Demonstration. *ibid.* Letters, p. 15, 16, 20, 35.

[h] Letters, p. 20, 24.

[i] Demonstration. p. 16, 18, 19.

[k] Demonstration. p. 20.

[l] Letters, p. 33.

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wait upon the *Argument a priori*, is little elſe but a train of Error and falſe Reaſoning. It would be tedious to enter into a large Examination of every Particular, but I ſhall make a few Strictures upon each. Ch. III.

(1.) As to the Ideas of *Infinity* and *Eternity*, conſidered as *antecedently* forcing themſelves upon us, there is no Truth in it, if it means forcing themſelves upon our *Reaſon*, and extorting *Aſſent*. Perhaps they may in ſome ſenſe force themſelves upon the *Imagination* (like many other Fancies, or waking Dreams) but as to *believing* that the Ideas of *Infinity* and *Eternity* have objective Realities *ad extra*, we are not *forced* to it, *antecedently* or otherwiſe, 'till *rational* Conviction ſhall render us *certain* of it.

(2.) As to the Ideas of *Space* and *Time*, they are not the ſame Ideas with thoſe of *Immenſity* and *Eternity*, but are conſtantly thought of and ſpoken of in a very different manner. *Immenſity* and *Eternity* are conſidered as *Attributes* of ſomething, and ſpoken of accordingly: Whereas *Space* and *Time* are conceived and ſpoken after the manner of *Subſtances*; as ſeveral other abſtract general Ideas (*Nature*, *Fortune*, *Death*, &c.) are. *Immenſe Immenſity* is an improper Expreſſion, is Blunder and Soleciſm: But *immenſe Space* carries no Impropriety in the Expreſſion; which ſhews that the *Ideas* are *different*. So again, *eternal Eternity* is mere Soleciſm: But *Time eternal* (in the large Senſe of *Time*) is a proper Expreſſion. *Space* and *Time* are conſidered not as being themſelves *Properties*, but as being inveſted with Properties: that is, they are conſidered after the manner of *Subſtances*, as many other abſtract Ideas are. And becauſe it is certain,

Ch. III. certain, that they are not *Subſtances* (much leſs can they be *Attributes*) they are, moſt probably, nothing elſe but general abſtract Ideas, *common Meaſures* and *Receptacles* formed by the Mind, for the better Lodgment, Rangement, and Adjuſtment of our other Ideas.

(3.) As to Exiſtence *ad extra*, it is not to be proved by ſtrength of *Imagination*, but by *Reaſons* proper to the Caſe. So it cannot be juſtly pretended, that we have *intuitive* Evidence. We know and feel our own Exiſtence, and from thence can *demonſtrate* the Exiſtence of God. I ſay, *demonſtrate*: For our Knowledge of God here is *demonſtrative* only, not *intuitive*, as will be ſhewn hereafter. We neither *ſee* nor *feel* Space or Time as exiſting *ad extra*: We contemplate nothing but our own *Ideas*: And from Ideas *within*, to Realities *without*, there is no immediate Conſequence to be drawn; but whatever we may draw, juſtly, muſt be work'd out by Deduction and Inference, and perhaps a long chain of Reaſoning, before we can come at *Certainty* as to real *external* Exiſtence.

(4.) To pretend, that our *Ideas within* are as neceſſarily connected with *actual* Exiſtence *without*, as the Ideas of *twice two* and *four*, is miſtaking *Imagination* for *Reaſon*, and *Aſſociation* of Ideas for *Connexion*. That *twice two* is equal to *four*, is as certain as that *the ſame Idea* is *the ſame Idea*: And the *Connexion* of the Idea of *Equality* is plain and certain. This is only pronouncing upon the Relations of *Ideas* with each other, and ſo far we cannot be miſtaken, having a *clear* and *diſtinct* Perception of ſuch Relations: But *ideal Exiſtence* is not neceſſarily *connected* with *real Exiſtence*, like

like as *Idea* with *Idea*; and therefore the Comparison here made is wide and foreign. There is no Resemblance between the two Cases, but they are as different as possible from each other, as much as *Fancy* and *Fiction* from *Truth* and *Reason*. Ch. III.

(5.) To make God the *Substratum* of Space and Time (which really are not *Attributes* or *Properties*, nor ever spoken of as such) is mere *Solecism* and *Impropriety* of Expression; a certain Mark of as great an Error in Thought. Not to mention many other just Objections which lie against the gross Notion of an *extended* or *expanded* Deity.

(6.) *NECESSARY-EXISTENCE* is inaccurately and preposterously explain'd by *Impossibility of Non-existence*: For the *Affirmative* is in order of Nature *prior* to the *Negative*; [m] and, strictly speaking, the Existence is not *necessary*, because Non-existence is *impossible*; but on the reverse, Non-existence is impossible, because Existence, in that Instance, is *necessary*, or infinitely *permanent*. [n] The *Negative* Truth in this case resolves

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[m] At vero *necessitas* describi vel intelligi haudquaquam potest absque ratione ipsius *esse*: nam *necessarium* est, *quod non potest non esse*. Quare ipsum *esse* prius est ratione *necessitatis*. *Gillius.* Lib. I. Tract. 8. c. 4. p. 396.

[n] Necessarium nequaquam recte per *possibile*, nec per *impossibile* definitur; nihil enim recte definitur per aliquid *posterius* eo, sicut 2do *Post.* & 7mo *Metaph.* demonstratur; sed utrumque istorum est *posterius* necessario. Non ergo recte definitur *necessarium* per hoc quod *non est possibile non esse*, vel per hoc quod *impossibile est non esse*. Ideoque *Avicen.* 1. Metaph. 5. reprobat definitiones Antiquorum de *necessario*, *possibili*, & *impossibili*, eo quod definiebant illa per se invicem *circulando*; ut patet de definitionibus quas ibi recitat

ſolves into its correſpondent *Affirmative*, as into its *Principle*, from which it is deduced.

(7.) In the making the Idea of a *neceſſarily-exiſting* Being to be the Idea of one whoſe *Non-exiſtence* is an *expreſs Contradiction*, there appears to be a two-fold Confuſion; one between *Phyſical* and *Logical* Neceſſity; another between a Contradiction *a priori* and a Contradiction *a poſteriori*. There is in a *neceſſarily-exiſting* Being a *Phyſical* Impoſſibility of Non-exiſtence: Which is not the ſame thing with a *Logical* Repugnancy, referring to our *Ideas* as *contradictory* and *repugnant*. Thoſe two Things are diſtinct, and ought not to have been confounded.°

A Contradiction *a priori* is, when we perceive from the Idea of ſuch a *Cauſe*, that it is a Contradiction for that Cauſe not to produce ſuch an Effect. There is no ſuch Contradiction as This comes to, in the Suppoſition of the Non-exiſtence of a Deity: For we ſee not *a priori* why He muſt be; we ſee no *Cauſe* of it; but, on the contrary, we perceive, that He is abſolutely *uncauſed*.

But *a poſteriori* we find it reſolve at length into a *Contradiction*, to ſuppoſe that no *Firſt Cauſe* exiſts: It is a Contradiction to our Ideas of *Cauſe*

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recitat ab Antiquis, dicitque id quod ex his tribus dignius eſt intelligi, eſt *neceſſe eſſe*; quoniam *neceſſe eſſe* ſignificat vehementiam eſſendi, *eſſe* vero notius eſt quam *non eſſe*: *eſſe* enim cognoſcitur per ſe, *non eſſe* vero per *eſſe*. *Bradwardim. De Cauſa Dei*, p. 204.

° See Dr. *Gretton* upon the Diſtinction between *Logical* and *Phyſical* Reaſon. *Review*. p. 69.

and

and *Effect*: For *Effects* muſt have a *Cauſe*, and if ſomething now exiſts, ſomething always exiſted, ſomething *independent*; for from *Nothing* could ariſe *Nothing*. This kind of Contradiction *a poſteriori* we admit; not the other *a priori*, which is *Fiction* only, tho' much has been built upon it. Ch. III.

(8.) As to abſolute (antecedent) *Neceſſity*'s being the Cauſe of the unalterable Proportion between twice *Two* and *Four*, it is all a Miſtake. There is no *Antecedency* in the Caſe. *Firſt* Principles and Axioms ſhine by their own Light, have nothing *antecedent* to demonſtrate them by, are perceived by *Intuition*, not *Demonſtration*; and reſolve only into this, that *every thing is what it is*; or *the ſame Idea is the ſame Idea*. The Idea of *Equality* is the Idea of *Equality*, and the Idea of *twice two* is the Idea of *twice two*, and the Idea of *four* the Idea of *four*: And, as ſoon as ever the *Terms* expreſſing thoſe Ideas are underſtood, the Propoſition is admitted of courſe, requiring no *antecedent* Neceſſity to aſcertain it, no *Cauſe* to fix it: It is above all *Cauſes*, being *intuitively*, not *demonſtrably* diſcern'd. But enough has been ſaid to ſhew how the erroneous notion of the Argument *a priori* has ſerved to uſher in a great deal of Confuſion and falſe Reaſoning in other Articles hanging upon it, or miniſtring to it: So that the letting in that one falſe Principle cannot but tend to the detriment of *Science* in general, which I undertook to ſhew.

And now, to look back to what has been obſerved in theſe Papers concerning the pretended Demonſtration *a priori*, the Sum is as follows: That the Thought is in ſome ſenſe *Old* enough, having been ſuggeſted, conſidered, and rejected by

Ch. III. the judicious fifteen hundred Years ago: That it has been frequently taken notice of since by the School-men and others; and drawn out into publick Light, but always like a *Criminal*, in order to be *condemn'd*: That tho' Attempts have been made in favour of something under the *Name* of an Argument *a priori*, yet as to the gross Sense of it, in which it is now contended for (*viz.* as an *antecedent* Ground, Reason, Foundation, internal Cause of the Deity) it appears not to have met with any professed Patrons before the eighteenth Century; when probably what former Ages had been doing was not remembered, or not duly attended to: That the new Countenance given to a Notion that had been so long and universally exploded, brought it into some degree of Credit and Repute, before it was understood: That as soon as it came to be more minutely look'd into, it began presently to decline, and to sink as it formerly us'd to do: That it is now found to carry in it such insuperable Absurdities, as must of course be a Bar to its Reception in an inquisitive and discerning Age: That, lastly, it seems to promise no Good to *Religion* or *Science*, while sapping the fundamental Articles of one, and crossing the established Principles of the other.

THIS appears to me to be a *true* Report, and *fair* Account of what concerns the Argument *a priori*, after the most attentive and impartial Enquiries I have hitherto been able to make into it.

FINIS.